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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this study is to examine the relationship between Informers and the 
police officers who handle them in England. Informers are specifically defined 
and can be differentiated from other sources of information or informants, such 
as public spirited citizens and police contacts. 
This research centres around the relationship, how it starts and is maintained, 
and its consequences. This is a partnership, although not necessarily equal. It is 
assumed that the partnership is unique and carmot be compared with other 
alliances such as the doctor and his patient. This research examines whether that 
assumption is correct. 
The reasons or so called motives for Informers helping the police have been 
examined to determine whether these motives have any relevance to the 
relationship, and if the reasons for informing affect the partnership in any way. 
In particular, the study has examined the change of motives over time, the 
results of which will inevitably provide management information to the police 
service in their future supervision and control of Informers. 
It is important to establish why some police officers become involved in the use 
of Informers. This has been achieved through a separate study undertaken in the 
Lincolnshire police district. Questionnaires were used to interview two groups, 
those who have been actively involved, and those who have not. A comparison 
has been made of their responses. The results have failed to show specific 
reasons why some police officers become involved in the use of Informers, 
other than their individual choice to use it as an investigative tool. 
The thrust of the study has examined how far the two groups will go in terms of 
breaching the criminal law and the police discipline code, in furtherance of their 
relationship. It has been established that both Informers and police officers 
consider it acceptable to break the law. 
There is evidence that both groups use their discretion in selecting the 
information that comes in their possession, and there are circumstances when 
they will not act on the information they have received. A substantial number 
of Informers and Handlers are prepared to commit criminal offences, or allow 
the commission of offences because of their relationship. 
The findings of this research have identified shortcomings in the way Informers 
are managed and controlled by the police service, and recommendations have 
been made in order that national Guidelines on the use of Informers can be 
amended. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
The main aim in this research is to examine the relationship between a registered 
Informer and a police officer, the Handler. This partnership is unusual; it differs 
from the doctor/patient or the lawyer/client relationship, in that the customer or 
client pays the professional for a service. With the Informer, it is he who usually 
demands some sort of reward from the professional, the police officer. 
The relationship is likely to create distrust because of differences in the 
backgrounds of Informers and police officers and probable differences of 
objectives. If such distrust does exist between the two parties, it is likely to 
become an important issue, particularly as the relationship can be close. It may 
be natural that such distrust should exist, as the two sides of the partnership 
come from different sides of the criminal justice system. The police officer is a 
law enforcement officer whose main function it is to uphold the law; the 
Informer, on the other hand, is primarily interested in helping the police in return 
for some personal benefit. That distrust appears to seep into the criminal justice 
system generally. For example, the lack ofwiIlingness by the police to disclose 
to the courts of an Informer's involvement will clearly affect the legal issues. The 
implications of this will be discussed in Chapter two. 
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It seems that the police will give priority to protecting the identity of the 
Informer, which may be due entirely to the demands placed by the Informer as 
part of the agreement between the two parties. This will inevitably become 
important to the progress of the relationship, but may also affect judicial process. 
This confidentiality issue will be discussed further in the thesis. This union 
could be better understood if the parties involved joined together for a common 
goal, say the reduction of crime. That may be one of the objectives of the police 
officer, but the thesis will show that rarely to be the case with regards to the 
Informer. It is this unique and somewhat incomprehensible partnership that 
makes the study so interesting. 
The problems which will be identified in this thesis are not new and have existed 
as long as Informers have been used. As discussed, they include the relationship 
itself and how that evolves over a period of time. The study will also explore the 
accepted boundaries surrounding the police use of Informers and examine 
whether or not those boundaries are crossed and, if so, for what purpose and to 
what end. Specifically, the study will examine whether there is evidence of 
police officers breaching the police discipline code, or more sinister, whether 
their relationship has any bearing on the commission of criminal acts. The 
motivational factors or reasons for informing have been recognised as an 
important facet of police handling of Informers. This study, however, will go 
further and examine whether those reasons change over a period of time and, 
whether this affects the relationship, or indeed the police perception of that 
relationship. 
The study will also attempt to define what Informers are and describe their use 
by the police in England. In doing so, it is hoped this will provide a foundation 
for the empirical study that follows. This study will concentrate on the situation 
in England, rather than say Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland, but in 
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reviewing the literature there have been a number of studies from North 
America, and these have been included where relevant. 
There are, however, numerous questions not discussed in this study which 
remain unresolved and unaccounted for. The use of juvenile Informers is 
referred to occasionally but not examined specifically, and this topic may benefit 
from future research. Certainly, the use and supervision of juveniles who act as 
Informers has serious implications for the police and others, if it is not managed 
properly. Similarly, the reduction or discounting of sentences, the payment to 
Informers and supervision of meetings, and the ethical issues linked to them are 
not examined. A number of police forces are presently examining the 
implications of witness protection schemes which can be closely related to the 
use ofInformers. The study though, will not examine this matter. 
Although the thesis will discuss where and how the relationship between the 
Informer and Handler starts, the problems of recruitment and cell intervention 
(the practice of police officers recruiting Informers whilst still in custody) will 
not be looked at closely. Moral and ethical questions arise here, but there are 
also legal issues. For example, the questioning of a juvenile offender whilst in 
police custody on the grounds of securing information may well breach the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act in terms of failing to secure an Appropriate 
Adult during that interview. Similarly, the payment to Informers out of public 
funds for information may not sit comfortably with the public who may consider 
they pay enough from taxes to maintain an effective police force, without some 
of the money going to criminals. These are all important issues in themselves and 
perhaps require future research. 
The history of Informers is considered not to be relevant to this thesis, and has 
not been included. Historical data perhaps only serves to prove that there is 
3 
nothing new in the use of Informers, and also that many of the mistakes made in 
the past are probably still being made. This thesis, though, has concentrated on 
contemporary issues, which affect their current use. 
The part the media play in the police use of Informers is also not directly 
connected with the aims of this work, although it could be argued that the 
consequences of the relationship have resulted in press and media coverage 
following specific incidents, particularly where an alleged miscarriage of justice 
has taken place. Perhaps the most common area for the media is the allegations 
that the police have 'set up' crimes using Informers to catch target criminals. 
The practice of Informers and police officers setting up crimes together will form 
a major part in the thesis when it examines the part the relationship plays in such 
activity. The suggestion that police and Informers have set up crimes is an 
emotive subject, and of course make the public concerned about this agreement 
between the two parties. Such concerns are often reported by the press and are 
well documented, appearing on a frequent basis. For example in one story, an 
undercover police Informer claimed that dozens of people who were jailed for 
drug trafficking, were in fact 'set up', and he cast doubt on 40 such prosecutions. 
The feeling at the time was that the police were breaking the rules, in that 
alleged offenders were being actively encouraged to import drugs by informers 
who were in fact inciting crime. l Another case involved a drug trafficker who, 
after being arrested, became an Informer for the Regional Crime Squad. He was 
asked to 'set up' crimes and although he attended himself, always managed to 
escape. It is alleged he encouraged targets to obtain drugs, and then informed 
on them in return for payment from the police and crimestoppers. 2 
1 "Police informant 'set up' drug busts," The Sunday Times 30 October, 1994. 
2"Double dealer with a poisonous sting," The C'J\lardian 7 March, 1994. 
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In 1994, the BBC postponed a television programme following pressure by the 
police suggesting that it could endanger the life of an Informer.3 The programme' 
was eventually shown and looked at the work of a number of Informers, asking 
the question "Are crimes being created by the infonnants to entrap police 
targets?" 4 One Informer had apparently made a living out of drug dealers by 
providing bogus drugs, knowing that those same drug dealers would not 
complain to the police. He suggested that the police started to target him 
because they thought he was dealing in drugs, or the dealers themselves were 
Informers and they wanted him off the scene. These are the sort of issues which 
the media quickly pick up on and are of course clearly of concern to the police 
because of their implications. Such issues will be addressed in this study by 
examining whether the relationship can lead to occurrences as described above, 
and determine how prevalent it is. 
An Informer defined 
As with all areas in social science, definitions remain difficult. This study is no 
exception, though it has been made worse by the variety of slang names and 
definitions used. Indeed, in America, it was suggested in the 1990s that there 
existed no less than 68 such terms for Informers. Perhaps the most common is 
'grass', the origin of this is somewhat dubious. 5 Campbell (1991) suggests it is 
derived from cockney slang. 6 
3 "Police pressure pulls Panorama off the air," The Observer 17 July, 1994. 
4Panorama," Grassed - the changing role of the police informant", BBC 
television, London, 8 August, 19949.30pm .. 
5 One theory is that it comes from the song, Whispering Grass which uses the 
lines, "Why do you whisper, green grass? .. Whispering grass, dont tell the trees 
because the trees dont need to know". 
6 Campbell D., "Splendour in grassing," The Guardian 26 January, 1991: p13. 
S 
It has to be said that the police themselves do not help to clarify the murky 
world of Informer use when they refer to him or her as an 'informant' or 
'informer'. One definition suggests that an Informer is, 'j1 person who informs 
or profers an accusation against another, whom he suspects of the violation of 
some penal statute. ,,7 Rapp 8 suggests that the words 'informer' and 'informant' 
are completely different in that an informant is someone who provides 
information, but only as a victim or witness, whereas an informer is a, 
"Co-conspirator or criminal associate who provides information for money or 
to secure another advantage, such as a reduced sentence or immunity from 
prosecution. "Rapp goes further and categorises the informer into three types: 
the agent in place, the defector, and the agent provocateur. It is the first which 
is the most common, that is he who informs secretly but at the same time does 
not give up his criminal status. He is the most vulnerable because he remains 
within easy reach of those he is informing against, and therefore always in 
danger of physical injury. Greer 9 also recognises the differences between an 
'informer' and 'informant' and suggests a sociological model which identifies an 
informant as a source of information which may include the Informer. 
Interestingly, he categorises people who give information as either Insiders or 
Outsiders, and separates these into Single or Multiple Event informants. Simply 
explained, Greer suggests the following can fully define all aspects of 
information providing:-
A. Outside Single Event Informant - This is the casual observer who is an 
on-looker or witness with information to assist the police. 
7 Black H. C., Black's law dictionary (St. Paul, Missesota (USA): West 
Publishing Company, 1968) p919. 
8 Rapp B., Deep Cover' Police Intelligence Operations (Colorado, USA: 
Paladin Press, 1989) p33. 
9 Greer S., "Towards a Sociological Model of the Police Informant," London 
School of Economics Vol46 issue 3 (January, 1995). 
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B. Outside Multiple Event Informant - The 'snoop' who always seems to be in 
the vicinity. Greer describes this person as a busy body. 
C. Inside Single Event Informant - This is the one-off accomplice who gives 
information only to help himself at the time. This category may also include the 
'confession informant', those suspects who give information against themselves. 
This type of person is rarely discussed when debating Informers and yet they are 
widely used by the police. 
D. Inside Multiple Event Informant - These are the regular Informers, agent 
provocateurs or supergrasses who tend to be registered as Informers. 
Others seem to emphasise that the Informer is closely connected with the 
criminal, in that he or she is either actively involved in committing crime or at 
least associating with other criminals. Such a conclusion is not too difficult to 
accept. Harney and Cross 10, for example, suggest that he is likely to be, '~ 
person in the underworld or a person on its periphery; in its confidence, or so 
much a part of the scenery ... that this person is in a particularly good position 
to know the story of a crime committed, the story of criminal business done, 
being transacted or proposed for the future ... " Brightwell 11 agrees that 
informers usually come from a criminal background, who have "one or both feet 
in the underworld and for various reasons impart information of criminal 
activities to the police." Similarly, the National Criminal Intelligence Service 
(NCIS) 12 also describe a typical informer as an individual, "-normally of 
10 Harney M. L. & Cross J. C., The informer in law enforcement (Illinois 
(USA): Thomas, 1968) p40. 
11 Brightwell A., What considerations ought to govern the Ilse of informants in 
the investigation ofcrime (Metropolitan Police service: (unpublished), 1984). 
12 Service level agreement between the National Criminal Intelligence Service 
and the Association of Chief Police Officers for England and Wales Crime 
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criminal history, habits or associates, who gives information about crime or 
persons associated with criminal activity, such information being freely given, 
whether or not for financial reward or other advantage. That individual 
. 
having the expectation that hislher identity will be protected" 
The NCIS definition has been adopted by the Association of Chief Police 
Officers (ACPO) in their guidelines on Informers. 13 whilst the United States 
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)14, on the other hand is far less specific and 
suggests that an Informer could be any person, not necessarily one who 
associates with criminals, that is, '~ny non law enforcement person ... who 
supplies information about criminal activities to a police officer." On a more 
light hearted note, one practitioner suggests, quite cynically, that an informant is, 
'a person who knows a great deal about very little, and goes along telling you 
more about less and less until finally he tells you practically everything about 
nothing. " IS This is however, contrary to the view of most practitioners that 
most Informers are a mine of information who merely need to be treated in the 
right way to coax that information from them. 
What constitutes an Informer will be discussed in Chapter VI. This study will 
go further, however, and consider the motivational factors in terms of defining 
an Informer. In the same way that Greer has arrived at a sociological model for 
informants generally, this thesis will provide a similar model, but specifically 
relating to the Informer. Even though this study concentrates on the Informer, 
Committee, IS March, 1995: Para 11.7 piS. 
13 ACPO, "National Guidelines on the use and management of informants," Part 
1, Section 1 (January, 1995): p3. 
14 Dorn N., Paul R & K., et ai, Traffickers' Drug markets and law enforcement 
(1992) . 
IS Byrom D. R., "Informants- The way forward," National informant seminar, 
Home Office, Exeter, 13 September, 1995. 
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there has been some reference to other sources of information such as the 
contact or the public spirited citizen. The study will differentiate between each 
of these categories, and in doing so, help provide a definition of an Informer. 
It will be seen in the methodology and design of this study that the respondents 
interviewed are all registered with the police. This was because of the 
complexities of selecting the population. It should be noted, though, that not all 
police Informers are in fact registered, but this fact alone can cause problems for 
the police service in terms of disclosure. If police supervisors and controllers do 
not keep records of their active Informers, then it would not be possible for them 
to be disclosed to the defense in any criminal trial. This quite important aspect 
has not been examined in detail during the study. 
Some problems - an overview 
There exists many varied and diverse problems connected with the use, 
management and supervision of Informers. For example, the Informer may argue 
that the present systems do not afford him sufficient protection; or the rewards 
are not worth the potential risks; or indeed that there is insufficient flexibility 
should he be caught committing crime in the furtherance of his so called duties. 
On the other hand, the police officer may argue that the problem lies with little 
or no support from his senior officers; no additional reward or recognition by the 
police service; or perhaps he merely feels isolated by having to associate often 
with criminals in covert and dangerous situations. All these may be problems of 
varying degrees; but the overriding factor is that they all originate from the 
relationship between the Informer and Handler. 
These anomalies highlight the interesting partnership between the law 
enforcement officers and those who do not possess the same obligation or 
9 
commitment, but agree to work together - a unique association between 
opposites. Their reasons or motivation will probably be different, as will their 
backgrounds, yet they have to bind the partnership in some loose and unofficial 
agreement between themselves in order to work together, even though this 
agreement may only be tacit. It is the relationship itself which is important, how 
that evolves, and indeed the implications should it fail to succeed. It is important 
because unless satisfactory control and management systems are put into place, 
this association could affect the principals of the British Justice system itself. In 
fact what could happen if it has not already happened, is that the relationship 
could add to the extent of criminality, instead of being a method of crime 
detection. This research aims to examine this aspect specifically. 
If such a partnership is found to be in conflict with the reason it was first 
instigated, that is to assist with the investigation of crime and criminals, then it 
may be sensible to ask what is being done to alleviate that conflict. Chapter three 
will emphasise the sparsity of official publications published on the subject of 
Informers, that is to say governments seem to have taken a less than positive 
stand on the subject. Through the Home Office, various guidelines have been 
produced on Informer use for the benefit of practitioners, but these have been 
quite shallow. Similarly, the Association of Chief Police Officers has relied also 
on promoting such guidelines, but appear to have done little to address the 
potential problems relating to the association of the Informer and the Handler, 
other than support the fundamental need to promote more use, as long as it does 
not interfere with the process of law. In fact, there is no evidence to suggest 
that ACPO recognised that such problems existed. The British Criminal Justice 
system has gone further, by producing a number of stated cases originating from 
relevant criminal trials, and these will be discussed in Chapter two. 
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The courts have shown a definite move away from demands from the police to 
protect the identity of the Informer. Whereas perhaps thirty years ago, the 
Informer had the luxury of total anonymity, and the circumstances surrounding 
his involvement was hardly ever questioned, that is not the case now, and any 
case brought to the courts where an Informer has been used is subjected to close 
scrutiny. There are however systems in place which assist the Informer, such as 
the possibility of being provided with Public Interest Immunity (PH), otherwise 
there would be a rather abrupt end to its use. Nevertheless, the disclosure rules 
demand that where an Informer is used, it must at least be revealed in order that 
the court may determine the degree of sensitivity. This thesis will also examine 
the importance placed by the Informer and Handler on the disclosure rules. 
This study will concentrate on the Informer, how he may be defined, what his 
reasons are for informing and how he reacts to the relationship with a police 
officer. However, it is just as important to look at the police themselves and 
why some of them become Informer Handlers. A separate study is discussed in 
Chapter five, when a number of police officers from one specific force were 
interviewed. Here there were two separate groups, those who were actively 
involved in the use of Informers, and those who had never become involved. 
They were asked for their reasons for making their decision, and the responses 
compared. This will help to understand the motivational factors for police 
officers, clearly and distinctly different to those of the Informer, but probably 
just as important. 
Perhaps the most crucial problem emerging from this liaison between an 
Informer and a police officer is the fact that both are prepared to breach the law 
in furtherance of this relationship. To some extent it is acceptable that criminals 
will have a propensity to break the law because that is what they do. The police 
officer though, has a duty to uphold the law. Such actions are not just in 
11 
contravention of accepted human standards, but may even attack the basic fabric 
of the Criminal Justice System. 
The Research Question 
What is the nature of relationships between Informers and Handlers within 
the Police Service in England, and what are the consequences of those 
relationships? 
This thesis has identified the need to consider the relationship between the police 
Handler and his or her Informer, and how this relationship affects the underlying 
concept of crime investigation and detection. It may be reasonable to assume, in 
the absence of findings to the contrary, that the alliance itself is the root of all 
concerns. In particular, it is important to establish how the relationship evolves, 
how it affects each of the partners, and how far they will go in terms of their 
attitude towards breaching the laid down rules and regulations. 
It is this relationship then that the present research will focus upon, but first of 
all it is essential to understand why there is a need to examine this area at all. It 
is suggested that the most striking reason has to be because of the enormous gap 
in the knowledge of such relationships. In the Literature Review (chapter three) 
it will be seen how little research has been undertaken, and this in itself provides 
an incentive to know more about it. There appears to be a consensus of opinion 
that the police cannot operate without using Informers, and if this is true, then 
the need to learn more about their use must be paramount. 
It is clear then, that the notion of a relationship which exists between an 
Informer and Handler is critical to this study. Accepting that law enforcement 
agencies need Informers, then it is inevitable that a police officer and an Informer 
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will form a relationship which needs to be managed. That can never be achieved 
without understanding how the relationship works. It has been necessary, 
therefore, to theorise the nature of the relationship which is central to the thesis. 
This is discussed in chapter five and examines other professional relationships, 
including those involving the police. 
The diverse partnership that ultimately exists between a police officer and an 
Informer, is bound to create an unstable relationship at times. It is hardly 
surprising that some consider the relationship diverse, when police officers, who 
are employed to arrest criminals, are prepared to work closely with those 
criminals. The implications of this instability must be studied. 
The research will concentrate on those persons who are registered with the 
police as Informers on a regular basis, often for some sort of reward, as 
described above, differentiating between Informers and Informants, 
Having described what constitutes an Informer and examined the relationship 
between him and the police officer, the study will then concentrate on the 
reasons why Informers become involved with the police. These reasons, or 
motivational factors, will affect the relationship and may well dictate how the 
relationship is to progress. 
Finally, the study will examine the consequences of the relationship in terms of 
what extent those parties would allow the police discipline regulations to be 
breached, or indeed the criminal law. The fears and concerns expressed by the 
media in relation to police officers setting up crimes, or at the very least, using 
too much discretion to become selective about crime, will be addressed to 
establish if there is indeed evidence to support those concerns, and if so, how 
widespread the problem is. 
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Some additional comments 
Those who have tried to define an Informer have been predominantly 
practitioners; mostly police officers who have relied essentially on their own 
experiences. In some cases, others have undertaken shallow research studies 
which have involved collecting data from police officers. There has been no 
previous research directed towards the Informer himself as a source of data and 
it is this area which has been concentrated on during this study. 
This chapter highlights the need to undertake direct research into this subject. 
The observations of others in terms of agreeing on a definition of an Informer is 
far from satisfactory if it fails to observe the perceptions of those people 
themselves - the Informers. How they see themselves and describe their function 
is paramount if we are to fully understand their existence. This relationship 
desperately needs close scrutiny and it is this area which will uncover the 
situation that exists as a result of their association. 
Even without looking at the history on the subject, it can be assumed that the 
Informer is by no means a new initiative, and its existence is more likely to be a 
behavioural aspect of human activity which has merely been exposed and used 
by the police for their own purposes. This use has not been all together 
surprising as the police have been put under substantial pressure to show results 
and other agencies have supported the use of Informers as an efficient and 
effective investigative tool, for example, the Audit Commission. Of course, the 
relationship has been a two way enterprise, with both sides profiting, albeit at 
different degrees, and history has provided the means to compare those 
relationships and their successes. 
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The response by the media, at least in recent years, has served to provide some 
indication of the public's response to the subject, and although there is evidence 
that the police are supported in their use ofInformers as an investigative tool, it 
is apparent that the over-riding view is that there are real concerns that the 
relationship will become unstable and ultimately create a unhealthy and 
unreliable team. Specific reference has been made to selective informing and too 
much use of police discretion in this respect. The public, generally, have never 
been at ease knowing that their police force are able to use discretion in the way 
they deal with crime and criminals. The level of discretion used in the context of 
Informer use will be examined in this thesis. 
It would seem that the most common preoccupation is the suggestion that 
Informers are being used to set up crimes in order that other criminal targets 
may be caught. Indeed, these fears have often been substantiated through reports 
of specific cases where such action has been uncovered by the media. This 
particular area forms a substantial part of the present study and will be 
considered within the notion that it is the relationship between the Informer and 
handler that creates the problems. 
Individual police forces are making moves to review their own systems in the 
light of heavy criticism recently by the media and the courts alike. Lincolnshire 
is one such force which has made mammoth advances in identifying the problems 
which arise from the use of Informers, as well as providing practical solutions. 
This force, like others, now use a computerised system which not only acts as a 
register of all Informers actively used within the force area, but also provides a 
management tool for budgetary control and supervision of Handlers. In 
particular, it has created an innovative tasking system which has attracted 
considerable attention from other forces. Lincolnshire has also incorporated a 
training course for Handlers and controllers using expert key speakers from 
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throughout the United Kingdom and Europe, 16 and again this appears to have 
received positive responses from other forces. 17 Indeed, there now appears to 
be moves by both the National Crime Intelligence Service and the National 
Crime Faculty (NCF) at the Police Staff College to promote such courses 
throughout the country. 18 The Lincolnshire course has addressed the many 
issues relating to Informer use, both practically and theoretically, and a dedicated 
Informer Handler Unit has also been set up within the force, where officers are 
engaged full time on the cultivation and use of Informers. Following an 
inspection of the force in 1995, Her Majestys Inspectorate of Constabulary 
reported favourably on the Informers Management course, and adds, "The use of 
informants by Forces to investigate crime is a cost effective resource and one 
which is well used in Lincolnshire Police." 19 Part of this study involves 
research into the use of Informers in Lincolnshire, comparing the responses from 
active Handlers against other police officers who, for whatever reason, have 
decided not to use this particular investigative tool. The results are shown in 
Chapter Five, and will be relevant to the main study in terms of police officers' 
motives, in that one of the aims is to determine what constitutes a Handler. 
The advancements presently being seen throughout the country seem 
encouraging, and the country is now seeing some improvement at least in the 
way the police service are thinking about the subject. There is a considerable 
amount of work being done to create a Code of Conduct for the use of 
Informers nationally, and this document is expected to be widely distributed, 
even within the public domain, a move which has been long awaited by those 
16 Bil1ingsley R., "Using informers," Police Review 26 April, 1996: pp20-1. 
17 'Skills gap' warning on informants," Poljce Review 24 May, 1996: p6. 
18 Morris R., "Informer database underway," poljce Review 17 May, 1996: p14. 
19 Home Office, "A report of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary," 
Lincolnshire Police Chapter VI (1996): p39. 
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who consider that far too much has been kept from them. But even here, there is 
a definite void in terms of addressing, evaluating and managing the relationship 
between the Informer and his Handler, and if police forces continue to produce 
figures which encourage more and more use, then the need to ensure that the 
partnership is properly controlled becomes even stronger. 
The use of Informers is a delicate subject and has generated a substantial 
amount of sensitivity within police forces during the data collection process. 
Chapter Four will explain in detail the specific problems and difficulties 
encountered during the research, but suffice to say, it has been a privilege to 
have been able to undertake this study, which has not been done before or 
indeed since. It will be seen in the Research Design (Chapter four) that this 
study is unique primarily because of the methodology used in interviewing active 
Informers throughout the country. My position as a senior police officer allowed 
me access to a very secret and confidential world, and one which could not have 
been made available to a non police researcher. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LEGAL ISSUES 
This chapter will examine the legal use of Informers and look at some of the 
issues which have affected practitioners within the criminal justice system. The 
use of informers is not governed by legislation unlike, for example, the use of 
firearms covered by the Firearms Acts, or the use of motor vehicles by the Road 
Traffic Acts. There are, however, a number of procedural guidelines which have 
given rise to argument in the courts requiring judicial decisions, usually by way 
of stated cases, and it is these decisions which will be discussed here. There are 
also a number of interesting cases heard in the American courts and some of 
these have some relevance to the situation in this country. 
Any future legal decisions will depend largely on public opinion on the use of 
Informers in this country. In Folkestone at least, the public were not that 
supportive. Here, the local police advertised a 'squeal for a meal', when they 
offered a night out including a meal and a show worth £200, for information 
about a burglar. They argued that the cost was less than the cost of an 
investigation, but the police were disappointed that nobody came forward. 1 
1 "Squealers turn down £200 meal," Folkestone Evening Standard 19 March 
1993: 3. 
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The specific questions raised here will examine the disclosure of an Informers 
identity, entrapment, discounting sentences, agent provocateur, and misprision. 
These relate directly to the research aims. The issue of disclosing the Informer's 
identity is arguably the most emotive of them all, particularly for police officers 
and of course the Informer himself, because it creates a conflict with the age old 
submission by practitioners that the protection of an Informer's identity is crucial 
to the relationship. The question of entrapment is also an important aspect 
because it impacts on the relationship between the Informer and the Handler, 
particularly if that relationship allows a criminal to be tricked into becoming 
involved in a crime. The use ofInformers as agent provocateurs is also relevant, 
as does the reference to misprision which will also be discussed. The decision by 
the courts to discount or reduce the sentence of convicted Informers is clearly 
relevant to this study as it may be one of the reasons why an Informer becomes 
involved. 
A series of legal issues will be examined including corroboration, disclosure etc. 
Despite the feelings of the police, supported by the Audit Commission and Her 
Majesty's Inpectors of Constabulary that the use of Informers is a proven and 
effective investigative tool, the courts and some legal advisers are becoming 
increasingly uncomfortable. This is not being helped by recent incidents which 
have given rise to anxiety within the criminal justice arena. For example, Ethon 
Leonard Green, a known crack cocaine supplier and criminal as well as 
successful Informer for the Metropolitan Police Service, led an armed raid at a 
warehouse in Nottingham in 1993, where a cocaine (yardy) party was taking 
place. It is alleged that Green, who came from the ghettos of Kingston, Jamaica, 
and brought up with guns and drugs, came to the United Kingdom whilst on bail 
for attempt murder. He was arrested shortly after for another offence and 
became a police Informer. He was, apparently very successful but because he 
continued to be involved in other major crimes, he soon became out of control, 
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and was violent against other drug dealers. The police always insisted that they 
had evidence he was committing crime and maintain that he was warned he 
would be arrested. Green was arrested by Nottingham police for an offence at 
the warehouse, which involved him shooting another person, and whilst on 
remand, he admitted murder in Jamaica. The police apparently did nothing about 
this. Nottingham police said they were not given full information about Green 
and the Metropolitan police failed to co-operate and impeded their enquiries. 
Moreover when the case got to court, Green apparently was given protection, 
and a senior police officer even tried to stop the trial. Green eventually received 
6 years imprisonment but there remains substantial discomfort as a result of this 
case. Green was dealing in cocaine, involved in an armed robbery and murder at 
a time when he was a police Informer. 2 The thesis will examine the questions 
surrounding known criminals giving information as Informers, whilst openly 
committing crime. 
1. Corroboration 
When a person is arrested on the uncorroborated word of an informant, there is 
always a danger and the courts will become more aware of this. For example, in 
the case of James v. Chief Constable of South Wales (1991) the case was 
dismissed, although on appeal the court advised that the arrest was lawful but 
gave a warning that such information should be treated with considerable 
reserve. 3 A similar warning was given by the then National Executive 
Co-ordinator for the Regional Crime Squads, Neil Dickens when giving evidence 
to the Home Affairs Committee enquiry into organised crime, urging that 
2 "Jamaican Yardies," World in Action, Granada Production, 6 November 1995. 
3 "Care is urged over word of informers," The Daily Telegraph 3 May 1991:p3. 
20 
Informers who were participating in crime should be assessed by a judge in 
advance. Dickens said that, 
"This way, the need of the informant to be protected from retribution can be 
reconciled with the need for independent assessment of his credibility. 
Informants are very dangerous people. They were usually criminals looking for 
money and their evidence had to be treated with caution. ,, 4 
This is just one example where distrust exists within the criminal justice system 
when Informers are involved. This thesis will examine that issue and other 
matters relating to the relationship between the Informer and the police officer, 
especially the motives of the Informer. It is the reasons why Informers give 
information to the police that has often urged the courts to seek corroborative 
evidence. 
2. Disclosure 
One of the most important questions relating to the use of Informers in the 
criminal justice system is that of disclosure; specifically whether the Informer's 
identity should be divulged. This is fundamental to any understanding between 
an Informer and Handler. The study will examine how important both parties 
consider this question of confidentiality within their relationship. Here, the legal 
findings will be discussed although there are a relatively small number of Stated 
Cases on this topic. It is apparent though, that the general feeling in the courts 
has gradually changed over the years. The following cases, which are 
representative but by no means exhaustive, show this change of attitude. 
4 Clarke M., "Plea for pre trial 'NOD' to protect informants," Police Review 3 
June 1994: 2. 
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In 1794 when the court of appeal examined the conviction of a drug dealer, 
Hardy, the police executed a warrant following information, and drugs were 
found in the defendants coat. The police were asked about two men who left the 
flat prior to the warrant, but the police refused to answer stating that it would 
reveal the identity of the informant. It was ruled that no miscarriage of justice 
would arise by not identifYing the men, and this case started the debate on 
disclosure, advising that, 
"-no questions may be asked and no evidence given which would reveal the 
identity of the informant. " 5 
The decision not to disclose the Informer's identity continued for nearly one 
hundred years, when a plaintiff tried to identifY an informant when suing for 
conspiracy to prosecute maliciously. Although the decision was upheld, the 
Court accepted that there may be cases when an informant's identity should be 
revealed if it proves the defendants innocence. 6 This did not, however, deter 
the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir Ronald Howe from saying in a 
speech to the Ghost Squad during 1945, 
''Never will you be required to disclose your sources of information. " 7 
At about the same time, the police in America were experiencing similar 
problems but the courts there decided there was no need to disclose the identity 
if the information resulted in obtaining a search warrant. As long as the validity 
of the warrant was not questioned, and there was little evidence of any 
challenge, then it was accepted that warrants were a good way of not disclosing 
5 R v Hardy (1794) Criminal Law Review 687 
6 Marks & Beyfus (1890) 25 QBD 494 
7 Lucas N., Scarlett B., The Flying Squad (London: 1945) 129-41. 
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the identity of the informant. 8 This particular issue is known in America as 
'probable cause', which simply means that the prosecution have a fundamental 
responsibility to prove that they could justify an arrest or search, and the issue of 
a warrant is one way of showing that there was probable cause to take the 
action they did. It became the norm in America, that where the information 
originated from a third party, such as an informant, the courts need to be shown 
(a). Details of how the informant concluded his claim, and 
(b). Details of how the officer concluded that the informant was credible and 
reliable. 9 
These two requirements became known as the Aguilar two-pronged test, and it 
became accepted practice for American Courts to demand corroboration of such 
information. 10 In one case where there was no warrant, the court convicted 
without disclosure on the basis that the police officer's testimony fully supported 
probable cause in that he relied on good faith and reliable information. It was 
argued though, that, 
"It is not unknown for the arresting officer to mis represent his connections with 
the informer, his knowledge of the informers reliability, or the information 
allegedly obtained from the informer. " 11 
Although this thesis will not consider such misrepresentations, nevertheless it 
will examine how important it is to protect the Informer's identity. Another 
8 People v. Keener- California Supreme Court (1955) 
9 Aguilar v Texas (1964) 
10 McGuiness R. L., "Probable cause: Informant information," FBI Law 
enforcement BuJIetjn Part 11 (November 1982) pp23-31. 
11 "McCray v D1inois (1967)," US Supreme Court Reports 18 Led 2d: 74. 
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American court quashed the conviction of a man convicted of possession of 
heroin and supplying to the informant, on the grounds that, 
"The informants possible testimony was highly relevant and might have been 
helpful to the defence. The informer was the only witness in a position to 
amplify or contradict the testimony of Government witnesses. " 12 
It is interesting to learn that one of the Judges, Justice Clark, dissented with the 
findings, arguing that informants needed protection and were crucial in drugs 
cases, and more importantly perhaps, that disclosure was not essential to proving 
the cases charged. An American court took a different stance in the case of 
State v Edwards (1958) where it held that no police officer should have an 
unqualified right to withhold the identity of an informant. This was probably one 
of the first cases which made the police concentrate on whether the informant 
was more valuable than the prosecution. 13 The debate continued in America, 
when an undercover informant bought heroin from a defendant using marked 
money. The informant gave evidence but his identity was not disclosed. He was 
convicted but on appeal the Supreme Court reversed the decision, arguing that 
the credibility of the informant was an important issue. The court also suggested 
that there may be an exception if the prosecution were to show that physical 
harm to the informant or his family were likely, or the informant was not a 
principal witness against the accused. 14 This case was further discussed in 
Theodor (1972) when the court agreed that the identity of the informant should 
not be disclosed merely to question probable cause of arrest. If the defendant 
could show that the informant was a material witness on the issue of guilt or 
12 Roviaro v U.S. (1957) US Supreme Court Reports I L ED 2D P.647 
13 Sullivan F. C., "State v Edwards, 317 S.W.2d.441 (1958)," ~ Vo1.lIssue 
(March! April 1959) 
14 Rissler L. E., "The informer - witness," FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (May 
1977): 31. 
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innocence, the case would be dismissed unless the informants identity is 
disclosed. 15 
One of the most important cases heard in Britain was Birtles (1969) when the 
court accepted that Informers should be protected, at least within certain limits. 
The Court recognised that such decisions may be disagreeable, but it was felt 
that the police should be allowed to make best use of their informants. 16 For 
practitioners, this was a turning point, and 1969 also saw the circulation of 
Home Office Guidelines on Informers, which was the first time Britain had seen 
such documentary advice afforded to the police. The decision taken in R v 
Birtles to protect the Informer continued, even with prosecutions brought by 
other agencies. HM Customs and Excise brought to the courts a case which was 
dependant on information in relation to tax liability. The source was not 
disclosed on the grounds that it would result in a lack of future information, 
making the Revenue Act unworkable. The court felt that there were arguments 
on both sides, and where such a fine balance existed, the court should uphold the 
claim to refuse to disclose the identity. 17 In D v NSPCC (1977) it was 
accepted that public policy must demand that sources of information will be 
withheld, but at the same time agreeing that no innocent man should be 
convicted as a result. 18 And yet, in R. V. Hennessey (1978), a case concerning 
telephone tapping, the courts appreciated the need to protect the informants 
identity for their own safety and also to ensure that the supply of information 
does not dry up. 19 
15 Theodor v Superior Court (1972) 8.CAL. 3d 77. 
16 R v Birtles (1969) 53 CRAPP.R 469. 
17 Alfred Crompton V Commissioners of Customs & Excise (HL) (1974) 
18 Hanvey P., "A structured approach to informants," Police Staff College, 
Bramshill, 4/5 April, 1994. 
19 Blackstones Criminal Practice - Public policy and privilege (London: 1993) 
Sect F9:pI898. 
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At this stage, then, there exists an overriding rule that the source of infonnation 
will not be disclosed, but there is the proviso that non disclosure must not result 
in the defendant being denied the possibility of proving his innocence. 20 This 
was also recognised when the Attorney General distributed some Guidelines in 
relation to the disclosure of unused material to the defence, when it was strongly 
advised that in the case ofInfonners, where there were reasons for fearing that 
disclosure would put him or his family in danger, then at least the prosecution 
should seek Counsel's advice. 21 Nevertheless, there continued to be a strong 
public interest in ensuring that the defendant was allowed to put forward a 
tenable case in its best light. (R v Agar (1989». A tenable case could only be 
presented if the infonnants identity was disclosed. 22 
In the Agar case in the West Midlands, the Crown Prosecution Service offered 
no evidence rather that disclose an infonnant's identity against the defendant 
John McPhee who was charged with possession of Cocaine having a street value 
of £50,000, with intent to supply. The defence was that the drugs had been 
planted by the Infonner and the Judge decided that the infonnant must give 
evidence if there was to be a fair trial, despite the prosecutions plea that his life 
would be in danger and the police view that future operations would be put in 
jeopardy. 23 
Another case, R v Saunders & Others (1990) commonly referred to as the 
Guinness trial, questioned the disclosure of unused material. The Judge ruled 
20 Acton H., "From a usually reliable source," police Review 27 January 1989: 
189-90. 
21 Attorney General's Guidelines (1982) Home Office London (unpublished) 
22 "Protecting infonner prejudiced defence," The Daily Telegraph 11 September, 
1989. 
23 Seton C., "Drugs case dropped to protect infonnant," The Times 13 June 
1990. 
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that such disclosure should cover any relevant material, not just witness 
statements, and this included all police reports which had a bearing on the case. 
This ruling had serious implications for the police, particularly where the use of 
Informers was involved, as all their records of meetings, contacts, intelligence 
and general reports would have to be disclosed. The current situation is that 
such material is sensitive, and in practical terms, the court will listen to ex parte 
hearings to decide on whether or not they should require the prosecution to 
disclose. In Scotland, there is no such legal duty to disclose information to the 
defence, although the Crown has an obligation to act in the interests of justice, 
to ensure that the true facts are divulged. A Scottish case (McKie v WSMT 
Limited (1952) confirmed that police reports are confidential, arguing that, 
"The only method of securing absolute candour and freedom in the making of 
such reports is an absolute guarantee against publication" 24 
Relying on the cases ofHennessy and Agar, the Court of Appeal considered the 
circumstances when Stephen John Keane was arrested for counterfeit currency 
found in his car and at his home address. The defence was that the defendant 
was set up and the disclosure of the informant's identity was necessary to put 
forward a tenable case. The trial Judge agreed that the police need not answer 
questions which would identify the source. The Appeal held that it was wrong 
for the police to be the sole arbiters, but concluded that:-
(a). There was a public interest in not disclosing, and 
(b). That material would not have assisted the defence. 
24 "Informants seminar," (Unpublished), Strathclyde Police, 24 June 1994. 
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The court decided that there had been no unfairness to the defendant, and the 
appeal was dismissed. 25 This then brought about the issue of 'fairness' to the 
judicial system, as opposed to the question of having the opportunity to prove 
innocence. A subtle difference perhaps, but an important one, certainly for the 
police. They were so concerned, that the Association of Chief Police Officers 
(ACPO) wrote to the Home Office fearing that prosecutions against key 
criminals would fail if the police were forced to identify their sources. 26 
Another case where the defence demanded the Informer's identity be disclosed 
was in Sheffield Crown Court. Andrew Meredith was charged with possession 
of cocaine with intent to supply following a successful search warrant at his 
home address. It was argued that the Informer's information was material 
evidence which may prove their clients innocence. As a result, the prosecution 
dropped the supplying charge and he pleaded guilty to simple possession, 
receiving 9 months imprisonment. 27 Here was a situation where a substantial 
reduction of sentence was given in preference to an Informer giving evidence. A 
similar case, again heard in Sheffield Crown Court revolved around information 
from an Informer suggesting that a robbery was to take place in a private house. 
Police carried out observations and the offenders were seen to break in to the 
premises and later arrested. The defence suggested that the incident had been 
set up by the Informer and demanded that he give evidence. The Judge agreed 
that this was a reasonable request, and the prosecution decided to offer no 
evidence. The officer in the case later said, 
25 Rv Keane(1992) - Court of Appeal No.92/6617174 
26"Police fear court disclosure rule will rob them of key informants," The Tjmes 
21 December, 1992. 
27 Rv Meredith (1993) 
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"It is difficult to comprehend exactly what damage has been done to the 
effective investigation of crime." 28 
This practice of offering no evidence, rather than proceeding with the 
prosecution may be regarded as morally wrong, perhaps, and maybe there are 
those who would argue that this is not justice. However, at the same time as 
these trials, the Regional Crime Squad were reporting that in the preceding 12 
months, 3 Informers had been murdered. Furthermore, there had been no less 
than 60 serious prosecutions dropped over the same period. The RCS National 
Co-ordinator, Neil Dickens recalled, 
'7n the last year several of our informants have lost their Jives, mainly in the 
drugs field where money and weaponry are so widely available. " 29 
The disclosure rules laid down in the courts resulted from an Appeal Court 
judgment in the case of Judith Ward the convicted IRA terrorist who was 
cleared after 17 years imprisonment after it was revealed that the police failed to 
disclose information which would have assisted her defence. What has transpired 
since is that police forces have become fearful that their Informers will be 
compromised, and are abandoning prosecutions rather than risk revealing an 
informant's identity. One informer was reported to say, 
"This ruling puts me and many like me in a vulnerable situation. In future I 
will have to think twice about getting involved" 30 
28 Rv Wiggan & Wiggan (1993) South Yorkshire Police Report (Unpublished) 
29"Save this threatened species," The Daily Telegraph 29 September 1993. 
30 Henry 1., "Fight to save key informers," Sunday Express 31 January 1993. 
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The only course open to the prosecution in these cases is to seek ex parte 
hearings for the Judge to issue Public Interest Immunity certificates, but the 
defence will always ask for disclosure, sometimes based on vexatious reasons, 
often as a spoiling tactic to get the case dropped.31 The defence may legitimately 
be allowed to put forward a tenable case. Also, there are cases where the court 
has granted Public Interest Immunity, and therefore afforded protection, but 
nevertheless the evidence of an informant has been excluded on the grounds of 
fairness.32 All this has given the police some encouragement to refuse to identifY 
their sources, and in one unreported case, a detective was given an ultimatum by 
a Judge that either he disclose, or go to prison for contempt of court. The 
prosecution stepped in at this stage, asking for an adjournment and in the end no 
evidence was offered, but the police are fearful that this practice will become 
more commonplace. In an unsuccessful drugs raid in Ireland, two detectives 
faced dismissal from the force for refusing to identifY their informants, even 
though no criminal proceedings were instigated. They maintained that the 
protection of informants is vital to police work. 33 
In a recent case, and one which portrays the feeling of the courts in this country 
at the present time, Rv Reiley (1994) the defendant met with an undercover 
police officer and informant after which the latter two men made up their notes 
of the meeting. The defendant gave his account of his involvement in the trial 
which differed from the other versions. The defence argued that the informant 
should give evidence because he was present at the meeting and his evidence 
was necessary to maintain a fair trial. The court of appeal agreed, concluding 
that if the Informer was capable of producing relevant evidence, he should have 
31 Informants and Observation Posts - Crown Prosecution Training Handout 
(1994) (Unpublished) 
32 Ibid. 
33"Garda detectives defend secrecy on informants," Police Review 18 March 
1994: 6. 
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been called. Some barristers are now suggesting, following this case, that this is 
a licence for acquittal in every case where an Informer is used, as the defence 
will always argue that he has 'relevant' evidence. 34 
The question of disclosing the Informer's identity has become more apparent 
over recent years and the Courts have changed their view; from protecting the 
Informer at all costs, to ensuring that trials are fair. This has made the police 
less comfortable in their disclosure of Informers to the point where they are 
considering the Informer to be more valuable than the prosecution. As a result, 
more criminal cases are withdrawn and criminals, according to the police, are 
going free. 
This issue is critical in the relationship between the Informer and the Handler. 
This study will examine disclosure of identity to determine whether the Informer 
or the Handler are more interested in maintaining the partnership than 
consideration of the legal system. 
3. Entrapment 
Entrapment exists where a criminal is dealt with through the courts for a crime 
which has been engineered by a law enforcement officer, or his agent, for 
example an Informer. In effect, the criminal has been trapped into committing an 
offence which he would not have committed, had it not been for the actions of 
the police. In this thesis, entrapment is defined as setting up crime, and again it is 
the relationship between the Informer and Handler which will be examined to 
determine whether such practice is acceptable to the partners, and if so to what 
34 Kelson P., "R v Michael Reiley (1994)," Unpublished, Regional Crown 
Prosecution Service, Briggate Lodge Hotel, Brigg, Humberside, 11 June 1994. 
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extent. In English law there is no defence of entrapment. The American courts 
have established guidelines, where it is apparent that the majority of cases have 
been connected with the illegal use of drugs. The cases fall into one of two main 
categories, the subjective, which focuses on the defendants state of mind or the 
objective which concentrates exclusively on the conduct of the police. 35 
The subjective test, otherwise known as the Origin of Intent is generally viewed 
by the American courts as the most acceptable, and in essence allows the 
defence of entrapment if it is shown that the offence charged was actuaIly 
created by the police or other law enforcement officers. The court, in applying 
this test ask two questions:-
(a). Was there an inducement on the part of the officer? 
(b). If so, did the defendant show any predisposition to commit the offence? 36 
This criteria depends on whether the criminal intent is in the mind of the police 
officer or the accused. It would not be construed as entrapment if the officer 
only provides an opportunity for the accused to offend. 
The two main cases are SorreIls (1932) 37 and Sherrnan (1958) 38 In the 
SorreIls case, the defendant had been involved in the possession and selling of 
whisky, contrary to the National Prohibition Act. He had obtained the liquor 
after persuasion by a police Informer who was acting as a tourist. The court 
35 Callahan M., "Entrapment, inducement and the use of unwitting middlemen," 
FBI Law enforcement Bulletjn Part I (December 1993): 17-24. 
36 "Entrapment to commit narcotics offense," 62 ALR3d 110 (1972): 117-48. 
37 SorreIls v United States (1932) 287 US 435, 771 Ed 413,53 S ct 210,86 
ALR249 
38 Sherrnan v United States (1958) 356 US 369, 2L Ed 2d 848, 78 S ct 819 
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held that he was not guilty because the police had lured him to commit the 
offence. 39 In the Sherman case the defendant was receiving medical treatment 
for drug addiction and was befriended by a police Informer by the name of 
Kalchinian who claimed to be another patient. Sherman was persuaded to obtain 
illegal drugs and he returned to drug taking himself. The court acquitted him on 
the grounds that law enforcement officials had created the criminal activity. In 
the case of Peters (1970) 40 the defendant was convicted of possession of drugs 
and on appeal it was held that although he was given the opportunity to commit 
the offence, he was ready, willing and able to do it and was therefore not 
subjected to entrapment. In a similar case against Gellers (1971) 41 the 
defendant appealed after a conviction for possession of drugs. The court held 
that there can be no entrapment where the criminal intent originates in the mind 
of the accused, even though he was given the opportunity and helped to commit 
the offence. This decision was upheld in another drugs case 42 where the court 
said that entrapment could only be used if the criminal intent originates in the 
mind of the informer. In this particular case, the police set a trap to catch the 
defendant in the execution of a criminal offence which he himself had conceived. 
Although this subjective test seems to be the most popular in the American 
courts, some favour the objective test where it is the activity of the police that is 
considered and not the predisposition of the defendant. In a number of cases, the 
defendants had been convicted of supplying drugs, but their convictions quashed 
on the grounds that the police actions in securing the convictions were 
reprehensible. These courts argued that unless the objective test was 
39 Elliott D. W. & Wood J. C., A casebook on crim;nallaw (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1974) 34-40. 
40 Peters v State (1970) 248 Ark 134, 450 SW2d 276 
41 State v Gellers (1971) 282 A2d 173, cert den 406 US 949, 32 L Ed 2d 337, 
92 S ct 2047 
42 State v Harney (1972) 499 P2d 802 
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administered the public's confidence in the administration of justice would be 
shaken.43 Such police action which was taken apparently to secure the 
conviction of a suspect, rather than provide the evidence, became known in the 
American courts as the Outrageous Government Conduct Defense. In one case, 
an Informer suggested setting 'up an amphetamine factory. He supplied the 
equipment and even did most of the manufacturing because the defendant did 
not have the requisite knowledge. He was acquitted because the government, it 
was suggested, was involved in the crime. 44 Another example where the court 
found in favour of the defendant based on Outrageous Government Conduct was 
where an Informer supplied a would-be heroin distributor with a sample of high 
purity heroin which was never recovered, and apparently made its way to 
unknown users. 45 It can only be assumed, because there are no documentary 
comments, that the court felt the police were doing no more than illegally 
supplying drugs. 
Another successful defence overturned a Federal child pornography conviction 
in the case of United States v Jacobson (1992) where it was decided that the 
police had induced the commission of a crime and implanted in the defendant the 
disposition to commit the criminal act. The circumstances were that Jacobson 
lawfully received magazines from an adult book store that contained 
photographs of nude boys. Such action later became an offence and he was 
targetted over the next two and a half years by repeated contacts through 
fictitious organisations. He subsequently ordered books and was later charged 
with receiving child pornography through the mail.46 Despite the success of this 
defence, the majority of courts expressed the opinion that they approved of the 
43 Op Cit Entrapment to commit narcotics offense, p 121 
44 United States v Twigg (1978) 588 F. 2d 373 3d Cir. 
45 United States v Sontana (1992) F.Supp D. Mass 
46 Thomas V. Kukura J.D., "Undercover investigations and the entrapment 
defense," FBI Law enforcement Bulletin (April 1993): pp27-32. 
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police infiltration and sanctioned their limited participation in the cnme, 
including providing valuable items to the defendant in order to gain their 
confidence; even drugs. 47 For example, in one case, the court approved of the 
police providing heroin to the defendant and then arresting him when he sold it 
back to them. 48 
In 1977, the Law Commission in England proposed various remedies to existing 
law, including the creation of an offence of entrapment for agent provocateurs, 
as well as mitigated sentences for entrapped defendants. Its recormnendations 
however were not taken up. 49 
In one of the few relevant cases to be heard in this country, two defendants, 
McEvilly and Lee had been convicted of handling stolen property. An Informer 
gave information to the police about their activities who then provided an 
undercover agent tasked with buying stolen property. The defence argued that 
the defendants had been subjected to entrapment, but the court, in dismissing the 
appeal, decided that the police did nothing wrong. They had received 
information which led them to believe there was a plan to commit crime, and the 
undercover agent was put forward as a willing means of disposal in order to 
bring the offenders to justice. 50 
This was not the outcome though in another case reported in 1985, when 
Customs officers lured two Yugoslavs into a £30,000 heroin deal. The court 
ordered the prosecution to identifY the Informer and the case was abandoned. 
47 CalIahan M., "Entrapment, inducement and the use of unwitting middlemen," 
FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin Conclusion (March 1984): p31. 
48 United States v Hampton (1976) 
49 Report on defences of general application - The Law Commission (Law. 
Comm. No.83(1977» 
50 Rv McEvilly and Lee (1973) Court of Appeal 
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The court heard that the defendants were alleged to have been encouraged to 
bring drugs to England for an undercover agent, in order that they could be 
arrested. 51 
A remarkably similar case, that ofR v Latif & Shahzad (1994) 52 looked at the 
implications of entrapment, but came to a very different conclusion. A Pakistani 
named Honi working as an Informer for the Drugs Enforcement Agency 
(D.E.A.) brought 20 kilos of heroin into the UK at the request ofShahzad, and 
with the knowledge ofH.M. Customs officers. The Informer met the defendants 
who were given what they believed to be heroin but in fact was Horlicks. They 
were arrested and charged, but on appeal claimed that there had been an abuse 
of process, and also that the evidence of Honi should have been excluded 
(Section 78 Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984) because it was unfair. The 
court dismissed the appeal stating that S. 78 was designed to protect the 
innocent, not major drugs traffickers. On the issue of entrapment or abuse of 
process, it was felt that, 
"If on occasions the big fish are lured here, then hooked, there is no abuse in 
that." 53 
Even though English law does not recognise entrapment as a criminal offence, 
the above Cases show the courts do not condone such action. The American 
system of examining the subjective and objective tests highlights an interesting 
difference of opinion and is beginning to appear now in Britain. Those Cases 
which described how the police merely engineered the evidence to secure a 
51 "FBI style trap used by heroin case officers," The Observer 8 December, 1985. 
52 The Times 17 March 1994 
53 Morton J., "Some you win, some you lose," police Review 25 March 1994: 
14. 
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conviction, had no sympathy from the courts and the defence were successful. 
The use of undercover agents and Informers are used by the defence as examples 
of entrapment, but the general view is that the police acted properly if they were 
providing the means to bring the offender to justice. 
This thesis will look at whether the Informer and Handler are prepared to 
become involved in entrapment, and if so to what extent. The study specifically 
examines 'agent provocateur' which is closely related to entrapment and 
discussed later in this chapter. 
4. Discounting sentence 
Another area which has created some consternation in the courts, especially 
where the use ofInformers is concerned, is when in return for co-operation or 
help to the police, a person charged may be given a reduced sentence. If this 
practice is acceptable within the judicial system, then it has serious implications 
for the InformerlHandler partnership. Clearly, it would be in the interest of a 
criminal facing a custodial sentence to become an Informer if there is any 
possibility that by doing so would help his cause during the trial. This thesis will 
examine the motivations of the Informer, but will also look at whether the 
reasons for informing change over time and if so, why. 
In one appeal hearing, the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Lane, was obviously in 
favour of discounting sentences. He was quoted as saying, 
"This is one area in which it is particularly important that offenders should be 
encouraged to give injormation to the police, and a confession of guilt coupled 
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with considerable aSsistance to the police can properly be marked by a 
substantial reduction in what would otherwise be the proper sentence." 54 
Such a stance was also taken in the appeal court which considered the case 
against four defendants who were properly convicted for the illegal importation 
of cannabis worth more than four and a half million pounds. 55 Two of the 
defendants had their sentences reduced, but the other two had given information 
to the authorities which was considered to be of value. Due regard was given to 
the nature and effect of the information, the degree of assistance provided and 
the potential risk to the Informer and his family. The court agreed that there 
should be a discount and the sentences were reduced from 10 years and 6 years 
to 712 and 4 years respectively. 56 A similar case heard by the court of appeal 
was Rv Afza1 (1989) where the defendant acting as a courier was concerned in 
the importation of over 4 kilos of diamorphine. He made statements identifYing 
the person who recruited him and volunteered to give evidence. He succeeded 
in having his sentence reduced from 712 years imprisonment to 6 years, and the 
supplier was arrested as a result. 57 
In another case, though, the criminal justice system showed their dislike for what 
was considered to be an abuse of process, when George Dean, 17 years of age, 
appeared before court having admitted being involved in a murder in Croydon, 
Surrey. He in fact burnt the victim's car in order to destroy vital evidence. Dean 
maintained that the police had assured him throughout the enquiry he would not 
be prosecuted if he assisted them in arresting the other defendants. The police 
emphatically denied making such promises, but the Crown Court threw out all 
54 R v Aramah (1982) 4CR.APP.REP(s) 407 p.409 
55 Rv Sivan,Ferman,Shortwise & Greenfield (1988) 
56 "Discounting sentences for assistance," The Times 6 December, 1988. 
57 "Sentence discount for drugs co-operation," The Times 14 October, 1989. 
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criminal charges against him, taking the view that the police had usurped the 
authority of the Crown Prosecution Service who had sole authority to proceed 
or not. The main offenders were in fact arrested and dealt with as a result of 
Dean's information. 58 
Another case where the court felt that the police had overstepped the mark was 
heard in the appeal court. The defendant appeared before the Central Criminal 
Court in 1993 on charges of robbery and possession of firearms whilst 
unlawfully at large. He was convicted and sentenced to 9 years imprisonment to 
run concurrent to a sentence imposed in 1990. The submission on appeal was 
that he pleaded guilty and co-operated with the police on the condition that the 
police provide a letter to the court showing mitigating circumstances and 
supporting a reduction in sentence. This letter was not forthcoming, and the 
court of appeal held that the decision whether to provide a letter is not for the 
discretion of the police, but a matter for the Counsel for the Crown. A discount 
on sentence was given by the court in the light of fresh material submitted by the 
defendant. 59 
Although the use ofInformers as supergrasses is not part of this thesis, this has 
been included because the use of a so called supergrass is directly concerned 
with the use of Informers within the legal system. Supergrass Informers have 
been used predominantly in Northern Ireland to describe those professional 
criminals who, with a view to securing a reduced sentence for themselves, or 
other such reward, decide to give information against others. The difference 
between the supergrass and others seeking a reduced sentence is that the term 
supergrass refers to the more serious type of offence such as terrorism. There 
58 "Court rejects charges against informant," The Independent 20 February1993. 
59 Rv Piggott (1994) Court of Appeal Criminal Division No 94/023SIWS 
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were a number of trials where the term supergrass was used in 1972, and it was 
at this time that a Commission was set up to enquire into terrorist trials generally 
in Northern Ireland. This produced what was commonly known as the 
"Diplock" courts where a single Judge sat without a Jury. Jury trials were 
considered to be unreliable with a danger of intimidation of witnesses and 
jurors. 60 The Royal Ulster Constabulary reported that the use of the supergrass 
was having a devastating effect on terrorism, although it was also arousing 
considerable political controversy. 61 Critics of the system argued that it was 
doing nothing but creating a form of 'internment by remand', in that the alleged 
offenders were spending unwarranted time in prison awaiting trial62 In practice 
many defendants were released either because the supergrass had withdrawn his 
evidence or it had been rejected by the trial Judge, One particular Informer 
though, Christopher Black from the Ardoyne area of Belfast gave evidence 
against 38 alleged terrorists, 35 of whom were convicted. Some of those 
opposed to the supergrass system argued that a supergrass was merely an 
accomplice and as such, his evidence should be corroborated. The lack of 
corroboration in Northern Ireland allowed the supergrass to provide false 
information, and fabricate evidence. One author commented that, 
"The supergrass system has achieved little except misery for those involved, 
considerable public expense, and a sharpened and perhaps even extended 
distrust of the legal system amongst certain sections of the community. It 
should never have happened at all ...... "63 
60 Report of the Commission to consider legal procedures to deal with terrorist 
activities in Northern Ireland. Cmnd. 5185 (1972) para 36. 
61"WiII supergrass sow a bitter harvest?" The Times 13 September, 1983 
62 Walsh D., The use and abuse of emergency legislation in Northern Ireland 
(London: Cobden Trust, 1983) Ch.5. 
63 Jennings A. (Ed), Justice under fire - The abuse of civil liberties in Northern 
Ireland (London: Pluto Press, 1988) 98. 
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This did not appear to deter potential Informers, and there continued throughout 
the 1980s a search for members of the main terrorist groups who would be 
prepared to give evidence against their colleagues in exchange for an indemnity 
and a new life. 64 It would seem that many were blackmailed into becoming 
Informers, although the rewards were high, but a large proportion committed 
suicide. Such a fate was far from new and could be traced back, for example to 
Judas Iscariot who hanged hirnselfafter giving information for money. 
In Northern Ireland there was a history of resistance to British rule in some 
quarters and this presumably highlighted the need for spies and Informers. One 
author suggested that such dangerous activity allowed the police to identity 
specific criminals whom the Informer should inform against. 65 Boyd argues that 
the promise of remission or immunity is distasteful and could encourage 
Informers to manufacture evidence. 66 This stance is supported by Bonner 67 
who argues that it is morally wrong to grant immunity to Informers whose 
crimes may be as serious or more than those accused. He suggests that there 
were allegations that the police encouraged Informers whose future depended on 
pleasing them, and recommended that, amongst other things, there should be a 
return to Jury trials and all Informer evidence should be corroborated. 
Another criticism of supergrass Informers is their cost effectiveness. They 
require protection, with high running costs and financial assistance required for 
their families whilst they are serving their sentence. They also tend to re-offend 
64 Greer S., "Supergrasses and the legal system in Britain and Northern Ireland," 
Quarterly Law Review 198 (1986). 
65 Boyd A., The informers - A chilling account of the supergrasses in Northern 
Ireland (Dublin: Mercier Press, 1984) 30. 
66lbid: p.40 
67 Bonner D., "Combating terrorism: supergrass trials in Northern Ireland," Ihe. 
Modem Law Review Vol51 (Jan 1988): 23-53. 
41 
and cause embarrassment to the authorities. There was certainly some 
embarrassment when in 1987, Nikolas Chrastney, one of the organisers of the 
biggest cocaine consignment smuggled in Britain, escaped from police cells in 
Yorkshire whilst helping Customs officials against other alleged offenders. He 
has never been found. 68 But one author believes that the use of the supergrass 
will continue because, 
"As long as there is a chance to avoid a long time inside by a bit of judicious 
talk and walk, the singing will continue." 69 
Not all the cases relating to supergrasses have been in Northern Ireland. For 
example, George Cheung gave evidence in 1992 as a supergrass in England, 
against other triad members plotting to shoot a rival gang member. The court 
was told that Cheung was given preferential treatment following his arrest, and 
he was likely to receive residency status on relocation abroad. It was alleged 
during the trial, that a police officer had abused his authority by looking after 
Mr. Cheung far too well, seeing this assignment as a Jeather in his cap' 70 
Another supergrass, Maurice O'Mahoney, who had worked for the police over a 
number of years was acquitted of armed robbery in 1993 after accusing the 
police of setting him up. Nicknamed 'King Squealer' he intimated that he feared 
for his life both from the criminal fraternity and the police. He had given 
information on more than 100 colleagues in relation to underworld activities and 
made a living dealing in jewelry, admitting that some of it was known to have 
been stolen. He claimed that the police asked him to commit a robbery in order 
to catch another criminal. During the robbery, he says, the police fired at him 
68"The inside story on a five star supergrass," The Times 3 July 1992. 
69 Campbell D., "Whisper who dares," police Review 3rd September, 1991: 
532-33. 
70 "Police criticised over triad perks," The Independent 11 June 1992. 
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intending to kill him because they feared he would expose them. He went on to 
admit fabricating evidence for the police to catch others. Naturally, the 
prosecution dismissed his revelations but he was subsequently acquitted. 71 
The practice of offering reduced sentences to Informers causes much debate, 
some encouraging its use whilst others are concerned that it does nothing more 
than persuade criminals to become Informers in order to benefit at court. The 
use of the supergrass, particularly in Northern Ireland, has been discussed and, 
although some practitioners argue that the supergrass has had a devastating 
effect on terrorism, others suggest that it merely prolongs the justice system 
whereby defendants are kept in custody awaiting trial for much longer. It is 
suggested by practitioners that if the supergrass Informer is to continue, then 
their evidence must be properly corroborated. Otherwise, there will remain the 
danger that such Informers will fabricate evidence and supply malicious 
information solely to receive a better deal by the court for himself. 
All these cases are relevant to the thesis in that they refer to the relationship 
between the Informer and the police officer, and the motivation an Informer may 
have. The reduction of an Informer's sentence for information about other 
criminals is a legitimate method of court procedure, but some practitioners argue 
that it is dangerous and morally wrong. It is important, therefore to determine 
how prevalent this practice is. 
5. Agent Provocateur 
71 "Supergrass's claims leave him between the dock and a hard place." The. 
Guardian 16 July 1993. 
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Closely related to the defence of entrapment is the submission by the defence 
that an Informer or undercover officer was acting as agent provocateur. This 
submission is more commonly used in Britain. Again, this practice is an 
important feature of this thesis as it will examine the possibility that in the 
furtherance of the relationship, the Informer and Handler will incite the 
commission of criminal offences. 
An early example of the incitement to commit criminal offences, can be found in 
a 1947 case. A plain clothes police officer was carrying out observations in a 
public house when he saw betting slips being passed from one customer to 
another. He made a bet himself, and later made a second bet in the presence of 
another officer. At the trial, the court found this practice unacceptable, and the 
magistrate declared, 
"It cannot be too strongly emphasised that it is wholly wrong for a police 
officer or any other person to be sent to commit an offence in order that an 
offence by another person may be detected" 72 
The courts maintained their dislike for such actions in a later case when the 
defendants had pleaded guilty to robbery on a postmaster with an unknown man, 
and received 4 years imprisonment. They continually declared throughout the 
trial that the unknown man had persuaded them to commit the offence, and it 
later became apparent that this man was in fact the informant. With the 
agreement of the postmaster, he had pretended to be tied up, with the police on 
the premises at the time. This was not disclosed at the trial. In effect, the 
defendants had pleaded guilty to an offence which had not been committed 
because the postmaster had technically consented. On appeal, the convictions 
72 Brannan v Peek (1947) 2.ALL.ER 572 
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for larceny were substituted, and sentences reduced. The court felt that the 
Justices had been blindfolded and perverted and, although they did not criticise 
the police for non disclosure of the informant, they expressed concern that 
evidence was concealed 73 which effected the quality of the offence. As a result 
of this case the Home Office published Guidelines on the use of Informers as 
agent provocateur,14 As said above in the case ofBirtles (1969) the police were 
supported in their use of Informers, but on the issue of incitement, the court 
said, 
'1t is vitally important to ensure so far as possible that the informer does not 
creale an offence. that is to stry. incite others to commit an offence those others 
would not otherwise have committed" 75 
There was indeed growing concern that Informers were being used to set up 
crimes, recruit participants and then give evidence against them after informing 
the police. This was increasing criminality rather than preventing it, and a 
lecturer in law, J. D. McClean suggested that three main questions should be 
asked in the courts:-
(a). How much can the police precipitate an offence? 
(b). How much can they resort to trickery? 
(c). How far can they breach the law themselves? 
He accepted that in drugs cases where there are no victims, the police have to 
resort to using Informers, but he argued that every participant, even an Informer 
73 R v Macro & others (1969) Crim LR 205 
74 Home Office Circular No.97/1969 (12 May 1969) Informants who take part 
in crime 
75 Devlin K. M., "Informers, spies and agent provocateurs," Justjce of the Peace 
and Local Goyernment Review (31 October, 1970): 805. 
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should be treated as an accomplice, and his evidence could be used as 
corroboration. 76 
A number of lawyers and civil liberty group members expressed concern about 
the use of agent provocateurs in 1993, and one officer for Liberty said, 
"We do not think it is the job of the police to go round creating crime. We 
think it is their job to prevent crime. To step over the line is a breach of their 
role." 77 
He was referring to a case where an Australian whilst in Amsterdam met an 
Englishman who was a heavy drugs user. At the instigation of this man, he flew 
to England to meet some contacts and became involved in the trafficking of 
drugs. According to the Australian, a certain amount of pressure was put on 
him to obtain large amounts of drugs and eventually he flew to London where he 
was given a suitcase containing 50,000 tablets of LSD. He was arrested and 
charged with importation of drugs estimated to be worth up to £ 1 million. In his 
trial, the defendant suggested that the people who befriended him were police 
officers and an informer,who had pushed him into carrying the drugs. He said, 
"This is a crime that would never have happened if it had not been for the 
people pushing me. ,,78 This matter did not appear to have been resolved, as the 
other persons concerned were not traced or identified. 
Another case in 1994 gave the crime correspondent for The Guardian cause to 
express his concern, after seven people were convicted of conspiracy to murder 
76 McClean 1. D., "Informers and agent provocateurs," Criminal Law Review 
(1969): 532 
77 Campbell D., "Appeal to query drugs informer's role," The Guardian 26 June, 
1993:p5. 
78lbid 
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their partners, all claiming that they were victims of police entrapment. They 
were jailed in separate cases although it was alleged that the hitman in each case 
was an undercover police officer. It was the hope of the various defence lawyers 
that each of the cases could be referred to the Court of Appeal, but none have 
so far appeared. 79 
Khan and Gillance 80 discuss a number of relevant cases and concluded that 
there is little point taking a case to trial if the evidence is either inadmissible or 
will be given no credence by the court, and in any case, they say, the courts 
dissatisfaction with the methods used will inevitably be reflected in a reduced 
sentence. However, it may be that such considerations are not given by the 
Informer or even his Handler. This thesis will examine the incitement of criminal 
offences as agent provocateur by the Informer and Handler. 
There is no support within the British Criminal Justice system for the use of 
agent provocateur or inciting another to commit a criminal offence. A number of 
cases have highlighted the courts' dislike for such tactics which do no more than 
create a criminal offence that would not have happened without the assistance of 
an Informer or other agent. Such actions only increase criminality instead of 
reducing or preventing it, and most practitioners argue that the police are 
abusing their authority in these cases. 
This study will examine the existence of 'agent provocateur' and try to determine 
how such practice is affected by the relationship between the Informer and his 
Handler. 
79 Campbell D., "Entrapment claim in police 'hitmen' cases," The CTIlardiao 18 
July, 1994: pS. 
80 Khan A. N. & Gillance K., "Agent Provocateur," police Review 30 April, 
1976: ppS36-8. 
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6. MlspnsJOD 
This particular concept is included here because there is a belief that all 
Informers commit a criminal offence themselves as soon as they become 
involved in a particular crime, and this then is directly relevant to the relationship 
between the Informer and the Handler. Misprision is, "The deliberate 
concealment of the commission of a felony'~ 81 There is, however, no longer 
an offence in this country if a person fails to tell the police when he has 
knowledge that a crime has been committed, that is with the exception of 
treason and acts of terrorism.82 So here there is quite an important anomaly. 
On one hand, it is accepted that an Informer, when infiltrating a criminal gang, 
cannot be an accessory because he is acting in the public interest but conversely, 
practitioners may argue that the police (including Informers) have no authority 
to commit crime to obtain evidence. This seems to be the nub of the problem, in 
that it becomes a matter of interpretation how far an Informer should be allowed 
to go. It has already been discussed that perhaps the most effective way of 
dealing with this is to treat the Informer as an accomplice and use his evidence 
as corroboration against the co-defendants. 83 But again, this raises the issue of 
disclosure, and the police would argue that such action would reduce the 
numbers and usefulness of Informers. The question of corroboration of hearsay 
evidence has been fu\Jy discussed in the American courts, and cases have 
suggested that corroboration may be simply veritying the details of the 
information, 84 although it is recognised that there needs to be a significant 
number of factors corroborated. Another method used is for the Informer to 
81 (ChiefEditor)Hanks P., The Collins Concise DictjoD!u:y (Glasgow: William 
Collins Sons & Co.Ltd., 1989) p727. 
82 Williarns G., Textbook ofcrimjnallaw (London: Stevens & Sons, 1983) 
p375. 
83 Ibid p.611 
84 United States v Draper (1959) 
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file an affidavit on oath in court, but again his identity will be revealed as a 
result. In Britain, there are an increasing number of cases where the Judge will 
listen to an Informer's account in secret in order that he may decide on the 
progress of the trial. All this shows the importance placed by the courts on the 
Informer's evidence. 85 
The Criminal Law Act, 1967 (Section 5(1)) actually replaced the offence of 
misprision but this offence is far less absolute. It merely creates an offence for a 
person to accept or agree to accept a consideration for not disclosing 
information about a crime. 86 This is different to Informers who are paid to 
disclose such information, but the thesis will examine whether the relationship 
affects that decision to disclose the information, or whether there is any level of 
discretion on the part of the Handler, or even whether the Informer and handler 
are selective about the information. If it is found that such practices exist, then, 
by definition, the existence of the InformerlHandler partnership may well be in 
contravention of the criminal law. 
The American court in a way supports the notion that the use of informers is 
unacceptable, in that they maintain that everyone has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy under the 4th Amendment. Such a stance is cited in the case of United 
States v Katz (1967) where an informant entered the defendants house for the 
purpose of discussing crime. It was considered to be a warrantless entry and not 
acceptable, as it had violated a citizen's expectation of privacy. It would appear 
that other cases have provided significant exceptions to this rule, for example 
United States v Hoffa (1966). In this case, it was found that, 
85 McGuiness R. L., "Probable cause: informant information (conclusion)," EBl 
Law enforcement bulletin December (1992):pp 19-24. 
86 Smith J. C., Hogan B., Criminal Law (England: Butterworth & Co., 1969) 
p521. 
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'ji criminal suspect voluntarily invited a police informant into an area where 
he reasonably expected privacy, and chose to expose criminal conduct to the 
informant. The suspect gave up any reasonable privacy expectation by 
misplacing his trust in the informant." 87 
It could be argued that, if it is acceptable for an Infonner to impose on a 
suspect's privacy in this way, it would be difficult to then suggest he has 
committed a criminal offence by his involvement, And yet there are many who 
believe that this is the case, and technically the Infonner could be said to be 
conspiring with a criminal. 
The thesis will examine whether the partnership between an Infonner and 
Handler breaches the criminal law. Although misprision in itself is not a criminal 
offence in this country, it does seem quite amazing that the law a\lows Infonners 
to conceal infonnation about the commission of criminal offences. As already 
stated, practitioners may argue that such concealment is inevitable if the use of 
Infonners is to be successful, but perhaps this issue needs more debate in the 
courts. 
Summary 
This chapter has looked at the judicial system in relation to the Infonner, and 
how this has been reflected in a number of criminal trials both in this country and 
America. It can be said that although there is no legislation governing the use of 
Infonners, there has been substantial debate about their use and the procedures 
adopted by the law enforcement agencies. It is fair to say that ten or twenty 
87 Callahan M., "Reasonable expectation of privacy, the employee - infonnant 
and document seizures," FBI Law enforcement Bulletjn August (1982): 
pp25-31. 
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years ago the police found few people who were against the use of Infonners, 
indeed there was a considerable argument for protecting them. As a result, it 
was not practice for their identities to be disclosed. Over the years, though, 
there has been conflict between those who have tried to show their value as an 
investigative tool, against those who favour the rights of the defendant. In recent 
years, the emphasis has been placed on ensuring that the accused is able to 
submit a tenable case, and giving every opportunity for him to prove his 
innocence. The concerns expressed by some practitioners about Infonners 
setting up alleged offenders and offences is substantial. Such practices raise the 
issue of fairness, that is to say defence lawyers are increasingly suggesting that 
the evidence supplied by an Infonner is unfair and should be excluded by the 
Judge, thereby weakening the prosecution case. 
On the questions surrounding entrapment, a large debate exists in the American 
courts between the so called subjective and objective tests.88 On one hand, 
questions are asked about whether there was any inducement and whether the 
defendant had a predisposition to commit the offence, on the other hand, 
whether there has been an abuse of process by the law enforcement officials? 
The majority seem to be more comfortable with the subjective test. 89 
In relation to the discounting of sentences, some practitioners have asked 
whether the police have overstepped the mark, and more importantly perhaps, 
others have alleged that Infonners have given infonnation in order that they can 
benefit by a reduced sentence. To take this argument further, it is suggested by 
some that Infonners may go so far as to fabricate infonnation if a reduced 
sentence is available. The implications of this are even more important as the 
880p Cit: Elliott D. W. p.40 
890p Cit: State v Harney (1972) 
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evidence of an Informer, unless an accomplice himself, does not need to be 
corroborated. Of course, this is why defence lawyers try whenever they can to 
convince the court that the identity of the Informer should be disclosed. 
There are a number of Guidelines on the issue of agent provocateur, with a 
number of cases suggesting that the police have 'set up' crimes, alleging trickery, 
breaches of the law and precipitation. Although there is no longer an offence of 
misprision, the question of concealment of the commission of offences has been 
discussed. It has been argued that Informers must always be treated as an 
accomplice and used in the courts as corroboration. This again raises the 
question of disclosure, which seems to be one of the critical issues in terms of 
criminal trials. 
In relation to the use of supergrasses, this type of Informer became a regular part 
of the judicial system in Northern Ireland during the terrorism trials of the 1980s. 
After the Northern Ireland agreement it is likely to lead to an end to this 
practice, but there will always be criminals who see an easy way out of serving 
their full sentence. Such acceptance by the courts will continue to be debates, 
and a number of practitioners have demanded a high level of corroboration. The 
dangers are numerous and allegations against the police in relation to abuse of 
authority need to be regularly addressed. 
What of the future? Will there be more or fewer restrictions placed on the use 
of Informers in the courts? A lot will depend on public opinion and how the 
media interpret the decisions made by the courts. The greater the use the police 
make of Informers, the more opportunities there will be for others to criticise 
their use. A good indicator perhaps is the number of cases highlighted where the 
use of Informers has breached the rules or resulted in an abuse of the judicial 
system. It is inevitable that there will be more and more research undertaken in 
this area, in the hope that some of the questions and concerns may be resolved. 
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How does this relate to the present research? 
This research cannot cover ail the aspects discussed above - not the least 
because the study of court cases using Informers warrants a separate study, as 
does the use of a supergrass system. However, ail the cases referred to in this 
chapter are relevant to this research because they concern the relationship 
between the police and Informers. The question of disclosure will feature highly 
throughout; the respondents were questioned about their views on disclosure, 
whether or not they had in fuct not disclosed such involvement, and their 
observations, and whether they should be placed in the situation where their 
identities are disclosed. Specifically, it will be interesting to learn from the 
results whether active Informers consider terminating their involvement rather 
than have their identities disclosed, and how important Handlers consider the 
protection of their Informers. 
AlthOUgh the defence of entrapment is not in itself an offence in English law, the 
issue is also crucial to this research as it will try to discover how far the 
Informers and their Handlers are prepared to go, in terms of breaching the law, 
in order to secure an arrest and conviction. It may well be that the American 
tests of subjective or objective are considered and perhaps, if this is the case, 
then there may be recommendations to look at the feasibility of using a similar 
rule. Likewise, using Informers as agent provocateur will be closely examined, 
and specifically, it will be crucial to determine the extent of setting up crimes. 
Indeed, respondents were asked whether they have knowledge of incidents 
where the use of Informers has in fact broken the law. Their answers 
undoubtedly beg other questions for future researchers as to the usefulness of 
Informers, or indeed whether their use increases crirninality or reduces it. This 
matter is closely related to the question of misprision, and again it is important to 
S3 
determine, if possible, just how far the Infonner and his Handler will go in 
concealing a crime in order to detect another crime. 
There are of course a number of ethical questions, but it is not intended in this 
research to examine this area, although a number of such questions will 
inevitably be raised. 
The importance of this chapter is that it has shown how legal problems arise and 
their implications to the criminal justice system, when the use of Infonners is 
badly managed or worse, abused. The Research Question requires an 
examination of the partnership and its effects in tenns of breaches of the criminal 
law. There can be no doubt that if this partnership is flawed, then it will have a 
measurable effect on the British Criminal Justice System, and the credibility of 
the use of Infonners will be diminished. 
The legal issues discussed in this chapter are all connected with the relationship 
between the police and Infonner, particularly in tenns of protecting the 
Infonner's identity. One of the aims of this thesis is to determine what that 
relationship is and examines how important confidentiality is to them. 
It is also one of the aims of the thesis to determine whether the police use of 
Infonners breaches the criminal law, or the Police Discipline Code. Some of the 
legal cases referred to in this chapter suggest that crimes are 'set up' and 
engineered improperly, for example agent provocateur, misprision etc. The 
study will examine whether such practices still exist. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
literature Review 
In this chapter. the literature regarding Informers will be reviewed. This existing 
work from the United Kingdom and America has become the foundation from 
which the present research study was built. There is a noticeable lack of 
research; this being an unexplored problem area. Certainly. in Britain the 
literature on Informers could be described as "unoccupied territory" 1 although 
there is rather more from America, but even then it cannot be described as in 
abundance. Zander 2 noted a substantial lack of empirical evidence in relation to 
police investigative methods in general. 
The review will be divided into three sections. Firstly, it will concentrate on 
researched literature emanating from the United States. American research is 
relevant to the research because it examines some of the problems already 
referred to in Chapter One and, not surprisingly, the concerns and fears 
expressed by writers in the USA have been duplicated here to some extent. 
Secondly Government publications in Britain will be discussed, including such 
documents as Home Office Circulars, which deal with the working practices, 
1 Leedy P. D., practical Research' planning and Design (London: Collier 
Macmillan, 1989) p67. 
2 Zander M., "The Investigation of Crime: A study of cases tried at the Old 
Bailey." Criminal Law Review 203 (1979). 
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rules and guidelines laid down within the criminal justice system, and from which 
practitioners work from. Indeed, the police service operated their Informer 
systems under Home Office guidelines which remained unchanged for 23 years, 
and only recently have they been updated. Finally, the empirical evidence 
originating from the United Kingdom will be discussed, although there is little 
available. That which is will include documents from police seminars and 
conferences, from police journals and other publications where Informers have 
been discussed. It will of course include the findings from commentators outside 
the law enforcement system. 
Not only is the literature limited, but even where it exists, it comes from the non 
academic level, such as the practitioner. This does not detract from its 
importance but such publications tend to include rather more anecdotal and 
speCUlative opinions than otherwise. 
1. A review oflitenture from the USA. 
(8) ('.enenl 
The notion that the Informer is a dangerous person was recognised by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 1981 whilst discussing Informers, when 
they suggested that, "Occasionally we may require a degree of co-operation 
with persons whose motivation and conduct are open to question. "3 Helfand 4 a 
boxing Commissioner in New Yark, and someone not usually associated with 
Informers, nevertheless made the following relevant statement. ''Without 
informer information, you're not going to get very far. It's more valuable than 
3 Attorney General's guidelines on FBI undercover operations. Office of the 
Attorney General, Washington D.C. (1981) 
4 Helfand J., "Informants," Saturday Evening Post (New York) 2 June, 1956. 
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all the work that investigators and detectives can do." This argument is 
somewhat qualified by Earhart 5, who believed that the general public actually 
tolerate Informers, rather than condone them, dependent of course on the crime. 
Child murder is a type of crime where their use would be seen as acceptable. 
Other practitioners warn that good Informers are invariably involved with 
criminal activities. 6 This is supported by Harney and Cross 7 who argue that 
the Informer is likely to be a criminal or at least an associate of criminals. They 
advocate that every citizen has a duty to report any breach of the law, if a 
democratic society is to be preserved 8, and add that, "No modern policeman 
who properly uses informers needs to be apologetic about them. Informants are 
used because no other avenue is open to the conscientious investigation 
whereby the identity of the perpetrator can be determined" 
Although the use of Informers is generally defended, especially by law 
enforcement officers, Falk 9 has looked at the consequences of Informer use and 
believes that support could make the police reluctant to turn to more scientific 
and objective means of law enforcement, for example forensic science and 
technical surveillance. More importantly, he is concerned with the involvement 
between law enforcement officials and the criminal, and suggests that such 
associations will damage the public's image of the police. Katz 10 goes further 
5 Earhart R. S., A critical analysis ofinyestigator-criminal informant 
relationships in law enforcement CN ashington: International Assocn. of Chiefs of 
Police, I 962}. 
6 Weston P. B. & Wells K. M., Criminal investigation - Basic perspectives 
(EngIewood Cliffs New Jersey: Prentice-HaII, Inc., 1970) p92. 
7 Harney M. L. & Cross J. C., The infollDer in law enforcement (illinois, USA: 
Thomas, 1960) p16. 
8lbid: pl05 
9 Falk G. 1., "The public's prejudice against the police," American Bar Assocn 
Journal 50: 754 August (1964): p755. 
10 Katz H. A., "Narcotics investigations: Developing and using informants," 
police law quarterly(U S ) April (1978): pp5-12. 
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and acknowledges the possibility that the Informer may use his reward to 
purchase drugs. He advised that, "The use of informants is controversial, 
repugnant to the general public and always under attack by civil libertarians. 
Officers must be judicious and ethical in developing and using informants. " 
Rapp 11 is also concerned about the ethics and questions any police officer who 
grants immunity on the spot for minor offences on the grounds that an arrest 
would impede the investigation. He suggests that the officer becomes merely a 
collaborator toan illegal act. Oscapella 12 also reinforces the fears ofKatz when 
he established that some Informers actually ask for drugs as payment, rather than 
use the money to buy drugs. Nevertheless, he advocates that the Informer must 
be protected, even at the expense of an investigation, arguing that he may be 
useful in future investigations as well as the current one, and revealing his 
identity could jeopardise his safety. This in turn, suggests Rapp, would lessen 
the chances of cultivating others. 13 
Marx 14 reluctantly agrees that the use ofInformers as an undercover tactic is a 
necessary evil, but finds it difficult to reconcile the paradox, "preventing crime 
by facilitating it." In particular he discusses the use of unwitting Informers such 
as John DeLorean who desperately needed cash to save his car business. An 
FBI agent gave him money to finance a major cocaine deal, and the agent later 
testified that it was the only way to set up the job, using DeLorean's 
vulnerability. Marx found that the police regularly legitimise improperly 
gathered evidence, and suggests that they can become inventive in finding legal 
11 Rapp B., Deep cover- PoJjce intelligence operations (Colorado USA: Paladin 
Press, 1989) p33-47. 
12 Op Cit: Oscapella (1980) p144. 
13 Op Cit: Rapp (1989) p30. 
14 Marx G. T., Undercover- poJjce surveillance in America (USA: University of 
California Press Ltd., 1988) pplO-158. 
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ways to obtain information already obtained illegally. 15 He also believes that 
the police do not necessarily have to tell Informers to act illegally, because the 
relationship between them makes supervision almost impossible. 16 One 
occasion where the Informer is alleged to have acted illegally, according to an 
American court, is when Mel Weinberg was involved in the theft of certificates 
worth $2 million. Weinberg decided to help the police in their recovery, resulting 
in a three year prison sentence being waived. He also received $133,000 for his 
co-operation. He later wrote a book about it and received a further $15,000. 
During the trial, it was suggested that the certificates had not even been stolen. 
Although this was not substantiated, the Judge clearly was not convinced about 
Weinberg and called him an "Archetypical, amoral, fast-buck artist. " 17 
The criminal will always show a dislike for Informers, it being a cardinal 
violation of the convict code. There are those who disregard this rule and an 
example was during 1959 in Texas, USA after 4 members of one family had 
been murdered. F10yd Wells, a prison inmate knew about the murder having 
been imprisoned with the offenders and discussed it with them. He was of course 
frightened of the convict code and initially said nothing, but eventually told all 
and testified in court. He was the vital link to the case, and without his 
information, the crime may well have gone unsolved. 18 
Skolnick 19 studied the use of Informers by local police in an American west 
coast City with a population of 40,000. He spent several months with local 
15 !bid: p 153 
16 !bid: p 156 
17 Fullam 1., "Memorandum & Order" US District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania. US v Harry P Jannotte, George Schwartz. No. 80-166 
(November 1980) 
18 Wilmer H. A., "The role of the rat in prison," Federal probation 29(1) (1965): 
pp44-9. 
19 Skolnick 1. H., Justice wjthout trial (New York, USA: Wiley, 1966) 
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police, and concluded that, "-there is an implied understanding between the 
policeman and the informer that the policeman will protect the informer's 
criminal status." He believed that the police maintain a class of Infonners 
through permitting them to commit crime, and argues that their use of discretion 
allows them to decide guilt or innocence, although he concedes that such reports 
are "exaggerated, but not entirely untrue." 20 Nevertheless, he insists that the 
drugs officer, particularly, often outwits the spirit and the letter of the law and 
even suggests that they routinely violate the law, although this view is not 
accepted by Harney and Cross. 21 Skolnick also found, in support of others 
fears, that there was an understanding between detectives and Infonners that, as 
a drug addict, he will buy drugs with the rewards he receives. More specifically, 
he found that police officers investigating burglary offences allowed their 
Infonners to commit drug offences, whilst drug squad officers allowed Infonners 
to steal. 22 The study also showed that, although the police have no moral 
reservations about setting a trap to catch a target criminal, their pride and 
morality is hurt if their infonner sets up another criminal, for example planting 
drugs in his house, in order that he can be taken off the scene. Skolnick also 
concluded that there is a pressure on police officers to produce results and this 
produces conflict for them between efficiency and legality. 23 
There are however a number of practitioners who have declared their support 
for the concept of Infonner use. Hoover 24 for example insisted that all citizens 
had an obligation to furnish infonnation. He maintained that their use could 
always be justified, and felt that the criminal world would continually try to 
pp 11 5-23 I. 
20 lbid: p 124 
21 Op Cit: Harney & Cross (1960)pl3. 
22 Op Cit: Skolnick (1966)p 129. 
23 lbid: p231 
24 Hoover was at the time Director of the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation (FBI) 
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destroy an effective informer system. He stated that, "Experience demonstrates 
that the co-operation of individuals who can readily furnish accurate 
information is essential if law enforcement is to discharge its obligations. " 25 
The acceptance of the Informer as a dangerous tool was reiterated by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 1981 whilst discussing Informers when 
they suggested that, "Occasionally we may require a degree of co-operation 
with persons whose motivation and conduct are open to question. "26 
(b) Motivation 
This issue of motivation was examined by Brown 27 and he identified the 
importance of establishing what motivates Informers when he declared that "To 
understand the motive of an informant is to have the key to control of the 
informant." Ericson 28 agrees that the police need to establish what the motives 
are for Informers and use them. He argues that sources can be categorised into 
organisational, acting on behalf of private or public organisations, or individuals 
acting on their own behalf. He suggests that, if no motive is apparent, the police 
officer should create one, so that he in fact can provide the Informer with a 
purpose which can be satisfied, especially if police demands are to be met. Such 
practice would not be difficult to maintain if Maslow's theory is correct. 29 
25 Hoover 1. E., Law Enforcement Bulletin June (1955): pI. 
26 Attorney General's guidelines on FBI undercover operations. Office of the 
Attorney General, Washington D.C. (1981) 
27 Brown M. F., "Criminal Informants: Some observations on use, abuse and 
control," JOIIrnal ofpoJice Science and Admjnistration aJSA) Vol13 NoJ 
(1985): pp251-6. 
28 Ericson R., Making crime· A study of detective work (Toronto, Canada: 
Butterworths, 1981) P 117. 
29 Hampton Et ai, A theory of human motivation· The basic needs(In 
Organisational behaviour and the practice of management) (Glenview, Illinois 
(USA): Scott, Foreman & Company, 1968) pp27-40. 
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Maslow suggests that any person will, "-hunger for affectionate relations with 
people in general, namely for a place in his group, and he will strive with great 
intensity to achieve this goal. " 
Deininger 30 believes that the Informer performs a vital civic duty and in fact 
forms a basic part of society. Even so, he agrees that they will ultimately have a 
reason for giving information and lists six main categories: 
(i). payment - Some sort of reward, usually money. 
(ii). Revenge - To get back at a fellow criminal. 
(iii). Se\fprotection - May dissuade the police from targeting the Informer. 
(iv). Damage a competitor - E.g. to take out a fellow drugs trafficker. 
(v). SecIITe esteem of the officer - And as a result become friends. 
(vi). personal satisfaction - Enjoys the excitement. 
O'Hara 31 seems to agree with these main reasons, or motivational factors, 
although he goes on to suggest that the list is not exhaustive, and depending on 
circumstances peculiar to the subject, there may well be others. However, he 
lists the most common factors as: 
(i). Fear - for his own safety or that of his family 
(ii). Vanity - so that he can be looked on favourably by the authorities 
(iii). Revenge - to get even with a fellow criminal 
(iv). Repentance - rectifying wrong, guilty conscience 
(v). Jealousy - so that he can humiliate another 
30 Deininger R., "Using informants and co-operative witnesses," Law and order 
(liS). July (1977): pp64-70. 
31 O'Hara C. E., Fundamentals of criminal investigation (Springfield, Illinois 
(USA): Scott, Foreman & Co., 1976) pp 160-61. 
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(vi). Remuneration - material gain 
(vii). Avoidance of punishment 
(viii). Civic mindedness - to rid the community of crime 
(ix). Gratitude - to express appreciation 
(x). Competition - eliminate criminal competitors in category of crime 
Katsampes 32 has also examined the reasons behind informing; he concludes that 
they can be separated into two main areas. Firstly there are those who "like the 
thrill of the skirmish" and in fact play the role of the police officer. Then there 
are those who, having been arrested, are given the opportunity to help the police 
in exchange for a reduced charge or sentence, or even as an alternative to being 
charged. Lee 33, on the other hand, supports the general consensus and goes 
along with the generally accepted reasons such as fear, revenge, money, 
repentance and altruism. He goes on to discuss the problem Informer who he 
describes as ''perversely motivated" who offers services to identify undercover 
agents, learn police methods, identify targets and intelligence, or eliminate their 
own competition in drug sales. He suggests that these often infiltrate police 
departments to learn about traffickers, and supply information about them as a 
decoy to divert police officers away from his own activities. 34 
Reese 3S has also discussed the motivation of Informers, but specifically refers to 
the characteristics of a psychopath which will effect the way he, as an Informer, 
is handled by the police. He suggests that one reason why a psychopath may 
32 Katsampes P. L., "Informants: motivations and inducements," police OIS) 
Vol16 (December, 1971): pp52-3. 
33 Lee G. D., "Drug informants: motives, methods and management," FBI Law 
enforcement Bulletin September (1993): ppJO-15. 
34 Ibid: p12 
3S Reese J. T., "Motivations of criminal informants," FBI taw enforcement 
Bulletin May (1980): pp23-7. 
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turn Informer is so that he may deflect the focus away from himself, and 
hopefully shift the investigation elsewhere. Reese concedes that a psychopath 
could be a successful Informer, although any information he may give needs to 
be checked and corroborated. This type of person feels no guilt or remorse and 
cannot form a close relationship. According to Reese, such persons are 
untruthful, insincere and unreliable. 36 
(c) Police Management 
There are a number of issues studied which loosely fall into the category of 
police management. Oscapella's study in the late 1970s found a number of police 
practices which were questionable, and he was particularly concerned about the 
payment of inducements to Informers, which he advised should not be too large 
so as to incite crimes or persuade Informers to manufacture information. He put 
the problems down to a lack of management, and argued that if police systems 
were not improved, the police would find themselves compromised, and the 
public alienated . He said, The greatest potential lies in improved control by 
senior police officers over the conduct of informer dealings." 37 
Kleinman 38 discusses whether the Informers should be controlled by the 
individual Handler or the department in which he works. The department will 
argue that they should in order to minimise corruption, to discourage Informers 
committing crime, and to ensure that the rest of the department is not denied 
access. Detectives, on the other hand, will argue against, saying that information 
will dry up if department files are kept, but more important, the Informers 
361bid: p26 
37 Op Cit: Oscapella (1980)p 145 
38 Kleinman D., "Out of the shadows and into the files: Who should control 
informants?" Police Magazine (New York) November 1980: pp36-44. 
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anonymity is at risk if their names are known by corrupt or incompetent officers. 
The arguments continue, but in this country the majority of police forces accept 
that the individual must not control the Informer himself K1einman insists that 
the most common problem for the detective is that he is "sometimes too anxious 
to overlook an informant's crimes. " 
Mount 39 argues that there is a need for properly laid down procedures to deal 
with those Informers who breach the rules creating significant legal and public 
relations problems. He also suggests that because a close relationship often 
develops between a Handler and Informer, this can lead to the loss of objectivity, 
in that the relationship itself becomes more important than the reason for the 
association, that is the arrest of the criminal. There is no evidence, though that 
this conclusion was drawn from anything other than personal experience. The 
procedures he refers to, though are often omitted leaving a lack of control over 
Informers. Practitioners 40 have suggested that this may be due to a number of 
reasons:-
(i). Pressures on officers for success 
(ii). Competition between officers 
(iii). Secrecy within the department 
(iv). Belief that other criminals may obtain information 
(v). Danger of retaliation 
With regards to the question of secrecy, this seems to have been exacerbated by 
officers who believe that they own the Informer rather than the Police Force in 
39 Mount H. A, "An administrator's dream or nightmare," FBI Law enforcement 
Bulletin December (1990): p16. 
40 Williams I. R., Redlinger L. I. & Manning P. K., "Police narcotics control: 
patterns and strategies," National Institue of law enforcement & criminal justice 
Law enforcement assistance administration (1978): Grant No. 76-NI-49 _0109. 
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general and they often consider that they have the authority to promise that the 
Informer's identity will never be disclosed. Such action results in few records 
being maintained. 41 
(d) .Juvenile Informers 
Katz 42 has examined the area of juvenile Informers and warns that practitioners 
must consider peer group pressures, child protection laws, attitu~es and 
behaviour, before using juveniles. He suggests that Informer use becomes a 
topic of conversation throughout schools. In relation to the parents, Katz insists 
that their permission should be given, although he concedes that their permission 
has little legal significance and they could sue the police if the juvenile was 
injured as a result. In America, the law enforcement agencies not only seek 
parental consent, but also authorisation from a juvenile court, but even this 
practice has not stopped civil claims being made against them. 43 Nevertheless, 
there is evidence that juveniles are being used more particularly in the area of 
drug trafficking involving children, where the use of adult Informers is not 
practical. Herbert and Sinclair 44 for example argue that use must be made of 
juveniles as only they can stand any chance of infiltrating their own peer group. 
They suggest that such use does not breach any criminal law, as there is never 
any criminal intent, and in fact the juvenile becomes part of the enforcement 
process. Katz concluded that a juvenile Informer is more likely to fabricate 
41 DeGarmo J. W., "Must identity ofinformants be on record?" Law and order 
(l1S) Vol20 (April 1972): pp80-3. 
42 Katz H. A., "Use of juveniles as police informants," Journal ofCalifomia 
Law Enforcement Part 4 (1979): ppI96-98. 
43 Juvenile Informers - National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS) 
Database, National Institute ofJustice (USA) Washington 1 June, 1981p13. 
44 Herbert D. L & Sinc1air Jnr. V. L., "The use of minors as undercover agents 
or informants: Some legal problems," Journal oHolice Science and 
Administration Vol5 No.2 North Western University School of Law (USA) 
(1977): pp185-92. 
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information, and because of the legal and personal risks, he advises that such use 
should be avoided at all costs. 
(e) The relationship 
The common thread which seems to have been apparent throughout this section 
of the chapter is the effects of the relationship between an Informer and his 
Handler. Skolnick describes this relationship as, "-0 matter of exchange in 
which each party seeks to gain something from the other in return for certain 
desired commodities ..... police relations with informers are in the pattern of a 
bargain. When two persons make a bargain it is in the interests of each to hold 
the strongest position possible; police maximise their position by using the 
authority given to them by the State. "45 
In 1988, the FBI spent $8.4 million on Informers which has given rise to critics 
that unethical relationships had been formed where some Informers started to 
think they were police officers. 46 Marx 47 found what he thought to be an 
interesting concept when he studied police behaviour in riots, as a member of the 
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder. He concluded that the police, 
in responding to disorder, may contribute, not perhaps intentionally, to the 
conditions which they seek to control. 
Manning 48 believes that the one thing separating the ordinary citizen from the 
Informer is the formal relationship which the latter has with his Handler. He 
45 Op Cit: Skolnick(1966) p124. 
46 " The Boston Globe (USA) 15 April, 1994: p 16. 
47 Marx G. T., "Civil disorder and the agents of social control," Journal of social 
issues, Washington USA 26, No.1 (1969): ppI9-57. 
48 Manning P. K., The narcs' game (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
1980) ppI41-93. 
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suggests that officers are under pressure to produce results, and those officers 
who are showing a flair for this type of work are encouraged. Indeed, failed jobs, 
he says, can cause embarrassment and damage the officers' credibility. Manning 
believes that police officers can become preoccupied with their roles rather than 
the agency's purpose. He says that, "Their vast discretion makes the law as well 
as enforces it. Police are keeping them (informers) in business. Making money 
from informing is assumed to be a legitimate motive." He concludes that the 
more control the organisation can exercise, the less control the agent has. 49 
This argument will be considered throughout this study, especially regarding the 
relationship between the Informer and Handler. 
(f) Summary 
There is an overwhelming consensus by American writers that the use of 
Informers is inevitable, but they have all expressed their conclusions about the 
implications of such use. Some consider that the police image may become 
affected, whilst others believe that unless more stringent controls are adopted, a 
number of ethical issues could be raised. 
Some writers have touched on the motives of the Informer and tried to produce 
a definitive list, but their research has been shallow in that they merely provide a 
number of labels or categories for Informers. This has resulted in uninteresting 
conclusions. There has been no work carried out on how the motivation may 
affect the relationship between the Informer and the Handler, or whether the 
reasons for infonning change over time. 
49 !bid: p 193 
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The management of Informers has been studied mainly in terms of police 
practices and procedures and most agree that there exists in America a lack of 
control by police supervisors. There is some agreement that the use of Juvenile 
Informers is on the increase, and some of the dangers are identified, but again 
very little empirical evidence exists about Juvenile Informers. There is an 
obligation for the police in America to consult with the parent of a Juvenile 
Informer, purely to alleviate any future civil claim. This is not the case in 
Britain, though, which may suggest that more care is necessary. This area is not 
covered in this thesis and clearly, there is a need for further research to be 
undertaken. 
It is the relationship between the Informer and the police officer which creates 
the most concern, but again any conclusions drawn are not based on any 
in-depth study. It is acknowledged that this relationship is unique, and it is for 
this reason that this thesis will concentrate heavily on the relationship and its 
implications. For example, reference has been made to the use of discretion and 
the role of police Handler which may conflict with other police roles. Such issues 
could result in corrupt practices although there is no previous research. This 
study will examine the relationship between an Informer and Handler with this 
mind. 
2. British C.oyemment publications. 
Informers are not new, and their use has been evident throughout the centuries 
in many varied legal cases. The recognition by governments in this country of 
the need for control has, though, been slow and only recently has there been any 
real progress, perhaps due to the upsurge in activity by the police service in their 
use. For example, there is evidence that uniformed police officers are becoming 
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more involved whereas in the past only detectives were considered suitable. 50 It 
could be assumed that the government, acting in the best interests of the police 
service, and having a positive interest in its progress, would have produced 
ample guidelines on the subject. This however is not the case, and one wonders 
whether the lack of publications is significant, or merely that historically, 
Informers have been associated with danger and misconduct, and as such, the 
authorities have simply neglected to address the issues. 
In 1969, after a number of legal cases where the use of Informers had been 
criticised, the then Home Secretary supported their use. He said, "If society is 
to be protected from criminals, the police must be able to make use of 
informants in appropriate circumstances. Informants appropriately employed 
are essential to criminal investigation and within limits, ought to be 
protected 'tSl 
Those limits became abundantly clear some two months later in what became 
the first laid down Guidelines for the police on the use of Informers, and which 
have continued very much alone, at least until recently. 52 The Guidelines 
demanded that no-one should incite the commission of an offence and an 
Informer must not act as agent provocateur. It was accepted that Informers may 
be required to participate in crime, but only where certain conditions apply. 
Officers were advised that they must never mislead the court, they cannot offer 
immunity if the Informer participates in a crime, and can ensure that payments 
from public funds are supervised. The Guidelines were accepted by every police 
force in the United Kingdom, and were produced because of public interest 
50 "Share crime work, says inspectorate report," Police Review (17 February, 
1995): p3. 
51 Speech by Right Honourable James CaIlaghan, M.P., Home Secretary 
(February, 1969) London 
52 Home Office Circular NO.97/1969 (12 May, 1969) Informants who take part 
in crime. 
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arising from a number of cases, some of which are referred to in chapter two. 
The question of whether they have been adhered to by the police must be 
relevant, and forms an integral part of the current study. 
In 1992, the police were beginning to express their concern that Home Office 
Circular 97/1969 was unhelpful and needed to be replaced. 53 A new manual 
was suggested as a replacement which, it was hoped, would become less 
constraining and more consistent with modern case law. 54 The Association of 
Chief Police Officers (ACPO) commissioned, through their Crime Committee, a 
working party to examine the use and management of Informers in order that 
some agreed Guidelines could be given to the police service. This resulted in a 
report which was accepted by ACPO and later by every police force in the 
United Kingdom. 55 The document acknowledges that "the effective handling 
and exploitation of informallts calls for judgement, experience and the 
management of risk. ,,56 This document can be looked upon as a watershed in 
the use of Informers, in that it clearly provides practitioners with acceptable 
practices, based on the results of legal cases, linked with experience from police 
officers. Most police forces agreed to accept the Guidelines in their entirety, 
with minor concerns over a few of the proposals, and in fact, there is evidence 
that the publication of this document persuaded the police to consider their owo 
working practices. A number of forces have since made quite rigorous changes 
to their own systems. The data collection for the present research was carried 
out after the ACPO Guidelines had been implemented, and therefore their 
acceptance or otherwise will be reflected in the results. 
53 ACPO Crime committee meeting (4 June 1992)(unpublished) 
54 ACPO Crime Committee meeting (17 September, 1992)(unpublished) 
55 National guidelines on the use and management of informants and related 
issues. (January, 1995LACPO. 
56 lbid: Foreword by W. Taylor, Chairman ACPO Crime Committee. 
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One specific kind of Infonner has been identified by the Home Office. These are 
similar to the others, but have one particular motive, to secure a reduced 
sentence. They have been involved in an active participation of a serious crime, 
but elect to infonn on their associates who have been involved in that or other 
crimes. These people, often referred to as protected witnesses or supergrasses 
became apparent in the 1980s in Northern Ireland. They are widely used by the 
police who believe that they have a valuable part to play in the fight against 
crime. 57 In essence, such Infonners are protected if it is considered that they 
may be prevented from giving evidence at trials, or there is a likelihood of 
revenge attacks on them or their families. As long as they fulfill their obligation 
to the police, they can be provided with a new identity and be assisted with 
re-housing as well as being offered long tenn welfare and support. S8 ACPO 
have never felt particularly comfortable with this arrangement 59 although it is 
apparent that little has been done to alleviate ACPO concerns or indeed change 
the working practices of law enforcement agencies. Although protected 
witnesses do not funn part of this present research study, their relationship with 
the police is most certainly relevant. Here we have, by definition, known 
criminals who are involved in usually quite serious offences, often involving 
injury, and the police are apparently content to deal with them to their mutual 
satisfaction. It has been noted that ACPO are not comfurtable with this 
arrangement, but allow it to continue subject to some very loose and simple 
Guidelines which remain susceptible to abuse. Nevertheless, at least there are 
some Guidelines for Infonners who are protected in this way. 
57 Home Office Circular No. 9/1992 Resident infonnants (1992) 
58 ACPO Crime committee letter to all Chief Constables dated 15 February, 
1990 (unpublished) 
59 ACPO (Crime committee) meeting 17 September, 1992 (unpublished) 
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An Audit Commission study in 1993 encouraged the use of Infonners and 
commented that they are the lifeblood of the CID, and wondered why more 
regular use was not being made of them.60 The Audit Commission report 
suggested that more emphasis should be placed on proactive work, and 
supervisory police officers should advocate more use. It also warned that if the 
police reduce their payments to Infonners due to restricted budgets, this may be 
counter productive if it stops infonners co-operating.61 It must be stressed, 
however, that the Audit Commission have never undertaken any research into 
the use of Infonners, relying heavily on the data supplied to them by official 
sources, and their motives for the study were based on financial accountability. 
Summary 
It is apparent from the lack of official publications in this country on Infonners 
that govermnent did not identify the need to circulate satisfactory guidelines or 
controls to the police service. Home Office Circular 97/1969 was for years the 
only guideline for the law enforcement agencies in this country, but this had no 
effect on police management, resulting in a lack of control of the Infonner and 
supervision of the police. The inevitable consequence, some say, is corruption 
within the police service, and undue pressures on police Handlers to produce 
results. 62 
The ACPO Guidelines were published in January 1995 and to date have become 
the rules for every police force in the country, and includes areas such as 
recruitment, resident Infonners and juveniles which have been debated albeit not 
60 Effective Crime Management - Report of Audit Commission Study 
(November 1993): Infonnant handling para 84-6. 
611bid: Encouraging the use ofinfonnants para.BO. 
62Clark R, "Infonners and corruption" (In Infonners: Policing, Policy, Practice, 
Billingsley R et al (Ed.) Willan Publishing) (2000) pp38-49 
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at length. The ethical, moral and legal implications give rise for most authors to 
conclude that they should not be used as Informers. It is interesting that the 
police service are now beginning to question the legitimacy of the ACPO 
Guidelines and there effectiveness, and suggesting that they should be replaced 
by a code of practice for use by law enforcement officers. 
The data for this present research was collected after the ACPO Guidelines were 
published which makes the findings so important, and any recommendations 
made in this thesis will reflect the areas of weakness found in the Guidelines, in 
the hope that tighter controls will be put in place. 
3. A review ofresean:h literature from the United Kingdom. 
(a) General 
It may be the reluctance by the police to identifY their Informers which has 
resulted in a lack of documentary evidence about them. Certainly Zander noted 
a lack of empirical data in England whilst researching police investigative 
methods in general. A study of ISO cases at the Old Bailey during 1971172 
revealed only 9 instances where an Informer was used. 63 Oscapella 64 
confirmed this in a later study and suggested that this was extraordinary when 
the police admit that Informers are the most common method of solving crimes. 
The consensus of opinion, for example the Audit Commission, has always 
appeared to be in favour ofInforrners as a useful means for the law enforcement 
63 Op Cit: Zander (1979). 
64 Oscapella E., "A study ofinforrners in England, "Criminal Law Review 
(1980): p 136. 
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agencies to adopt. Westley 65 for example considers them to be "-the life blood 
of the good detective." Glutterman 66 agrees that the Informer is vital to combat 
crime and suggests that if this view is accepted, then it follows that the 
anonymity of the Informer must be preserved. Such police support of Informers 
is also given by Wyles, an ex woman senior police officer, 67 who argues that 
many crimes would remain unsolved without their use. Indeed there have been 
many examples where the public have thought the police had made brilliant 
detections, when in fact the Informer had been responsible. She warns this is a 
risky business where the Informer is "-running with the criminal while hunting 
with the police." She enquired, "-What a strange mentality is theirs; taking with 
one hand profit from the gang with whom they work, with the other hand they 
collect the reward for their treachery against that same gang. Honour among 
thieves? There is none. " 
The fate of three men, alleged to be Informers, was revealed in a television 
programme in 1994, and highlighted the dangers involved in this type of work. 
The men, Gregory Burns, John Dignam and Aidan Stars were accused by the 
IRA of being police agents. They were abducted and interviewed on tape, when 
it is alleged that they confessed to being Informers. As a result, they were 
executed. All three were apparently involved in the murder of Margaret Perry, 
Bums' girlfriend, because she knew about a robbery they had committed. 
Dignam says that he told the police about the murder and agreed to work for 
them. According to Stars, he was told by the police that if he didn't give 
information he would be arrested for murder. A year after the murder, in 1991, 
they were executed and the television programme accused the police of failing to 
65 Westley W. A., The police' A sociological study oflaw, custom and moralit):, 
diss., University of Chicago (Chicago: Dept. of Sociology, 1951) p70. 
66 Gutterman M., JonmaJ Qfcriminallaw, criminology and police science Vo1.58 
No. 1 (1967): p63. 
67 Wyles L., A WQman at Scotland Yard (London 1952) p76. 
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act in relation to the murder. There is of course some doubt as to whether the 
confessions were true or whether the story was merely IRA propaganda against 
the Royal Ulster Constabulary, but Brendan Cirran of Sinn Fein said, "Agents 
are corrnpt. That's why the British use them. "68 
On the other hand, Reiner 69 agrees that the police may well 'Jeel impelled to 
stretch their powers and violate suspect's rights", but argues that, for the most 
part, the police are dedicated to maintaining order and fighting crime. Jones 
agreed arguing that the police service has been encouraged to use Informers, but 
felt that this was a cause of the problem as some police officers were not suited 
to this type of work but would not admit it. This will be discussed later in 
Chapter five, but on this issue, Jones warns that this is a specialised field and far 
too valuable to spoil. He explains that, "In my early days we used to say the 
three most dangerous things were what we called the three P's - prisoners, 
prostitutes and property. But the one I, for informants can make the P's pale 
into insignificance. They tend to be untrustworthy, unbalanced, greedy, 
treacherous and yes, dangerous. ,110 
Brightwell confirms that the use ofInformers is an essential and established part 
of police work, but stresses that those that deal with them should always be 
aware of the inherent dangers, and always establish their motives. He suggests 
that, "They present a minefield of indiscretion which can only be negotiated by 
the application and preservation of a decent standard of fair play and a resolve 
to act within the spirit of the law at all times. '111 
68 States of terror. BBC Television production. Peter Taylor, Producer/writer 
(Thursday 13 January, 1994) 
69 Reiner R., The politics ofthe policer (Brighton: Wheatsheafbooks, 1985) 
p88. 
70 Jones 1., "Its good to talk," Police Review 29 September, 1995: p21. 
71 Brightwell A., What considerations ought to govern the use of informants in 
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Gosling, a practitioner who worked in the 1950s appeared to be far more 
nonchalant, although he too accepted that Informers were a difficult group to 
deal with. He argued though that, "-You may have to let him go free after he's 
committed a crime because then you can put the squeeze on him afterwards-. " 
His attitude at the time is perhaps one of the most significant reasons why this 
present research was considered, especially when he explained that, "-/ began to 
cultivate thieves. / made friends with them, listened to their troubles, and shut 
my eyes to their minor misdeeds. ,fl2 
The question of payment was highlighted by the national press when it was 
reported that an Informer had sued the Hampshire police for £30,000 in relation 
to unpaid tip-offs. The Informer, a criminal on legal aid, claimed he was owed 
money for information against a number of gangs and had waited four years. He 
decided to take civil action after Hampshire police revealed that they were 
enhancing their intelligence network. It could be argued that proper 
management systems would not have allowed the police to have found 
themselves in this situation, but the High Court found against the Informer. He 
explained that, '1 see myself as a self employed police officer rather than an 
informant. ·fl3 
Following the Audit Commission Report in 1993, the Home Office 
commissioned a study into how some police forces looked at proactive criminal 
investigation methods. Specifically looking at Informers, all forces were 
concerned about the lack of training, and it also became apparent that a number 
the investigation of crime - thief maker or thief taker. (1984) Metropolitan 
Police Service (Unpublished) 
72 Gosling J., The Ghost squad (New York: Doubleday, 1959) p17. 
73 McGowan R., "Grass demands a cut - Informer sues police for tips." ~ 
Express 7 February, 1996: p19. 
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of experienced detectives expressed reservations about "sharing or even 
revealing their existence to supervisors. ,f74 
The Audit Commission report concluded there was a widespread view that the 
disclosure rules deterred potential Informers, and that the restriction of payments 
gave little incentive bearing in mind the risks involved. One practitioner argued 
that one way of alleviating these fears was for police forces to ensure that they 
maintained an adequate intelligence system. This would support the notion, he 
says, that intelligence belongs to the force and not the individual, and 
presumably bring everything out into the open.15 This theory may have been 
somewhat naive but the theory has to be considered. 
A seminar on Informers held at the Police staff college, Bramshill in 1994 heard 
a heated debate in connection with selective informing, a key issue in this study. 
Selective informing is where the Informer decides on which piece of information 
he passes on, depending on the circumstances. For example, an Informer may be 
a drug addict and will not wish to jeapordise his supplier. The danger that the 
Informer will not give information which may involve himself or in any way 
disadvantage his own objectives. Those present at the seminar, who were all 
senior police officers, accepted this as an unsatisfactory but natural phenomenon, 
although one of the delegates commented that, ''Leaving the decision to 
prosecute to the police is controversial; leaving it to the informer seems 
indefensible. ,f76 
74 Maguire M. & John T., "Intelligence, surveillance and informants: Integrated 
approaches," Crime detectjon and preventjon services paper Home Office (July 
1995): p27. 
75 Rusling M., Police intelligence - an investigation into the collection, 
correlation, evaluation and use of intelligence. Metropolitan Police Service 
(unpublished) 1990. 
76 A structured approach to informants. Police seminar at Police Staff College, 
Bramshill (unpublished) 4/5 April, 1994. 
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(b) Crimestoppers 
Although the crirnestoppers scheme 77 is not in any way connected with the 
police use of registered Informers, there are similarities in as much it is a way for 
the public to give information about crime and criminals, anonymously if they 
wish, and in return for a reward. It is worth including therefore, in this literature 
review. One practitioner commented about the system, "These methods all 
continue to make the job of detecting criminals easier, giving better protection 
to the people and property of our community." 78 Although the Scheme is 
regionally based and funded by the participating police forces. 79 the rewards 
are funded by a National charity, Community Action Trust. 80 In the first six 
years of its inception, the system helped with nearly 8,200 arrests nationally, and 
the recovery of £\3. 7 million worth of stolen property. One officer posted to a 
regional office suggested that, "/ have found most people who ring in prefer to 
leave information anonymously rather than claim the money. ,,81 
Because of the confidentiality of the system, it is not known whether police 
Informers use the crimestoppers scheme. Certainly there is no system in place 
allowing the police to check, but there seems to be nothing to stop a registered 
informer being paid for his information twice; once out of public funds by his 
handler, and again through the Crimestoppers scheme. There are moral 
questions here, together with management issues, but without more research, the 
77 Originated in Minnesota, America because State law prohibited public funds 
to be paid out as rewards. This became the forerunner to Crimestoppers set up 
in London in 1988 and now taken on throughout the Country. 
78 Bennett W., "Contacting and paying informants," Law and Order Vol21 (21 
April, 1973): pp28-31. 
79 Minutes ofNo.3 Region meeting at Wakefield 2 August, 1988. (unpublished) 
80 No. 3 Region Crirnestoppers Unit - Standing Order (unpublished) 
81 "Crime-time Prime-time The Crimestopper Unit," 999 Emergency Services 
Publication Vol8 No.2 (1994): p7. 
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extent of the problem is not clear. Again, the official Guidelines are quite sparse 
and do not appear to have addressed the issues relating to registered Informers. 
This present research study does not address this issue either but it is 
nevertheless relevant as the Crimestoppers scheme is so closely related to the 
use ofInformers. 
4. I,iteratllre relating to practical matters. 
Some of the existing literature discusses a number of specific issues relevant to 
the practitioner, and which will be examined in this study. 
(a) Motiyation 
The Thames Valley police, when registering Informers, ask their handlers to 
complete a profile form, and they are asked to report the perceived motivation of 
their Informer. 82 These fall under the following headings: 
(i). Avoidance of punishment 
(ii). Gratitude 
(iii). Remuneration 
(iv). Revenge 
(v). Vanity 
(vi). Repentance 
(vii). Fear 
(viii). Competition 
(ix). Civic mindedness. 
82 Cox M., Crime informants - a new approach, Thames Valley Police, 
(unpublished), 1989) plO. 
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One of the most recent studies of Informer motivation was conducted by 
Dunnighan 83 who refers to two types of Informer, the regular and the 
supergrass. The latter's reason for informing is purely to receive a lighter 
sentence and as such his usefulness is short-lived. The regular, on the other 
hand, can go on providing information for a long time. His research involved 
asking police officers for their perceptions of the motivation behind Informers 
who they had been involved with. The main reasons were identified as: 
Financial reward (33%) 
Enjoys being an informer (13%) 
Looking for a favour (11%) 
Gratitude to officer (7%) 
Dislike for that type of crime (7%) 
Pressure by officer (6%) 
Part ofa deal (5%) 
Friends with officer (1 %) 
These reasons are of course those of the police officers, and not the Informers. 
It is suspected that Informers would have responded in much the same way, but 
there is a need to seek the views of the Informers before any conclusions can be 
drawn. Perhaps their motives are quite different. This thesis will undertake to 
compare and examine the responses from both groups. 
(b) Police management 
Many of the issues addressed by Dunnighan and Norris 84 during their research, 
concentrate on police management of Informers. The study relies heavily on 
83 Colin Dunnighan, "Reliable sources," Police Review 14 August, 1992: 
ppI496-7. 
84 Dunnighan C. & Norris C., Practice, problems and policy· Management issues 
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interviews with 62 police officers from 2 police forces and questionnaire 
responses from 227 police officers, and concludes that:-
(i). Insufficient training is given 
(ii). Handlers by-pass system 
(iii). Handlers under pressure to provide results 
(iv). Lack of supervision 
(v). Officers believe they act for the right reasons 
Zander 85 and Oscapella's 86 findings which showed a reluctance by the police to 
disclose the use of Informers, were supported by Dunnighan and Norris's study; 
when 31 case files were examined and none showed the role of an Informer 
having being used. Skolnick's view is supported by the finding that police 
officers are put under pressure to provide results, and it was found in some cases 
that officers used their own money to reward their informers. Dunnighan and 
Norris suggest their research demonstrated that, "not only does the practice of 
running informers often involve corner cutting and breach of rules, but it also 
involves what many may view as ethical misconduct. " Dunnighan believes that 
his study has uncovered "legally and morally dubious tactics" and suggests that 
the officers consider that their actions are "in the best interests of both the 
public and the police service. ,,87 The researchers in this study had hoped to 
interview about 30 Informers but only managed to see 11, and 8 of those were 
seen in the presence of their police handlers. This was mainly due to difficulties 
experienced in arranging the meetings as well as the officers' reluctance to 
in the police use of informers, University of Hull, (unpublished) (May 1995) . 
85 Op Cit: Zander (1979) 
86 Op Cit: Oscapella (1980) 
87 Burrell I. & Ley A., "Police accused of abusing the 'snout' system," The. 
Sunday Times 7 May, 1995. 
82 
introduce their Informer to a third party. 88 It was also conceded that this 
research was carried out between 1993 and 1995, prior to the ACPO guidelines 
on the Management and Use of Informants. 89 Nevertheless, the police service 
appear to be actively addressing the issues, as shown by a Durham police 
training initiative which has set up a course to train controllers. The course, run 
in conjunction with Teeside university, has received independent accreditation by 
the National Crime Faculty and the Police Foundation have shown an interest. 90 
It has been widely accepted by the police service that the use of Informers 
creates problems, and it is how those problems are managed which are 
important. Grieve 91 expressed his concerns and said, "It is my contention that 
the base of all these problems is not just the weakness of the officers involved 
but the failure of their organisations to outline to them the dangers involved '~2 
In the report, Grieve refers predominantly to drug offenders and suggests that, 
even when dealing with this category of criminal, the police must be fair. He 
believed that there has to be a measure of risk management involved, but 
suggests that management decisions are more likely to relate to operational risks 
rather than the Informers reliability or the content of the information. He argues 
that "Risk is concerned with decision making in conditions of uncertainty. " 93 
88 Norris C & Dunnighan C., "The role of the informant in the criminal justice 
system," Economic and Social Research Council R000234202 (1995): ppl-16. 
89 Dunnighan C, & Norris C., "The Nark's Game," New Law Journal 22 March, 
1996: pp 402-404. 
90 Potter K., "Inside Information," police Review (2 January, 1998): pp20-21. 
91 Commander Grieve was at the time the Director ofIntelligence for the 
Metropolitan Police Service. 
92 Grieve J., Informant handling-Dangers (draft report) Metropolitan Police 
Service (unpublished report) 1985:p2 
93 Grieve J., Leadership and risk - how to decide .... "What you can get away 
with or drilling a 50 foot hole in mother earth" ... when using informers and some 
other applications. Police Staff College (1989)(unpublished)p6. 
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His fear was that, unless the management systems are properly in place, "-the 
informer will become a more prolific, more dangerous criminal than those we 
are seeking to destroy by his use. "94 
Grieve accepts that handling Informers must inevitably involve approving 
criminality to some degree, if only because a high proportion of Informers come 
from criminal backgrounds. What Grieve in fact is suggesting, is that because the 
Informer is generally a criminal himself, then his association with a police officer 
may at some stage corrupt that relationship, manifesting itself in some degree of 
law breaking by one or both of the partners. He suggests, though, that such a 
situation is workable as long as the decision-making process is open to scrutiny, 
that is, each police force must determine a system which allows for 
comprehensive documentation so that an independent body may carry out an 
audit. Grieve recalls where he has seen many occasions where officers write 
down the minimum on files, which is counter productive, and open to criticism 
by defence lawyers who are more frequently becoming "lawfully audacious". 95 
Explaining that Informers are treacherous people, Grieve reluctantly agrees that 
the informant system can be a prime cause of corruption, which is a problem not 
managed very well by the police in the past. He says, "The relationship between 
the informant and his handler is a hot house where corruption can flourish. 
You have to have a system. It has to be open to audit analysts and third party 
scrutiny. "96 
Following a number of disasters in the London area during the 1970s, very 
stringent regulations were imposed on the police dealing with Informers. 
94 Op Cit: Grieve (1985):p13. 
95 Personal interview with Commander John Grieve. 24 May, 1994 New 
Scotland Yard, London. 
96 Ibid. 
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Unfortunately, these were largely unworkable and the number of arrests and the 
detection fell. 97 It is important therefore that any rules should be realistic 
without stifling the flexibility of the situation. Such rules have been constantly 
monitored and evaluated by Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary, who give 
due consideration to the management of a police force's working practices in 
terms of their systems, level of security and protection of the Handler, and it may 
be significant that no mention is made of the protection of the Informer. An 
assistant Inspector of Constabulary suggests that the whole purpose of an 
inspection is, "-to satisfy that there is integrity and security of the system and 
the maximum protection for police officers involved in handling informants. " 98 
The lack of official documentation on the recruitment of Informers is, to say the 
least, bewildering. On one hand the police support the need for increased use of 
Informers, and yet they seem to have neglected to take the opportunity to advise 
their officers how to do it, and the problems and pitfalls that may arise as a 
result. It is as though this has not been considered as a worthwhile area to 
pursue, that every police officer must somehow already be aware. Even the 
ACPO Guidelines which are recognised as the definitive document on the 
subject, makes no reference whatsoever to this important aspect. Grieve points 
out that there is a history of problems connected with recruitment, but maintains 
that, "The informant is just another method of intercepting communication and 
assists in interdiction. " 99 
But even here, Grieve fails to debate the specific problems, such as the 
implications for the police in failing to understand the motivation of an Informer, 
97 Penrose R., Informants - The ACPO view. National Seminar on informants -
Exeter (13 September, 1995) (Deputy Assistant Commissioner) (unpublished) 
98 Abbott J. M., Police Use of informants. National Seminar on informants, 
Exeter (13 September, 1995) (unpublished) 
99 Notes of presentation by Commander John Grieve 26 October 1993, p3 
(unpublished) 
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and the handler. There is an obvious lack of research into the issues of 
recruitment. One officer attached to the Special Branch in Belfast insisted, "If 
the CID arrest a man on a positive fingerprint, for example, and we get to hear 
about him, we will try to cultivate him. We will offer immunity from the crime 
in return for his help. It's a great way of recruiting and I wish the CID always 
told us of such cases." 100 It is hardly surprising to learn that the CID in the 
Royal mster Constabulary are not always so supportive of this initiative, as often 
it will undermine their responsibility to detect crime. The special branch, 
however are not put off by such criticism, and one officer pointed out, "I will 
use blackmail if necessary. I have no problem with that. We are trying to 
identify terrorists and that is the overriding factor." 101 The use of Informers 
against terrorism is arguably the most difficult for the police, especially when the 
IRA openly threaten the public that they will "take action" against anyone who 
informs to the RUC about terrorist activity. 102 
In 1995 a long awaited document was produced on recruitment, which followed 
a study based on interviews with 85 police officers from throughout the United 
Kingdom, Europe and the United States of America. 103 This research has 
turned out to be somewhat shallow; it did not seek the views of the Informers 
themselves. Nevertheless, it was aimed at increasing police officers knowledge 
and awareness, as well as highlighting to senior officers the importance of having 
a structured approach. In particular the motivation of the Informer was 
discussed. Interestingly enough these motivations were rarely known by 
100 Confidential notes of visit to Royal mster Constabulary 22/23 June 1994 
(unpublished) 
101 Ibid. 
102 "IRA Threat to Police Informants," Police Review 17 January, 1997: p6. 
103 Hanvey P., "Identif'ying, recruiting and handling informants," Home Office 
police Research Group Special Interest Series: Paper 5 (July 1995): pi. 
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Handlers. 104 A number of recommendations were made which are being 
considered. 
(c) .Juyenile Informers 
As already noted in Part 1 of this chapter there is very little literature and a lack 
of data originating from America on juveniles and this is also the case in Britain. 
Law enforcement agencies have not as yet given this area the consideration it 
deserves, and in fact some European countries explicitly restrict their use of 
Informers to adults. 105 Iganski 106 agrees that there would be a great deal of 
hostility against recruiting juveniles, and the national media has been negative in 
its response, the major concern being over payments to juveniles. Police officers 
going into schools may well damage the image of the police, but more 
importantly may raise other issues such as the breach of confidentiality, and the 
implications for the police should they decide not to obtain pennission from a 
parent. These are all questions which have been raised but to date not answered. 
They are of course important questions, particularly when it has emerged that 
there exists in this country a number of juvenile informers who are earning 
substantial amounts of money that the police are investing these rewards into 
trust funds to provide for the child when he reaches 18 years of age. 107 
Despite little literature on this topic, more and more police forces are 
acknowledging the presence of juvenile Informers, particularly as the National 
104lbid: p9 
105 Minutes of the 1st European Meeting on Informant Handling - Lyons, 
France 13/14.2.96. 
106 Iganski P., "Exploring the sensitivities about the police use of juvenile 
informants," National Seminar ofInformants, Home Office(unpublished), Exeter, 
13 September, 1995. 
107Twomey J& Oakes J, "Trust Fund Informers," Express on Sunday 5 
October, 1997: p26. 
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crime figures suggest that "- 14 to 16 year olds are responsible for a great 
number of crimes. " 108 It follows that the more useful Informer for this 
category of crime will be of a similar age group. The ACPO guidelines does 
refer to the subject, albeit briefly, suggesting that there is no legal reason why 
juvenile informers cannot be used, but emphasises that " Great care must always 
be taken -': 109 Current Home Office research looking at the registering and 
handling of juvenile Informers is hoping to formalise Guidelines for the police. 
This research has studied selected police forces and secured interviews with 
police Handlers, but it appears that some officers have developed their own 
unofficial operating rules. 110 Recommendations made in the report include the 
suggestion that a\I police forces promote the use of juvenile Informers with 
appropriate Guidelines for officers which would, it is hoped, enhance the value 
of such use. 111 
The use of juvenile Informers most certainly raises a number of ethical 
questions, and like the subject in general, has not to date been resolved. In 
1992, the police service identified the need to consider ethics within general 
policing, and published a statement of ethical principles. 112 These resulted from 
a review of operational policing which led to a quality of service initiative. It was 
agreed that the police service should accept the rule oflaw and actively oppose 
any malpractice, ensuring that all police officers only act within the law. 
Specifica\ly, the principles state that, "_It is not for the police to operate outside 
108 Balsdon S., "Juvenile informants," police Review (21 July, 1995). 
109 Op Cit: ACPO guidelines (1995) p83. 
1I0 Balsdon S., Juvenile informants - National Seminar on informants 13 
September, 1995, Exeter (unpublished) 
III Balsdon S., "Improving the management ofJuvenile Informants," lfuxru:. 
Qf!ke. April, 1996: p28. 
1I2 The Police Service Statement of Ethical Principles (1992) (unpublished) 
88 
the law to achieve a conviction. It is for the legislative to legislate; the police 
to police; the judges to judge. "113 
This appears to be sufficiently clear, and yet the use ofInformers seems to be in 
direct conflict with this. In any event, how these principles are interpreted by 
practitioners is vague. There are those who may feel that the conviction is the 
most important issue, and how that is achieved is merely a means to an end. At 
a recent assembly of police officers discussing Informers, one was quoted as 
saying that "Noble cause corruption feels ethical to some handlers." 114 But 
specifically relating to children, it is perhaps interesting to note that in 1991, the 
United Nations Convention on the rights of the child have identified the need to 
ensure that special care and protection is given to them due to their vulnerability. 
Their report demands protection from exploitation where their use is 
"prejudicial to any aspect of the childs welfare." 115 
It is clear, then that Police Forces in Britain are at least addressing some of the 
issues affecting juvenile Informers, and one police force has incorporated this 
essential aspect into their own training course, 116 On the other hand few forces 
have developed a satisfactory code of practice or procedures. There is a real 
need for further research into this aspect, otherwise, as Balsdon has pointed out, 
"-we will drive the whole issue underground, putting both the officers and 
youngsters at risk." 117 
113 Ibid: p20 
114 Informers Management Course (Lincolnshire Police) 22/24 January, 1996 
(unpublished) 
115 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. UNICEF, 
London (1991) Article 36 p12. 
116"New Course for Informant Controllers is Launched," Police Review 17 
January, 1997: p6. 
117 Potter K., "Teenage sources," Police Review (8 November, 1996): pp22-3. 
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(d) I.inkjng the Handler to the Informer 
Whether the issues are regarding juveniles or not, the common theme maintained 
throughout is the importance placed on the relationship between the two groups, 
the Informer and the police Handler. In the 19th Century, there were regulations 
prohibiting police officers associating with criminals, but detectives tended to 
ignore this, arguing that they needed to buy information, either with money or 
promises of preferential or lenient treatment. 118 
According to Maguire and Norris, the police can become too close to the 
Informer, resulting in corrupt practices, and they noted excessive pressure put 
on some offenders to give information against others, which tended to shed 
doubt on the truth of the information. 119 They also suggest that the closeness 
of the relationship a110wed some police officers to reward their informers out of 
their own money, to fail to report participating informers, in order for them to 
avoid the official systems of red tape. This closeness became apparent during a 
study in the Metropolitan Police District by Searby 120 when 50 police officers 
were interviewed with a follow up questionnaire involving 159 respondees. One 
officer, talking about his relationship said of one informer, "-He wanted a stall in 
the market. He came to us because an officer has contacts in the market and 
was able to pull a few strings and get him a little stall." 121 Another officer 
admitted that some informers are a110wed to commit crime as long as they give 
regular information. He explained, "He may wish to get irrvolved in a little bit of 
villainy and if he's going to see police regularly about information perhaps he'll 
118 Maguire M. & Norris C., The Ruyal Commission on Criminal Justice' The 
conduct and supervision of criminal investigations (Research study No.5: 
HMSO, 1992) pIS. 
119 Ibid: pl07 
120 Searby G. P., Gjving criminal information to the police in confidence An 
assessment ofpuhlic motive and police response, Cranfield Institute of 
Technology, 1988 (London: January 1988) Volume I-I!. 
121 Ibid: p67 
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be given a little bit of the old insurance." 122 Other officers in the study 
accepted that some informers will give information against drug traffickers with 
a view to removing their own debts. By putting the opposition out of business, 
they can make a lucrative trade for themselves. Others will give information 
about other criminals so that the focus will be taken away from their activities. It 
has been noted in America that in drugs work, informants are involved in 95% of 
cases, and some defence lawyers have suggested that it has been common for 
Informers to receive a percentage of drug forfeitures. 
Bean 123 noted from his research into drug users, that some dealers were 
believed to be enjoying a 'Javoured relationship with the police", and appeared 
to be practicing with immunity. They were thought to be Informers using their 
close relationship with the police for their own benefits, although this was never 
substantiated. One particular house in Nottingham became one of the busiest for 
crack dealing, which allegedly was occupied by an Informer, where the dealers 
were "capitalising on the infonners perceived police immunity." 124 Bean 
accepts though that his study produced little data to guide him through an area 
which was neglected in terms of research, but asks the question - does the police 
use of Informers actually increase criminality? 
South's study of the police use ofInformers in 1993/1994 125 concluded that the 
relationship between Informers and their Handlers was a key area of policing 
which needed to be researched to enable it to be better understood by policy 
makers, the public and the police themselves. His research included interviews 
122 Ibid: p71 
123 Bean P. T., "Home Office," Cocaine and crack in Nottingham - a follow up 
~(1992). 
124 Bean P. T., Informers and the police' drug dealers as infOlmers, 
Loughborough university,(November, 1995). 
125 South N., The po1ice use ofinformants' some key issues and 
recommendations, University of Essex, ( September, 1994) . 
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with 20 police officers and 5 Informers and his findings supported Maguire & 
Norris who showed that officers often omit to reveal that their Informer has 
participated in a crime. One officer said, "You don't reveal to the court that they 
were participating, and its not as though they are going to know - so you bend 
the rules and don't tell them. " 126 South concluded that there was room for 
improvement and made a number of recommendations which are being 
considered, although the ACPO Guidelines seem to have addressed most of the 
issues covered. He makes the point though, that "The relationship between the 
informant and the handler is a partnership - but it is not an equal partnership. 
The handler must run the informant not the other way round" 127 
(c) Summary and oyelYicw 
The literature discussed in this chapter suggests there is substantial support for 
the use ofInformers, mainly from practitioners, arguing that they are an essential 
part of the investigative process. Nevertheless, there are those who agree with 
the system in principle but warn that such use will inevitably allow Informers to 
commit crime. Furthermore, there is evidence that some practice selective 
informing, the dangers being that Informers are in fact being allowed to use their 
discretion in terms of which information and criminals are targeted. 
Some concern has been expressed in relation to the use of rewards, and the level 
of immunity afforded by some police officers, with some argument about the 
measure of police discretion which subsequently arises. In a number of cases, 
the lack of data where the use of an Informer has been disclosed in a criminal 
trial, has been the subject of discussion, as has the difficulty for some academics 
126 Ibid: p21 
127 Ibid: pp 16-17 
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to reconcile the balance between the prevention of crime and the facilitation of 
criminal offences, as a result of the use of Informers. These are both 
understandable and valid concerns which demand clarification, and the present 
research will address some of these issues. 
Police management issues have also been debated and concern expressed over 
the reward system, and whether it may induce criminality. The fact that minor 
criminal offences by Informers have been overlooked has not been considered 
necessary by most, and it has seemingly resulted in the cutting of corners and a 
breach of the rules. 
The notion of InformerlHandler relationship is a major issue, and the consensus 
appears to be that they are too close, and this situation can only lead to a 
unhealthy situation for the police service. It is crucial to point out, though, that 
none of the theorists referred to in this chapter have actually examined this 
relationship in any meaningful way. This conclusion is based on the fact that 
although they have sought the views of practitioners and relied on police reports 
and other documentation, none have studied the observations of police officers 
and Informers, and gone on to compare the results. It is only by doing this that 
the implications of this relationship can be understood and therefore acted upon. 
There will always be those who will argue in support of Informers or against 
their use, but surely no real conclusions can be drawn until those who are 
directly involved are studied. Skolnick 128 acknowledges the limitations of his 
research in restricting his study to "- one City, one police department, one 
prosecutor's office, one criminal court's community." Indeed, his data regarding 
Informers was totally reliant on other bodies. Oscapella, in his study of 
Informers in England, had a surprisingly weak methodology, in that he examined 
128 Op Cit: Skolnick(1966) p40. 
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the role of the Informer through court files and police documentation, rather 
than collect data from source. Similarly, the research undertaken by Dunnighan 
and Norris relied heavily on interviews with police officers from only two 
separate forces, and some case studies. South's study in 1994, and that of 
Dunnighan & Norris (1995) both interviewed Informers, but only small samples 
were used, and they cannot be regarded as representative. 
Some practitioners referred to in this chapter admitted they have had direct 
contact with Informers and some of those are recognised as experienced officers 
in the field. Grieve is one such man who is regarded by most as an officer with 
vast practical knowledge of the use ofInformers. But even this is not sufficient 
to arrive at solid conclusions about their use. Only by talking to a substantial 
number of Handlers and Informers and securing data direct can there be any 
hope of determining the real situation. 
The discussions in relation to juveniles, crimestoppers, recruitment and the 
supergrass system are of course all relevant to the general topic, but will not be 
covered in the present research. These particular areas have been included so as 
to provide a complete picture of the situation and encompass all the issues of the 
subject which of course is most complex. What is significant though is the 
change of management procedures which have resulted from the circulation of 
the new ACPO Guidelines which were accepted by every police force in the 
country. These guidelines were implemented from January 1995, and therefore 
any lessons which may have been learned over the decades since Home Office 
Circular 97/1969 was brought into being, will have been incorporated into the 
new rules. The present research involving interviews with Informers and their 
Handlers all took place after the new rules were brought into operation, and it is 
hoped therefore that the results will reflect the success or otherwise of the 
Guidelines. The level of control of the systems practiced within the police 
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service is also relevant to the present study, in that it will show how much self 
regulation exists, if at all. By establishing and identifYing these controlling 
measures, the present research will be in a position to examine whether or not 
they are being maintained. 
It is the relationship between the Informer and his Handler which is of particular 
importance, and how that alliance manifests itself in the police use oflnformers. 
The thesis will examine how the partnership works, if at all and if it is too close. 
The study will also examine the implications of this relationship. The suggestion 
that police officers are content to allow their Informers to commit crime, and 
use discretion about their activities is of course important to establish. It will be 
relevant to see whether the relationship puts undue pressure on the police officer 
to secure results, or indeed whether the Informer is subjected to pressure, which 
may affect the reliability of the information. Indeed, it will be useful to 
understand just how far each of the partners will go in their relationship, before 
there becomes a breach of the rules, a short cutting of the systems or a 
contravention of the law. Perhaps the police use of Informers can be compared 
with the experiments carried out by Milgram 129 to establish how far people 
were prepared to inflict harm on others if they were ordered to do so. Tests 
included volunteers using electric shock treatment on participants who were 
being tested on their memories. This treatment was in fact faked and the 
volunteers were misled with a view to establishing the experiment which showed 
that many would in fact be brutal on the authority of others. There is an ethical 
question here but when relating this exercise to Informers, how far they will go 
under the authority of a police officer is quite relevant to the present study. The 
use of Informers could be in conflict with the police service tradition of 
129 Milgram S., Obedience to authority· an experimental view (New York 
(USA): Harper & Row, 1973). 
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upholding the law, and the research will be looking to see if the police are in 
control or the Informer, and is that control being dealt with properly. 
Put simply, the concerns, fears and suggested implications of this relationship, 
expressed by authors both in America and this country, will be examined in this 
thesis, using data which has not before been available or accessible. This work 
will therefore prove or disprove what has been inferred for years, that the 
partnership is dangerous, not controlled and creates criminality; that is to say the 
relationship between an Informer and Handler increases crime rather than 
prevents or detects it. The important difference is that the data is now available 
for analysis, enabling a detailed study of the relationship to take place. 
This chapter has shown a lack of research into the use of Informers, both in 
America and Britain. In particular, there are few studies which have secured 
their data directly from the Informer, relying instead on police records and police 
officer's perceptions. 
This lack of research has resulted mainly because of the sensitivity of the subject. 
The work of an Informer is confidential and the police service generally are 
uncomfortable about discussing their relationship with Informers. It has not 
been possible for anyone outside of the police service to have access to the data, 
and this has therefore restricted the research to the police themselves. 
Further research into Informers in Britain would need the authority of the 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) through both the Crime Committee 
as well as the Research Committee, the final decision resting with the individual 
Chief Constables concerned. Chapter four will discuss this further and detail the 
problems and difficulties experienced during this study. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Tbe Researcb Questiou 
Wbat is tbe nature of the relationsbip between Informers and tbeir 
Handlers within the Police Service in England, and wbat are the 
consequences of these relationships? 
TbeAims 
1. To determine what constitutes an Informer. 
SUB AIMS 
a. Io define an Informer, and identify the role 
Law enforcement agencies interpret the name Informer 
in a number of different ways. It is crucial that all interested parties begin to 
understand exactly what an Informer is and what part hel she plays in the criminal 
justice system. 
b. Io differentiate hetween a registered informer, a 
police contact and a public spirited citizen. 
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There are a number of sources of information and the 
Informer is just one. They are all different, and these differences must be 
understood if they are to be dealt with properly. 
c. To establish a profile for informers 
If a typical profile exists for an Informer, this fact may 
assist law enforcement agencies in their management and control. 
2. To determine what constitutes a Handler 
SUB AIMS 
a. To establish a profile for Handlers 
Not every police officer has the inclination or skills to 
become an Informer handler, and it would be useful for those who are tasked 
with identifYing potential handlers to be aware of such factors. 
b. To identify the Handler's role 
What the Handler does, his terms of reference and how 
this fits into the role of a police officer generally needs to be established. 
3. To determine the relationship between the police and 
the Informer. 
SUB AIMS 
a. To determine how the relationship is initiated. 
This refers to where the Informer and Handler met and 
under what circumstances. 
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b. To determine whether the relationship can be categorised 
The study examines the factors which make up the 
relationship and looks at their importance. 
c. To determine whether the relationship has any significance 
The relationship between the Informer and the Handler 
may only be important if it is relevant to the work they both do. 
d. To compare those feamres ofthe relationship with other partnersbips 
Chapter Five has examined the theoretical implications 
of other partnerships involving professionals, and specifically those partnerships 
which involve the police service. The chapter begins with an assumed model of 
the InformerlHandler relationship; that is to say, the common perception of 
practitioners as to what the features are which make up that relationship. The 
assumed model will help to determine the data collection for the research. This 
study will establish whether those features which emerged from the theoretical 
examination actually exist in the relationship between an Informer and Handler, 
and if not, will perhaps propose a more accurate model. 
e. To establish what causes some police officers to involve themselves 
with Informers and others not? 
This may be connected to Sub aim 2a in relation to a 
Handler's profile. A separate study looks specifically at the reasons why some 
police officers engage in the use ofInformers. 
4. To determine what the informer wants 
to get out of the relationship. 
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SUB AIMS 
a. To establish the motiyational factors for informers 
The reasons why Informers become involved are diverse 
and numerous and this study looks at providing a definitive list of those reasons. 
b. To determine whetber these factors affect tbe use of informers 
An examination will be made into the reasons to see if 
tbey make any difference to the relationship or bow it is developed. 
c. To establish if the reasons for informing Can change 
If the motivational factors change during the partnership, 
then this may affect how that partnership is progressed and managed. 
5. To determine whether the police use of informers 
breaches the Jaw. or Police Discipline Code and if so, 
to what extent. 
SUB AIMS 
a. To determine whether selective informing exist 
The existence of selective informing could have a 
dramatic effect on any national guidelines or codes of conduct, and it is crucial 
therefore to determine the level of activity. 
b. To determine whether the use ofinformers break the law 
The management of Informers is accountable and any 
breach of the criminal law therefore needs to stand scrutiny, but first the level of 
such breaches has to be determined. 
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c. To estaWish ifthere is any leyel ofdiscretjon used with the law 
The study will try to determine how widespread the use 
of discretion is by the Infonner and the Handler. 
d. To determine whether police Officers breach the Discipline Code 
The police is a disciplined service and subject to strict 
regulations. The study will establish if those regulations are being breached and 
if so, to what extent. 
6. To make recommendations. if releyant relative to the 
relationship between tbe infonner and handler. 
SUB AIMS 
a. Does the informer/handJer relationship jn any way 
effect working practices 
The management of Infonners in this country is subject 
of national guidelines, and eventually an agreed code of conduct will be 
published. If this study shows that existing procedures are not adhered to or 
breaches occur, then the guidelines must reflect such action. 
b. Is there a need to make any recommendatjons? 
Only when this study has been carried out will it be 
possible to determine whether any recommendations should be made, but if so, 
then the Association of Chief Police Officers will be the likely recipients. 
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Method 
Aims 1 and 2 will be established through interviews with Informers and police 
handlers by way of structured questionnaires, studying each of the group's 
perceptions of their role and comparing the responses. The specific comparison 
of police officers who are involved in Informer handling against those who are 
not, with similar rank and service, is made in a separate study which is covered 
in Chapter six. The data obtained from the main sample will however be used to 
produce a typical profile for both groups. In addition, the definitions of an 
informer were examined from the literary review, where practitioners and 
theorists debated the topic. 
Some people give information to the police who are not considered to be 
Informers. For example, the public spirited citizen who sees an incident or 
overhears some suspicious conversation which they feel compelled to relate to 
the police. This is not a regular occurrence, and they do it for no other reason 
than to help the police. There are also the regular contacts such as the bank 
manager and the local social services officers who are willing to help the police 
whenever possible. These again do not help for any reward or personal gain. Of 
course these people give information and could be described as informants but it 
is the informer, the person who regularly gives information motivated by some 
sort of reward, financial or otherwise, who is of interest to this study. Sub aim 
1 b will establish the difference between these three types of informants, the 
Informer, the Public spirited citizen and the Contact. 
Aims 3 and 4 will be established using the same interviews, referred to above. 
As a means of determining the relationship between the Informer and Handler, 
the respondents were asked for their thoughts and observations. Some 
theoretical work has been carried out in Chapter five which has identified some 
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common features from relationships involving professionals, some involving 
police officers, others not. This study will establish whether those features also 
appear in the relationship between an Informer and Handler, proving in fact 
whether this partnership is as unique as commonly thOUght. 
Specifically referring to sub-aim 3e, a separate and distinct study was undertaken 
in Lincolnshire and the results are discussed in Chapter six. 
Aim 5 will be established using the same prepared questionnaire as the previous 
main aims. Reference to the law means the criminal law by way of statute or 
Common Law, and the Discipline Code is found in Police Regulations 1 
Aim 6 relates to the effect on working practices within the police service, and 
substantial reference has been made to the ACPO guidelines on the use of 
Informers, in establishing exactly what the current procedures are. The 
interviews with both Informers and Handlers was used to reflect their 
observations, and this has allowed a number of recommendations to be made, 
which are shown in Chapter seven. 
The Research Design 
This work is an exploratory descriptive study; that is to say, it is looking to 
formulate new hypotheses, rather than test existing ones. As such, it will have a 
relatively low theoretical input and a relatively high level of data collection, 
because very little is known about Informers and it was necessary to get the 
whole subject off the ground. This type of explanatory survey certainly has its 
I HMSO, "Statutory Instrument No.SI8," The poljce (DjscipHne) Regulations 
1985· Schedule I Reprinted 1994: pp20-23. 
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limitations and some of these will be discussed later, but it has the advantage of 
obtaining data direct from source. As Silverman points out, "No hard and fast 
rules for conducting research can be provided" 2 It was a question then of 
determining the most effective method of dealing with this problem. Because of 
the lack of previous research, even though there exists some work relative to the 
law on Informers, it has been inevitable that this study breaks new ground, and 
the methods reflect this. 
Because of the limitations of this type of study, a number of a priori 3 
assumptions have been made, based on the experience and practical knowledge 
of the police. For example, some Informers may not have been totally truthful in 
their responses due to their criminal background and although the data was 
checked where possible, the information had to be taken on face value. This 
situation is not helped by the lack of previous research, as discussed in chapter 
three. 
The research will involve to a large extent, the use of questionnaires, and will be 
based on the perceptions of various people, including the Informers and 
Handlers, with only a small amount of documentary data as corroboration. This 
is because of the importance of securing data direct from source, rather than 
having to rely on police records, which themselves could not be assumed to be 
accurate. The Literary Review of Informers has included both published and 
unpublished material, the latter of which was taken generally from police 
sources. It has already been noted that very little academic research has been 
undertaken in relation to the police use of Informers, and the review therefore 
2 Silverman D., Qualitative methodQlogy & sociology (London: Gower 
Publishing Co., 1985) p17. 
3 I have on a number of occasions had to think about what exists using my own 
practical experience, without knowing if it does or not. 
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relies mainly on the rules, guidelines and orders produced internally by the police 
service, as well as anecdotal evidence from practitioners, which forms the basis 
for the qualitative research. A broad spectrum of areas will be discussed in 
order that the subject can be understood. 
The Ipformer populatiop 
At the time of writing, 43,352 police Informers were registered in England 
(Appendix A). It was inevitable therefore that only a small number ofInformers 
and Handlers could be used in the study. Also, it was apparent from the start of 
the research that not every police force would agree to participate, and in fact a 
total of 12 forces co-operated with the study. These 12 police forces were likely 
to be unrepresentative as they were not chosen in a controlled manner, although 
they may represent an adequate cross section of the total including large 
metropolitan areas, rural and urban, as well as a substantial Regional Crime 
Squad office (now reorganised as the National Crime Squad). Although only a 
proportion of police forces participated in the study, it was felt that because this 
was an exploratory study, it was the inferences made by the participants that was 
important. 
Those forces which decided against participation all acknowledged the 
importance of the research but either felt that it was a far too sensitive a subject 
to allow such an exercise within their area, or merely felt that their systems were 
in need of improvement and therefore did not wish any sort of external scrutiny. 
This in itself was of concern and showed even more the importance of this work. 
The reasons given by Forces for not participating were accepted without 
question, and it was decided that any attempt to persuade them would have been 
futile, as clearly they were not comfortable with a request to visit their areas. 
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Interviews were restricted to registered infonners mainly because there existed 
at least some documentation relating to them which could be used if necessary to 
check their validity. For example, it was necessary for the purposes of 
producing a profile, to ask their dates of birth. Not everyone gave it but those 
who did could be checked against their records to confirm or otherwise their 
accuracy. The rules governing the police use of Informers insist that Informers 
must be registered, and although it is recognised that some officers may not 
follow this rule, it would have been difficult to identifY unregistered Informers. 
Recognised sampling methods were considered in turn, and not found to be 
practical for a number of reasons. Firstly, because of the sensitivity of the 
subject, the interviewees had to remain anonymous. Secondly, the selection 
relied heavily on the Informer's agreement to be interviewed, and any method of 
systematic sampling would therefore be inappropriate. This was also the problem 
when considering the statistical method of random sampling. This research then 
has relied on the nonprobability method of accidental samples, that is taking the 
opportunity of using those Informers willing to assist, and ensuring that they do 
not grossly mislead the situation. There has been an attempt to control bias as 
far as possible, but it was recognised from the beginning that the method of 
selecting individuals from a group such as police Informers would be difficult to 
account for. 
There is no data available from individual police forces which shows the ratio 
between male and female Informers. Similarly, there is nothing to suggest what 
percentage of police Handlers are female. One indicator may be the percentage 
of female officers in each force, although no assumptions could be made from 
this. Any figure established in this way would be dangerous because there may 
be other factors which contribute to the total, for example, the rate of female 
detectives. Their ages, length of service and type of work, unifonned or plain 
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clothed are also unknown, and in relation to the Informers, their antecedent 
history and backgrounds are not specifically recorded. This meant that it was 
impossible to decide on a sampling method using such key factors. The gender 
of the Handler could well be the subject of research in the future. In this study, 
the only criteria set was that both the Informer and the Handler should have been 
actively involved in this type of work. Each force was asked to provide a 
number of each for interview using no other consideration. 
It was accepted that by restricting the questionnaires to registered informers and 
police officers who handled informers, then each and every interviewee's 
responses were relevant and appropriate. Even though, for example, one 
informer may have given a reply which was not representative of the population, 
the fact that he gave it was indeed valuable data and worth including. To some 
degree, then it was not so important to abide by the general rule "The larger the 
sample, the better." 4 The total number of persons seen in this study was not 
restricted to a maximum figure. Instead, the numbers were dependent on how 
many could be arranged within the available time. In making contact with each 
of the police forces who agreed to participate, a senior police officer was asked 
to act as liaison officer and secure a number of officers and Informers to be seen. 
There was no stipulated limit to actual numbers, but the liaison officers were 
restricted in terms of time, resulting in a manageable number being organised for 
interview. Logistically, the researcher travelled long distances from his own 
force area, and although some stays lasted for a number of days, there was a 
limit as to how many interviews could be arranged in one session. This had the 
effect of automatically placing constraints on the actual number of elements. 
4 Leedy P. D., Practical Research' planning and design (New York (USA): 
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1989) p156. 
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Reliability and validity 
The data for this present research relied on the responses ofInformers and police 
officers, and as such, an important consideration is whether such data is valid. 
Galtung 5 argues that information obtained through verbal data is just as 
important as non verbal, however Phillips 6 maintains that if the interviewees 
motives are suspect, making him or her provide a less than candid report, then 
that report has little credibility. Certainly in the case of Informers, many come 
from a criminal background and therefore can be assumed to be dishonest to 
some degree. This assumption may not be made with police officers, however 
they may feel reluctant to give totally honest answers to some of the questions. 
It has to be conceded from the beginning that this research study covers a very 
sensitive area, and therefore must be susceptible to inaccurate responses. A 
number of validity checks within the questionnaire were used, such as date of 
birth etc., which were checked against the Informer files. From this exercise, no 
cases were identified where details given were found to be incorrect. 
Nevertheless, substantial reliance was given to the assessment of each 
interviewee. This is far from satisfactory, but in the circumstances probably all 
that can be hoped for. Kidder 7 makes the point though that such a method 
provides information for the researcher which could only be obtained by other 
methods which are perhaps less valid. This data check showed that all the 
respondents gave their correct details. Of course, it can not be assumed that 
because they answered one question truthfully, they would continue to give 
honest answers, but it did provide some confidence in the other data. 
5 Galtung J., Theory and methods ofsocjal research (New York (USA): 
Columbia University press, 1967) . 
6 Phillips D., Knowledge from what? Theories and methods in social research 
(Chicago (USA): Rand McNally, 1971). 
7 Op Cit: Kidder p147 
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The impressions of the researcher were quite surprising, in that it was felt the 
Informers genuinely wanted to provide accurate information. It was wrongly 
assumed that they would take every opportunity to mislead the interviewer who 
they knew was a police officer, but on the contrary, the respondents all seemed 
to want to help this important research work, perhaps because they felt they may 
benefit from changes in the working practices. 
Dean and Whyte 8 discuss the problem a researcher is faced with when 
interviewing an Informer, and stress the importance of assessing whether the 
information is subjective or objective. "The informants statement represents 
merely the perception of the informant, filtered and modified by his cognitive 
and emotional reactions and reported through his personal verbal usage." 
They warn of distortion for whatever reason and suggest that a system of cross 
checking is essential. In this present study, a certain amount of testing has been 
achieved within the questionnaire. As already discussed, the date of birth of an 
Informer was requested, albeit not particularly relevant to the study, as their 
general age group was all that was required. 
There are a number of questions which are the same for both the Informer and 
Handler, and some of these relate to factual questions where the response 
options were alike and therefore able to be compared. Such a comparison would 
help to show the level of validity of these questions specifically but also the 
questionnaire in general. This was achieved by testing for statistical significant 
differences between the two sets of responses, as shown in Chapter Seven. 
8 Dean J. P. & Whyte W. F., "How do you know if the informant is telling the 
truth," Human organisation Vol 17 (1958): pp34-8. 
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There were ten specific questions chosen which fitted the criteria, and only two 
of those showed obvious disagreement, giving a high degree of confidence in the 
rest of the data. Another validity test built into the questionnaire was the 
response options to each of the questions. Due to the effective pilot study, all 
possible options, with some exceptions, were included at an early stage which 
meant that the relevant options were covered in the exercise. This resulted in 
later frequency checks on the questions showing no missing cases, concluding 
that all cases were valid. 
Perhaps the most important reason for the researcher undertaking all of the 
interviews was to reduce the bias caused by systematic differences from one 
interviewer to another, and enhance the test-retest reliability. This meant that 
any bias that existed was restricted, which could be controlled as much as 
possible during each session with the respondents. As a sole researcher, 
inter-rater reliability did not apply. 
A measure of this reliability was achieved through the questionnaire, which 
allowed for a structured response, and alleviated different perceptions the 
researcher may have held during the interviews. This in effect reduced the 
interviewer's freedom thus negating any preconceived ideas he may have had of 
the responses. It is the respondent's perception of the interviewer that is 
probably more likely to have caused some distortion. 
Both the Informer and the Handler never previously experienced a situation 
before when they were asked sensitive and delving questions by a senior police 
officer. The Handler is a police officer and therefore subject to police discipline 
regulations and as such may be guarded with his answers. The Informer may 
also have a number of reasons for giving less than accurate answers to a police 
officer whom he or she has never previously met. All these possibilities are 
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inevitable and must exist to some degree, and this was identified from the start 
of the research. 
The Pilot Study 
Having produced what was considered to be a relevant and workable 
questionnaire, it was considered necessary to undertake a pilot study 9 to pretest 
the questions on a number of recipients, referred to as qualitative fieldwork by 
Sieber. 10 The rationale was to try out the questionnaires to ensure that they 
would work, to resolve unforeseen problems and also to see if any changes were 
required prior to the main study. 11 It was particularly interesting to learn how 
the phrasing of the questions would be accepted, and whether there would be a 
need to eliminate some questions and add others. Having identified at an early 
stage, that the questions will differ between Informers and Handlers, it was also 
necessary to accept that Informers may find it more difficult to understand the 
function of the questioning. It was imperative, therefore to be satisfied that the 
questions were pitched at the right level, and fully understood. 12 This point 
was also identified by May when he noted that, "You might think that the 
meaning of a question is clear enough. but it does not follow that the people 
answering it will agree with your interpretation. " 13 
9 ShipmanM., The Hmitations of social research (London: Longman, 1988) p80. 
10 Sieber S. (Denzin N. K. (Ed.», The integration of fieldwork and survey 
methods in Sociological methods' a source book (London: McGraw-Hill, 1978) 
p36S. 
11 Kidder L., Research methods in social relations (New York (USA): 
Holt-Saunders), (1981) 4th edition: p162. 
12 Leedy P. D., Practical Research - planning and Design «(USA): Macrnillan 
Publishing Co., 1989) p143. 
13 May T., Social research - jssues, methods and process (Buckingham: Open 
University Press, 1993) p76. 
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Although it was established that the main study should be undertaken outside 
Lincolnshire, the Pilot Study was in fact conducted within the County, as a 
matter of convenience. This did not have any negative effect on the study, and 
the advantage of accessibility far outweighed any disadvantages envisaged, such 
as having personal knowledge of the respondents. 
Before the decision was made to pilot the questionnaires in Lincolnshire, a postal 
questionnaire was considered using one specific police force. A senior officer 
within that force was contacted and he agreed, after some deliberation, to 
receive a total of ten questionnaires with which he circulated to officers who he 
believed would take the trouble to complete and return them. They were duly 
sent back and without exception lacked explanation, and as far as the police 
officers were concerned, gave very safe and deliberate replies which in no way 
put them in jeopardy. This exercise was discontinued, and it was accepted that 
all the interviews needed to be done personally. Nevertheless, this was a 
worthwhile exercise which helped to decide on the agreed methodology. 
Three questionnaires were completed for the Informers and the same number 
for the Handlers. A senior police officer centrally based in the force who had 
responsibility for maintaining records of informer handling within Lincolnshire, 
was used to identifY the respondents. Three Handlers were randomly identified 
from his records, relying on code numbers alone, and therefore not concerned 
with their age, sex or for that matter, any other type of categorisation. The 
Handlers were asked to nominate one Informer with whom they had recent 
contact, and further interviews were arranged with them, at different times. All 
the interviews were conducted separately and no other persons were present. 
They were all carried out at police stations - this did not appear to have caused 
any problems. It should be pointed out here that in the main study, it would not 
be left to Handlers to identifY Informers for interview. This was achieved 
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through a Senior police officer in each police forces concerned, so that only he 
would know who had been chosen, in line with the agreed methodology. 
All the recipients were fully aware of the purpose for the pilot study, and where 
there were areas of confusion in the answers, they were asked to provide more 
acceptable responses. Some time was spent in discussing the questions, and all 
answers were recorded. The questionnaire required that all questions should be 
answered, and there was no need therefore, to complicate the session by 
pointing out areas not requiring attention. At the end of each interview, 
sufficient time was allowed to note any relevant observations and comments 
from the session, including the questionnaire itself, for example space allowed 
for each question, and general format. 
This type of research poses problems of confidentiality. Some of the questions 
are sensitive and honest answers may place the recipient and the interviewer in 
an invidious position. It was for this reason that the questionnaire did not seek 
to identifY individuals. Furthermore, an undertaking was given that the 
information provided would not be acted upon at any future date. 
During the pilot, it was found that the Police Officers interviewed showed a 
great deal more discomfort in answering than the Informers. It was thought that 
this was in part because they were talking to a senior police officer, knowing 
that potentially they were in danger of admitting certain breaches in their codes 
of practice. Some time was spent in assuring the interviewees that total 
confidentiality would be afforded. This problem arose again in the main study, 
and was dealt with at the time. Although all of those persons interviewed 
appeared satisfied with the assurances given at the start of the sessions, it is 
known that two Handlers and one Informer refused to participate in the pilot. 
Their reasons were not recorded, although it seems that the Informer intimated 
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that he required payment for this work. This was refused on the grounds that no 
funds were available for this purpose, and also, this would set a precedent for 
the main study. 
The pilot interviews took approximately forty minutes and this was felt to be a 
reasonable period to retain attention. The time taken for each interview was 
important when it came to arranging large numbers of interviews during the 
main study. 
Following the pilot interviews, the respondents were again assured that their 
responses would be treated as confidential, and on every occasion they appeared 
to be satisfied with the questions and the general progress of the interview. In 
all cases, the interviewees suggested that they would be available for further 
interview should it be required. In addition to the interviews, the questionnaire 
was shown to a number of other senior police officers and their observations 
requested. No specific criticism was made. 
Following this pilot, a small number of amendments were necessary. A few 
questions required changing and in some cases, taken out completely. Where 
the interviewee was asked to expand on some detail and give examples, this had 
not been made clear. A number ofthe questions were changed as a result. 
The Pilot Study showed how frank and honest the interviewees would be and of 
course this was encouraging. For example, when one Handler was asked, who 
incidentally was known to the researcher, about whether he had been selective 
about the information he had received, he said, "I've used certain injonners 
knowing full well they have handled stolen property but to arrest active 
burglars, I have turned a blind eye." The same sort of honesty was experienced 
by a local Informer who answered the same question by saying, '1've missed a 
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job out like when I waited for the offender to get out the Wlry. The police have 
been happy because they recovered the property." This type of response helped 
to support the validity of the research. 
Where multiple choice answers were offered, the Pilot provided a number of 
additional options which had not been recognised before and these were all 
incorporated into the final document, and it was necessary to establish some 
supplementary questions to Informers which were not applicable to their 
Handlers. However, there was no need for substantial changes and in view of 
this, it was felt that a second pretest was unnecessary. 
The Interviews for the Main Study 
The main thrust of the data collection involved the interviews of Informers and 
police Handlers. Kidder 14 considers that interviews and questionnaires are a 
useful method of collecting data when it is impossible or impractical to collect 
data about people by observation. Certainly in the case of Informers, it would 
have proved very difficult to observe them whilst in the business of informing 
due to the very nature of their role, and their reluctance to participate. The 
interviews were done, therefore, by way of a structured prepared questionnaire, 
the detail of which will be discussed later. It was felt that the interview was 
crucial to this particular research as it gave the researcher the opportunity to talk 
to each of the individuals personally. Watson 15 supports the notion of 
conversation and suggests that it '~ .. gives a feel of something, even if it tells you 
nothing you did not already know." The interviews were intended to extract 
more than just factual information, but feelings and observations of the 
14 Kidder. L. H., Research methods in social relations (International edition: 
Holt-Saunders, 1976) p146. 
15 Watson. G, Writing a thesis (Essex: Longman Group, 1987) pS3. 
115 
respondents. SeJlitiz et al 16 argued that it is always useful to "obtain the 
respondent's perceptions of the facts rather than the facts themselves. " 
The option of using a tape recorder was considered and certainly there was an 
obvious advantage of ensuring that every part of the conversation was recorded. 
It was decided against such use though, mainly because the questionnaire was 
considered an alternative tool in collecting the data. Hubbuch 17 advised that 
the permission of the respondent was essential when using tape recorders, and 
there was a real possibility that some would not give their consent, making the 
interviews dissimilar in their approach. May 18 agrees, arguing that some people 
may find the tape recorder inhibiting, but also accepts that it can assist the 
interpretation of the interview, in that it can allow the interviewer to concentrate 
on the conversation. In view of the sensitivity of the questions, it was felt that 
the majority of participants would be suspicious of such a technique, and at the 
least, feel uncomfortable during the session. 
Not only was the questionnaire designed to fuUiII the research objective, it was 
intended to be "a tool to probe beneath the surface" 19 It was essential 
therefore that the questions were clear and all the relevant assumptions had been 
examined. The questions were kept simple with all ambiguity eliminated. The 
fact that the interviews were face to face also helped to provide the respondent 
with an explanation for specific questions or clear up any misunderstandings, 
should this have been necessary. It was regarded by the researcher as an 
important feature for him to be present for all the interviews, in order that he 
16 SeJlitiz. C, Jahoda. M, Deutsch. M, Cook S. W., Research methods in social 
relations (London: Methuen & Co., 1979) p246. 
17 Hubbuch. S. M., Writing research papers across the C!!rricnlnm (CBS college 
publishing, 1985) p35. 
18 May. T., Social research' issues, methods and process (Buckingham: Open 
University Press, 1993) p 104. 
19 Op Cit: Leedy. p142 
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could establish a rapport with the interviewees. This was essential when 
considering the nature and sensitivity of the questioning. It was because of this 
aspect that the option of telephone questionnaires was not considered, although 
of course this latter method would have been substantially more cost effective 
and perhaps allowed the possibility for a larger sample, although there was some 
doubt as to whether such interviewees could be convinced to talk on the 
telephone with any degree of confidentiality. 
A total of 120 Informers and 120 Handlers were interviewed over a period of 
approximately 9 months. 
The questionnaires 
Two questionnaires were used for this study, relating to all the aims; one for the 
interview of Informers (Appendix B) and a second for police Handlers 
(Appendix C). They were similar in that some of the questions were used for 
both groups. There are a number of other questions, however which differ. The 
questionnaires were made up of four parts and follow a similar pattern for both 
the Informers and Handlers. The first part examines their personal details and is 
used to provide a profile. Part two examines the relationship between the 
Informer and Handler, how it begins and how it is maintained. Part three 
concentrates on the motivational factors for both groups in establishing why they 
get involved in this type of work. Part four looks at the results of the 
association and the interviewees perceptions of their relationship in terms of how 
far they will go to maintain this partnership. In addition, the Informer 
questionnaire contains some sensitive supplementary questions and which were 
not considered beneficial or worthwhile putting to police officers. For example, 
the Informer was asked how he might feel if a criminal avoids punishment due to 
the rules having been broken. It was not considered relevant to ask the Handler 
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that question, although in hindsight, their responses may well have been 
interesting. 
A number of the questions contain multiple choice responses, some of the more 
obvious being included in the document from the outset, and the Pilot study 
helped to identify these answers. There were further replies which were 
included, and all of the responses were coded for the purposes of computer 
analysis. A number of the questions sought the interviewees' opinion towards 
certain areas and these have been shown by way ofLikert Scaling. Using this 
method, it was possible to test a series of attitudes around a particular theme 
rather than rely on individual questions, which may have been considered to be 
unreliable. 
A substantial number of questions were open ended. The study aimed at 
determining the interviewees perceptions, and therefore it was considered 
necessary to give them the opportunity to explain why they took certain actions 
or made a particular decision, or at least give them the opportunity to explain 
their answers. A number of responses also called for specific examples. 
The sensitivity of this research has been referred to earlier, and the anonymity of 
the respondents has been particularly important. Indeed, without such 
assurances, interviews would not have been given. The qualitative evidence is 
also crucial to the credibility of this work, providing important additional data; 
this too had to be given in such a way as to provide confidentiality. 
It will be seen in Chapter VI, then that the qualitative references merely give the 
questionnaire number, so avoiding individual respondents from being identified. 
For example, the study does not say, 
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'it Detective Sergeant with 5 years service in a metropolitan police force said 
" 
Whilst this would have undoubtedly enhanced the data and perhaps even helped 
to put it into perspective, the anonymity of the respondents is of such high 
priority, that no chance of them being identified was allowed. 
Other sources 
To enhance the knowledge of the researcher, a number of police seminars, 
conferences and meetings throughout the country were attended, although not 
directly contributory to the aims of this study In addition, a visit was made to 
the Royal Ulster Constabulary, and particular attention was given to officers of 
the Special Branch in Belfast, where arguably the most effective Informer 
Handler unit in the western world is run. Although their problems involving 
terrorism are often quite different from most other police forces, the fundamental 
systems are comparable. 
An Informer Management Course, directed by the author and attended by 
experienced police officers, became a useful vehicle on which to examine the 
issues and theories in informer use. A National Conference on Informers, again 
organised by the author at the request of ACPO(Crime Committee) was another 
method of source collection and the key speakers involved academics and 
practitioners, including police officers, Special Branch and FBI Agents, as well 
as representatives from the Security Services.20 It is interesting to note that this 
conference has been established as an annual event. 
20 National Informers Conference, Ist - 3rd April, 1997, Lawress Hall, Lincoln. 
119 
The problems and difficulties experienced during research. 
At the time of carrying out this research, the author was a Detective 
Superintendent in the Lincolnshire Police with responsibility for C.lD 
Operations, which mainly involved the investigation of murder and other serious 
crime. Of course this was often difficult to manage in terms of setting aside 
sufficient time to undertake both roles, and there have been numerous occasions 
when one has interfered with the other. My responsibility as a police officer 
always took priority, but there was no real conflict between the two. 
The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) have published national 
guidelines setting out how they see the future for informer use, although a 
skeptic may argue that the guidelines will benefit ACPO officers rather than the 
police practitioners. Their paper outlines how an informer should be used and 
provides rules which must be adhered to. But the relationship between the 
Informer and his handler, and how this relationship affects the way business is 
done is not covered in the document. The Audit Commission have supported the 
use as an investigative tool, and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary also 
accept that the use of police informers is the way forward as part of pro-active 
policing. Cost effectiveness has been strongly argued, compared with other 
methods of investigation such as surveillance and observations, although there is 
now some indication that this argument is not without critics. Nevertheless, it is 
perhaps this acceptance of Informer use that may create its own problems, 
particularly if Police Forces are not prepared for such an upsurge. 
In order to establish a reasonable population who had experience in the handling 
of Informers, contact was made with the Heads of Criminal Investigation 
Departments (C.I.D), in a number of Police Forces, other than Lincolnshire, to 
allow them to identify Police officers engaged in the handling of Informers. A 
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total of 120 handlers were identified in this way, each one being interviewed by 
the researcher. This ensured that each question was fully understood, as well as 
enable the interviewee the opportunity to provide personal observations and 
examples without restriction. 
Certain criteria was laid down, so that there existed some control on the 
Handlers identified. By using the same method, 120 Informers were identified 
and interviewed. Only those Informers who were registered with the police were 
used so that there existed some documentation from which to validate the 
responses. It is recognised that this may have restricted the representative 
population, and this issue will be discussed later. 
Because of the potential time constraints that would inevitably occur during the 
study, it was decided to consider a secondary method of data collection relating 
to the aims. Using the same questionnaires, one Police Force was chosen to 
carry out a postal method of interviewing. This entailed identifying a liaison 
officer in that force, an officer of the rank of Detective Superintendent, who 
agreed to act on the researcher's behalf to identifY a number of Handlers and 
Informers willing to participate. Twenty questionnaires were sent with some 
written advice on completion, together with an assurance of confidentiality. It 
was apparent that the Police Force were having second thoughts. After a 
number of lengthy telephone conversations, the Force concerned decided that 
they no longer wished to participate and returned the questionnaires, not one of 
which had been completed. It was suggested by the Liaison Officer that the 
questions were too sensitive, and because this Force were looking at their 
Informer handling procedures internally, they felt that it would be unwise to take 
part in my research. At least, this made the decision on methodology relatively 
easy, in that it was blatantly obvious that the interviews would have to be 
undertaken personally. 
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The predominant part of this research involved interviewing a number of 
Informers and police Handlers throughout England. This was camed out by 
way of a prepared and structured questionnaire, giving a degree of uniformity 
and standardisation during the interviews, as well as assisting in the later 
computer based analysis. It was first of all assumed, wrongly as it transpired, 
that being a research student AND a serving police officer would create a 
synergistic effect. In reality, though, this combination rarely assisted the 
situation at all. 
There were a number of sensitive questions put to both Handlers and Informers 
which tried to establish whether the respondent had or was likely to breach the 
criminal law or the Police Discipline Code during their involvement in Informer 
use. Such questioning required careful management, because on one hand the 
researcher needed to prove credibility with people not met before, but on the 
other, as a Police Officer, he had a responsibility to uphold the law and deal with 
those who contravene it. 
Although some of the interviews took place in local police stations, there was a 
reluctance by some to be seen in such places, and it quickly became apparent 
that the interviewees wishes, both Informer and Handler, had to be given 
priority. Ai; a result, meetings had to be arranged in various locations, including 
public houses, hotels, open spaces, and on one occasion under a viaduct some 
miles from a built up area, at 3.30 in the morning. This created its own problems 
in the completion of the questionnaires in far from ideal situations, but more 
importantly giving real concerns about safety, although it did seem to provide 
some reassurance to the interviewees. There were many occasions when waiting 
in a prearranged spot for hours before the interviewee appeared seemed 
inevitable and sometimes the respondent failed to show at all. Those meetings 
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had to be arranged again, when the subjects' fears or concerns had been 
overcome. 
To ensure that the Informers could not use the meetings for any illicit purpose 
afterwards, a full contact record was submitted through the relevant force 
registrar, which complied with the general police procedure of recording all 
meetings with Informers. 
There is an ethical problem which arises from this study, in that it was 
understood from the start that any admission made by the respondents regarding 
the criminal law or police discipline code would not be acted upon. This was 
essential to maintain credibility. To justity this work, it is argued that the 
research is crucial to the future of crime detection, and can only continue if such 
questioning is included. A similar problem of ethical and political issues was 
identified by the National Opinion Research Centre (NORC) in America when it 
sought to design research on American's sex Iives21 This same conflict, however 
meant that all the interviews were undertaken personally, so as not to burden 
other police officers with this dilemma. 
Some Senior Police Officers have yet to accept the necessity for these questions, 
and furthermore, have expressed their concern about the work generally. It 
could be suggested they fear that the results may create an embarrassing 
situation for them. There is evidence in both the United Kingdom and America, 
that research into sensitive subjects have incurred such opposition that those 
commissioning the work have been persuaded to withdraw support. 22 This 
seems to be an issue of police culture that needs to be addressed. 
21 Sieber 1. E., The Ethics and Politics of Sensitive Research (California, USA) 
1992 ppI4-26. 
22 Lee R. M. & Renzetti C. M., "The Problems of Researching Sensitive Topics: 
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Being a police officer has not been particularly helpful in seeking ACPO support. 
Most forces in England are reluctant to allow research in their districts without 
ACPO Crime Committee backing. This was not been forthcoming in this study, 
indeed it became apparent that some Senior Officers did not wish this study to 
continue, and as a result, a number of forces have refused to participate. The 
official explanation offered was that there was ample research into this subject. 
The fact of the matter is though, that there is no other study looking specifically 
at the relationship between an Informer and his Handler and how that 
relationship can effect the future use of Informers. There may be another, more 
sinister reason for not wishing this study to continue, relating to the fact that 
some forces perhaps felt they could not stand scrutiny. What this means, in 
practical terms though is that the sample size was reduced - as is discussed 
earlier in the chapter. 
Fortunately, there have been a number of forces throughout England who were 
prepared to allow access. A circular was prepared by the Home Office in 
consultation with ACPO, after the ACPO Crime Committee had expressed 
concern about releasing police data to researchers. Although it suggests that 
police forces should welcome research and encourage it whenever possible, the 
document warns that unless the project is sponsored by the Home Office or 
ACPO, then it should give serious consideration to the sensitivity and 
confidentiality of the subject as well as any future publication of the data 
obtained. 23 This study does not carry such sponsorship, and this has indeed 
created some difficulty when visiting other police areas. It was necessary in a 
number of cases to provide a written contract between the researcher and the 
An Introduction and Overview." American Behavioural Scientist 33. (1991): 
pp3-13. 
23 Home Office Circular No. 48/95 The release of police data for academic 
research (September 1995) Home Office London. 
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Police Force concerned, before access was allowed. Such a document gave a 
certain amount of credibility for the study, but more importantly helped to assure 
those forces of the commitment to the notion of confidentiality (Appendix D). 
There is also the question oflogistics. Those forces which agreed to participate 
are situated throughout England, and it was difficult to arrange visits at 
convenient times. It was necessary to take periods of annual leave to undertake 
this work, and of course to visit as many areas as possible in the time allowed. 
This proved to be frustrating, to say the least, and sometimes impossible bearing 
in mind the researcher's responsibility to the Lincolnshire Police, as already 
discussed. 
It was originally felt, perhaps naively, that some sort of structured approach 
could be used in determining the population to be used in this study. Indeed, by 
contacting each separate Police Force in England the number of registered 
Informers and the population/acreage of each force area was established which 
provided sufficient data to produce a satisfactory random number from each 
Force. Unfortunately, as previously stated, not every Force was willing to 
participate, and this affected the overall ratios. To some extent, it has been 
found necessary to accept what has been offered. 
Because each Force was al10wed to identify its own respondents, it was not 
possible to control the population. This task was left with the Registrar of 
Informants in each Force area, usually of the rank of Detective Inspector. 
Certain requests were made, such as a need for a mixture of male and females, 
but in the final analysis it was inevitable that those respondents put forward by 
the Force had to be accepted. There was some consolation in the knowledge 
that those officers did not pick the interviewees most likely to participate. 
Indeed, there are examples of a number who were difficult to meet with and talk 
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to. Because the decision to arrange the interviews was left to each individual 
Force, then there is no data to show how many Informers, or for that matter 
Police Officers, refused to participate. Assurances were however given that 
these numbers were low. 
During visits to other Force Areas, it was found that ample numbers of Police 
Officers were willing to participate in the research. In relation to the Informers, 
though, some incentive was necessary to encourage a proportion of them to 
participate. Two police forces were prepared to give cash to their Informers 
from their budgets in order to persuade the Informer to attend, although most 
police forces did not consider such a course of action. An early decision was 
made in this research not to pay Informers for the interview, and it has not been 
a particular problem. Of course, the Informers' motivation is relevant here, and 
if the respondents reason is financial, then naturally enough, he or she will want 
to be paid for his time. 
The Police Handler may have a lot to lose by telling the truth. Certainly, unless 
the Police Officers could be convinced that the assurances of confidentiality and 
anonymity were credible, then it would be difficult for them to admit breaches of 
the law or the Police Discipline Code to a Senior Police Officer. Fortunately a 
refreshing level of frankness was demonstrated by most. One Informer, though 
insisted that his one and only reason for informing was because of his 
commitment to assist the Police as a friend. The researcher was however aware 
of his criminal history; he was in fact a professional drug smuggler, and at the 
time of the interview was awaiting trial in another force area for possession with 
intent to supply quite copious amounts of heroin! 
By far the most problematic area was the distrust shown by police officers 
during the interviews. As already stated, the police officer perhaps has more to 
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lose in admitting breaches of the police discipline code. The art is to see through 
their answers and to convince the respondent that "no hann will come to him by 
telling the truth". This in itself is a total turn around for most officers. Usually it 
is the police who are trying to convince others to tell the truth. Supervisory 
officers were often the worst, with the Detective Inspector feeling obliged to 
give the safe answer. A considerable amount of time was spent discussing these 
points hoping always to secure an honest response. On the other hand, there 
were also occasions when both Informers and police officers who for one reason 
or another felt obliged to embroider the truth, and suggest that the problem was 
more acute than it really was. Such respondents were just as misleading as those 
who responded within the rules and regulations, and their answers just as futile. 
Fortunately, these types were in the minority. Also, it was possible to check their 
validity against police records or individuals who had a personal knowledge of 
their backgrounds. 
It can be seen, then, that the problems and difficulties being experienced in this 
work have been varied and diverse. They range from logistical problems in 
actually setting up the interviews, to obstacles in seeking permission to actually 
carry out the work, to the difficulties in checking the validity of the respondents 
in ensuring that their answers are as honest and accurate as possible. 
There have been a number of police forces anxious to participate because they 
realise that the service carmot progress further until it knows more about the 
subject. That can only be achieved by talking to those people who are heavily 
involved in it. That is why this study has concentrated on interviews with 
Informers and Handlers. 
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Summary 
It has been noted on numerous occasions throughout this thesis that it is the 
relationship between an Informer and the Handler that is so important, and this is 
reflected in the aims of the research. This study has relied heavily on individual 
interviews with police officers and registered Informers by using a standardised 
questionnaire. The responses to set questions together with some freedom for 
the interviewee to express an opinion or explain an answer have been crucial to 
this study which has tried to establish through their perceptions and experiences 
what the true picture is of this association. A number of areas have been 
recognised as lacking; for example, no approved method of sampling has been 
used due to the sensitivity and background of the subjects. As a result, and 
despite some test and retest exercises, the validity of the answers had to be 
accepted. 
The interviews were all carried out by the researcher although other methods 
were considered and discarded. The advantages and disadvantages of using such 
a method have been discussed in this chapter. 
A number of problems experienced during this research have been identified, but 
by far the most important has been convincing police forces to allow interviews 
with registered Informers. Such access has hitherto been denied to researchers 
but is crucial if meaningful research is to continue. 
It is still the case that ACPO consider the subject ofInformers to be too sensitive 
to allow outside agencies to carry out research work. It is certainly the case that 
the police have the monopoly on relevant data and without their co-operation, 
no meaningful study can be undertaken. Nevertheless, there is also a need for 
research work to have credibility, and this can only be achieved through 
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academic resilience. This concept needs to be understood by the Association of 
Chief Police Officers in the interests of future research. 
Because of the sensitivity of the subject and the need for police forces to 
maintain confidentiality, the data collection has been problematic throughout the 
study. Because of this unique situation, it has been felt necessary in this chapter 
to include the problems and difficulties experienced by the researcher during the 
study. This section has been detailed because of its relevance to the methodology 
and design. 
This Chapter cannot be concluded without referring to some personal 
observations from the researcher. The data collection was naturally interesting 
but often not enjoyable, and in fact was sometimes positively frightening. There 
are many memories where the interviews arranged were dangerous, and often 
even reckless, although all were necessary for the sake of the study. 
It has been difficult to accept throughout this study that many police officers, 
colleagues within the service, have themselves broken the law. This has been a 
disappointment throughout the work for a number of reasons. Of course there 
are a number of ethical and moral issues, but by far the most worrying aspect is 
that law enforcement officers, trained to investigate and prevent crime are 
prepared in effect to increase criminality. In the same vein, it has also been 
surprising that so many respondents were prepared to tell the truth and be honest 
about their involvement. Both the Informers and police officers could have 
taken the easy way out and been less than frank, but this was not the case, which 
has given substantially more credence to this study. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Theory 
It has already been stated that this study is based on exploratory descriptive 
research, and as such contains a relatively high level of data but has a relatively 
low theoretical input. This has been necessary because of the lack of previous 
research, and therefore limited knowledge, to get the subject off the ground. It 
would have been wrong therefore to impose too heavy a theoretical input at this 
stage. 
Nevertheless, a study of some ofthe issues surrounding the relationship between 
an Informer and the Handler are worthy of discussion. The main thrust of this 
research deals with the inter-action between the Informer and hislher Handler, a 
police officer. The Informer is generally a lay person, with no recognised 
qualifications and no rules or guidelines to obey. The Handler, on the other hand 
is regarded as a professional, trained to undertake his role, and obliged to work 
within laid down regulations. I It is the interaction between them which is crucial 
to the research and how it affects their relationship. 
This chapter will examine firstly a so called standard professional relationship; 
that is to say, an accepted classic relationship involving a Professional. This will 
be examined in order to identifY a number of features which make up this 
I It is commonly accepted that a professional is one where their occupations 
require an educational qualification, and their behaviour is subject to a code of 
conduct laid down by a central body or professional association. 
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relationship. Secondly, general police relationships win be examined to 
determine whether those classic features also exist in policing. Finally, the 
InformerlHandler relationship will be compared to the standard. In this way, it is 
hoped that any differences will become apparent, especially those which emerge 
from the findings in Chapter seven relating to the Informer and Handler 
relationship. 
1. Standard Professional Relationship 
Looking first at the standard professional relationship, there have been a number 
of studies and examples of this and it is not necessary to review them here. In 
general terms, however, the professional relationship is characterised by a 
number of common features. Ifwe concentrate on two of these features, 'power' 
and 'control', it is suggested that these will throw some light on the police 
HandlerlInformer relationship, for 'power' and 'control' appear at first sight to 
be the most important features of any professional relationship. 
Looking further into the link between power and control, as it affects the 
professional, Eliot Freidson 2 suggested that what is special about professionals 
is that they are bound by a stable set of ethical values which guide their 
behaviour. He argued in the 1970s that professionalism in the medical services 
reduced its effectiveness because of the way the professional interacts with the 
patients. He suggests that the professional sees himself as a creative, self 
regulating individual and, to put it crudely, a cut above the rest of humanity. 3 
Furthermore, he argues that the educational differences were relevant, as is the 
status difference, both of which leave the client feeling uncomfortable. An 
2 Freidson E., Professional dominance' the social structure of medical care (New 
York: Atherton Press, 1970). 
3 Ibid: p60 
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interesting thought, and this may also be relevant for the InformerlHandler 
relationship, in that the police officer may consider that he enjoys a much higher 
status than his Informer, and therefore to some degree is the better person. 
Perhaps even, the Handler may consider he has power over his Informer. 
Freidson also talks of the professional being handicapped when the client is not 
subject to the same bureaucratic authority; that is to say, the client may request 
something which the professional may feel is inappropriate. For example, an 
Informer who is expecting payment for some information will not be sympathetic 
towards the Handler who, because of the bureaucratic reward system, cannot 
deliver the cash on time. Freidson refers to the different perceptions of a 
problem, where the patient may consider it to be an emergency whilst the doctor 
looks at it as routine. 4 The outcome is reached on trust. "Essentially, he (the 
patient) is expected to have faith in his consultant - or else choose another 
consultant in whom he does have faith. "It seems that this same element of trust 
exists between the Informer and the Handler; that is to say, the bureaucracy 
which exists in the police service may be a handicap to the relationship. Or 
perhaps their trust in each other becomes more important, resulting in the 
bureaucracy taking a back seat. If this is indeed the case, it will have serious 
implications for the police service: the Handler may disregard any regulations 
and rules in favour of his relationship with the Informer - perhaps leading to 
corrupt practices. 
Max Weber studied the distribution of power, and argued that such distribution 
was reflected in the existence of status groups, for example elite clubs or 
associations, and classes, suggesting that the class struggle first became apparent 
4lbid: pl05 
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with the relationship between debtor and creditor.5 Weber attributes power 
according to a person's class and status, and suggests that power is "the chance 
of man or a rmmber of men to realise their own will in a communal action even 
against the resistance of others who are participating in the action." 6 
Butterworth and Weir suggest that, "Power does not exist in itself: it flows 
between people, And everybody has some of it, some area of choice, of ability 
to affect things his wqy ", 7 They make the point that power is not randomly 
distributed, but institutionalised, arguing that the most common orders, political 
and economical have the most importance in deciding the level of power. 
These issues of control and power certainly have an important part to play 
within organisations and specifically private sector companies: indeed references 
to 'power struggles' are only too frequent. It must be assumed therefore that 
these same issues are considered to be important to individuals within those 
organisations. It is of course true that a natural ingredient of ambition is having 
more power and control over others. 
Kinlaw 8 differentiates between power and empowerment, seeing the latter as a 
way of improving organisational performance by making the most of competent 
people. He acknowledges though that organisations mistakenly concentrate on 
the notion of power rather than the competent influence derived from 
empowerment. 9 Kinlaw suggests that managers have difficulty with 
5 Runcirnan W. G. (Ed.), Weber - selections in translation (Cambridge: 
University Press, 1978). 
6 Gerth H. H. & Wright Mills c.(Ed.), From Max Weber - essays in sociology 
(London: Routledge, 1970) p180. 
7 Butterworth E & Weir D (Eds), The Sociology of Modem Britain (London: 
Collins, 1970) p250. 
8 Kinlaw D. C., The practice of Empoweonent· Making the most of human 
competence, (Aldershot: Gower Publishing, 1995) 
91bid:p21 
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empowerment because they do not understand what it means. They feel that . 
organisational empowerment results in them giving up control over other people, 
and if controlling others is their function, then they will be out of a job. 10 
Kin1aw also suggests that grass-roots workers probably know more about the 
technical aspects of their jobs than their supervisors, and empowerment can only 
be successfully demonstrated if such managers learn the competencies of those 
under their control. 11 This thesis does not examine specifica\ly the level of 
power and control, nor of the knowledge of police officers acting as Controllers, 
but there is evidence that many Controllers have not had the benefit of 
experiencing for themselves the handling of Informers and there may be some 
comparison here then. Handlers are empowered by their managers to obtain 
information from their Informers in order to improve performance, but this 
brings with it a lack of control, perhaps allowing the Handler far more power 
than is acceptable. Using Kin1aw's theory, a police Controller will have difficulty 
in empowering the Handlers unless he fully understands the skills required to 
become a Handler. This highlights the difficulty a Controller has when 
supervising and managing officers under his authority, especia\ly when a 
Controller has not experienced the role of Handler, a situation which is far too 
common in the police service today. 
Whilstcomparing democracy with bureaucracy, Weber visited America where he 
found that the workers there "preferred a set of corrupt politicians whom they 
could oust and despise, to a caste of expert officials who would despise them 
and who were irremovable. "12 Weber suggests that the professional is indeed a 
bureaucrat who will deal within the rules irrespective of human feelings, and 
10 Ibid:p27. 
11 Ibid:p29 
12 Op Cit: Gerth & Wright Mills (1970) piS. 
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argues that the professional execution in effect means the execution "without 
regard to persons in accordance with calculable rules." 13 Weber advocates 
that there must be strict hierarchical control by the professional; perhaps this is 
the crucial difference between Informer and police officer; the fact that the latter 
is considered to be a professional, and therefore 'controls' his Informer. 
Giddens 14 describes professionals as 'gatekeepers', i.e. those who control 
access, such as the university professor who may determine the grade and pass 
or failure of academic degrees, or the surveyor who may control the relevant 
licences required before building work can start. Perhaps then, the police 
Handler can be similarly described as he controls the access of crime intelligence 
from his Informer. This element of control then, clearly features in the work of 
professionals no matter what the organisation. 
Others have discussed professionalism in terms of moral values and rules 
required to ensure that those values are maintained, as with Durkheim who 
insists there has to be a level of morality within economic life. 15 Elliott 16 
discusses the importance of the professions in modem society and suggests that 
they may be described as an elite group, so that where the organisation holds a 
strong position over the client, then the professional may well ignore the clients 
representations. He concedes though that there is insufficient research to 
determine whether such professional assertiveness necessarily increases with 
professional superiority over the client. Others who have discussed the theory of 
13 Rheinstein M. (Ed.), Max Weber on law in economy and society (Harvard 
(USA): University Press, 1954) p350. 
14 Giddens A., Sociology (Cambridge: Polity Press,1989)p287. 
15 Durkheim E., Professional ethics and civic morals (Glencoe: The free press, 
1958) p29. 
16 Elliott P., The sociology of the professions (London: Macmillan, 1972) pl05. 
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professions argue that it is far from a generic concept, but rather one which will 
change regularly throughout history. 17 
A number of features have emerged involving the professional relationship, 
including accountability, status, bureaucracy, trust and elitism. It is suggested 
that these are all features which may also manifest themselves during an 
examination of police relationships. However, the two particular features 
already referred to, power and control, stand out and are especially attributable 
to police work. Clearly, a police force has a duty to uphold the law, and in 
doing so is allowed to use appropriate force. This is just one example where 
power and control become important to the police. Skolnick 18 noted this during 
his study and concluded that police officers may be tempted to use this power 
even when they have no legal grounds to do so. He suggests that the police 
consider themselves to represent "authoritative power" and are therefore 
entitled to "command obedience ", 
Skolnick identified that the issues of power and control can be manifested in the 
police use of discretion; either delegated or unauthorised. He accepts that a 
police officer is entitled to use his discretion, for example to arrest a wrongdoer 
or report him for summons depending on the circumstances. He suggests, 
though, that the police often exercise discretion for which they have no 
authority: Skolnick says that the police officer sees his job, '- to maintain public 
order. and restraints upon his initiative will only reduce his capacity to fulfill 
his assigned task.' 19 
17 Dingwall R. & Lewis P. (Eds), The sociology of the professions (London: 
Macmillan Press, 1983) p22. 
18 Skolnick J. H, Justjce without trial - Law enforcement in democratjc society 
«USA): John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1966) p90. 
19lbid. 
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A more detailed examination of police relationships will determine whether these 
features are indeed apparent, and, if so, how and in what way they affect the 
relationship with the Informer 
2. Police Relatjonships 
The police service has for some time been forging partnerships with a growing 
number of so called customers,· the public being but one example. The 
relationship between the police and the general public has to be based on trust 
and confidence, so that linking this to management, if a police force loses 
management control, it can ultimately lead to a loss of public confidence. 20 This 
trust is considerable but will only be maintained if the police service displays the 
highest standards of conduct. Richards 21 identifies trust as a key concept in 
policing and suggests that, "Only by gaining its (the public's) co-operation and 
trust could it hope to secure the objective of helping to uphold social order. " 
The basic sense of trust was recognised by Erikson 22 as one of the most 
important stages of personal development, and therefore of extreme importance 
to the individual. It is suspected that such trust of the police service has been 
eroded considerably since the 1980s perhaps due to revelations of corruption, 
high profile criminal trials alleging miscarriages of justice and malpractice, and 
more recently the allegation of institutionalised racism following the Stephen 
Lawrence murder investigation. Questions are being asked about the amount of 
discretion available to police officers, which if not controlled could effect police 
morality and ethics. Others argue, though that the police are expected to 
exercise discretion in order to "-realise the 'spirit' rather than the letter of the 
20 Q'Connell G., "Will the drive for efficiency in the British police service 
endanger the police/public relationship?" 25th Senior Command Course Police 
Staff College (1989) (unpublished) 
21 Richards N. " A plea for applied ethics" in Thackrah J. R. (Ed.), 
Contemporary Policing' An examination of society in the J 980s (London: 
Sphere Books, 1985)p 13. 
22 Erikson E. H, Childhood and Society (New York: NortoD, 1964). 
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law" 23 One such supporter was Scarman 24 who said that, "Discretion is the 
art of suiting action to particular circumstances. It is the policeman's daily 
duty." Richards argues that for the police to enjoy the trust and confidence of 
the public, they should not rely on their codes of conduct, but instead use 
applied ethics as a necessary requirement for every individual officer. 25 
The relationship between a police officer and a member of the public is complex, 
in that a police officer often finds it difficult to carry out his duties and at the 
same time become an accepted member of the community. Banton 26 uses the 
1962 Royal Commission on the police to support this argument. Out of the 
sample of police officers interviewed, two thirds stated that they found 
difficulties in making friends outside the force, and the majority felt that the 
public were suspicious of them. This suspicion was also noted in the latest 
British Crime Survey report 27 which found that people closer to the top of the 
social ladder had contact with the police most often. 
It is interesting to see that the police service, as a legitimate authority, has the 
power to make and enforce rules, but that does not mean that others have to 
accept those rules. Reiner defines police power as the "capacity to inflict legal 
sanctions including force" and suggests that such power is legitimised into 
authority, but says that 'Just because the police, as an authority, are considered 
23 lbid:p20. 
24 Scarman The Rt. Hon. Lord, The Brixton Disorders 1O-12th April, 1981 
(HMSO,1981). 
25 Op Cit: Richards,p31. 
26 Banton M., The policeman in the community (England: Tavistock 
Publications, 1964) p 198. 
27 Skugan W. G., The police and public in England and Wales' A British Crime 
Survey report, Home Office Research Study 117, (London HMSO, 1990): p7. 
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to be legitimate, does not mean that their rules must be agreed with, merely 
some acceptance of their right on a minimal basis to make or enforce rules. "28 
Howley tries to categorise the difference between the police and the people they 
deal with, suggesting that the police tend to be preoccupied with technical 
efficiency whilst their clients are more concerned about seeking support and 
reassurances. 29 Lowenstein argues that the police see their role purely as 
upholding the law and seem to be more concerned with rules than people. 30 
This may support Freidson's theory already discussed, that the professional's 
need for bureaucracy is in fact a hindrance to the relationship. 
Skolnick 31 has looked at the concept of police conduct v. professionalism, and 
argued that a professional code within the police service fails to bridge the gap 
between the conflict of rule oflaw against law and order. In fact he goes further 
and suggests that it undermines police accountability. On one hand, he says, the 
police are striving for managerial efficiency in the guise of improved technology, 
and on the other trying to work within the rules of ideals and values. Skolnick 
suggests that professionalism is not the solution to this conflict, although it is 
often considered to be so. Evans 32, speaking as the incoming president of 
ACPO and Chairman of the presidential task force on corruption suggested that 
there was a need for a Professional Institute of Policing which should be able to 
"-inform and stimulate debate about the future shape of policing in a world in 
which we feel less like the driven and more like the drivers. " 
28 Reiner R., The politics of the police (London: Wheatsheaf, 1985) p215. 
29 Howley J. A., VictimIPoIice interaction - Community policing in microcosm .. 
Police Staff College, Bramshill (1984) (unpublished) 
30 Lowenstein L. F., The police and the social services' what unites and divides 
them7. (The police journal July,1994): pp243-5. 
31 Op Cit: Skolnick, p235. 
32 Evans J., Inside Write, (policing Today Volume 5, Issue 3, September 
1999)p5. 
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Clearly, he believes that police officers as professionals should have more say in 
the way policing evolves, in fact it could be suggested that Evans is talking here 
of wanting even more control and power. 
One practitioner Buchanan, takes a much more simplistic view and argues that 
everything depends on how one person treats another. He was speaking 
specifically about policing the gay community, but explained that "If you treat 
the most vulnerable well, the chances are you are going to treat the great mass 
of people fairly well, if not better. ,,33 According to McEldowney who examined 
the relationship between the regular police and special constables, the latter did 
not appear to have been treated very well. Although the research only used a 
sample of 19 respondents, it concluded that regular police officers despised 
those officers who put on a uniform on a part time basis, pretending to be 
professionals. One officer commented that "Specials do not earn the respect of 
regulars because they are incompetent, and lack knowledge." 34 This may 
suggest a feeling of guarded jealousy on the part of the regular police officers in 
terms of their professional standing. However, it may also support Freidson's 
argument that so ca1led Professionals insist on some sort of status difference. 
Holdaway 35 continues with the theme of the police being professional and 
therefore accountable, but argues that there are those people who can weaken or 
neutralise police work, whom he calls 'disarmers', such as women and children, 
and others known as 'challengers' who will continually question the power of the 
police such as lawyers, doctors and social workers. Both these types can attack 
the professionalism of the police. Informers do not appear to fit into either of 
33 Buchanan, Inside, outside, (The Job 23 July, 1993). 
34 McEldowney B., The working relationship between the special constabulary 
and the regular constabulary (West Midlands Police: Unpublished, 1989) p196. 
35 Holdaway S., Inside the British police' A force at work (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell Publisher Ltd., 1983) p71. 
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these categories, but nevertheless could attack the accountability of the police 
service in tenns of corruption. 
The partnership between a police officer, a professional, and his client, a lay 
person creates additional problems because of differences in priorities and 
objectives. This was recognised in a research study which examined levels of 
co-operation between social services and the police, where it was agreed that 
co-operation is essential but that huge differences may never be overcome. 36 
For example, the police and social services work closely together on child 
protection matters and in fact both agencies work within recognised and 
accepted guidelines. Despite this, there exists fiiction between the two groups 
largely because their priorities are different. The police are law enforcers and 
look towards arresting an offender, whilst the social worker concentrates on 
what is best for the welfare of the child. This difference in priorities is best 
illustrated in a Home Office study of police and victim relationships where it was 
concluded that most victims were not satisfied with the police following an initial 
visit after a crime had been reported. However the police felt that further contact 
was unnecessary, and anyway they did not have the time. 37 This may reflect, yet 
again, how the perceptions of groups can be so far apart. 
It is apparent that the law enforcement officer has to possess many qualities if he 
is to carry out his core business professionally. His relationship with the many 
facets of police work makes it a complex affair, when on one hand he is 
providing a service in order to solve a problem, but on the other he is involved in 
a confrontational situation, for example public disorder, where the officer is 
36 Cooperation between social services and police - International crime research 
association (ICRA) (1990) Denmark (unpublished) 
37 Newbum T. & Merry S., Keeping in touch' Police - victim communication in 
two areas (Home office research study 116 London HMSO, 1990): plO. 
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perhaps seen as the enemy. His technique in dealing with a member of the public 
may be different to dealing with a criminal, but his professionalism on both 
counts is what seems to be paramount. RusselI et al 38 note on this point that, 
"The police officer with a professional attitude toward behavior must be able to 
assess and understand the behavior with which he is dealing." The Police 
officer has the same human feelings and emotions as those he is responding to 
and he has to develop ways of dealing with them. The professional police officer 
will anticipate his own emotions and those of the person he is dealing with, 
allowing him to be objective and not judgmental, focusing on the real problem 
whatever it may be. For example, the police officer often has to deal with simple 
traffic offences such as the 'speeder'. The facts may be quite simple, but there is 
a potentially volatile situation: The driver may not dispute that he was speeding 
but cannot accept any criticism about his driving and takes offence against the 
officer. It is this type of behaviour that the police officer is expected to deal with 
using all the skills available to him. Such skills are necessary for most 
professionals though, not just police officers. 
The partnership between a police officer and the criminal is a complex one and 
differs between organisations and even individuals. Many police officers would 
argue that their role is to uphold the law and there is therefore a clear distinction 
between them and the criminal. Other practitioners would suggest there is a thin 
line separating the two and often difficult to define the difference. It is a fact 
though that the two groups are on different sides of the criminal justice system 
and most would have little difficulty in drawing the line. The situation may 
however become more complex when the line is crossed. A good example of 
this is in Hong Kong where every offender arrested by the anti corruption 
38 Russell H. E., & Beigel A., Understanding Human Behavior for Effective 
Police Work, (Basic Books Inc, USA, 1982)p26 
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agency becomes a long tenn Infonner. The reason for this is that custodial 
sentences for those convicted are inevitable and lengthy, resulting in defendants 
being prepared to give information in return for reduced sentences. 39 
One interesting section of the InfonnerlHandler relationship, commonly known 
as the so called Stockholme Syndrome, is worth noting here. Named after a 
bank robbery attempt in Stockholme, Sweden on 23 August, 1973 when a 
hostage declared her fear of the police and of her protection by her captor. 
There have been a number of cases where the hostage expresses unusual 
sympathy for the criminal, and research suggests that this may occur when both 
are isolated by authorities. 40 There seems to exist a sensitive relationship which 
emerges over a period of time, between a terrorist and his hostage. Studies have 
shown that in these situations, the hostage may actively collaborate, and there 
becomes a developing bond much like any friendship, albeit forced on them by 
the circumstances. 41 Strentz talks of a positive bond in which there is created a 
philosophy of "It's us against them, uniting its victims against outsiders. " 42 
This issue of fiiendship will be discussed at length in Chapter seven. 
There does appear to be, then, a number of similarities between the standard 
professional relationship and the police professional relationship. In particular, 
the issues of accountability, bureaucracy, trust and confidence seem to exist in 
all types of professional partnerships. It is interesting, but not surprising that the 
issues of power and control also feature high in police relationships. It is 
39 The author had the opportunity of studying working practices in 1999 of the 
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) and although this visit was 
after the handover to the Chinese Government, had not changed it's procedures. 
40 Olin W. R. & Born D. G., A behavioural approach to hostage sinIations, 
(Australian Federal Police Journal April, 1983): pp67-75. 
41 The Stockholm Syndrome, (Police Review 9 January, 1981): pp54-6. 
42 Strentz T., Law enforcement policy and ego defenses of the hostage, (FBI 
Law enforcement bulletin Vo1.48 (4), April 1979): pp2-12. 
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important now to examine whether these features exist in the specific Informer! 
Handler relationship. 
3. InformerlHandler Relationship 
Skolnick43 suggests simplistically, that 'The informer-informed relationship is a 
matter of exchange in which each party seeks to gain something from the other 
in return for certain lksired commodities. From the informer, the policeman 
receives information that assists him in the enforcement of the law. Informers 
typically cooperate with police because they have been caught doing something 
illegal and want a reduction in charges or some sort of "break" in the criminal 
process.' He is referring mainly to drug addicts and this definition of the 
HandlerlInformer relationship is of course valid but the Informers' motives can 
be far more diverse than he is suggesting. 
Because of the lack of existing theoretical examinations regarding Informers, this 
study must consider some common assumptions. That is to say, how is the 
relationship between an Informer and Handler regarded by others? This can best 
be shown using a comparative table from which an assumed model emerges. It is 
generally regarded that the police use of Informers has some sort of mystique, 
and as such, its mystery is what makes it so different from other relationships. 
The following table lists some of the most common differences as perceived by 
most people, including some practitioners, and compares the HandlerlInformer 
relationship with a standard professional relationship. 
43 Op Cit: Skolnick, p 124 
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Assumed model - Informer!Handler relationship 
Standard Professional Relationship Handler/Informer Relationship 
Client pays Professional Professional pays client 
Relationship is accepted in community Community mostly unaware of relationship 
Both parties work within agreed standards Only Handler is bound by standards 
Client has recourse outside of profession 
Professional and client meet openly 
Friendship appears to play no part 
Business open to public scrutiny 
No such recourse available 
Handler and Informer meet in secret 
Informers consider it important 
Business sensitive and covert 
The relationship between a doctor and his/her patient or a solicitor and his/her 
client may well typify a standard relationship between the professional and the 
lay person. However, the most obvious difference between these and the 
InformerlHandler relationship, and highlighted in the above assumed model, is 
the fact that it is usually the professional who is paid for his services. With the 
Informer, though, it is he who gains some personal benefit. This alone suggests 
that the relationship is unique, but maybe the real difference is that the role of 
'customer' and 'supplier' changes during their contact. For example, a person 
arrested and in custody is in effect a customer or client of the police. As soon as 
that prisoner decides, for whatever reason, that he wishes to become an 
Informer, then his role changes to one of supplier; the provision of information. 
The Informer is providing a service, and one which the police are keen to 
reward. 
Another common perception is that most professionals such as lawyers and 
doctors for example, are accepted in the community. As such, they would not 
be out of place setting up their offices within that community. That would not 
be the case with the Handler and Informer because of their need for 
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confidentiality. Indeed, it is essential that the Informer and Handler meet in 
secret and this leads to a general unawareness by the general public. 
Also, it is accepted that a patient relating to his doctor, or a client to his 
solicitor, will maintain their relationship within accepted standards, either moral 
or legal, and should that patient/client have cause for complaint, he can progress 
it through an independent body such as the General Medical Council or the Law 
Society. The Informer, on the other hand is not bound by such standards and it 
is unlikely he will make a complaint regarding his relationship with his police 
Handler because of the need for maintaining anonymity. In the event that such a 
complaint is made, it would be investigated by other police officers and could 
not therefore be described as an independent enquiry. 
The assumption then, is that the relationship between a police officer (the 
professional) and the Informer (the client) is totally unique and cannot be 
compared with any other professional partnership. It is commonly believed 
amongst practitioners, at any rate, that what sets this union apart is the mystery 
and secrecy that surrounds it. The expectation is that it is best not known what 
really goes on between Informers and police officers, and in fact this is not an 
unnatural stance to take. Many law enforcement officers also do not understand 
nor want to understand the relationship, let alone be involved. This helps the 
relationship to be considered unique; this theoretical study will examine, 
however, whether or not the assumption is valid. 
The police have a monopoly on the business of informing; for where else can the 
Informer sell his wares? Useful comparisons can be made with the Forensic 
Science Service, where neither its members nor the agency generally are in 
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competition with anyone. Some commentators consider this to be unhealthy. 44 
It may be this monopoly situation which allows the police officer to have the 
upperhand and ultimately take control. The Informer will be only too aware that 
if his relationship with the police begins to break down, he does not have the 
opportunity to consider other professionals or sell his wares in other markets. It 
may follow then, that if financial gain is uppermost in the Informer's mind, he 
will try to ensure that this lucrative partnership continues. 
Nevertheless, police officers can be categorised with the doctor and the lawyer 
as professionals which brings more autonomy and discretion in relation to their 
jobs. All have control over others, are bound by codes of conduct and therefore 
accountable, but free to carry out their duties and accept their responsibilities 
without interference from their organisations. For example, a Health Authority 
would not insist that a surgeon carries out an operation in a particular way, or a 
firm ofsolicitors tell a partner how to present a case in court. Similarly, a police 
force does not strictly tell an officer how he can detect crime, although all three 
must work within comprehensive guidelines to achieve their objectives. 
There is no evidence to suggest that a police officer can exert power over 
another, merely because he is in a professional occupation. In the case of an 
Informer, it would be natural to assume that a police officer would have 
difficulty as he, the Informer is not subject to any rules or procedures and 
therefore has no constraints on his actions. Those who investigate corruption 
within the police service are now suggesting that the police officer can be 
'controlled' by his Informer; so much so that their roles are being reversed. 
44 A monopoly on science, (police Review 20 July, 1994: ppI6-17. 
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Clearly then, it is far from straightforward to compare the relationship between 
an Informer and Handler with any other partnership. Certainly it is the 
inter-reaction between them that is so important and this chapter has 
distinguished some of the features from other classic professional relationships 
as well as relationships between the police and other parties. 
The use and distribution of power, the need for control and professionalism all 
feature in the relationship between two partners. Weber places substantial 
importance on the professional having to work within a set of rules or codes 
resulting in bureaucracy. The existence of the professional and his relationship 
with others has been widely discussed, and Chapter seven will consider the 
relationship between the Informer and Handler in terms of the professional and 
his 'client', and in particular the importance placed on the relationship between 
the two groups. 
The relationship between a police officer and other groups unsurprisingly 
identifies power, professionalism and accountability as key features of the 
relationship. There are however, additional features which emerge from the 
police partnerships. In particular, the public's need to trust and have confidence 
in the police, knowing that their business is guided by high standards of conduct 
and ethics. Concerns over the level of discretion used by the police are also 
apparent. More surprising though is the importance placed on friendship. 
Namely that the longer the relationship between the police officer and Informer 
continues, the more the partners begin to like each other. This is not a feature 
that would naturally emerge from a relationship with many other professionals. 
However, it is of course natural for two people to become closer as they get to 
know each other. 
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In terms of power and authority, the issue is not just one of the police 
controlling the Informer; more importantly, perhaps, it is a question of how 
much power the InformerlHandler relationship has over the police service. For 
example, how much discretion does the relationship exercise, and how selective 
are the police in the use of the intelligence gathered? 
These features will be considered in the main study (Chapter seven) to determine 
whether the InformerlHandler relationship can be compared with other 
partnerships. It seems, though, that the main difference between the 
InformerlHandler relationship and other professionals is the mystique that it 
creates for itself Practitioners seem to prefer to hide behind the veil of secrecy 
for whatever reason, but probably to alleviate the need to discuss the 
relationship. 
With this exception, perhaps the InformerlHandler relationship is not that 
different to other professional relationships. Interestingly, Weber's definition of 
social behaviour 45 where he distinguishes between: 
• rational goal-oriented conduct 
• rational value-oriented conduct 
• affectual conduct 
• traditionalist conduct, 
could easily be compared with the Informers' motives for informing; in terms of 
personal gain, friendship, or moral reasons (see Chapter Seven) The 
'traditionalist' behaviour is not so relevant as Weber considers this to be an ideal 
rather than a practical application. 'Goal-oriented' behaviour could be described 
as utilitarian and will have some objective such as a reward. 'Value-oriented' 
45Freund J The Sociology ofMax Weber (AlIen Lane The Penguin Press, 
London 1968) p104. 
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behaviour is practised by someone who is "guided solely by his convictions" 46, 
for example has high moral standards, or because what he is doing is right. The 
affectual conduct, according to Weber, also has emotional and passionate 
elements which may be determined where the action seeks revenge, for example. 
This type of conduct could also be as a result of pleasing others through 
gratitude or merely taking some pleasure from a relationship. 
The theoretical decisions found in this Chapter will be compared with the 
empirical findings in Chapters Six and Seven. The summary and conclusions 
(Chapter Eight) will show whether or not there is any support of the theories in 
this study. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
A Case Study io IJocoloshire 
Aim 3 of the study is to determine the relationship between the police and the 
Informer, and sub aim 3(e) is to establish why some police officers involve 
themselves with Informers and others do oot (Chapter four). It is important to 
establish why some police officers involve themselves in this type of work, so 
that the motives of the police officer may be established. This may be relevant to 
the overall relationship between a police Handler and Informer. A Case Study 
was undertaken in Lincolnshire to examine why some police officers are actively 
involved with Informers. For example, a detective constable working in a normal 
C.lD environment may want to become involved in the use of Informers, whilst 
another officer with a similar background and antecedent history will not. 
There is no direct financial reward for Handlers, although the findings in Chapter 
Seven may suggest that some police officers see Informers as an advancement to 
their career. The common perception would be that there is justification for 
becoming involved with criminals on a regular basis; indeed it could be 
considered perverse that a police officer could associate with criminals when his 
main objective is to lock them up. It is important to know, therefore, why a 
police officer may feel the need to involve himself with Informers. An 
examination of the relationship between the two parties may help to understand, 
at least to some extent, why this should be so. 
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The main part of the research analysed in Chapter seven, concentrates on police 
forces outside Lincolnshire County, due largely to the sensitivity of the questions 
and the need to maintain confidentiality and anonymity. The need to go out of 
the County was considered to be not so crucial for this part of the study and 
accordingly this smaller study was restricted to Lincolnshire. It is also important 
to note that the data collected for this study was by way of postal questionnaire 
to nominated officers, rather than through personal interviews. This is because 
the researcher was known to the Handlers, and it was thought that the 
questionnaires would be completed honestly and accurately if there was no 
direct personal contact. 
Background information 
Lincolnshire is predominantly a rural County covering some 2,300 square miles 
with a resident population of 600,000. There are a total of 1200 police officers 
within the Lincolnshire Police and the force has three autonomous Divisions 
each having its own Crime Management Unit. The philosophy of the force is 
that each Area identifies its own problems and concerns locally, and tries to 
commit sufficient resources to resolve them. Like most forces in this day and 
age, there are many constraints including financial, and the manpower 
implication is an ongoing issue. There is presently one police officer for every 
503 inhabitants, compared with the national figure of one per 407. 1 
The constraints quite obviously affect the investigation of crime, making it more 
and more difficult for the force to detect and reduce crime. This fact has been 
1 Lincolnshire police Annual Report (1998) 
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identified by the then Chief Constable of Lincolnshire, Peter Bensley, when in his 
report to the police authority in 1995 he said that, 
"It is likely in the coming year many of the expectations of the people of 
Lincolnshire will not be met, not through any lack of effort on our part but 
through a diminishing ability to meet all of the demands placed upon us. "2 
All this means that the police have needed to evaluate their crime management 
systems with a view to increasing the success rate using the resources available 
to them. The use of Informers is recognised by Lincolnshire Police, like many 
other forces, as a useful investigative tool and one which must be encouraged. 
In July 1995, the Research Department of the Lincolnshire police completed an 
activity analysis of all detective officers working in three of the five police areas 
of the County. The analysis looked at officers of all ranks who were involved in 
the investigation of crime, and identified their duties by category, enabling them 
to produce total figures showing these duties as a percentage of the total hours 
worked, over a period of a month (Appendix E). 
The use ofInformers was of course one of the activities analysed, but the figures 
revealed that detective constables only spent 6.12 minutes per day per officer on 
the use of Informers, which is 1.25% of the total hours worked. Supervisory 
detective officers spent even less time, with sergeants averaging 2.81 minutes 
per day per officer, being 0.57% of the total. Detective Inspectors showed a 
greater commitment although their work was predominantly administrative and 
not normally connected with operational work. This perhaps only serves to 
2 Lincolnshire police Annual Report (1995) 
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show that the police are not placing sufficient importance on this aspect of their 
work, or conceivably that police officers generally are not adequately trained 
with the skills to engage in Informer use. 
Lincolnshire had a total of 590 Informers registered as at the beginning of 1995 
(Appendix A). These were not all active in as much as they were not all regularly 
volunteering information to the police. There are other reasons why police 
officers desire to register Informers. For example, it has been suggested, 
although there seems to be no evidence to confirm this, that officers wishing to 
join the Criminal Investigation Department try to impress their superior officers 
by registering Informers, giving the impression that they are already involved in 
the use of Informers, and are therefore the right calibre to become detectives. 
This present study does not examine the registration procedures within the 
police service, which may be worth future research. 
Nevertheless, there stiIl remains a number of people who are potentially willing 
to help the police. In terms of pro-active policing, which in effect means 
Informers, observations and surveiIlance, and the development of intelligence, it 
must be far cheaper for the police to be told exactly where a crime is going to 
occur, who is involved, and where the stolen property will be taken to. In 
simple terms, all the police have to do, armed with this information, is wait for 
the offenders to turn up. This continues to be the philosophy of intelligence led 
policing which is practised in Lincolnshire. The police force covering this 
County is similar to many other forces in the provinces, with a relatively low 
crime rate, and an emphasis on community policing. 
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Methodology 
Confidential records in Lincolnshire, which could not be published, showed that 
twenty five police officers were actively involved in handling Infonners. The 
criterion used to establish those 'active' Handlers was merely to choose those 
officers who had requested payment to their Infonners on more than two 
occasions in the preceding twelve months. It was not relevant how many 
Infonners were actually registered to these officers, but only that regular 
requests for payments had been made. This information is sensitive, and in fact 
only known to the Registrar of Infonners within the force, and even the Area 
Crime Managers are unaware of the true identities of Infonners working within 
their districts. The author of this research was at the time in charge of the 
Infonner Indices, and therefore in a unique position to ensure access of the data. 
It should be pointed out here, though, that the records only apply to registered 
Infonners, and predominantly therefore, those who had sought financial 
payment. There are of course those officers who received infonnation from 
people not registered, although this is becoming more and more infrequent due 
to the need to disclose the source of information to the defence in court. There 
also exists a number of Infonners who provided infonnation for reasons other 
than financial; this will be discussed later in the main study. However, the 
requests for payments are a useful indicator of how active the Handler is at that 
particular time, and therefore a useful method of identifying the relevant officers 
for this study. 
Questionnaires (Appendix F) were compiled so that they could be completed by 
all interviewees, regardless of whether they were actively involved in infonner 
use or not. In addition to questions relating to their own personal circumstances, 
each of the interviewees were asked why they became involved in the use of 
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Informers, or conversely why they did not, dependent on which group they 
belonged to. 
In order to give some freedom to express their views, interviewees were given 
the opportunity to qualifY their answers, and a number of officers did in fact take 
up this offer. Each of the interviewees knew which category they had been 
placed in, and therefore there was no possibility of an officer with no Informer 
experience answering the questionnaire as if he/she was one of the original 
twenty five. The advantage of this was that the interviewees were known 
personally to the author, and in particular, all the respondents were personally 
identified as officers who were actively involved or otherwise. 
It was felt unnecessary to undertake a pilot study prior to the main research 
study. Clearly, there were some limits to the number of officers who could be 
used as active Handlers, and the questionnaire itself was simple in its format, as 
the majority of questions simply required factual data about the individuals 
concerned. It was, however desirable to consult with a number of other police 
officers, not involved in the study with a view to establishing whether the 
questionnaire was 'user friendly' or that no ambiguous questions had been 
included. The response to this consultation process confirmed that no 
amendment was necessary. 
Contact was made with the twenty five active Handlers in Lincolnshire. A 100% 
response was achieved from these officers. A further 50 officers were also 
identified in the force who had not been actively involved with the handling of 
Informers. This was confirmed by force records which showed that none of 
them had registered an Informer with the force during their service. This second 
set of interviewees were established and made up of similar rank, age, gender 
and duties to the first twenty five. In this way, it was hoped that a true 
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comparison could be made. It was decided to enlist the help of twice as many 
non-Handlers as Handlers, so that a better comparison could be made. It will be 
seen though in the following tables that a complete match was not possible, in 
terms of the relevant variables, although a reasonable comparison was achieved. 
Again, a total response was achieved from the latter set of officers. 
Validity and ReliabiJity 
There has to be some concern in relation to the accuracy of the questionnaires, 
in as much as, although they were completed anonymously, of course it was 
obvious that their identity were known to the researcher, and the possibility may 
have existed whereby they felt obliged to impress, or more importantly, not wish 
to become involved in providing sensitive answers. This problem was never 
fully overcome, and the only remedy was to provide adequate reassurances to 
the respondents, and to advise of the importance in giving frank and honest 
answers. The fact that a 100% response was achieved goes some way to 
negating the concerns. Where possible, the data supplied in the questionnaires 
was checked against existing police records, particularly in relation to the 
respondents personal details such as age and length of service. Again this was 
possible due to personal knowledge, even though the questionnaires were 
returned anonymously, and this created a test of validity against the rest of the 
data. 
Tables 1 to 4 show selected sociodemographic features of the respondents in 
terms of rank, gender, age and present posts held by the Handlers, and the non 
Handlers. These tables show how the two groups may be safely compared even 
though the non-Handlers are not an exact match. 
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Table t - Ranks of police Handlers and non Handlers 
HANDLER NON HANDLER TOTAL 
CONSTABLE 14 28 42 
SERGEANT 7 16 23 
INSPECTOR 1 2 3 
CHIEF INSPECTOR 3 4 7 
TOTAL 25 50 75 
Table 1 gives the data in terms of the rank of the respondents. 
Table 2 - {'..ender of police officers 
HANDLER NON HANDLER TOTAL 
MALE 22 42 64 
FEMALE 3 8 11 
TOTAL 25 50 75 
Table 2 gives the data in terms of Gender. It can be seen that out of the 2S 
Handlers, only 3 (or 12%) were female. This, on the face of it seems a low 
figure, but in fact is comparative to the percentage of female officers in the 
Lincolnshire Police, presently standing at approximately 12%. One of the 
respondents is a detective policewoman aged 26 - 36 years, having handled 
Informers for 3 - S years; she suggested the main reason she became involved 
was the detection of crime. The second officer was a female uniform sergeant, 
aged 26 - 3S years, engaged in handling for 1 - 2 years and she gave the main 
reason as being a cost effective tool. She said, "So far my experiences with 
informants have not been particularly fruitful but I continue as I have been 
involved in successful jobs where the information provided has been correct 
and property recovered and prisoners arrested" 
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The third Handler was a ChiefInspector aged 36 - 40 years, involved in handling 
for 3 - 5 years who also gave the detection of crime as the main motivation. 
Unfortunately, the data does not allow further analysis to be carried out 
regarding gender issues. For example, the female Handlers were not questioned 
about the categories of crime they were interested in, or more importantly, 
whether they dealt specifically with female Informers. In hindsight perhaps, the 
research should have considered these issues which are clearly important in this 
context, although even so the numbers are two small to draw meaningful 
conclusions. 
There are however, some assumptions that can be made by the researcher 
through the personal knowledge of the respondents. All three have considerable 
crime investigation experience, and all said they were able to cover the full range 
of offences with their Informers. It is also known that all three officers also 
handled male Informers, in fact they had rather more male than female 
Informers. There is no evidence that the 3 female Handlers placed any specific 
emphasis on their gender. 
Table 3 - Age groups of police officen 
HANDLER NON HANDLER rrOTAL 
19-25 0 2 2 
26-35 10 23 33 
36-40 10 9 19 
41-50 5 16 21 
TOTAL 25 50 75 
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Table 4 - Status of police officers 
HANDLER NON HANDLER OTAL 
UNIFORM 6 17 23 
CID 11 26 37 
OTHER POST 8 7 15 
rrOTAL 25 50 75 
(x2 = 3.46, df= 2, P = 0.177) 
It was important to match as many of the variables as possible in order that any 
comparisons could be made between the two groups. This was achieved using 
the officers rank, sex, age structure and post held, as shown in Tables 1 to 4. 
Table 3 recasts the data in terms of age, and Table 4 extends this to cover status. 
No significance tests were appropriate in Tables 2 and 3 because the numbers 
were too small in some of the cells. 
As already discussed, the two groups were well matched, even though there 
were slightly more non-handlers in the over 40 age group, and proportionally 
fewer aged 36-40. There is no obvious reason for this, and if the two age 
groups are considered together, that is 36 - 50 years, then the comparison is 
more balanced. These results are not significant. 
The reference in Table 4 to 'other posts' include the Regional Crime Squad, Drug 
Squad and local Drug Enforcement Teams; there were proportionally less of the 
non Handlers in this group. A chi square test was carried out but was found not 
to be significant at the 90% or even 85% levels. There is therefore no statistical 
evidence of a difference between the two groups. To speculate, it could be 
argued that the specialist squads tend to be more proactive and therefore rely 
more heavily on the use of Informers. It would be more likely therefore to find 
officers in this group to be Handlers. 
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With these exceptions, there appears to be no relevant difference between the 
two groups, and it may be concluded that the two populations can reasonably be 
used as control groups against each other. 
The Handler 
The first part of the analysis was to examine the data provided by the 25 active 
Handlers who were asked their main reason for becoming involved in Informer 
handling and Table 5 looks at the responses they gave for their involvement. 
Table 5 - Main reason for involvement 
REASON FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE 
DETECTION OF CRIME 12 48 
ARREST OF CRIMINALS 5 20 
ENJOY DEALING WITH CRIMINALS 4 16 
COST EFFECTIVE TOOL 3 12 
EXCITEMENT 1 4 
TOTAL 25 100 
It has to be accepted that some of the respondents may have more than one 
reason for becoming involved as Handlers, and this study does not try to 
establish an order of priorities. For these purposes, it was sufficient to obtain the 
'main' reason, that is the one which, in their view, was the most important. 
Table 5 examines the main reason given by the Handlers for informing. The data 
shows that only one Handler (4%) considered the main reason to be excitement. 
He was a male detective constable, aged between 26 and 35 years, working in 
mainstream CID with more than 6 years experience as a handler. He explained 
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his answer saying, ''Dealing with informants creates a personal interest in 
specific crimes, and therefore having a personal interest contributes to 
maintaining my enthusiasm for dealing with the job and securing the correct 
result. I feel a mood of contentment whenever I am involved in a job from start 
(obtaining the information) to finish (securing the conviction)" 
This officer does not expand on what he considers to be the 'correct result' but 
presumably he is suggesting the arrest and conviction of criminals. It may be 
argued that this does not tie in with his reply that he is involved with Informers 
for the 'excitement'. In fact, his response suggests that he is more concerned 
with being fully involved with an enquiry; nevertheless, the excitement seems to 
be uppermost in his mind. 
Another four Handlers (16%) stated that they enjoyed dealing with criminals. A 
further three (12%) felt that the use ofInformers was a cost effective method of 
crime investigation. However, the majority of those interviewed, seventeen in all 
(68%) gave their main reason as the 'arrest of criminals' (5) and the 'detection of 
crime' (12). The dominant feature here then is the responses from 20 (80%) of 
the Handlers who wanted to get the job done, arresting criminals, detecting 
crime and doing it cost-effectively. Of the three officers who feIt that the use of 
Informers was a cost effective investigative tool, one detective constable 
remarked that he felt that senior police officers were not fully aware of the need 
to pay Informers a suitable amount of money, and with the least possible delay. 
This is not an uncommon criticism of the police system, and there is ample 
evidence throughout the country which indicates that bureaucracy tends to take 
priority over complaints from practitioners. A male uniform inspector with 3 to 
5 years experience as a Handler said, "The cultivation and usefulness of a tried 
informant can be an effective and efficient tool in the detection of crime." He 
warned though that, "the informant system is now becoming more frustrating 
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due to the introduction of the disclosure rules'~ This may suggest that 
practitioners feel the constraints and controls on them are inhibiting their role as 
Handlers. 
Of the four Handlers who gave 'enjoyment' as their main reason, one detective 
constable said it was obtaining the information that he enjoyed most, whilst a 
young male uniform constable with little over a years experience as a Handler 
said, ''/ find dealing with criminals far more interesting and rewarding than any 
other aspect of my police service. I enjoy a pro-active approach to police work. 
Dealing with and obtaining information can be rewarding and it may detect 
crime that may otherwise go undetected I find I am able to communicate well 
with criminals and this has been of benefit in cultivating informants. But being 
in uniform makes it difficult due to the lack of time to allow for the numerous 
visits that are often required to meet informants. " 
This officer's final point suggests that uniformed officers are by definition 
restricted in what they can do, and there can be few who believe that "being in 
uniform" cannot have some effect on the cultivation ofInformers. That is not to 
say though that detectives will become more involved simply because they are 
"in plain clothes", merely that there is an assumption that plain clothes officers 
have more opportunity. 
In relation to the arrest of criminals, one young male uniform officer attached to 
a pro-active team said, "The more people you arrest, the more opportunity there 
is for recruiting informants." He is suggesting that the best time to recruit 
Informers is when the individual is in custody who, for various reasons, they will 
provide more information. This aspect of recruitment will be discussed later in 
the main research study. 
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Out of the 12 officers who felt that the 'detection of crime' was the main reason 
they became involved, one detective constable suggested that Informers are now 
the only method of recovering stolen property, and a male detective sergeant 
with I to 2 years experience as a Handler said, "Dealing with informants is an 
easy and unique method of detecting crime. They are an essential tool in the 
pro-active field of work. The difficulty, sometimes, is obtaining quality 
information that can be acted upon. " Other practitioners may disagree that 
Informers are easy to deal with; 'easy' is rather a poor term to use in these 
circumstances. Nevertheless, few can argue that their use is not unique. 
Table 6 - Main reason for involvement. by rank of Handlers 
CONSTABLE SERGEANT INSPECT~ CIINSP TOTAL 
EXCITEMENT 1 0 0 0 1 
DETECT/ON OF CRIME 6 4 0 2 12 
~RREST OF CRIMINALS 2 2 0 1 5 
ENJOY DEALING 4 0 0 0 4 
COST EFFECTIVE TOOL 1 1 1 0 3 
rrOTAL 14 7 1 3 25 
Table 6 sets out the main reason for being involved with Informers in terms of 
the rank of the Handlers. It is clear from Table I that the majority (14, 56%) of 
respondents were constables, and this is not surprising. However, Table 6 
shows that only the constables considered their involvement was due to 
'enjoyment' or 'excitement'. The supervisory ranks were involved because they 
felt that the use of Informers gets the job done. The detection of crime, the 
reason given by most of the Handlers seems to relate to most ranks of the 
officers. 
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The Non Handlers 
The study examines those 50 police officers who were known not to have 
become involved in the use ofInformers. The findings from this study can not be 
linked to the main research (Chapter seven) as non-Handlers do not feature 
there. Table 7 examines the reasons these officers gave for their 
non-involvement. 
Table 7 - Reasons given by non-handlers for not being inyolved 
FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE 
NO OPPORTUNITY 23 46 
NOT INTERESTED 9 18 
HASSLE 8 16 
NOT CUT OUT FOR IT 5 10 
NO SUCCESS 2 4 
DISAGREE MORALLY 1 2 
SUPERVISORY OFFICER 1 2 
HANDED OVER TO CID 1 2 
[TOTAL 50 100 
Table 7 shows that by far the most dominant feature was those respondents (23 
or 46%) who claimed to have had a lack of opportunity to cultivate Informers. 
There is then a group (24 or 48%) who gave an assortment of negative reasons, 
including those who claimed they were 'not interested' (9 or 18%), or it was too 
much 'hassle' (8 or 16%), or they felt they were 'not cut out' for this type of 
work (5,10%), or merely that would have 'no success' from such an involvement 
(2.4%). 
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Three others (6%) were more positive in their responses, one saying that he 
'disagreed morally', and another suggested that any involvement would be 
'handed over to the CID', and the third explained that he was a 'supervisory 
officer'. In fact, he was an experienced male detective sergeant who said, 
"1 am a supervisory officer. Detective constables in my section involve 
themselves in informants which 1 encourage. Whenever 1 come into contact 
with potential informants, 1 steer them towards one of my men. 1 retain 
practical interest in the informant handling activity of my men while avoiding 
personal ownership. " 
It is difficult to understand what this officer is trying to say, when he obviously 
does not feel comfortable about getting too involved with Informers, and is quite 
content to leave such work to his staff. But as a supervisory officer, perhaps 
one could be forgiven for thinking that he is merely avoiding his responsibility. 
More importantly, as a detective, perhaps he has failed to understand the 
importance the police service is presently placing on this aspect of crime 
investigation. He does however only represent 2% of the population studied. 
Table 8 - Reasons for non involvement of police officers by status 
UNIFORM CID DRUG SQUAD KlTHER !TOTAL 
INCONVENIENCE/HASSLE 0 4 4 0 8 
NOT CUT OUT FOR IT 1 3 0 1 5 
NOT INTERESTED 0 8 1 0 9 
DISAGREE MORALLY 0 1 0 0 1 
NO OPPORTUNITY 13 9 1 0 23 
NO SUCCESS 2 0 0 0 2 
SUPERVISORY OFFICER 0 1 0 0 1 
HANDED OVER TO CID 1 0 0 0 1 
ftOTAL 17 26 6 1 50 
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Table 8 recasts the data and shows the main reasons given for not being involved 
in terms of status. It is not surprising to see that the majority of the uniformed 
officers ( 13 or 76%) felt they had 'no opportunity' to act as Handlers. One such 
officer suggested, " If it has looked likely that I would get an informant, then 
the CID approach and want to take over." This suggests that the officer may 
have given up his right to cultivate an Informer because he was not in the C,I.D., 
but it could also be the case that this uniformed officer was quite satisfied to 
hand over an Informer to an officer with more opportunity to cultivate that 
Informer. There is no data available from this study to confirm this or otherwise, 
and similarly, there is no evidence that the relationship between uniformed 
officers and the C.lD has created any sort of conflict. 
Another young constable in uniform believed that his lack of involvement was 
due to what he called the necessity to pass on potential informers to the C,I.D. 
He said, ''All persons to date that have passed information onto me, I have 
introduced to detectives to register, who have more time and means to deal with 
informants. " This officer's answer was not dissimilar to that uniformed officer 
who felt that he did not have the opportunity because the C.lD took over the 
handling of his potential Informers. 
More interestingly, though, this 'lack of opportunity' was offered as a reason by 
the majority (9 or 35%) of mainstream C.I.D. officers. These were all sergeants 
or constables who presumably were in the business of detecting crime. None of 
these officers felt it necessary to explain their answers further, and this in itself is 
interesting. 
Further more, if it is assumed that C.lD. officers are actively involved in the 
investigation of crime, there seems to be some conflict with the 15 (58%) 
detectives who were 'not interested', 'not cut out' for this type of work or 
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thought it was 'hassle'. All of the 9 (18%) respondents who said they were 'not 
interested' were detectives working in mainstream C.I.D. or drug squad. A 
sergeant attached to the drug squad suggested that, "This is not the way to get 
on ill the job. There are easier ways. " This mayor may not be right, but must 
be seen as something of a surprise from an officer who is presumably dedicated 
to pro-active policing in the fight against drug abuse - as well as being a 
supervisory officer. This particular point will be examined again in the main body 
of the research when the respondents there were asked if the use of Informers 
advances them in their careers. Here, a detective constable in the C.I.D 
remarked that, although he was not against using Informers in the fight against 
crime, he merely preferred to use other ways himself. 
Out of the 5 (10%) officers who felt they were 'not cut out' for this type of 
work, only 1 was a uniformed officer; the remaining 4 were established 
detectives, 3 (12%) from mainstream C.I.D.. The uniformed officer was a 
female sergeant, aged between 26 and 35 years of age who said, "/ do not feel/ 
have the necessary skills, but also because there is no training programme, / 
cant learn . ., 
These sentiments were echoed by a male constable attached to a proactive team, 
who explained that he had never been taught how to handle Informers. This is 
true for most police forces in this country as there have been few courses 
teaching officers how to be a Handlers; such training has come with experience 
and officers having the necessary flair. There is ample evidence that police forces 
are recognising the need to establish training packages for Handlers and their 
controllers. Lincolnshire in fact are spearheading a radical package which 
centres on improving the knowledge and awareness of active practitioners. In 
addition, the National Criminal Intelligence Service have piloted a scheme which, 
if approved, will be accepted nationally. 
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A similar picture emerges in relation to those who thought the involvement was 
'hassle'. Again, all the respondents (8) were detectives from either mainstream 
CID or drug squads. Perhaps one can assume they at least tried cultivating 
Informers. Only two officers decided to quality their answers, and a detective 
sergeant on the drug squad exclaimed, ''I cant believe why anyone should get 
involved They're shit. " A detective constable working in the C.lD added, ''I'm 
not going to put my neck on the line for them. " One may assume that this officer 
believes that by becoming involved will automatically compromise his position as 
a police officer. In effect, there is a tacit assumption that the use of Informers 
must involve breaking laws or violating laid down procedures. 
Table 9 - Ranks ofthose officers who suggested a lack of opportunity 
FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE 
CONSTABLE 12 52 
SERGEANT 5 22 
CHIEF INSPECTOR 4 17 
INSPECTOR 2 9 
TOTAL 23 100 
Table 9 looks more closely at those officers who thought they had no 
opportunity to act as Handlers in terms of their rank. The data shows that of the 
23 respondents, over half (52%) were constables; this is a large proportion of 
the total non-Handler population (Table I). One male uniform constable 
explained, '}Is a uniformed town officer, there is a very limited opportunity to 
become involved. People are generally reluctant to give information to the 
uniform. " 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
Although the two groups are relatively small, they are closely matched in terms 
of age, sex, rank and role. 
It could be suggested that, in relation to the first 25 interviewees, the data offers 
few surprises. Those who get involved in handling, it appears, are very positive 
about the benefits and are clear about their reasons for doing so. The majority of 
officers engaged in this type of work are constables who work in plain clothes. 
As such, it is hardly a revelation to learn that the majority of those officers 
considered the main reason for their involvement to be the arrest of criminals or 
the detection of crime. Indeed, that has to be their main objective as detectives 
anyway. There emerged, though, two separate groups. Firstly there were those 
who saw handling as a way of getting the job done effectively, who were 
concerned about the arrest and detection of crime. The second group, though, 
were involved for more personal reasons, either for enjoyment or excitement. 
This second group were all constables whilst those having what could be seen as 
a more professional approach seemed to be of higher rank. This may have some 
implications; that is to say, the constables who are involved for personal reasons, 
may not be as professional as they ought to be. The concern is not that police 
officers have expressed feelings of enjoyment or excitement, but rather that some 
have considered such feelings to be rather more important than the more 
professional reasons. This concern may emerge during the main study but 
whether it does or not, will not detract from the need to refer to these concerns 
in the recommendations (Chapter eight). 
The fact that none of these Handlers thought that career advancement was a 
reason for involvement was a little surprising, particularly regarding the 
detective officers. Informer handling is considered to be an important aspect of 
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detecting crime, and therefore one which detectives could be judged in terms of 
their performance. Clearly this is not the case; these findings will be compared 
with the respondents in the main study ( Chapter seven). 
The second group of police officers, that is the 50 who had not become involved 
in the handling of Informers, have also been examined. This group appeared to 
be much more negative or evasive about their reasons for not being involved. 
Nearly half of this group felt that they did not have the opportunity to do so and 
interestingly, 10 officers in that group were detectives. This lack of involvement 
by detectives becomes even more interesting after finding that a further 9 
detectives admitted they had no interest in this side of their work, and another 8 
detectives considered that Informer handling was 'hassle'. 
When including the detectives who felt that they were not comfortable with this 
type of work, or disagreed morally with its use, and the detective sergeant who 
used his supervisory duties as an excuse for not engaging in the use of Informers 
personally, then it is apparent that a majority (33 or 66%) of the respondents 
directly concerned with the detection of crime, were not actively involved in 
Informer use. 
This research has not examined the reasons why such a high proportion of 
detectives in either C.LD or specialist roles (62% Table 8) have decided not to 
become involved in the handling of Informers. A large case load, for example 
may restrict the time available, or the level of support and advice offered by their 
supervisory officers may have failed to provide the correct level of enthusiasm. 
The fact remains, though, that a high proportion of detective officers who 
presumably have been made aware of the importance of cultivating Informers, 
have decided to ignore this particular method of crime investigation. 
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A number of the respondents referred to the lack of training given to them, and 
it is true that very few police forces provide training courses on the use of 
Informers. This situation is slowly improving nationally, but it is suspected that 
the 'lack of training' may be nothing more than an excuse for not wanting to 
become involved. Indeed, some police officers argue that the skills required to 
be an Informer Handler cannot be taught and come only from experience. 
However, the new Codes of Practice which every force is now signed up to, 
requires that officers are given appropriate training, and defence lawyers will 
undoubtedly be interested if untrained Handlers and Controllers are involved in 
trials where Informers have been used. 
Table 5 has shown that 80% of the Handlers (20) became involved in the use of 
Informers because 'they wanted to get the job done'. It could be assumed, 
because the second group were drawn from similar backgrounds, that they too 
would have wanted similar results. The difference however, is that the second 
group of 50 respondents have not felt that the use of Informers helps them to 
achieve this. Indeed, Table 8 shows that 9 officers, all detectives admitted they 
were not interested in Informers. These results are surprising when the Audit 
Commission, Her Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary and the police service 
generally have all agreed that such use is an efficient and cost effective tool. 
There is perhaps a more simplistic conclusion that can be drawn from this work. 
The individual, a police officer, who ever he or she may be, of whatever rank, 
gender and background, may have merely decided that he or she does not wish 
to enter into this type of work. Because one officer feels comfortable with 
dealing with Informers and has been successful, that is not to say that another 
officer feels the same. Some officers prefer to present a crime file, some prefer 
surveillance work, whilst others like the management and strategic planning of 
an operation. It follows then that, whilst some police officers will enjoy handling 
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Informers, not all will do so, and it must be accepted that the use ofInformers is 
not the only investigative tool to be used by the police service. 
This small part of the research has tried to examine the rationale behind police 
officers becoming Informer handlers within the police service. It has identified a 
number of known active handlers, and compared them with another group made 
up of similar antecedent history who are known to have gone through their 
policing service without involving themselves in Informer use. The research has 
failed to establish any definitive reason for the actions of the two groups, except 
to show that the decision to become a Handler is a subjective one, and depends 
solely on the preferences of the individual. In essence, if an officer shows an 
aptitude towards this method of policing, then the chances are that he or she will 
continue to pursue this area, as long as there is the opportunity, and to some 
degree, the support from supervisory officers. 
It has to be conceded that this study, having been carried out in a rural police 
force, may not be representative of the country. Lincolnshire can only be 
compared in terms of size, population and the level of crime with a handful of 
other forces in England, and a study undertaken in a larger urban area would 
possibly have produced different results. However, in the absence of any 
evidence to the contrary it is reasonable to assume that the population used in 
this study forms an acceptable cross section of police Handlers throughout 
England. 
Perhaps the conclusions to be drawn from this study can provide something of a 
foundation for the rest of the work. The fact that an individual will decide for 
himself whether or not he will become involved should be borne in mind when 
discussing the relationship between the Informer and Handler. The variables 
identified here relating to the lack of opportunity, insufficient interest in this 
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method of policing, an acceptance that the officer is not suited to Informer 
handling, are all acceptable and to some extent reasonable explanations for their 
non involvement. We are dealing here with a cross section of officers, all with 
their own priorities, objectives and standards. 
For every police officer who has some inclination towards using Informers, there 
are at least two more with similar backgrounds, rank and experience, who do 
not. Nevertheless, it is those officers who become involved who are important to 
this study. Drawing from the findings of this study, we know that 62% of the 
non-Handlers were detectives or plain clothed officers such as drug squad 
officers. This is the type of work in which it would be expected that Informers 
feature heavily. Nevertheless, a substantial number of officers have decided not 
to become involved. 
It has been the case in the past that as soon as a police officer becomes a 
detective, he is automatically considered to be an expert Informer Handler. It 
was thought to be a qualification for selection, and there is evidence that officers 
attending selection interviews for CID would register a number of Informers to 
convince the panel that he/she was actively involved in the use of Informers. 
Similar examples are less likely to be seen now, probably due to the fact that 
competency skills for detective training identifies Informer Handling as one of 
many investigative skills required by crime investigators. As a result, what seems 
to be happening in the police service today, is that specialist dedicated units are 
being set up with far less officers given the opportunity or required to handle 
Informers. This situation is made worse by the publication of stringent codes of 
practice, and the implementation of the Human Rights Act 1998 (operative from 
2 October 2000) which will demand tighter controls of the use of Informers in 
terms of an individual's right to privacy etc. It is expected that future trials, and 
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case law will not favour the use of Informers, and this may deter officers from 
becoming involved. 
If this does occur, then not only will it affect Handlers, but also Controllers. The 
police service will require Inspectors and above to control the use of Informers, 
when in fact those officers will probably have no experience as Handlers 
themselves. Such controllers will not understand the problems of handling 
Informers; not be able to carry out meaningful risk-assessments; and therefore 
not make appropriate decisions. It is feared that Controllers will not be in a 
position to control those Handlers under their supervision, resulting in the 
potential for corruption, miscarriages of justice, and abuse of authority. 
There is an argument then, for the police service to consider career detectives 
and their appropriate training through the ranks. This specific study will link the 
findings regarding the active Handlers with the main body of the research. 
However, the importance of the conclusions drawn in respect of the 
non-Handlers must not be forgotten. 
The aim of this specific study was to determine why some police officers become 
involved in informer handling, and others do not. The results have shown that 
most Handlers start because they feel it will increase their chances of success in 
their role; that is to say, Informers will help to detect more crime or arrest 
criminals. On the other hand, those police officers who had not become 
involved either thought that they had not been given the opportunity, or they 
were merely not interested in that type of work. Very few of the respondents 
referred to the relationship with an Informer. Even from the respondents who 
had not become involved with Informers, hardly any seemed to be critical of the 
relationship itself. This fact does not seem, on the face of it, to link the findings 
of this specific study with the main research, which concentrates on the 
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relationship between an Informer and Handler. However, the results could 
suggest that the initial motives of a police officer are not likely to affect the 
relationship. Put simply, the reasons for a police officer becoming a Handler 
may not have any relevance to the HandlerlInformer relationship. The 
relationship may not be so important when it first starts, but becomes more 
important as it develops through time. The relationship itself will be examined in 
more detail in chapter seven. 
The study in Lincolnshire has highlighted the importance of recognising some of 
the motives of police officers, and also that those motives are as important as 
those of the Informer. The study has also shown though that any attempts to 
produce a profile of a typical police Handler (Sub aim 2a of the study - To 
establish a profile for Handlers) are difficult, to say the least. This issue will be 
examined further in chapter seven. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Results 
The analysis of the data is discussed in order of the six Aims referred to in 
Chapter Four. 
The data are based on the information obtained from the questionnaires. Some 
assumptions can be made from the available data. In relation to employments, 
for example, it would be safe to assume that those who were unemployed, had 
they secured any job at all, would have been in Social Class 5 (unskilled 
labourer) (Appendix I). That assumption is based on the fact that 38% of the 
Informers in employment described themselves as labourers, and it would be 
likely therefore that a substantial number of the remaining Informers would have 
been in the same social class. 
Aim ] - To determine what constitutes 3n Informer. 
Suh Aim A. To define 3n Informer 
The aim here is to define an Informer. The data is set out in Tables 1,2 and 3. 
Table 1 compares the perceptions of the Informers and Handlers; both were 
asked to give their definition of an Informer. Table 2 examines the definitions 
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given by the Informers in relation to their reasons for starting informing, and 
Table 3 provides more detailed information on this theme. 
Table 1 - Definition of an Informer. as perceived by the Informer and 
Handler. 
INFORMER HANDLER ~OTAL 
PASSING INFORMATION 0 116 116 
PERSONAL BENEFIT 12 0 12 
HELPING POLICE 102 0 102 
OTHER 6 4 10 
TOTAL 120 120 240 
(x2 = 230.4, df= 3, P = <0.001). 
Informers and Handlers were asked how they would define an Informer. The 
statistical significance in Table 1 could be discounted, the Chi square test being 
meaningless due to number of cells showing no figures. Nevertheless, the table 
does show clear differences. 
Table 1 shows that for the Informers Group, most (102 or 85%) saw themselves 
as someone who helps the police or catches criminals. Twelve regarded 
themselves as informing for payment or reward. For these, the reward was 
crucial as one Informer (34) explained 
• "My mates are all criminals and I knaw I'm dropping them in the shit but 
I've got to get the money from somewhere. " 
Another (61) said, 
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• "I'm in this business because I can make more money this wtry than the 
dishonest wtry without worrying about you lot knocking on my door. 
Anywtry, I enjoy it'~ 
In contrast, the majority (116 or 97%) of Handlers believed that the Informer's 
role was to pass information, as suggested by one Handler (215) who defined an 
Informer as, 
• .~ person who associates with villains, possibly a villain himself, prepared 
to give me information". 
The difference may be quite subtle, in that providing information and helping the 
police could be construed as being one and the same thing. 
Clearly most Informers consider they are working together assisting the Police. 
As one Informer (1) explained, 
• '~ssisting with evidence to convict somebody. Being able to find out things 
that other people can't. To gain access to places where police officers 
can't go." Another Informer (7) suggested a more simplistic role defining it 
as, 
• "Catching little shits'~ The Handler, on the other hand merely believes the 
Informer is someone to be used to achieve his objective, as suggested by one 
Handler (213) who defined an Informer as, 
• .~ necessary tool who has to be used for information against criminals'~ 
Interestingly, 4 Handlers considered Informers to be dangerous, but none of the 
Informers saw themselves in this way. Also, it is surprising to see that none of 
the Handlers suggested that 'obtaining personal benefit' by the Informer should 
be part of the definition, even though, as we will see later, one of the main 
motives is financial. 
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The distinction between the two groups is more apparent after the Handlers 
were asked to explain their role. One (214) said, 
• "Controlling Informers - maintaining the upper hand, but treat them as a 
friend'~ This element of control was highlighted by another (228) who saw 
his role as, 
• "Managing the Informer and the information, directing the Informer'~ 
Others saw it as their responsibility to protect the Informer and some (288) 
considered the development of the relationship as their prime role. 
Table 2 - Informen reasons for starting. by definition. 
DEFINITION 
PERSONAL GAIN HELPING POUCE ~OTAL 
PERSONAL BENEFIT 12 74 86 
OTHER REASON 0 34 34 
TOTAL 12 108 120 
0?- = 5.3, df= 1, P = 0.021) 
Developing the definition further, Table 2 compares the reasons given by 
Informers for getting involved, with the definitions they gave for their role. The 
table shows that 12 (10%) Informers define an Informer as someone who does it 
for 'personal benefit', and 12 also confirm that is why they started informing, 
like the Informer (54) who said, 
• "I have been bled dry by the dogs of the earth. The only way I can get back 
at them is to tell the police about their activities", 
'Personal benefit' may also include those who use the police, like a female (120) 
who explained, 
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• "To look after myself I give information to the police. In my business, I 
need them to be on my side, but it suits them as well. They wouldn't get the 
information if I didn't carry on business. " 
This particular Infonner was a married woman who lived in privately owned 
good class accommodation. She ran an illegal brothel which was well known to 
the local police, and all the infonnation she gave was connected with her clients 
and often involved child pornography and sexual offences. It was established 
during the interview, that she was having a sexual association with her Handler, 
and this fact seemed to be common knowledge, at least in police circles. Her 
interpretation of 'personal benefit' was probably different to some of the others. 
A discrepancy emerges with the 108 (90%) Informers who define an Informer as 
someone who helps the police or has some other non-personal motivation; in 
that out of those 108 Infonners, 74 (69"10) said started for personal reasons, not 
in any way connected with helping the police. This suggests some conflict 
between the Informer's reason for giving infonnation and their definition ofthe 
role of an Informer. It should be noted here that Table 2 shows 108 Infonners 
who said they were helping the police, as opposed to 102 in Table 1. This is 
because Table 2 includes 6 Informers who did not know why they started 
informing. 
There is conflict also in the results when comparing Table 1 and Table 2. As 
already noted, 86 Infonners accepted that they started informing for personal 
reasons, but when asked to define an Informer, only 12 thought 'personal 
benefit' was worth mentioning. Perhaps though, this is not so surprising as they 
may well have considered that 'helping the police' would have ensured that they 
themselves benefit. 
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The fact remains though that 74 Informers who started informing for their own 
benefit defined their role as 'helping the police'. This fact becomes even more 
confusing when in Table 1, it is shown that none of the Handlers defined an 
Informer as someone who 'helped the police'. 
Table 3 - Detailed comparison between definition or an Inrooner and 
"fi"fi " reasons glVcnor ID orrnlDg. 
Catching/Grass Reward Helping PolicE Don! know :Total 
REVENGE 3 2 8 2 15 
REDUCE SENT 6 0 10 0 16 
Friendly with officer 0 0 6 2 8 
Dislikes that crime 5 0 12 0 17 
FINANCIAL 13 6 11 2 32 
ENJOYMENT 0 0 1 0 1 
Gratitude 0 0 2 0 2 
LOOKING FOR FAVOUR 3 2 4 0 9 
Police pressure 2 0 2 0 4 
PART OF A DEAL 0 0 2 0 2 
CHALLENGE 0 0 2 0 2 
GET ON RIGHT SIDE 4 2 3 0 9 
;fake out competition 0 0 3 0 3 
TOTAL 36 12 66 6 120 
Table 3 extends even more the definition of Informers and highlights the 
discrepancy which has emerged between how the Informers define an informer 
and what they say their reasons for informing are, as shown in Table 2. Even 
though significance tests are not relevant here, because the cells are too small, 
the point is made that although 108 Informers define their role as helping the 
police or catching criminals, it becomes apparent that 86 of them became 
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Infonners for other reasons, all of which benefit themselves personally (those 
reasons are highlighted in Table 3). For example, 32 Infonners became involved 
for financial reasons; this does not easily fit in with the concept of 'helping the 
police'. However, out of those 32, only 6 included payment or reward in their 
definition. 
Perhaps what these first three tables show is that the reason why Infonners start 
informing cannot necessarily be related to their definition of an Infonner. It will 
be seen later the motives appear to change throughout their career, but it seems 
reasonable to accept that the reason an Infonner first becomes involved has little 
bearing on what he later perceives his role to be. What is clear though, is that no 
agreed definition emerges, and in fact the two groups, the police and Infonner 
have little common ground. 
Sub Aim B. To differentiate between a registered Informer. a police contact 
d hI' •. d •• an a pu IC splnte CitIZen. 
The research was directed at registered Infonners, that is those who infonn on a 
regular basis. It has therefore not been possible to compare other infonnants 
known by the police simply as contactsl or as public spirited citizens2. Although 
there is no data available from this study in relation to each of these other types 
of infonnants, the interviewees were asked what they perceived the differences 
to be between the various groups. The results are set out in Tables 4 and 5. 
1 A contact is defined as someone who regularly gives infonnation, but who 
does not have a criminal background, and does not require payment or other 
reward, E.g. a Bank Manager. 
2 A public spirited citizen is defined as someone who gives infonnation to the 
police about a particular incident, the sole reason being as a public duty, E.g 
witness to a road accident or Neighbourhood Watch Co-ordinator. 
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Table 4 shows the Handlers' views on what they perceive to be the differences 
between an Informer and each of the other two groups, the contact and public 
spirited citizen. 
Table 4 - DitTerences between Informers and contacts or public spirited 
citizens according to the Handlers. 
INFORMERlCONT ACT INFORMERlPSC 
!SOMETHING IN RETURN 38 (32%) ~5 (38%) 
CRIMINAL HISTORY 38 (32%) 35 (29%) 
REGULARITY 19 (16%) NO DIFFERENCE 
OTHER REASONS 13 (11%) 27 (22%) 
QUALITY OF INFORMATIO 12 (10%) NO DIFFERENCE 
PUBLIC DUTY NO DIFFERENCE 13(11%) 
TOTAL 120 (100%) 120 (100%) 
First, Table 4 looks at how the Handlers perceive the main differences between 
the Informer and the Contact and also the differences between the Informer and 
the Public Spirited Citizen. The table describes how they, the Handlers, 
differentiate between an Informer and other sources of information. The results 
show that Handlers saw Informers as different to both the Contact and the 
Public Spirited Citizens in two respects; first, due to the previous 'criminal 
history' of the Informer group, and second due to the Informers' demands for 
'something in return'. As one Handler (207) put it, 
• 'My Informers are professional criminals'~ Another Handler (235) adds 
that, 
• "His motives for giving information usually being financial reward". 
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Handlers distinguished between Infonners and Public Spirited Citizens in two 
distinct ways First there was a sense of public duty (11 %) by the Public Spirited 
Citizen and second, in their willingness to give evidence in court, shown as 
'other' (7%) in the Table. One Handler (225) explained, 
• "An Informer does it for a reason, gain power, revenge, whereas a public 
spirited citizen does it out of a sense of duty'~ Another (227) said, 
• "They do not usually mind if their identity is disclosed and therefore will act 
as witnesses". One Handler (286) suggested the Public Spirited Citizen was 
• "-Limited; one-offinformation". 
When comparing the Contact group with the Infonner group, the Handlers 
thought that the unique differences were that the Infonners were more regular 
with their information (16%) and the information was usually better quality 
(10%). Amongst the 'other' reasons, it was felt that the Infonner's demand for 
anonymity (6%), set them apart. 
A number of assumptions can been made in relation to an assessment of the 
Handler's responses. The analysis has shown a number of characteristics which 
specifically relate to the Infonner, the Contact or the Public Spirited Citizen. 
These can be shown as follows: 
(a). The Infonner will probably have a criminal history, will be highly motivated 
by payment or reward and be in regular contact with their Handler. He will be 
able to offer good quality infonnation, give it for his own benefit and will 
demand anonymity. 
(b). The Public Spirited Citizen will be much likely to be selfless, and driven by 
a sense of public duty. He will be prepared to give evidence in court and as such 
will not demand anonymity, and will not necessarily have a criminal background. 
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He wiIJ not be motivated by payment or reward and wiIJ make contact on an ad 
hoc basis. 
( c). The Contact group are similar to Public Spirited Citizen group but do not 
have the same altruistic motives. Contacts prefer anonymity and are unlikely to 
give evidence in court; they are not motivated by a sense of duty, but more likely 
to be interested in some personal benefit; they are likely to be in more regular 
contact than the Public Spirited Citizen. 
(d). The Contact is a long way from being an Informer, and closer to the Public 
Spirited Citizen in many respects, so that it is suggested they are at different 
points on the same continuum. Indeed the latter probably constitutes a different 
type of informant altogether, whereas the Informer and Contact are similar. 
However, it is easy to see how each could move up or down as their motives 
and rewards change. 
Clearly the Public Spirited Citizen is far removed from the Informer and equa1Jy 
a long way from the Contact. Simply put, they are all so different. The result 
may be considered surprising in that all give information to the police, but their 
motives are substantially different, as too are their backgrounds. Perhaps that is 
why the police deal with them differently, and in particular it may be why only 
the Informer is registered and controlled. 
Sub Aim C. To establish a profile for Informers: a sociodemQgraphic 
analysis. 
The aim here is to arrive at a profile of an Informer in terms of selected 
sociodemographic features. The results are shown in Tables 6 to 18. Table 6 
refers to the age and sex of the Informers, whilst Tables 7 to 10 look at their 
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marital status. Tables 11 to 14 examine the employment details and Tables 15 
and 16 examine their criminal backgrounds. Table 17 links those Informers with 
previous convictions first by length of time informing and second, by gender. 
Table 18 looks at the Informer's knowledge about whether other members of 
their family are also informing. 
Broad Demographjc Detail of Informers. 
There were 120 Informers in all, and 120 Handlers interviewed during this study. 
Table 5- Age/C'rimder profile ofInformers. J 
MALE FEMALE rrOTAL 
18·21 9~ 3 (11) 12 (10) 
22-28 23 (25) 6 (21) ~(24) 
29-35 34 (37) 5 (18) 139 (32) 
36-42 7(8) 8 (29) 15 (13) 
OVER 42 19_(21) 6 (21) 125 (21) 
[TOTAL 92 (100) 28 (100) 120 (100) 
(Figures in brackets refer to percentages) 
(x2 = 10.09, df= 4, P = .0388) 
NAnONALCOMPA~SON 
7% 
14% 
13% 
13°.(, 
53% 
100% 
Table 5 shows that 10% of all Informers were aged between 18 and 21 years, 
and 21% over 42 years. The data does not show specific ages, only age groups, 
but the youngest Informer was 18 years of age and the eldest Informer was 48 
years of age. The Male:Female ratio was 77:23, which compares with 49:51 for 
the adult population generally (Appendix G). Out of the 120 Informers in the 
population, 92 were males and 28 females, showing that males were over 
3 The National comparison figures are taken from the 1991 census in relation to 
adult populations. 
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represented. The males were mainly in their early 20s to mid 30s (62%), 
whereas females were more evenly distributed across the age groups. Females 
were significantly over-represented in the 36-42 age group (Standardised 
Residual = 2.4) and under-represented in the 29-35 age group (5), suggesting 
that the male Informers tend to be younger than females. 
Compared with the population generally, Informers were over-represented (by a 
ratio of2: 1) in all the age groups up to 42, but under-represented (by 2:5) in the 
age groups over 42. The 29-35 age group accounted for the biggest single 
group, being 32% of the total - this compared with a National figure of 13%. 
These figures suggest that informing is primarily a younger person's activity, 
with 66% of the total under 36 years of age. 
Table 6 - Marital status of Informers by gender 
MALE FEMALE TOTAL 
MARRIED 42 6 48 
DIVORCED/SEPARATED 17 13 30 
SINGLE 33 9 42 
TOTAL 92 28 120 
(x2 = 9.9, df= 2, P = 0.007) 
A good deal of care needs to be exercised when interpreting marital status as 
reported by the Informers. Some, who are separated, saw themselves as single, 
and some who are married but separated saw themselves as married. The data in 
Table 6 therefore is only concerned with the responses, and compares the marital 
status of the Informers with gender. The Table shows there were many single 
informers - rather more than expected, (35% compared with only 24% 
nationally) with almost one third single males and one third single females. The 
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most significant feature in terms of marital status is 46% (13) of females were 
divorced or separated, (Standardised Residual = 2.3) and the correspondingly 
low percentage who were married (21%, 6). Only 6 females out of 28 (23%) 
said they were married, compared with 42 males out of92 (or 45%). This was a 
little surprising, especially as Table 5 showed that females were generally older 
than the males. 
Table 7 - Divorcedlseparated Informers reasons for informing. by gender. 
MALE FEMALE rrOTAL 
PERSONAL GAIN 12 6 18 
FRIENDSHIP/GRATITUDE 2 4 6 
MORAL REASONS 1 3 4 
POLICE PRESSURE 2 0 2 
rrOTAL 17 13 30 
Table 7 shows the listed reasons for informing given by those divorced or 
separated Informers, by gender. Those 30 Informers who were divorced or 
separated were analysed separately to determine whether their marital status had 
any bearing on their reasons for starting informing. Table 7 shows the results. 
The data shows male Informers to be more interested in materialistic gains, 
personal gain and police pressure (14, 82%) whilst the females gave more 
'humanistic' answers, with Friendship/Gratitude and Morality their main concern 
(7,54%). 
Table 8 - Marital status of Informers by age group. 
AGE 
18-21 22·28 29-35 3642 OVER 42 TOTAL 
MARRIED 0 9 25 6 8 48 
DIVORCED/SEPARATED 0 7 6 3 14 30 
SINGLE 12 13 8 6 3 42 
TOTAL 12 29 39 15 25 120 
(x2 =47, df= 8, P < 0.001) 
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Table 8 examines the data in terms of marital status and age and shows, not 
surprisingly, that all the Informers in the 18-21 group were single. Again, nearly 
half of those aged 22-28 were also single, with correspondingly fewer single 
Informers in the older age groups. There was a large group of married 
Informers, aged 29-35 - the data from Table 6 shows that the majority of these 
were males. Also, unsurprisingly, nearly 50% of those divorced or separated 
were over 42 years of age. 
Using Factor Analysis a typical profile for Informers has emerged. Factor 
Analysis identifies groups of variables, examining the statistical similarities which 
might be explored further. In effect, this statistical technique summarised a large 
number of variables with a smaller number of derived variables, or factors. The 
variables originated from the already known data in relation to the Informers, 
comprising of: 
(a) Accommodation 
(b) Age 
(c) Children 
(d) Convictions 
(e) Employment 
(f)job 
(g) gender 
(h) marital status 
The interesting point in this exercise is that the factors which emerged, useful for 
characterising a set of variables were not known in advance, but predetermined 
by the Factor Analysis. It is interesting then, that the following three separate 
factors were produced:-
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A. Domestic situation 
B. Employment situation 
C. Criminal history 
Below, each of these factors is analysed in detail to detennine their impact on 
the sociodemographic nature of Informers, and to show to what extent these 
factors might affect the Informers' motives. 
A. Domestic situation 
First, domestic situation: this is defined in terms of marital status, but as said 
earlier the data should be interpreted with care given the type of responses listed. 
Table 9 - Extended table of marital statlls by gender. 
MALE FEMALE TOTAL 
MARRIED 42 6 48 
MARRIED/APART 1 1 2 
SEPARATED 2 4 6 
DIVORCED 9 8 17 
SINGLE 33 9 42 
WIDOW 5 0 5 
TOTAL 92 28 120 
Although chi Square tests break down badly in Table 9 because of the small 
numbers in the cells, this additional chart shows that roughly two-thirds of both 
men (64%) and women (68%) were either married or had been married. 
It is difficult to compare these figures with the population at large because the 
1991 Census did not categorise 'separated' as a category. However if we group 
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the separated and divorced women together, it is clear that they are massively 
over-represented in this group of informers, accounting for 46% of the total, as 
highlighted in Table 6. 
Certainly, there is a high proportion of single people among the Informers, as 
seen in Table 6, and the majority of those were male. Compared with the adult 
population generaIly, single males are over-represented by a ratio of 4:3 and 
females by 3:2. 
B. EmplQyment situatiQn 
The second factor to be analysed is in relation to the employment of the 
Informers. 
Table 10 - EmplQyment statlls Qflnformers.4 
EMPLOYMENT INFORMERS WIDER POPULATION 
EMPLOYED 50 (42%) 87% 
UNEMPLOYED 63 (52%) 11% 
OTHER 7 (6%) 2% 
TOTAL 120 (100%) 100% 
(x2 = 44.3, df= 2, P = < 0.0001) 
Table 10 examines the employment status of the Informers. Although there is a 
slight weakness in one of the Chi square tests due to a smaIl number in one of 
the cells, the table shows some interesting results. Fifty two percent of the 
4 Data taken from the 1991 Census and based on the over 16s who are 
considered to be economicaIly active and therefore able to work. 
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Informers were unemployed. This compares with only around 9"/0 of the 
economically active adult population generally. Also, only 42% of the Informers 
were employed compared with a National figure of 89"/0 (6% were classified as 
'other' i.e. students and housewives). Unemployment then can be assumed to be 
an interesting facet in relation to Informers, and will be an important factor in 
building up a profile of the Informer. Interestingly in this respect, this high level 
of unemployment is consistent with most studies of offender populations, 
particularly where certain types of persistent offenders are concerned. 
By speculation, it may be assumed that those people who are out of work have 
more opportunity to concentrate on informing. More importantly perhaps, their 
motives may have some bearing on this; for example, the study will show later 
that financial motivation is important. (See Table 38). 
Table J 1 - JJnemplQyed Informers. by age and gender. 
~GE MALE FEMALE [OTAL 
35 and under 30 7 37 
Over 35 17 9 26 
rrotal 47 16 63 
(x2 = 1.9, df=l, P = <0.159) 
Table 11 further examines unemployed Informers and compares their ages and 
gender. Despite the fact that the Chi Square test is not fully valid, there are 
definite characteristics for the unemployed Informers. Of the 47 unemployed 
males, 30 (64%) were 35 years of age and under. Of the 16 unemployed females, 
these were relatively evenly distributed across the age range, although more than 
half(56%) were over 35 years of age. 
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There is a suggestion then that unemployed male Informers are generally 
younger than the unemployed females. There is no significant difference, though 
and for profiling purposes, it would seem that the ages of unemployed Informers 
is not a strong feature. 
Table 12 - Informers in ful! time employment, by age and gender, 
AGE MALE FEMALE 'TOTAL 
35 and under 24 1 25 
Over 35 5 1 6 
Lotal 29 2 31 
(x2 = 1.2, df= I, P = <0.257) 
Table 12 gives the details of the 31 Informers who were employed in terms of 
their age and gender. The Table shows that the Chi Square test is not fully valid. 
owing to the small number offemale Informers - 2 in all. However, as in Table 
11, it can be seen that far more of the male Informers (83%) were aged 35 and 
under, with only 5 (17%) male employed Informer over 35. This seems to 
compare reasonably with Table 5 which showed that 71% of all male Informers 
were aged 35 and under, perhaps reinforcing the argument that Informers 
generally tend to come from the younger age groups. 
There was only one single (i.e. unmarried) male in full-time employment; the 
other single Informers were all unemployed (70%). He was aged 29-35, a 
painter and decorator who lived in a council house with three dependent 
children. He had previous convictions for drug offences and had been informing 
for 3-5 years. The main distinguishing factor with this man was that he had a 
skilled trade (Social Class 3). Although he classed himself as single, the 
presence of his children suggested that he had at least one serious relationship. 
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Only 2 of the 28 females were in full-time employment, whereas most were 
either unemployed or classified as housewives. These two Informers had very 
little in common. One was single, aged 22-28, a farm worker living in 
owner-occupied property. She had no children, no previous convictions and 
been informing for less than a year. She said she started informing to get on the 
right side of the law, and was first recruited during police enquiries. She saw the 
role of an Informer as one of helping the police, and apparently did not take 
payment for her information. 
The second woman was married, aged 36-42, worked as a self employed 
masseuse, lived in her own house with her two children. She had previous 
convictions for sexual offences, and had been informing for over 6 years. She 
started informing to take out some of the competition and was also recruited 
during police enquiries. She saw her role as helping to catch criminals, and was 
paid in cash for her information. On the face of it, this woman came from a good 
background and was financially stable. She had little incentive to become as 
involved as she was with the police, particularly when her information involved 
child abuse, a category of crime especially distasteful to most people. 
Curiously enough both lived in owner-occupied property; only one other female 
in the sample was found to be in a similar situation. The difference between the 
two women described above is that one was young and apparently innocent, 
involved as an Informer for altruistic reasons, whilst the other was more 
professional and so called 'business-like'. 
195 
Table 13 - Age groups by emplQyment status and gender 
AGE EMPLOYED UNEMPLOYED OTHER TOTAL 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
35 and under 32 6 30 7 4 1 80 
Over 35 9 3 17 9 0 2 40 
Total 41 9 47 16 4 3 120 
Table 13 shows the data in terms of the Informers' employment status and 
gender, where their age groups are dichotomised between those aged 35 and 
under and those over the age of35. 
Table 13, as in Table 12, the Chi Square list is not valid, and for the same 
reasons. However, the Table links the two previous tables in terms of 
employment, age and gender. The data shows those Informers in the 'other' 
employment included housewives and students. 
Again we see twice as many Informers aged 35 and under, and the largest group 
is the unemployed males (47) followed by the employed males (41). 
It is interesting to see that in terms of employment status and gender, one group 
stands out from those Informers over 35 years of age. These are the unemployed 
females (9 out of 16). These figures do not include those shown as 'housewives' 
which makes the figures even more surprising, although of course they may well 
have been married but divorced or separated. However, with only 40 Informers 
in total over 35 years of age, this group make up a large proportion. This may 
suggest, in terms of profiling, that the more mature female could well appear 
more often than expected. 
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Table 14 - Type ofemployment, by gender 
MALE FEMALE TOTAL 
LABOURER (5) 17 2 19 
MASSEUSE (3) 0 1 1 
SHOP ASSISTANT t4t 0 2 2 
BUILDER (3) 3 0 3 
DRIVER/MECHANIC (3) 7 0 7 
~NTIQUE DEALER (3) 2 2 4 
PAINTER/DECORATOR (3) 3 0 3 
SECURITY (4) 3 0 3 
FARMER/HORSE TRAINER (2 2 1 3 
SALES/CLERK (3) 4 1 5 
~OTAL 41 9 50 
(Figures in brackets refer to Registrar General's Classification of Occupations in 
terms of Social Class) 
Table 14 links type of employment to gender and looks at specific employments. 
The data shows there were 41 employed males, almost all were either manual 
tradesmen (social class 4) or were unskilled labourers (social class 5). The 9 
employed females were also in the range of manual or practical trades. The 
majority of working Informers were labourers (38%) with the next largest group 
working with vehicles (14%) although none of these were female. 
To summarise, the data in this section examines the employment of the 
Informers and shows that the majority were unemployed. The majority of males 
were under 35 years of age, but that was not the case with the females. Most of 
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those Informers who were employed were either manual workers or unskilled 
labourers. 
C. Criminal history 
In this section an examination is made of the criminal history of the Informers. 
Table IS examines this in terms of gender. 
Table 15 - Informers with criminal convictions. by gender. 
MALE FEMALE rOTAL PERCENTAGE 
YES 89 18 107 89 
NO 3 10 13 11 
TOTAL 92 28 120 100 
(x2 = 23.4, df= 1, P = < 0.0001) 
Although the majority (107, 89%) of the Informers reported they had previous 
convictions, Table 15 shows a significant difference between males and females 
in this respect. Thirty six percent (10) of women had no criminal history 
(Standard Residual = 4.0), but only 3% (3) of the men had no such history. 
Those 10 females do not stand out in any way, and they had no special 
characteristics. It is interesting to see the disparity between males and females in 
terms of previous convictions, but the data is insufficient to examine the reasons 
in more detail. A study of the female Informer generally would require further 
research. 
The high proportion of males generally, compared with females is highlighted in 
Table 6, and it can be assumed that the majority of those with previous 
convictions are male. This data suggests that having a criminal background is an 
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important feature in the profile of an Informer. Incidentally, as many convictions 
as possible were checked from current records using the Informers' dates of 
birth, but not all gave this information. Presumably they felt this may 
compromise their identities. 
Table 16 - Previous convictions by type and gender 
'VIAL IIA.,C 
.NO ,IIV,,"'" 3 10 13 11 
I 44 16 60 50 
.T 6 0 6 5 
23 1 24 20 
1 1 2 2 
@RGLARY 9 0 9 8 
6 0 6 5 
'V~L 92 28 120 100 
Table 16 examines the 1ype of previous conviction by gender listed according to 
an Index Offence, that is, the main category of offending for which the Informers 
have been convicted. It is acknowledged that many criminals commit different 
crimes, that is to say a drug offender may well also be a burglar in order to 
provide the funds to feed his habit. The category of crime offered by the 
Informers is the one perceived by themselves to be the 'main' category, or Index 
Offence. One hundred and seven (89%) Informers had previous convictions, 
which is shown in Table 15 and these are mainly for fraud or dishonesty (50%) 
which is the largest category for both males and females. Those offences are 
predominantly property offences. Drug misuse (20%) is the next largest category 
but interestingly, only one female Informer had drugs convictions. Twenty one 
male Informers had convictions for assault, burglary and robbery, whereas none 
ofthe females had been convicted of these 1ypes of offences. 
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It is interesting to see that previous convictions for females were restricted 
mainly to dishonesty and fraud, and this is in line with patterns of female 
criminality generally. As mentioned, few female Informers had a criminal history 
in Drugs. It is not known why this is, but to speculate perhaps female drug 
offenders do not want to get involved in informing, or the police are not 
specifically recruiting them. This may be an area for future research. 
Table 17 - Length of time as an Informer with convictions, by gender. 
MALE FEMALE TOTAL PERCENTAGE 
LESS THAN 1 YEAR 10 7 17 16 
1·2 YEARS 32 6 38 36 
3-5 YEARS 36 4 40 37 
~ YEARS OR MORE 11 1 12 11 
OTAL 89 18 107 100 
(x2 = 9.18, df= 3, P = 0.2695) 
Table 17 examines the length of time being an Informer in terms of gender and 
previous convictions. The data confirms that the majority of male Informers had 
previous convictions (89 out of 92). Far fewer females had previous convictions 
(18,64%) and they tended also to have shorter informing careers, the majority 
(39%) having been involved for less than a year. Informing generally seems to 
be a temporary occupation for the majority, with 89% who had been informing 
for less than 6 years and 52% for less than 2 years. Relatively few had been 
informing for less than a year or more than 6 years, although the largest age 
group for females had been informing for less than a year. Out of the 12 
Informers who had been informing for more than 6 years, II (92%) were male; 
here again we see a difference between the two groups, suggesting that perhaps 
that males have a longer informing career. 
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In terms of criminal backgrounds, there appears to be no relationship between 
the data in Table 14 (referring to types of occupation) and that of Table 16 
(Categories of previous convictions). For example, it is interesting that none of 
those Informers whose occupation involved the driving or repairing of vehicles 
were convicted of vehicle related crime. As will be seen later, nor is there any 
relationship between the previous convictions and occupations and the way 
Informers select information to give to the police. That is to say, an Informer 
with convictions for drugs does not necessarily restrict his informing to drug 
offences. It could be assumed therefore, that the relevance of having a criminal 
background is merely one of association; that is to say someone with previous 
convictions has more opportunity to receive information, regardless of hislher 
employment. For example, a drug user who is associating with burglars, is more 
likely to have information about burglary than drugs. 
Table 18 - Other members o(the Io(onner's (amily 
FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE 
YES 4 3 
NO 91 76 
DONTKNOW 25 21 
TOTAL 120 100 
Table 18 examines whether other members of the Informer's family are also 
Informers, and the data shows that 76% (91) of informers thought they were the 
only member of their family who were informing, but a further 21 % (25) weren't 
sure. Put another way, only 3% (4) knew of other informers in their family, 
although it is not clear how those 91 Informers could be so positive that their 
family members were not Informers, when anonymity is so important. Given that 
confidentiality is an important aspect of the InformerlHandler relationship, at 
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least 4 Infonners seem to know of the existence of other family members, and 
another 2S Infonners believe it is possible a family member is also infonning. 
This is interesting and the whole matter of confidentiality is specifically 
addressed in Tables 31 and 32 below. 
Of the 4 Infonners who knew that other family members were also Infonners, 
two were female aged between 36 - 42 years, and two were the males aged 18 -
21 years. All were single and unemployed. The males lived with their parents, 
and the females lived in council accommodation. Three of the 4 Infonners 
described their relationship with the police as 'fiiendly' and the fourth as 
'trusting'. Their reasons for infonning were all different. One of the female 
Infonners referred to her family and said, 
• "/ would tell my handler anyt'!ing concerning anyone including my own 
family, and leave him to use his own discretion'~ 
This show of loyalty to the Handler against family members emphasises how 
important the relationship is to the Infonner in many cases. There are a few 
Infonners who seem not to be dissuaded from infonning, even when they know 
other family members are doing the same. Clearly their motivation to infonn is 
very powerful, whatever the reasons they give. 
A profile of an Informer 
An aim of this research has tried to provide a profile of a typical Infonner. The 
data has shown that such a profile must centre around the Informers' marital 
status (See Table 8) from which 3 main categories emergel: 
( a). The young single. 
(b). The family man, and 
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( c). The divorced/separated. 
These categories can then be linked to some of the other characteristics 
identified by the data such as accommodation, previous convictions etc. 
(a) The young single 
He is a young unemployed single male, aged between 18 and 28 and living in 
private rented accommodation with no dependents. He will probably have 
previous convictions for either fraud, dishonesty or drugs, and possibly robbery. 
Ifhe does work, he will probably be in an unskilled occupation, i.e. social class 
5. He will be a relative newcomer to the informing scene. 
(b) The family man 
He is a married male also working in an unskilled or perhaps semi-skilled 
occupation (social class 4 or 5), living in council property with his wife and 
children. He will have previous convictions for either fraud, dishonesty or 
drugs, and will have been informing for 1 - 5 years. 
(c) Divorced/separated 
A typical informer in this group will be either:-
a) An unemployed male, living in council or private rented accommodation 
without any dependent children. He will have previous convictions for 
dishonesty or drugs and will have been informing for at least three years. He is 
quite likely to be aged over 42, but could easily fall into the 22-35 age group. 
Or, 
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b) An unemployed woman, living in council or private rented accommodation 
with her children. She may well have previous convictions for fraud or 
dishonesty, but will have been informing for less than two years. She will be any 
age over 21. 
Expanding the profiles 
To develop the profiles further, other factors can be considered, including the 
data relating to the Informer's relationship with the Handler, the Informer's 
motives and criminal history etc., as shown in Tables 5 to 17. 
The data suggests that the largest group consists of unemployed males, aged 29 
- 35, married and living with their wives and two children in council or housing 
association property. The categories are not discrete as Informers could be 
described under more than one heading, nevertheless the groups listed above 
represent the main profiles of Informers as shown by the data However using 
additional information from the interviews, it has been possible to arrive at a 
more sophisticated profile which categorises all the respondents used in this 
research. 
The Beginner 
He will be a relative newcomer to the informing scene. He probably sees 
informing as a game or as a way of making easy money. He is not particularly 
bothered about what information he gives, nor what the 'knock-on' effects might 
be. He has some reservations about the risk of physical violence, but that will 
probably not stop him. He places a lot of importance on confidentiality in his 
dealings with the handler, but is quite cavalier in other respects. He is more 
interested in the excitement and challenge than in forming a solid relationship. 
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He is happy for the Handler to arrange the meetings and to determine the 
location. He is consumption-orientated, spending most of his money on food, 
drink, clothes and drugs. 
The Provider 
He started informing for the money or to get a reduced sentence, following 
previous criminal activity. While those initial reasons have been satisfied, he has 
continued informing because he sees it as a way of providing earnings for his 
family. He may develop an opposition to drugs and start informing on people 
who deal in them. He places great value on confidentiality, trust, truth and 
honesty in his relationship with the Handler. Informing is a valuable source of 
income and he does not want to sour the relationship by passing poor quality 
information. He is happy for either party to arrange meetings, but prefers to 
meet in licensed premises. 
The Estranged 
This refers to the divorced or separated man or woman. He is likely to be 
recruited whilst in custOdy, but she will probably start informing after police 
enquiries. He is likely to want to restrict himself to certain categories of crime 
e.g. drugs, but she is less particular. He is quite likely to refuse to get involved 
if there is any danger of violence either to him or his friends and family, but she 
is less likely to refuse. Confidentiality is considered to be important to both 
although she will put a higher value on this. Another major difference between 
the male and female Informer is that he puts very little value on friendship with 
the handler, whereas she considers this to be quite important. Neither take the 
lead in arranging meetings, but he prefers to meet in a public place or a vehicle. 
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She on the other hand prefers to meet in her own home. He spends his money 
on food, drink and drugs while she spends her money primarily on her family, 
but of course she has children to care for, and her male counterpart does not. 
The Professional 
He is driven by financial reward, although initially his motives could have been 
many and varied. His relationship with his Handler probably started when they 
met during police enquiries or socially. During his informing career there isn't 
much he hasn't informed about but that is not to say he is reckless about getting 
involved. He is well aware of the dangers, and would rather hold back 
information than be required to give evidence in court. He tries to maintain a 
'professional' relationship with his Handler, as this is an important source of 
income for him and his family. 
The motives oftbe Informer 
The data can be recast into the motives of an Informer (although this will be 
discussed in detail under Aim 4) and to this end, the data has produced three 
distinct categories. These can be described as:-
(a). The financially motivated. 
(b). The experienced criminal. 
( c). The inexperienced. 
Interestingly, these separate categories, which relate specifically to the 
Informer's motives, can easily be linked with those categories referred to earlier. 
For example, the 'financially motivated' is closely connected to 'The Provider", 
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the 'experience criminal' to 'The Professional' and the 'inexperienced' to "The 
Beginner" 
(a) The Financially Motivated 
He will be motivated by money and appear to be quite a desperate individual 
who can be kept under control as long as there is a promise of reward. The 
Handlers will probably have a lot of influence over these individuals. The 
Informer is not too concerned about the terms and conditions of the relationship 
- he will be quite blinkered. As long as he gets his money, he is happy. He puts a 
high value on trust and understanding because he needs to know that the money 
will be there if he needs it. 
(b) The Experienced Criminal 
This is the hard-core offender who has a long criminal history and is weU used to 
dealing with the police. He sees himself as in business, the same business as the 
handlers, only on the other side of the counter. He expects the relationship to 
proceed with a degree of mutual respect and professional recognition. He wiU 
offer some information in return for a reduced sentence, but is unlikely to lay all 
his cards on the table at once. He does not see his reasons for informing as 
significantly affecting the way the relationship should proceed. For him, the 
information itself is much more important. 
(s:) Tbe Inexperienced 
These Informers have probably been involved with crime before, but the 
situation has suddenly become more serious. He can be quite frightened and is 
likely to respond to the suggestions of the Handler. The Handler may not hold 
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all the cards, but seems to be in control. This Informer is more nervous about 
his relationship, his reasons for infonning are quite important, particularly 
because it can affect the way he would like to proceed. 
Summary for Aim 1 
The results show that most of the Informers started informing for personal 
reasons, including financial. However, no agreed definition emerged, indeed the 
Informer and Handler have different perceptions of the Informer's role; that is to 
say, the Informers generally defined their role as helping the police, whereas the 
Handlers specifically thought that the Informers' role was to pass information. It 
would seem that an Informer's reason for becoming involved has no bearing on 
his perception of the role. The study also shows that, although the Informer, 
Contact and Public Spirited Citizen all give information to the police, they are 
treated very differently, and only the Informer is registered and controlled by the 
police. 
The study has been able to provide a sociodemographic profile of an Informer. 
This has been achieved by classifYing the categories of marital status, then 
reclassifying in terms of employment, motivation and relationship, as shown 
below. 
MARITAL EMPLOYMENT 
single 
family 
divorced 
unemployed 
employed 
other 
MOTIVATION 
criminal 
non criminal 
financial 
RELATIONSHIP 
professional 
beginner 
social 
The list above shows the potential features that may make up an Informers 
profile, although the actual numbers of Informers which fit into each category 
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are not relevant here. This study has shown that an Informer does not have only 
one specific profile. He may just as easily be married as single, the majority of 
Informers are unemployed, but not all. His reasons for informing may well be 
financial but not necessarily (see later) and the relationship also is diverse; 
although the study will show later that Informers tend to be more social, whilst 
the Handler is professional. It is suggested then, that a number of profiles exist 
which make up a typical Informer. Nevertheless, distinct categories have 
emerged which will enable practitioners to determine probable profiles of 
Informers. 
The female Informer 
A special category related to gender needs to be considered. It is apparent that 
the majority of Informers are male (Table 5) and although the male Informer 
tends to be in the younger age groups, that is not the case with female Informers. 
The majority of female Informers were either divorced or separated (Table 6) 
and most of them seemed to have become involved because they wanted 
fiiendship or for moral reasons, whereas the males were more concerned with 
personal benefit (Table 7). Unlike their male colleagues, a large proportion of 
females had no previous criminal convictions (Table 15), and those that did, had 
been involved mainly in fraud and dishonesty (Table 16). It was interesting to 
find that those female Informers with previous convictions had far shorter 
careers than their male colleagues. 
It may be assumed that there is a definite distinction between male and female 
Informers in terms of their profiles. It is probably not the case, although this 
study fails to support the argument, that female Informers will only give 
information about female criminals. Nor is it likely that female Informers prefer 
to be handled by female police officers. 
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Nemitz 5 has examined a number of criminological theories relating to women, 
and specifically refers to 'biological determinism'. Here, the female is depicted 
as devious, neurotic and evil, and attributes their lower rate of criminal 
behaviour to the female biological make-up, being essentially passive and 
non-criminal. Nemitz is surprised that there are not more female Informers if 
indeed they are naturally devious, deceitful and more cunning and crafty than 
men. Especially as such traits are commonly accepted as necessary for 
Informers. Perhaps this is too simplistic; that is to say, there may be many other 
factors to consider, such as association. For example, later in this study whilst 
examining the relationship between an Informer and Handler, it will be seen that 
most Informers first become involved whilst in custody, where the majority of 
prisoners are male. 
Nemitz suggests in her study that female Informers tend to become involved for 
reasons relating to their farni1ies or 'loved ones'. It was also apparent that 
female Informers particularly disliked a type of crime, usually drugs, especially if 
a member of her family was involved in drug abuse. Also, the majority offemale 
Informers were financially rewarded for their information, often to help pay for 
the upkeep of their families. Moreover, Nemitz suggests that the female 
Informers' motivation tends to be altruistic, caring or 'traditionally feminine '. 6 
Aim 2 - To determine wbat constitutes a Handler 
SlIb Aim A. To establisb a profile for Handlers. 
5Nemitz T Gender issues in Informer handling (In Informers: Policing, Policy, 
Practice. Billingsley R, Nemitz T, Bean P (Eds) (WilIan Publishing, Devon 2000) 
6 Ibid. 
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In terms of trying to establish a typical police Handler, the data has concentrated 
on rank, post and length of service. Handling Informers is defined in terms of 
the task rather than of the individual Informers. That is to say, a Handler may be 
handling Informers over a number of years but those Informers may change, 
some lasting a short time; others much longer. For example, one of the 
respondents was a Detective Sergeant who had been handling for over 5 years, 
but only handled 1 Informer during that time. 
The analysis of existing data is shown in Tables 19 to 23. Table 19 looks at the 
Handlers by rank, and Table 20 at their occupational position in the police; Table 
21 links the two together. Table 22 considers the Handlers length of service in 
terms of rank, whilst Table 23 examines that length of service in terms of their 
current posts. 
Table J9 - Handlers by rank. 
RANK FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE 
CONSTABLE 70 58 
SERGEANT 35 29 
INSPECTOR 13 11 
CHIEF INSPECTOR 2 2 
[fOTAl 120 100 
Table 19 shows that the majority of Handlers were constables (58%) but 
surprisingly a high proportion were sergeants (29%) (compared with a national 
average of 15%). It is less surprising that only 13% were of inspector ranks, as 
these are recognised by the police service generally more as controllers than 
Handlers. It is not uncommon though for senior ranks to continue handling 
Informers. 
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Table 20 - Handlers by position. 
POST FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE 
CID 83 69 
UNIFORM 11 9 
DRUG SQUAD 2 2 
OTHER SPECIAUST SQUAD 24 20 
[TOTAL 120 100 
Table 20 looks at the position within the police the Handlers held at the time 
they were interviewed. The data shows that the majority were C.I.D officers 
(69"10). Indeed only II (9%) Handlers were uniformed officers, compared with 
the national uniform establishment at around 80%. This may indicate their lack 
of opportunity in cultivating Informers, but clearly it can be assumed that the 
police Handler is more likely to be a plain clothes officer working within general 
C.lD or specialist squads than anything else. It is surprising though that so few 
Handlers were drug squad officers; it has been a common assumption that the 
investigation of drug abuse is pro-active and relies heavily on information 
received by the police 
Table 21 - Handlers position, by rapk. 
RANK 
CONSTABLE SERGEANT NSPECTOR ClINSPECTOR TOTAL 
UNIFORM 11 11 
CID 45 24 13 1 83 
DRUG SQUAD 2 2 
OTHER SQUADS 12 11 1 24 
TOTAL 70 35 13 2 120 
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Table 21 recasts the data and shows the Handlers' rank. All of the uniformed 
officers (11, 16%) were constables. This is interesting, in that there are no rules 
within the police service which suggest that Handlers should be restricted to one 
rank, and in fact it could be argued that the supervisory officers have the same 
opportunity to cultivate Informers as other ranks 
Sergeants and above may see their supervisory duties as more important than 
being involved with an Informer. The same may be said of drug squad officers 
(2, 3%) but in other specialist squads, 50% (12 from 24) were supervisors, 
mostly sergeants. This is discussed further in Chapter 5. 
Table 22 - HandleD experience. by rank. 
CONSTABLE SERGEANT NSPECTOR ClINSPECTOR TOTAL 
LESS THAN 1 YEAR 2 2 4 
1-2YEARS 10 2 12 
3-5 YEARS 25 11 2 38 
6 YEARS OR MORE 33 22 9 2 66 
TOTAL 70 35 13 2 120 
Table 22 recasts the data again, this time in terms of levels of experience 
measured by time spent as Handlers. The Table shows that not all constables are 
inexperienced Handlers. In fact 33 (47"/0) had been handling for over 6 years -
this was the largest group - and only 2 (3%) had been handling for less than a 
year. Most sergeants had been handling for over 6 years (22, or 63%) and that 
was also true of the other ranks. Of all the Handlers, a clear pattern emerged in 
terms of experience; that is to say only 4 (3%) had been involved in informing 
for less than a year, 12 for 1-2 years, 38 for 3-5 years, and a further 66 (55%) of 
them having more than 6 years experience. Similar patterns occur in relation to 
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rank where it seems that Handlers with the highest rank have the greatest 
experience i.e. there are no police officers with less than 1 years handling 
experience above the rank of sergeant, but 11 out of 66 with 6 years or more 
handling experience. This is probably due to the fact that Handlers first become 
involved in the lower ranks, but continue to handle Informers despite their 
promotion. 
Table 23 looks at the data in terms of length of service and occupational 
position. 
Table 23 - HandleD experience. by occupational position and lengtb of 
senrice 
UNIFORM CID DRUG SQUAD OTHER SQUAD rrOTAL 
LESS THAN 1 YEAR 2 2 4 
1-2YEARS 7 5 12 
3-5YEARS 2 29 1 6 38 
6 YEARS OR MORE 49 1 16 66 
TOTAL 11 83 2 24 120 
The previous table showed that, regardless of rank, Handlers tend to continue to 
handle Informers, but Table 23 shows a different picture when the data is recast 
in terms of the Handlers' position in the police. This table produces some odd 
results which are difficult to interpret. There are few Handlers in the Drug 
Squad but where they exist they seem to be long term Handlers. Also, CID 
officers seem to dominate (83 out of 120) the majority of whom have at least 3 
years experience. 
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It can only be speculation, but the small number of uniformed officers who have 
shown a liking for Informer handling could well find themselves working in the 
C.I.D. or squads at a later stage, whilst those officers who remain in uniform, 
perhaps do not receive the support or incentive to continue in this role. 
To summarise Sub Aim A, the existence of a Handler's profile has been 
examined in terms of rank, occupational post and handling experience. The data 
has shown that the majority of Handlers are constables who work in the CID. 
More than half of the Handlers had over 6 years experience, and the majority of 
supervisory officers seemed to have more handling experience. There were 
surprisingly few Handlers working in the drug squad but those that did, seemed 
to have more experience than some of the others. 
Because of the low numbers, the data did not cater specifically for gender issues. 
However, it is known from the interviews that the female Handlers held various 
ranks and worked either in the CID or a plain clothes department. They had all 
been handling Informers for some time. 
Sub Aim B. To identify tbe Handler's role. 
The Handlers were asked how they define their role, and the results are shown in 
Tables 24, and 25. The first Table gives their perceptions and the second 
examines these findings against the Handler's experience in the use of Informers. 
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Table 24 - Frequency of Handler's role. 
ROLE FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE 
GATHERING INTELLIGENCElINFORMATIOI 66 55% 
CULTIVATING INFORMERS 18 15% 
TASKING 10 8% 
LOOKING AFTER INFORMER 7 6% 
OBTAINING EVIDENCE 4 3% 
OTHER 15 13% 
TOTAL 120 100% 
Table 24 sets out what the Handlers thought was their primary responsibility or 
role expectation when dealing with Informers. The data shows the Handlers 
expressed a wide range of attributes as to what they perceive their role to be. 
The majority (66, or 55%) thought their role was to gather intelligence or 
information, but 4 (3%) considered that it was to obtain evidence. How and why 
this differed from gathering intelligence is not clear. However, there is in the 
police service today, an emphasis on Handlers becoming part of Dedicated 
Source Units, whose objectives are to collect information, leaving the arrest of 
criminals to others. This change will have some bearing on the Handler's 
responses. So for example, the cultivation and tasking of Informers 7 (28, or 
23%) was considered to be important, but this too could be seen as being the 
same as collecting information, i.e. merely another way of saying the same thing. 
That apart it is interesting that 7 (6%) Handlers considered their role was to 
'look after their Informer', - this does not relate to the collection of information 
7 The 'tasking of Informers' is a phrase used by the police service which means 
instructing the Informer to obtain information about a particular crime or 
criminal. 
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or evidence. To these respondents, the relationship or partnership between 
themselves and the Informer is the most important aspect, whereas the majority 
were more concerned with information than anything else. This small group or 
minority of Handlers are likely to pose a problem for the police service, in that 
their priority clearly lies with the protection of the Informer. This group will be 
looked at again when the study considers the development of the relationship 
between an Informer and Handler. 
Table 25 - Role of the Handler. by length of time being a Handler 
ROLE LESS THAN 1 Y 1-2 YRS 3-5 YRS 16 YRS OR MORE TOTAL 
GAIN INTELLlGENCElINF 4 9 14 39 66 
CULTIVATE 12 6 18 
TASKING 5 5 10 
LOOK AFTER INFORMER 2 2 3 7 
OBTAIN EVIDENCE 2 2 4 
OTHER 1 3 11 15 
OTAL 4 12 38 66 120 
Table 25 recasts the data in terms of the Handlers role and the length of time 
being a Handler. The Table looks again at the role of the Handler and shows 
how their perception changes as they become more experienced. All those who 
had been informing for less than a year (4, 3%) considered their role to be 
obtaining intelligence or information. This seems to take priority throughout 
their careers, increasing through the years. The cultivation and tasking (the 
proactive use of Informers) does not begin until they have at least 3 years 
experience. Although only 7 (6%) said they were 'looking after their Informer', 
the numbers involved seem to increase with experience, and may be another 
indication of how the relationship develops and becomes stronger over a period 
of time. 
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Summary of Aim 2 
The results show that most Handlers tend to be constables and work within the 
C.LD or plain clothes departments. This seems to confirm the findings from the 
Lincolnshire case study (Tables I and 4). It would also appear that plain clothes 
officers handle their Informers longer than their uniformed colleagues. It may be 
assumed that crime investigators have more opportunity to recruit Informers. 
The majority of Handlers thought their role was to obtain information or 
intelligence. This can be compared with the Lincolnshire case study where the 
majority of Handlers considered their main reason for involvement was the 
detection of crime and arrest of criminals (Table 5) both of which are closely 
linked with intelligence gathering. It is interesting though that in the case study, 
none of the Handlers mentioned 'personal gain' or 'advancement' as being 
important, and yet in the main study, both these areas were considered to be an 
advantage. It is difficult to draw conclusions from this, other than to suggest 
that because of the researcher's personal knowledge, the respondents were 
apprehensive about reporting these as reasons for becoming involved; to 
consider 'personal benefit' as a reason is perhaps not considered to be 
professional. 
A number of respondents also considered that looking after their Informer was 
the most important function. The data also suggests that the Handler's need to 
look after his Informer increases with experience. 
The female Handler 
As already discussed, the gender issues have not been a priority of this study. 
Nevertheless, if a meaningful Handler profile is to be determined, some reference 
must be made to those few female officers. This can be best achieved by 
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recalling the data available form the Lincolnshire Case Study (Chapter Six). 
Here we identified that only 3 of the 25 Handlers were female (Table 2) which is 
in fact an accurate reflection of female officers in the force generally. From 
personal knowledge of the 3 Handlers, the researcher is satisfied that their 
Informer's were predominantly male and it was their current role which was of 
importance to them as Handlers, not any specific gender issue. The three officers 
were drawn from varying backgrounds, and their ranks, ages and police roles 
were wide ranging. 
Nemitz 8 makes the point that female police officers know that they must 
perform better than their male colleagues if they are to be given credibility. It 
follows therefore, that female Handlers will ensure that the information they 
obtain from their Informers is also credible. Female Handlers believe that the 
most credible information comes from the local community, as opposed to the 
criminal world. Indeed, the female Handler will be highly critical of her male 
colleague for suggesting that Informers must be 'good criminals'. Nemitz 
suggests that female Handlers are in many ways different from male Informers. 
For example, female handlers will usually recruit their Informers who have been 
victims of crime or witnesses, and the relationship is developed based on trust 
and respect. This present research will show, however, that trust particularly is 
a common feature for Handlers, irrespective of their gender. The results Will also 
show that Informers can usually give credible information only if they associate 
with criminals. 
It could therefore be suggested that the role of the Handler is not gender driven. 
8 Op Cit: Nemitz 
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Aim 3 - To determine the relationship hetween the police and the informer 
Sub Aim A. How is that relationship initiated? 
The study now turns towards examining the relationship between the Informer 
and Handler and begins with a close look at the start of the relationship. The 
results are set out in Tables 26 to 28. Table 26 examines where the relationship 
is likely to begin, with Table 27 specifically looking at those who meet socially, 
that is to say, meeting as friends rather than partners. Table 28 compares the 
social activity of the two groups. 
Table 26 - Where the relationship first starts 
INFORMER HANDLER TOTAL 
CUSTODY RELATED 60 105 165 
DURING ENQUIRIES 50 11 61 
OTHER 10 4 14 
TOTAL 120 120 240 
(x2 = 38.5, df= 2, P < 0.0001) 
Table 26 looks at where the respondents thought the relationship began and the 
data shows a significant difference of opinion between the Handlers and the 
Informers in terms of where the relationship actually starts. Eighty eight per 
cent (105) of the Handlers said it is 'custody related' whilst 9% (11) said 'during 
enquiries'. Only 50"10 (60) of the Informers said it was 'custody related', but 
42% (50) said during enquiries. It could be argued that these results are merely 
a difference of perception by the two groups. That is to say, they may be in fact 
reporting the same thing, but from different viewpoints; some Informers prefer 
to see themselves as helping with enquiries rather than having been in custody. 
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It could also be argued that because police officers are constantly told to recruit 
Informers from the cells, commonly known as 'cell intervention', then they may 
feel it appropriate to suggest that the majority of first meetings were from there 
when in fact they were not. For example, one Handler (257) who thought the 
relationship started whilst in custody, then qualified his response by saying, 
• "/ have dealt with a number of women who have been superb. Once you get 
them on your side, they are good. They are usually cultivated whilst their 
partners are in custody'~ 
Table 27 - Sitllations where relationship b~ag 
INFORMER HANDLER rrOTAL 
LICENSED PREMISES 2 0 2 
PRISON VISIT 1 0 1 
SOCIALLY 7 0 7 
~NYWHERE 0 4 4 
rrOTAL 10 4 14 
Table 27 looks more closely at the situations in which the relationship began and 
examines those 14 respondents who said the relationship started other than 
'during custody' or 'enquiries' (Table 26). Seven Informers suggested that they 
first met during social occasions, and yet none of the Handlers said this was the 
case. Also, a minority of Informers said it started as a result of prison visits or 
licensed premises as a place they first met but none of the Handlers thought this 
to be the case. Perhaps this difference is because police officers may feel 
uncomfortable about these venues as being acceptable places to meet, or maybe 
the Handler wanted to give the Informer the impression they were meeting 
socially, when in reality the police officer was on duty treating the meeting as 
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business. This seems to be borne out by one Handler (288) who said that he 
meets with his Informers socially but qualified his answer by saying, 
• "/ will take him and his wife out for a meal but / am always on duty". 
If this is the case, then a disparity in the relationship emerges. The police look on 
the partnership as professional whilst the Informer considers it more informal 
and mendlier. This so called 'friendship' characteristic appears above in Table 
20, and is discussed later in this study. At this stage it is important to note that 
only one respondent referred to 'prison visits' as the place where the relationship 
started, whereas the police service have generally accepted the usefulness of 
obtaining intelligence from such interviews following conviction. Perhaps 
though, the police officers are aware of Her Majesty's Inspectors of 
Constabulary who have warned police forces that far too many crimes are 
recorded as 'cleared-up' as a result of prison visits. Also, both groups may well 
consider that such meetings fit into the category of being 'custody related'. 
Table 28 - Start of relationship. with respondents who meet socially. 
INFORMER HANDLER !TOTAL 
CUSTODY RELATED 4 13 17 
DURING ENQUIRIES 14 2 16 
UCENSED PREMISES 1 0 1 
SOCIALLY 3 0 3 
TOTAL 22 15 37 
The respondents were asked if they met their partner, the handler or Informer, in 
social situations; that is to say outside of their normal working environment. 
Twenty two (18%) Informers and 15 (13%) Handlers said they met 'socially'. 
Table 28 examines those 37 individuals in terms of where they thought the 
relationship started. There seems to be no connection between the fact that they 
met socially and what they said about the start of the relationship, as only 3 out 
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of the 37 said it started 'socially', and none of those were Handlers. Most of the 
Informers (18,82%) and all of the Handlers said their relationship started 'during 
enquiries' or whilst in 'custody'. 
Sub Aim B - Can the relationship be categorised? 
Here,. the data concerns the various categories which, put together, provide an 
assessment of the Informer and Handler relationship. The results are set out in 
Tables 29 to 32 inclusive. Table 29 compares descriptions of the relationship by 
the groups, and Table 30 develops this by concentrating on the so called extent 
of 'fiiendship' between them. Tables 31 and 32 show the level of importance 
placed on each of these characteristics. 
Table 29 - Description of relationship. compared by Informer and Handler. 
INFORMER HANDLER TOTAL 
PROFESSIONAL 13 45 58 
FRIENDLY 51 13 64 
NECESSARY 18 16 34 
ITRUSTING 29 29 58 
DIFFICULT 0 12 12 
OTHER 9 5 14 
TOTAL 120 120 240 
(~= 53.4, df= 5, P = <0.001) 
Table 29 shows how the respondents described their relationship. The data 
shows evidence of statistical significance between the two groups. Although 
only 6 Informers considered 'respect' worth mentioning, (shown as 'other') there 
were no Handlers who referred to it. Conversely though, 12 Handlers said that 
they found the relationship 'difficult', none of the Informers felt this way. The 
Handlers may well find it 'difficult' to manage some Informers, whereas the 
Informer clearly finds no difficulty with his role. It is interesting that the same 
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number from each group (29) thought their relationship was 'trusting', that is 
25% of the group as a whole, and yet it is felt by most practitioners that 'trust' is 
an important element of a partnership. Clearly this is not what the groups 
considered to be the most important feature. 
Table 29a - Relationship described as friendly. by Infonner and Handler 
INFORMEf HANDLER ~OTAL 
FRIENDLY 51 13 64 
OTHER 69 107 176 
TOTAL 120 120 240 
(x2 = 30.8, df= I, P < 0.001) 
Table 29a recasts the data in terms of a 2X2 table where the data from Table 29 
is taken. The 64 respondents from Table 29 who said the relationship was 
'fiiendly' were tested against the remainder. 
Table 29b-Relationship described as professional, by Informer and 
Handler 
INFORMEI HANDLER TOTAL 
PROFESSIONAL 13 45 58 
OTHER 107 75 182 
TOTAL 120 120 240 
(~= 23.3, df= 1, P <0.001) 
Table 29b takes out those respondents who said the relationship was 
'professional' from Table 29, and in the form ofa 2X2 table, tests 'professional' 
against the remainder. 
The data from Tables 29a and 29b which look specifically at the responses in 
relation to 'fiiendly' and 'professional', both produce a highly significant result. 
Forty five (38%) Handlers described their relationship as 'professional' compared 
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with 13 (11%) Infonners. Fifty one (43%) Infonners thought it was 'friendly' 
whereas only 13 Handlers (11%) thought it so. This suggests that the 
perceptions of the two groups are very different; Handlers believing that the 
relationship is professional and fonnal, Infonners suggesting that it is more 
informal and friendly. 
This conflict is interesting when considering the relationship as a whole, which 
clearly cannot be as close as one would imagine when the two roles are seen so 
differently by the Infonners and Handlers. The 'friendship' characteristic win be 
discussed in more detail below. 
To examine the relationship further, the interviewees were asked to show the 
level of importance they placed on the relationship according to 7 main headings. 
The categories were shown as:-
i. Confidentiality 
n. Friendship 
iii. Honesty 
iv. Reliability 
v. The Relationship 
vi. Trust 
vii. Truth 
With one exception, both groups considered a\1 these to be important. In terms 
of the matter of 'friendship' there was some disparity, as is explained in Table 30 
below. 
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Table 30 - The importance placed on 'friendship' by Groups. 
~ IER ~ 2 17 
34 29 63 
NOT VERY 51 52 103 
IUNIM~urdANT 20 37 57 
IVI. 120 120 240 
(xl = 15.41, df= 3, P = 0.00149) 
Table 30 looks at the importance placed on the 'friendship' between the Handler 
and Informer. The table shows that there was a significant difference of opinion 
between the two groups. This divergence was most notable at the extremes of 
the rating scale (i.e. Very Important and Unimportant). 
The tables show an unexpectedly high number of Informers who rated 
'friendship' as Very Important (IS, 12%, Standardised Residual = 2.2) and an 
unexpectedly low number rated it as unimportant (20, 17%). Conversely, an 
unexpected high number of Handlers rated friendship as Unimportant (37, 31%), 
and a correspondingly low number rated it as Very Important (2, 2% 
Standardised Residual = -2.2). The proportions in the mid ranges were roughly 
equal, and in fact a similar number in both groups considered it to be not very 
important. 
It is known that regarding the 2 Handlers who rated 'friendship' as Very 
Important, both were meeting their Informers socially, although none of the 
Handlers said they started their relationship during social occasions (Table 27). 
The suggestion that Handlers are far less interested in a friendly relationship with 
their Informer is emphasized by one Handler (15) who said, 
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• "If he gets too friendly, he gets knocked back to a police/Informer 
relationship '~ 
This aspect was supported by another Handler (298) who recalled that his 
Informer, 
• "Got too friendly. He thought he could do what he wanted I had to sort 
him out - put him straight'~ 
Table 31 - l,evel of importance giyen to main factors of the relationship. by 
Informers 
Table 31 looks at the level of importance given by the Informers to each of the 
main factors of the relationships as shown above. Two notable minority groups 
emerged from the data. Firstly, only 5 (4%) Informers thought 'the relationship' 
was not important. Secondly. only 8 (7%) Informers thought that 'Trust' was 
unimportant, and yet, when they described the relationship with their Handlers. 
as shown in Table 29. 29 (25%) Informers described their relationship as 
'trusting'. On the face of it then, there appears to be conflict in the Informers' 
responses. That of course may due to a measure of confusion about the terms. 
Perhaps they wished to describe their relationship as 'fiiendly' which to them may 
include 'trust' as well. 
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Table 32 - Respondents rating of each characteristic as Important or Very 
Important. 
INFORMERS HANDLERS [VARIATION f%) 
Confidentiality 118 (98%) 120 (100%) 2 
Friendship ,49(41%) 31(26%) -15 
Honesty 99 (83%) 104 (87%) 4 
Reliability 101 (84%) 104 (87%) 3 
The Relationship 115 (96%) 113 (94%) -2 
~rust 112 (93%) 108 (90%) -3 
Truth 107(89%) 101 (84%) -5 
The data in Table 32 is taken from Table 31 comparing the two groups in terms 
of those characteristics of the relationship considered by them to be important. 
Clearly there is a marked variation between the two groups in relation to their 
perception of 'friendship' emphasising the disparity shown in Table 30. There is 
little variation between the two groups in relation to the other characteristics. 
Interestingly, 'friendship' is the one category where both the Informers and the 
Handlers place relatively little importance, yet this is the category which yields 
the greatest difference of opinion. The vast majority of respondents from both 
groups rate all the other factors as Important or Very Important, with very little 
variation between them; that is to say, the data in Table 32 shows that the 
respondents from both groups agree on the importance of all the characteristics 
of the relationship with the exception of 'friendship'. 
Out of the 240 respondents, only 2 thought 'Confidentiality' was unimportant. 
These were both young (18-21) unemployed male Informers, both single and 
with no children. Both had previous convictions for Fraud or Dishonesty and 
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both started informing according to them because of police pressure. With these 
exceptions, 'confidentiality' is an integral part ofInforming , and yet, as discussed 
in Table 18, there were a number (3%) of Informers who knew that other 
members of their family were also informing. Nevertheless, the importance of 
confidentiality seems to be a high priority for both groups. 
To summarise Sub Aim B, in order to categorise the relationship between the 
Informer and Handler, it is interesting to note that whilst describing their 
relationship, the Handlers considered the most important feature to be 
'professionalism', whereas 'friendship' was more important to the Informers. 
Additionally, the groups identified a number of characteristics of the relationship, 
and here again there is a significant variation by the groups in terms of the level 
of importance placed on 'friendship'. 
Sub Aim C - What significance is the relationship to Informer handling? 
In developing the so called relationship theme, it is important to establish its 
relevance to how the Informer and Handler behave to each other. The results are 
shown in Tables 33 to 37 inclusive. 
Table 33 shows the importance placed on the relationship by the two groups, 
whilst Tables 34 and 35 show the advantages and Table 36 the disadvantages by 
each of the groups. Table 37 establishes the level of protection afforded to the 
Informers by the police. 
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Table 33 -Importance of the Relationship to Informers and Handlers. 
INFORMER HANDLER ITOTAL 
VERY IMPORTANT . 45 57 102 
IMPORTANT 70 56 126 
NOT VERY IMPORTANT 5 7 12 
OTAL 120 120 240 
Table 33 examines the level of importance placed on the 'Relationship' by the 
groups. The data shows that the majority of Informers and Handlers consider 
the relationship to be important or very important (126 & 102, or 95%) and the 
degree of importance seems to be evenly spread between the two groups. Some 
of the reasons why members of each group consider the relationship to be 
important are given below. For example, one Informer (120) who thought that 
the relationship was important, also believed that it could change, saying, 
• "If I needed some help on some thing and I didn't get it, then I would lose 
interest". 
Similarly, another Informer (34) felt that the relationship would change if, 
• "1 found out he wasn't acting on my information, I wouldn't bother with 
him'~ 
For the Handlers, some thought the relationship could change and one (1) said, 
"Once an Informer gave false information to get money. I lost all confidence 
and trust in him'~ 
One Handler (237) admitted that in one case the relationship, 
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• ''started off professional but over time I have grown to hate him. But he is 
successju/'~ 
Another (286) explained that, 
• "Our first meeting was whilst he was in custody. After his release, the 
relationship changed Also, he lost his wife and of course his needs change. 
You have to adopt". 
It was also suggested that the relationship will change because of the Infonners 
actions, as the case of one Handler (288) who recalled, 
• "When my Informer got nicked by Customs, my relationship changed to a 
formal basis. Then it changed back'~ 
Another reason the relationship may change is when the Infonner becomes 
disillusioned by his reward. This was the case with one Handler (320) who 
explained, 
• "1 had a guy recently put in a theft of a JCB valued at £16,000. I paid him 
£400 by the force. The insurance company wouldn't pay any out so I was 
blamed for not getting him enough. We're starting to get back together, 
now'~ 
In summary, the Handlers and Infonners agreed that the relationship was 
important to them, but for different reasons. The Infonners thought the 
relationship could change over such things as money or not being given 
sufficient help or support. The Handlers, though took a more professional view 
and suggested that the relationship could change if it started to affect the results. 
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Table 34 - Main advantage of the relationship. as perceived by Informers 
and Handlers. 
INFORMER HANDLER rrOTAL 
NONE/DONT KNOW 13 1 14 
PROFESSIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 11 70 81 
FRIENDSHIP 21 0 21 
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE 11 6 17 
PERSONAL SATISFACTION 0 37 37 
PERSONAL GAIN 40 6 46 
REVENGE/COMPETITION 24 0 24 
TOTAL 120 120 240 
To establish whether there is any relevance to the relationship, the study looked 
at the advantages and disadvantages declared by the Informers and Handlers in 
terms of whether they thought there was any benefit or otherwise to them during 
their relationship. 
Looking at the main advantages, Table 34 shows a marked difference of opinion 
between the two groups (x2 = 161.86, df = 6, P < 0.00001) . Seventy (58%) 
Handlers quoted 'Professional Effectiveness' as an advantage but only 11 (9%) 
of the Informers thought this was an advantage to themselves in terms of the 
relationship with their Handler. Thirty seven (31%) Handlers thought 'Personal 
Satisfaction' was an advantage but none of the Informers reported this. Thirty 
four(28%) Informers thought there was a 'Financial' or 'Family Benefit', 24 
(20%) quoted 'Revenge' or 'Competition', and 15 (13%) said it was an 
advantage 'Keeping in with the Police'. None of the Handlers reported any of 
these as advantages. Clearly. taking out the competition would be a particular 
advantage to the Informer, and one Handler (317) recalled, 
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• "There is one man who is a druggy. He thinks that I will protect him so he 
gives information to get his associates arrested, so that he can carry on. I 
will not get involved, but I know of a sergeant, ex drug squad who is using 
him'~ 
An example of 'revenge' was given by another Handler (319) who said, 
• "-1 remember once when an Informer gave me information that another 
criminal had some bent gear. I found out that the Informer had planted the 
gear himself to get rid of him, 'cos he had been grassed up by this man". 
What we are seeing here again is the conflict in perceptions of the relationship 
between the two groups, as shown also in Table 29 when the groups were asked 
to describe their relationship. The two groups have different objectives, and of 
course this may explain why they see the advantages differently. The presence of 
'friendship' appears again, and Table 34 supports the previous finding that 
although the Informer may consider 'friendship' to be an advantage to them in 
their relationship (21, 17.5%), none of the Handlers agreed. 
In summary then, this table shows that the Handlers and Informers had quite 
different perceptions of the advantages ofthe relationship. 
Table 35 - Does the use oflnformers advance tbe Handler personally? 
FREQUENCY 
~ES 41 (34%) 
NO 37 (31%) 
POSSIBL Y/PROBABL Y 41 (34%) 
DONTKNOW 1 (1%) 
rrOTAL 120 (100%) 
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Table 34 has shown that, in relation to the Handlers, only 6 thought there was 
any personal gain involved in being a Handler, but when it was further examined, 
this response may not turn out to be accurate. Table 35 shows that the Handlers 
thought their use of Informers advanced them personally, and 41 were adamant 
that it did. A similar number (41, 34%) thought it might, and only 37 (31%) said 
not. This seems surprising, as any advancement in their careers would certainly 
be beneficial, i.e. probably financial. However, there seems to be no justification 
for these views, as there is no evidence that Police Handlers can expect any sort 
of advancement. This issue has been examined in detail in Chapter Six. 
Table 36 - Main disadvantage of the relationship, as perceived by 
Informers and Handlers. 
INFORMER HANDLER TOTAL 
NONE 20 13 33 
DANGEROUS 91 19 110 
AGGRAVATION 5 58 63 
INSUFFICIENT RECOGNITION 14 14 
ADDS TO WORKLOAD 0 13 13 
DONT KNOW/OTHER 4 3 7 
TOTAL 120 120 240 
(x2 = 120.3, df= 5, P < 0.001) 
Table 36 looks at the disadvantages of the InformerlHandler relationship. It 
shows that the Handlers expressed a range of disadvantages, in contrast to the 
more limited disadvantages noted by the Informers. The majority of Informers 
said that the relationship was dangerous, 87 (73%) of whom quoted 'Being 
Found Out' as the main disadvantage. One such Informer (58) explained that, 
• "There is a contract out on me already over a £15 million drugs job. 1 need 
some heavy money to get out ofit'~ Another (114) said, 
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• "- I was into some mega criminals from abroad who would shoot your legs 
off as soon as look at you. I've got two kids. I'm not stupid'~ 
Only 19 (16%) of the Handlers thought the relationship was 'dangerous', but 
their perception of dangerous was different in that they felt they were susceptible 
to allegations being made against them. Those Handlers who felt the relationship 
was 'Aggravation' (58 or 59%), thought so mainly because they could be 
contacted at home or off duty. To a lesser extent, some suggested 'Insufficient 
Recognition' (12%) and 'Adding to their Workloads' (11%) were also 
disadvantages. One Handler (290) suggested, 
• "A lot of the Controllers have never had a snout so they don't want to know. 
The job discourages you because they don't understand". 
There appears to be a clear difference of opinion between the Informers and 
Handlers as to what they perceive the disadvantages to be. The Informers see it 
as dangerous for themselves to be involved, i.e. in terms of physical dangers, but 
the Handlers are thinking of how dangerous it is in terms of their susceptibility of 
allegations made against them. These findings help support the hypotheses 
referred to under Table 32, suggesting that both groups consider the 
'relationship' to be important; although for different reasons. 
Table 37 - Protectjon given to Informer. by groups. 
INFORMER HANDLER rrOTAL 
ALWAYS/USUALLY 96 98 194 
SOMETIMES 17 20 37 
RARELY/NEVER 7 2 9 
TOTAL 120 120 240 
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The study so far has shown the relationship between the Handler and Informer 
to be far from close, due largely to the different objectives of the two groups. 
Table 37 describes an additional feature, in this case where the Handler and 
Informer happen to be in total agreement. Ninety six Informers (80%) and 98 
Handlers (82%) had no doubts that the police would grant the Informer 
protection, with a further 37 (15%) stating that protection would be afforded 
only sometimes. 
If by protection, they mean protection of the Informer's anonymity, and this is 
most likely, then this finding is supported by the data in Table 32 where both 
groups considered confidentiality important to their relationship. However, 
9(4%) Handlers and Informers thought that affording protection was rare or 
would never happen. This is quite a disturbing figure, as a number of Informers 
and Handlers, albeit small, did not consider protection of the Informer to be 
important. The implications are that, if one Handler alone fails to recognise the 
importance of protecting the Informer's identity, then that single case could 
jeapordise the integrity of the relationship within the criminal justice system. It 
can be assumed that Informers expect their anonymity to be maintained, and it 
would only need one case to drastically reduce the numbers of Informers 
recruited. 
Sub Aim D - To compare tbose features of the relatiouship wjth other 
partnerships. 
Chapter Five examined the theoretical relationships involving professionals and 
identified some common features which existed between them. This study looks 
at those categories which seem to make up the relationship between the 
236 
Informer and Handler as discussed in Sub Aim B, to establish if there is a 
similarity between the relationships. 
The presence of 'power' and 'control' on the face of it, is not manifested 
through the groups' perceptions of their relationship and is not mentioned in 
their descriptions (Table 29). However, when the respondents gave the main 
advantage ofthe relationships (Table 34) the majority of the Handlers suggested 
'professional effectiveness' which could give some indication of control. In 
relation to the Informers, 40 (33%) thought that 'personal gain' was the main 
advantage and this in itself could provide them with some degree of power. 
Similarly, no direct reference has been made to 'accountability' or 'bureaucracy', 
and yet when the Handlers proposed their main disadvantages of the relationship 
(Table 36) a substantial number thought it was 'aggravation' and 'added to their 
workload' which may well be some criticism of their bureaucratic systems. 
An examination of the relationships between police officers and other groups in 
Chapter Five clearly showed professionalism as an important factor and that has 
also emerged from the InformerlHandler partnership. What is perhaps more 
surprising though is that 'trust', 'confidence' and 'friendship' have all been 
identified as features in other police relationships. AJ1 three were also identified 
as characteristics by both groups in this study (Table 32) and with the exception 
of 'friendship', a1l the respondents considered them to be important features. In 
relation to 'friendship', the Informers placed far more importance on this than 
the Handlers, but nevertheless its was a feature worthy of mention by both 
groups. 
237 
Summary of Aim 3 
The relationships between the Informer and Handler have been examined in 
terms of how the relationship begins and the important features of the 
relationship. What is particularly striking about the comparison of the two 
groups is that their perceptions of each other are vastly different. For example, 
most of the Handlers thought the Informer was recruited whilst in custody; far 
less of the Informers thOUght this was the case. Similarly, some Informers 
believed they met their Handler during a social occasion, but none of the 
Handlers agreed. 
The general feeling about this 'relationship' was that the Informers considered it 
to be friendly, whereas the Handlers thought of it in a much more professional 
way. This highlights again the difference between the two groups, emphasising 
the diversity between the Informer and Handler. It is perhaps not surprising 
though that both groups suggested 'confidentiality' to be important where 
protection of the Informer's identity was a priority given by the Informer and the 
Handler. However, as said above, it only needs one such case to attack the fabric 
of the relationship. 
Aim 4 - To determine what the Informer wants to get out of the 
relationship. 
Sub Aim A - What are the motivational factors for Informers? 
The study has looked specifically at why Informers first become involved with 
the police in this type of work, and the results are shown in Tables 38 and 39. 
Table 38 lists the motives; that is the main reasons for starting informing. Table 
39 links these to the Handlers perceptions. In this study, motives, motivations 
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and motivational factors have been defined to include the so-called 'reasons' for 
being involved in informing, and these terms will be used throughout. 
Table 38 - Main reasons for starting informing. by the Informer. 
INITIAL REASON FREQUENCY 
FINANCIAL 32 
DISLIKES THAT CRIME 17 
REDUCED SENTENCE 16 
REVENGE 15 
RIGHT SIDE OF THE LAW 9 
LOOKING FOR A FAVOUR 9 
FRIENDLY WITH OFFICER 8 
POLICE PRESSURE 4 
[rAKE OUT COMPETITION 3 
PART OF A DEAL 2 
HE CHALLENGE 2 
GRATITUDE 2 
ENJOYMENT 1 
IOTAL 120 
Table 38 lists the motives, i.e. the reasons given by the Informers for starting to 
act as Informers. This table shows the most common reason is financial (32); 
perhaps this is not surprising when 52% of the Informers were unemployed 
(Table 10). The financial benefit was certainly uppermost in the mind of one 
Informer (96) who said, 
• "If the money they're offering isn't enough, I wont bother. I do it for the 
money. I have something the coppers want - information. They have to pay 
otherwise they get nowt'~ 
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Not all the respondents were satisfied with their financial arrangements though, 
and one Informer (62) stated that, 
• "I was happy until recently. I got £55 million 0/ paintings back and my 
share was £100,000, but I've been waiting/or 2 years and I still haven't got 
it'~ 
Incidentally, paying Informers can lead to anomalies. For example, over half of 
the Informers were unemployed, and probably therefore also claiming 
unemployment benefit from the State, whilst being paid out of public funds by 
the police for informing. The police service are examining whether their reward 
procedures are compatible with Social Security Regulations. Also, the question 
being asked is, are these payments taxable? At present there is no definitive 
ruling on these issues either from the Department of Social Security or the 
Inland Revenue .. 
The second most frequent reason given for informing, and perhaps more 
surprising, is the Informer's stated dislike for a particular type of crime. This is 
usually stated on moral grounds, as shown in Table 38 above. 
Other reasons given for informing include 'reducing sentence' and 'revenge'. 
These are particularly good examples where the Informer is prepared to give 
information in return for some personal benefit to himself. In fact, Table 38 
shows that there are very few reasons why an Informer gives information 
without some sort of personal advantage. 
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Table 39 - Compares the Informers' motjyes against the Handlers perceptjons 
NFORMER HANDLER OTAL 
PERSONAL REASONS 86 112 198 
FRIENDSHIP/GRATITUDE 10 4 14 
MORAL REASONS 17 0 17 
OTHER 7 4 11 
TOTAL 120 120 240 
(xl = 23.8, df= 3, P = 0.00003) 
Table 39 compares what the Informers state are their reasons for informing, 
against what the Handler believes are the reasons. There are some strong 
indications of a difference of opinion between the two groups as to why the 
Informers start informing. This Table condenses the data from Table 38 into 
three main reasons for informing. Firstly, there are those reasons which 
personally benefit the Informer. Secondly, there are social reasons such as 
friendship, and thirdly, moral reasons against a particular type of crime, for 
example drugs. It is interesting that these categories can be compared with 
Weber's definition of social behaviour (see Chapter Five), and therefore perhaps 
not coincidental that Table 39 uses a similar set off actors. 
Table 39 supports the previous finding that 17 (14%) Informers said they 
disliked that type of crime on moral grounds. Handlers did not consider this to 
be an option. One of these Informers was an ordinary, hard working married 
man with no previous convictions. He had been an innocent victim of an 
unprovoked attack in a busy London street, when for no apparent reason a youth 
threw acid in his face resulting in substantial disfiguration. He decided to help 
the police in ridding the streets of violent crime so that decent people could go 
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about their business in safety. It appears that his fight against crime became an 
obsession with this particular Infonner. 
The majority of Handlers (93%) thought the Infonner started for 'personal 
reasons', whereas only 72% of the Infonners agreed. Out of these, 32 (27%) 
Informers said it was for financial reasons, whereas 62 (52%) Handlers thought 
this was the prime reason. Nine (8%) Infonners said it was to get on the right 
side of the law, but only 2 (2%) Handlers gave this explanation. Finally, not 
surprisingly, no Handler acknowledged that they applied police pressure, yet 4 
(3%) Infonners said this was why they started. 
Clearly, the analysis shows that the two groups disagree on the motivational 
factors of the Infonners, particularly in relation to financial motivation and moral 
objections. One can only speculate as to why their beliefs are so apart. It could 
be that the Handlers did not consider it worthwhile to establish the reasons, or if 
they did, then they misinterpreted the responses. In any case, we are again 
seeing a conflict between the two groups in tenns of their relationship, and at the 
very least, a misunderstanding by the Handlers for whatever reason of the 
Infonner's motivation. 
Suh Aim B - How do these facton aITect the "se of Informen 
Having established the various motives for informing, the study has looked at 
whether they affect the relationship; the results are shown in Tables 40 to 42 
inclusive. Table 40 determines what the two groups opinions are, and Table 41 
develops this further. Table 42 links the Informers motivations with their 
perceptions of the relationship. 
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Table 40 - Do the reasons for informing affect the JlsefJllness of the 
relationship? 
INFORMER HANDLER TOTAL 
YES 24 56 80 
NO 54 46 100 
DONT KNOW 42 16 60 
TOTAL 120 120 240 
(X2 = 23, df= 2, P = 0.00001) 
Table 40 shows a difference of opinion between the two groups, that is to say 
the Handlers and Informers had differing views on whether they thought the 
reasons for informing in any way affected the usefulness of the relationship. 
Nearly half of the Handlers (47%) thOUght they did whereas only 20% of the 
Informers thought so. Again this may be due to the lack of thought given by the 
Informers, whilst the Handlers may be more in tune with the motives. In any 
case only 80 (33%) out of the total group had considered this to be relevant. 
Also, the Handlers seemed more positive about the relationship, only 18 didn't 
know, whilst 42 Informers were not sure. 
One of the Informers (62) whose main reason for informing was financial, but 
also accepted that he enjoyed it said, 
• "/ take satisfaction in taking the riff raff off the streets, but / don't know if it 
makes any difference ". 
Table 41 continues this part of the discussion and looks at the reasons given as 
to why the relationship may be affected. 
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Table 41 - Reasons why relationship afTected. 
INFORMER HANDLER TOTAL 
NOT APPLICABLE 92 55 147 
AFFECTS THE WAY YOU PROCEED 19 18 37 
IRRELEVANT IF INFORMATION IS GOOD 2 15 17 
MAY AFFECT RELIABILITY 2 32 34 
DONT KNOW/OTHER 5 0 5 
ITOTAL 120 120 240 
(x2 = 50.7, df= 4, P = < 0.00001) 
Table 41 examines the views of the groups about their reasons for informing, in 
terms of any likely effect on their relationship. The results show the Handlers 
were much more definite that motivational factors affected the relationship. 
They were concerned about the reliability of the information (27%), and tended 
to give more examples as to how the relationship may be affected. In contrast 
the Informers were more vague; the majority who responded though (19,16%) 
thought that the motives may affect the way relationship proceeded. For 
example, an Informer who needs the money will probably put more effort into 
collecting the right information. One such Informer (34) who was involved 
solely for the money said, 
• ''If you need money like I do, you have to come up with good information". 
Another Informer (40) who became involved due to his dislike for drug abuse 
explained, 
''It's important to me. I want to wipe drug dealers off the face of the earth. It 
makes a difference to me, and the police need to know I'm genuine ". 
Another (39) added, 
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"1 do it because crime is wrong. But there are devious reasons why some 
people inform. The police need to know if they're going to do a proper job'~ 
This point is supported by one Handler who said, 
• "Some might be trying to get rid of the competition. They might be bigger 
than I thought. You can trust the information more if you know': 
Another Handler (235) who thought that the reasons for infonning made a 
difference to the relationship suggested that, 
• "-revenge is likely to make the Informer exaggerate a lie in order to get the 
person arrested to satisfy his ego". 
On the other hand, a large number of Handlers felt that it made no difference, 
and one (239) explained quite simply, 
• 'ifs long as there is a result': 
This stance was supported by another (315) who said, 
• "It's nice to be aware but if we get a result we shouldn't be looking too 
closely at their reasons': 
In summary, although only a minority of Informers and Handlers thought that 
the motives of an Informer affected the relationship, those that did responded in 
a number of diverse ways. There were those Informers who for their own 
benefit made sure that the information they obtained was useful, whilst others 
had a genuine wish to help the police. Some of the Handlers recognised that 
where the motive was personal, for example taking out the competition and 
revenge, then the Handler would need to exercise more care over the 
relationship. 
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Table 42 - Motivations compared witb Informers description of 
relationship. 
IMAlN ~rHE DLY ~ 3: 16 9 B6 
~ B C 0 10 
1 11 0 5 17 
0 2 2 0 4 
0 0 2 1 0 3 
OTAL 1~ 51 18 ?O !:> 120 
Table 42 compares the description given by the Infonner of their relationship 
with the Handler (Table 29) with their main reason for starting (Table 38). It 
seems that those who started informing for 'personal reasons', for example to 
get a reduced sentence and for money, mostly described the relationship with 
their handler as fiiendly, and those who wanted to 'remove the competition' 
described the relationship as necessary. The majority of Infonners who started 
for 'moral reasons' described their relationship as fiiendly. Also, the majority of 
Infonners who started mainly for 'friendship' with the police, also described 
their relationship as fiiendly. This may indicate a level of satisfaction on their 
part with the partnership. 
In summary, this study has examined whether the motives of the Infonner in any 
way affect the relationship. A difference of opinion was identified between the 
groups when a substantial number of Handlers thought the reasons made a 
difference whereas few Infonners agreed. Both groups, though agreed that if 
the motives did make a difference it would be in tenns of how the relationship 
progressed, but the Handlers were far more concerned about how the motives 
affected the quality and reliability of infonnation. 
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The study has also shown that most of the Informers described their relationship 
as 'friendly' despite their motivation to inform. 
Sub Aim C. - Can the reaSOnS cbange? 
In developing this study of the motives of Informers, it was important to 
establish whether their motives or reasons changed over time. The results are 
shown in Tables 43 to 4S inclusive. An examination of motivational change was 
undertaken, comparing the motivations with the length of time they had been 
informing. Table 43 shows how the initial reasons for starting changed as their 
informing career progressed. Table 44 links the Informers length of time 
working for the police, by age, and Table 4S shows the potential change of 
reasons over time. 
Table 43 - Informers reaSOn for informing - cbanges througb time. 
NITlAllY M/lTHIN 1 YR WITHIN 2 YRS wrrHIN5YRS All INFORMERS 
~WN BENEFIT 86 as 89 85 83 
~9C1Al CONSCIENCE 17 17 17 20 24 
HELPING POLICE 14 14 12 10 8 
REMOVE COMPETITION 3 3 3 5 5 
OTAl 120 120 120 120 120 
Table 43 demonstrates how the initial reasons for informing changed over time. 
The respondents were asked if their initial motives had changed during their 
informing career. Of course, it was not possible to identifY exactly when they 
changed; the table therefore generalises and relates to their length of time as an 
Informer. The objective of this table was to identifY the existence of any pattern 
of change. 
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'Own benefit' includes financial and reduced sentence etc.; it features 
prominently, showing a similar number of Informers giving this reason 
throughout their careers, being at its peak within the first 2 years of informing. 
'Social conscience' mainly describes those Informers who are opposed to drugs, 
and increases in numbers over time, and certainly after 5 years. 'Helping the 
police' does not appear to be a great motivator at any level, and tails off the 
longer the Infonner is active. 
'Removing competition' slightly increases as time passes; this may suggest that 
they may not have been effective in achieving their goals originally, or it could 
be that the Infonners have identified new competition. 
Table 44 - InConning experience by age. 
18-21 122-28 29-35 3&-42 KJVER42 !TOTAL 
LESS THAN 1 YEAR 2 8 0 5 8 23 
1-2 YEARS 10 8 16 5 2 41 
13-5 YEARS 0 11 21 4 8 44 
I6YEARS OR MORE 0 2 2 1 7 12 
!TOTAL 12 29 39 15 25 120 
To expand on the length of experience as an Infonner, Table 44 looks at the 
length of time spent as Informers in terms of their respective ages. It could be 
assumed that as people get older their circumstances change as perhaps do their 
interpretation of the role; but this is not entirely true. 
Admittedly, there were no 18-21 year olds who had been informing for more 
than 2 years, and most of those who had been informing for more than 6 years 
were aged over 42. However, 10 Infonners (40%) aged over 42 had been 
informing for less than 2 years, and 10 (67%) of those aged 36-42 had been 
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informing for less than 2 years. It could be assumed therefore that their ages are 
not relevant to the length of time of the Informer. 
The Table also shows that nearly half of the Informers (56) were aged between 
22 and 35 years of age and had been informing for 1 to 5 years. 
Table 45 - Breakdown of bow the reasons for informing are likely to change 
tbrough time. 
NITIAL REASON WHO CHANGE N1YR WIllfN2YR8 THlN5YRS T SOME nME 
FINANCIAL 32 22 NJOYMENT NJOYMENT NJOYMENT 
SUKE THAT CRNE 17 12 INANCIAL 
SENTENC 16 62 INANCIAL IN.(X)MPETITION INANClAL 
jlEVENGE 15 93 FINANCIAL FINIENJ Y FINIE JQYMENT SLlKES THAT CRIME 
GHT SIDE OF LAW 9 22 INANCIAL 
EEKlNOFAVOUR 9 78 INIF MILV INlDISLIKES CRIME 
R1END OF 0Fl'ICER 8 25 ISLlKES THAT CRIME 
I'QI.JCE PRESSURE 4 100 INANClAL ISLlKES THAT CRIME 
AKE COMPET. 3 0 
ART A DEAL 2 100 INANClAL 
GE 2 0 
RATITUDE 2 0 
OYMENr 1 0 
orAL 120 42 9 31 39 42 
To understand how motivations change over time, and therefore to have an 
indication of what will happen with individuals who are being recruited, an 
examination of the data was carried out looking at the reasons for starting, the 
propensity to change, and likely changes. Having established what the initial 
motives were for the Informers, the respondents were asked to state whether 
those reasons had changed, and if so to what. Table 45 shows the frequency 
distribution of the different reasons for starting informing, as found in Table 29; 
the proportion of each group who change their reasons; what they change to; 
and at what· point in time those changes are likely to take place. The findings 
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from this table reveal a totally new concept for practitioners to consider. Firstly, 
the table provides evidence of motivational change over time, and secondly 
identifies the reasons the Informer may change to. This data will undoubtedly 
provide the police service with important management information for the use of 
Informers. 
There are a number of points to be made from Table 45. Firstly, 42% of the 
Informers changed their reason for informing at some stage during their career, 
with 9% ofInformers changed in the first year, and 31% changed within 2 years. 
Those who started informing for financial reasons are, it seems unlikely to 
change (22%), but if they did, it was because they started to enjoy informing. 
Secondly, those who started because of so called 'moral objections' (those who 
have a dislike for that type of crime for moralistic reasons) were unlikely to 
change (12%). One or two placed a higher value on the financial benefits but by 
and large it is their moral objection which dominated. Clearly, from the police 
perspective, it would not be worthwhile to get them to inform about things 
which they do not have strong feelings about. 
Thirdly, those who start informing either to get a reduced sentence as part of a 
deal, or for some other favour, are very likely to change (70%), most probably 
after the first 2 years. It is strongly suspected from the data that they will be 
easily tempted by the money, so they are more of an easy target for the police to 
recruit them. 
Fourthly, those who start for what has been called 'revenge' are extremely likely 
to change (93%). The data shows that they will quickly become attracted to 
financial benefits, and in the medium term may even be encouraged to enjoy 
informing. In the longer term however, they may develop a conscience and 
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cany on informing out of a sense of public duty or because of moral objections, 
but in any case with so many of the group changing their view on informing, one 
could speculate that their initial needs were satisfied. 'Revenge' itself could be 
closely allied with what has been called 'Taking out the competition', and yet 
Table 45 clearly shows that these Informers do not change. This matter is also 
discussed in Table 43. 
Finally, the minority who start informing for other reasons are not likely to 
change. These are out of the mainstream, perhaps having fallen into informing 
through a fiiendship with an officer, or while looking for a favour, or through 
gratitude for a favour done. Retaining these individuals as Informers will depend 
more on the continuation of that relationship than on the lure of other rewards. 
If the relationship does break down, they might possibly be tempted to continue 
for financial reward. It would seem though, that if this minority group do not 
begin informing for financial reasons in the early stages, they are unlikely to do 
so during their informing career. 
Summary of Aim 4 
The Informers' motives have been examined, showing that the majority of 
Informers start for financial reasons. Again though, the perceptions of the 
Informer and Handler are different; Handlers thought the main reason why 
Informers started was for 'personal benefit'; substantially less Informers gave 
this as their main reason. 
The study has shown that motives can change. For example, those Informers 
who start for 'financial' reasons may change within 2 years because the 
'enjoyment' of informing becomes their priority. Similarly, those who start to 
obtain a 'reduced sentence' could also change within 2 years for 'financial' 
reasons. Those who start for 'revenge' could change within a year either for 
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'financial' reasons or because they 'enjoy' informing. On the other hand, it is 
probable that an Informer who starts to 'take out the competition' will never 
change his motives. 
There is an indication that the reason why an Informer becomes involved, itself 
dictates subsequent change; that is to say for example, those Informers who start 
for 'revenge' are more likely to change within a year, and become more 
interested in financial rewards, whereas other motives may never change 
throughout the relationship. 
Aim 5 - To detennine wbetber tbe police IIse of infonners breacbes tbe law. 
or Police Discipline Code and ifso, to wbat extent. 
Sub Aim A - Does selectiye informing exist? 
Selectivity in this context means making choices by the Informers and Handlers 
for whatever reason, about the information available to them; that is to say, the 
Informer may decide not to give his Handler a particular piece of information, or 
the Handler decides, having been given that information, not to take action on it. 
This would be defined as 'selective'. The research concentrated on three specific 
areas of selectivity. Firstly, on the types of crime; secondly, on the information 
received or given; thirdly, on whether the groups had been selective about 
particular individuals. The results are shown in Tables 46 to 53 inclusive. 
Table 46 looks at the reasons some Informers are selective in relation to certain 
types of crime. Table 47 links that with the Informers' previous convictions, and 
Table 48 looks at how many Informers were selective about their information, 
further developed in Table 49 in terms of the reasons for such selectivity. Table 
50 considers the Handlers reasons for selectivity and links that with their 
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experience as police Handlers. Tables 51 to 53 develop the issue further 
providing examples of crimes not acted on, criminals not acted against, and in 
particular, specific groups of people. 
Table 46 - Reasons for Informers being sdective by types of crime. 
DRUGS OTHER ~OTAL 
PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT 16 13 29 
MORAL REASONS 15 0 15 
iTOTAL 31 13 44 
Table 46 shows that 44 (37%) Informers said that they had restricted themselves 
to informing about certain types of crime, that is they only informed about 
specific types. The study does not confirm, however, that the respondents were 
selective in every case, but only that they had previously acted in this way. 
Among those who were selective, there were basically two groups; those who 
informed primarily about Drugs, and those who informed about other offences, 
for example Burglary, Theft and Robbery. There were also two Informers who 
said they restricted their information to Firearms offences. One of these was a 
taxi driver (114) who said, 
• "It's what I hear about as a cabby and I try to sort it out. I cant sit back 
and see guns on the streets so I tell the cops'~ 
The most significant feature was that all those who informed about crimes other 
than drug offences did so because they were involved in those crimes themselves 
or had some personal knowledge. None of them reported having moral 
objections to those crimes. This was not the case however for those who 
restricted themselves to Drug offences. Whilst there were some who restricted 
themselves because of personal knowledge; that is to say, they were personally 
involved or associated with drug offenders, some (15, 50%) restricted their 
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infonnation to Drug offences because of 'moral objections' to that type of crime. 
This was the case with one Infonner (40) who said, 
• '~ daughter is on heroin, so I started doing all I can for the police to 
help'~ 
Another Infonner (28) was more general stating that, 
• .. "I'm against drug abuse especially involving kids'~ 
Drugs was by far the largest type of crime, where 31 Infonners said they had 
been selective. One Infonner (51) explained, 
• ''All my mates are into drugs so its easy money for me'~ 
One Handler (253) restricted his activities to Drugs because, 
• ''I have an interest in drugs. It is more common to turn someone into an 
Informer who is involved in drugs because they have more to lose in terms 
of sentencing'~ 
Another (201) said, 
• ''Knowing that an Informer has handled stolen property, I have turned a 
blind eye to get the burglar'~ 
In relation to the types of crime, then, there appears to be 2 distinct categories: 
drugs and others. Drug Infonners may be selective either because the have a 
moral dislike for that type of offence or because they are personally involved, 
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whereas those giving information about other types of crime are all personally 
involved. 
Table 47 - Sdectivity ofInCormers with convictions. by types oC crime. 
PREVIOUS CONVICTION TYPE OF CRIME 
DRUGS OTHER rrOTAL 
NO PREVIOUS 4 1 5 
FRAUD/DISHONESTY 8 9 17 
~SSAULT 0 2 2 
DRUGS 13 0 13 
SEXUAL 0 1 1 
BURGLARY 6 0 6 
TOTAL 31 13 44 
Table 47 takes the argument a little further by linking those Informers with 
previous convictions to the types of crime where selectivity has occurred. The 
Table shows that of the 31 Informers who restricted their activities to drugs 
(Table 46), 27 (87%) had previous convictions. Only 13 of those Informers had 
convictions for drugs (48%); 8 (30%) for FraudlDishonesty and 6 (22%) for 
Burglary. 
It seemed reasonable to assume that those Informers who were involved with 
drug abuse, for example previously convicted of a drug offence, may confine 
themselves to information about drugs, but this was not exclusively so. 
Table 16 shows that 24 Informers had convictions for drugs, but only 13 drug 
offenders restricted their information to drugs. However, it is clear that if an 
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Informer with drug convictions does decide to be selective, he will probably 
restrict his information to drugs. 
Table 48 - Selectivity of information given or received. 
INFORMER HANDLER TOTAL 
~ES 43 74 117 
NO 70 44 114 
REFUSED TO ANSWER 7 2 9 
TOTAL 120 120 240 
(x2 =16.92, df= 2, P = 0.0002) 
Table 48 suggests that when examining selectivity of information given or 
received, there is a marked difference between the two groups, the Handlers and 
the Informers. To speculate, the reasons for this may be that their responses are 
reflecting the two completely different backgrounds/roles in the relationship. 
That is to say, the police officer will naturally want to prioritise the information 
dependent on his current investigations, whereas the Informer will have no such 
requirement; making him far less selective. 
Overall, more Handlers were much more selective about the information 
received, 62% of them reported being selective, compared with 36% of the 
Informers. This does seem to reflect a very high level of selectivity by the 
Handlers. It seems as though they have the authority to make decisions about 
whether criminal intelligence is to be acted upon, when in fact it would be 
natural to assume that all information is analysed and actioned. Indeed, this is 
fundamental to the concept of 'Intelligence Led Policing' advocated by most law 
enforcement agencies. 
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Table 49 - Reasons for selectivity. by Groups. 
INFORMER HANDLER rrOrrAL 
NOrr SELECrrlVElREFUSED TO ANSWER 77 47 124 
TURN A BLIND EYE 0 4 4 
OFFENCE IS RELEVANT 0 4 4 
OTHER AGENCIES INVOLVED 2 9 11 
SELECTED BEST JOBS 0 28 28 
o PROTECT INFORMER 0 11 11 
PETTY CRIME 0 6 6 
DUBIOUS QUALITY 17 9 26 
REFUSED TO ANSWER 2 2 4 
LET OFFENDER ESCAPE FIRST 3 0 3 
IF I AM TOO CLOSE 8 0 8 
FAMILY AT RISK 3 0 3 
DEPENDS WHO THE TARGET IS 8 0 8 
TOTAL 120 120 240 
Table 49 shows the reasons given for being selective by the Informers and 
Handlers. The main concern for Handlers was selecting the best jobs (28, 39%) 
and protecting the Informers (11, 15%). The Informers however were more 
concerned with the quality of information (17, 14%), although the Handlers also 
referred to this reason, making it the main factor which caused both groups to be 
selective. 
One Handler (257) explained, 
• "Last year, the movement of a large consignment of guns from London into 
the Counties. They were in the possession of known criminals. I didn't act 
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because the information was not good enough. I still haven't done 
anything'~ 
Informers were also concerned about who the target was (8, 20%), and being 
too close themselves (8, 20%). An example of this was given by one Informer 
(25) who explained, 
• "If I'm involved in the job, I wont say so. I'll just drop the others in it". 
Another (26) said, 
• "1 remember when I did a job with some others. I informed on them but 
didn't say I had some of the gear". A similar example was given by an 
Informer (53) who explained, 
• "When I can make a few bob from nicked gear, I'm not going to give that up 
am I?'~ 
One ofonIy 3 who said he would let the offender escape first (1) remarked, 
• "I've missed a job out to let the offender get out the wtry. The police are 
happy if they get the property back'~ Another example was given by an 
Informer (9) when he said, 
• "It was a difficult situation. I was dealing with two forces and I got in too 
deep. I tried to be selective. " 
This issue of involving other agencies seemed to be of more concern to the 
Handlers than the Informers (9 and 2). One such Handler (209) expressed his 
concern when he said, 
• "1 got intelligence that the Informer had repeatedly misled other agencies 
and he was touting for the highest bidder'~ Surprisingly, none of the 
Informers suggested they were selective about petty crime, although one 
(57) qualified his response by saying, 
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• ''Petty things, yeah, like shoplifting, theft from cars and stuff like that". 
This may be a matter of interpretation; it will be seen later (Table 51) that 
'petty crime' is highly featured. 
Generally, it would appear that the Informers' reasons revolved around concerns 
for their safety and welfare, or that of their family. One Handler (296) tended to 
support this prioritisation and explained, 
• "1 sometimes turn a blind eye if my man is involved It's part of the game, 
but he always tells me. He trusts me to look after him'~ 
The majority of Handlers, on the other hand were far more professional in their 
reasoning, most of them simply taking the best jobs from the pile. One Handler 
(207) gave as an example where the information, 
• "-is for another Agency and I know they don 'I want to know, I don 'I 
bother'~ Another example was given by a Handler (207) who said, 
• "Another Informer has come in and given information about my Informer. 
If we had acted on it, it would have jeapordised his role'~ 
It would seem also that the Informer does not consider the seriousness of the 
crime when being selective, and yet 6 (5%) Handlers said they would be 
selective about petty crime. There is some evidence, then that some Handlers 
are using their discretion, for whatever reason, in relation to the commission of 
crime, and only considering the more serious offences, as one Handler (209) 
suggested when he said, 
• "1 tend to tell them to concentrate on one job. I will address the main job'~ 
This was supported by another Handler (256) who said, 
• "On a meeting, he might give information about ten to fifieen jobs. I will 
pick the best - ". 
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Another Handler (237) made this point far more succinctly by saying, 
• "Forget the crap, I want the good stuff~ 
The aspect of discretion will be discussed later (Aim SC) but there is clear 
evidence from this study that the Handlers often make the decision about what 
action they will take on information obtained from Informers. The two groups 
have given different reasons for their selectivity, the Handlers wanting to select 
the best jobs, whilst the Informers giving more consideration to the quality of the 
information. 
What has been surprising though is that none of the Handlers suggested they 
would be selective merely because the information related to a type of crime not 
in their jurisdiction. This contradicts Skolnick's suggestion that "- narcotics 
police typically ignore burglaries when questioning their informants. Likewise, 
burglary detectives overlook the use of narcotics by their informants -" 9 One 
reason for this may be that nowadays, police Handlers often work within 
dedicated units and rather than specialise in specific crimes, for example drugs, 
are expected to secure information on a range of crimes. Of course, this 
contradicts the Handler's decision to be selective. 
9 Skolnick J H Justice without trial - Law enforcement in democratic society, 
(John Wiley & Sons Inc, USA 1966) p137. 
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Table 50 - Handlers selectivity of information by length experieQce. 
1 year 1-2 years 3-5 years ~6years TOTAL 
NOT SELECTIVE 2 7 18 20 47 
URN A BUND EYE 0 0 2 2 4 
OFFENCE IS RELEVANT 0 0 2 2 4 
OTHER AGENCIES INVOLVED 0 0 3 6 9 
SELECTED BEST JOBS 0 0 5 23 28 
o PROTECT INFORMER 0 2 1 8 11 
PETTY CRIME 0 2 1 3 6 
DUBIOUS QUAUTY 2 1 4 2 9 
REFUSED TO ANSWER 0 0 2 0 2 
TOTAL 4 12 38 66 120 
Table 50 compares the length oftime as an Handler with their reasons for being 
selective. Results show the most significant feature in terms of experience as a 
Handler was that those who 'selected the best jobs' (information which was 
most likely to result in arrests, and therefore success) had all been handling for at 
least 3 years, and 23 (35%) had 6 or more years experience. Those few less 
experienced Handlers who were selective were more concerned with the quality 
of information; that is to say, its accuracy. It is also apparent that those with 
over 6 years experience in handling show more concern for the protection of the 
Informer, than do others. 
Overall, it is clear that the more experienced the Handler becomes, the more 
likely he/she will be selective, ranging from 44% (7) of those handling less than 2 
years to 70% (46) of those handling 6 years or more. It is not known, however, 
why this may be, but clearly the long term Informers are far more prepared to be 
selective than the others. 
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Table 51 - Examples where crime is not acted on. by groups. 
INFORMER HANDLER TOTAL 
PETTY CRIME 34 22 56 
INFORMER TOO CLOSE 8 12 20 
FRIEND INVOLVED 7 0 7 
OTHER 17 18 35 
rrOTAL 66 52 118 
Table 51 develops the issue of selectivity and gives examples where the 
commission of crimes had come to the respondents' knowledge but they had 
decided not to act; for example, the Informer had given information about a 
crime but the Handler decided not to take any action, A total of 118 
respondents gave examples, and this seems to compare with the 117 in Table 48 
who said they had been selective about information, 
When comparing the examples in Table 51 with Table 49 (Reasons for 
selectivity) however, there is an interesting difference between the two, Thirty 
four (52%) Informers and 22 (42%) Handlers, 56 in total, gave 'petty crime' as 
an example of where they had either not given the information or not acted on it. 
However, when they were asked about selectivity in general, none of the 
Informers and only 6 (5%) Handlers mentioned 'petty crime', There appears to 
be no explantion for this disparity, but nevertheless, from a police perspective, it 
is a matter of concern when so many admit take no action because it relates to 
'petty crime', 
Table 51 also shows that 7 (11%) Informers said they would not gtve 
information if a friend was involved, but this was not referred to at all in Table 
49, This is surprising, as it will be shown later (Table 53) both groups had no 
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doubts that they would be selective in relation to friends and relatives (108, 
89%). One such Informer (116) recalled, 
• "This youth I know pinched a car and knocked somebody down and badly 
injured him. He was me best mate so I didn't grass on him'~ 
There was a similarity, though with the 8 (12%) Informers, and 12 (23%) 
Handlers (20, 17%) who referred to the 'Informer as being too close'; that is, 
the Informer was so closely associated with the crime that by giving information 
about it would put the Informer in jeopardy. Table 49 shows that none of the 
Handlers mentioned this, although 11 suggested they would protect the 
Informer, and this could be regarded as much the same thing. The number of 
Informers were the same in both tables (8,7%). 
There appears to be no obvious reason for the differences in these responses, but 
this may be explained by their interpretation of the questions. There may also be 
some subtle difference in their perceptions of selectivity and not acting on a 
crime. Whatever the reasons though, it is clear that a large proportion of the 
respondents (118) were not prepared to take action about certain crimes that 
had been committed. This appears to conflict with the objective of the 
InformerlHandler relationship, i.e. to clear up crime generally. 
Table 52 - Crimjnals not acted agajnst. bJ' grollps. 
INFORMER HANDLER TOTAL 
iYES 88 33 121 
NO 29 83 112 
MAYBE 3 4 7 
[TOTAL 120 120 240 
(x2 = 51.2, df= 2, P < 0.001) 
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Table 52 develops the issue of selectivity further and asks whether Informers and 
Handlers had failed to act on information relating to known criminals. The table 
shows a highly significant difference of opinion between the Handlers and 
Informers. Eighty eight (73%) Informers said they would be selective with 
criminals, whereas only 33 (28%) Handlers agreed. Conversely, 83 (69%) of the 
Handlers said they were not selective, compared with 29 (24%) Informers. This 
may not however be so surprising, when reca\ling from Table 15 that 89% of the 
Informers had criminal backgrounds themselves. In reality, the number of 
Handlers who said they were selective is less relevant if the Informer decides for 
himself that he is not going to furnish the police with information against a 
particular individual. In such cases it is likely that the police will not even hear 
about it. Nevertheless, there are still a number of Handlers who, given the 
opportunity, will not take action against criminals, showing again that police 
officers find it acceptable to make such important decisions which in effect 
usurps the criminal justice system. 
Table 53 - Examples of selectivity of individuals, by groups. 
INFORMER HANDLER TOTAL 
FRIENDS/RELATIVES 88 20 108 
INFORMERS 0 14 14 
TOTAL 88 34 122 
Table 53 develops the selectivity of individuals and examines who might escape 
action by the Informer or Handler. The Table shows that all of the 88 Informers 
who said they would be selective (Table 52), specified 'friends or relatives' as 
those who were so favoured. One such Informer (22) explained that he would 
not give information against friends if, 
• "-they use drngs at a party where I am'~ 
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Of the 34 Handlers who gave examples, 20 (59%) also stipulated 'friends or 
relatives', but a further 14 (41%) said they would not act against other 
Informers. It is not surprising that the Informers did not mention other 
Informers, as they are not likely to know their identities, and perhaps even if they 
did, they would not have any allegiance towards them. The Handlers, on the 
other hand may feel that it would not be in the best interest to act against other 
Informers, especially if they are providing current information. Again, this shows 
some conflict in the InformerlHandler relationship; the police officer will be 
aware of a number of active Informers but the Informer will be quite isolated, 
relying solely on his Handler. 
More importantly perhaps, there is an indication here that an Informer may have 
a distinct advantage over other criminals in that the Informer may not be dealt 
with for crimes he is committing. Indeed, this study has shown that in relation to 
selectivity, a large number of Handlers are prepared to take no action regarding 
certain types of criminality. It is apparent they are abusing their authority 
making decisions which they are ill-placed to do. The study will develop this 
issue further in relation to discretion. 
Sub Aim B - Does tbe use ofIuformers break the law? 
The study has considered whether this unique relationship between an Informer 
and Handler breaches the criminal law; that is to say, is the partnership between 
an Informer and Handler instrumental in the commission of crime. The results 
are set out in Tables 54 to 63 inclusive. Table 54 sets out the number of 
respondents in each group who believe it does, with examples given in Table 55. 
Tables 56 and 57 then looks at how many have been involved in setting up 
crimes. Table 58 establishes any significance between the category of crime set 
up by the Informer, and his of previous convictions. Then, Table 59 looks 
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specifically at those who had been party to the commission of crime. Tables 60 
to 62 relate to Participating Informers. IQ Table 63 examines the responses by 
both groups who were asked if the police allowed Informers to commit crime. 
Table 54 - Informers breaking the law, by groups. 
INFORMER HANDLER h'OTAL 
YES 17 50 67 
NO 56 56 116 
DONTKNOW 24 2 26 
REFUSED TO ANSWER 21 10 31 
TOTAL 120 120 240 
(x2 = 38.8, df= 3, P = <0.001) 
Table 54 looks at whether the two groups, Informers and Handlers, believe that 
their relationship with each other can itself be instrumental in breaking the law. 
The Table shows there is a significant difference of opinion between the 
Handlers and Informers; the most apparent was the 20% (24) of Informers who 
said they didn't know if the use of Informers breaks the law; (standardised 
residual = 3.1) and the 42% (50) of Handlers who said the use ofInformers did 
break the law. (standardised residual = 2.9). Interestingly, though, there were 
identical numbers of both groups (58, 48%) who said such use did not breach 
the law. 
10 A Participating Informer is a registered Informer who is authorised by a 
police officer of Assistant Chief Constable rank to take part in a crime, taking a 
minor role and not acting as Agent Provocateur. For completeness sake, it is 
worth pointing out that the police service are currently reviewing their 
procedures for the use and authorisation of Participating Informers to ensure 
compatibility with the Human Rights Act 1998. 
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It could be argued that the observed differences between the two groups are not 
reflecting a difference of opinion, but rather a difference of awareness of the law 
itself. Clearly, the police officers will have a better understanding of this subject, 
with 90% giving a definite yes or no, whereas only 63% of the Informers were 
able to do so. Nevertheless, these findings are important as 17 Informers (14%) 
were in no doubt that breaches were occurring. 
A total of 67 respondents were clear that the informer relationship breached the 
law. There were a substantial number who refused to answer (31) and so it 
could be assumed that the actual figure could be far more. This acceptance by 
so many of the respondents that their relationship could break the law is of 
concern, and the implications for law enforcement policy makers are clear; there 
is a need to acknowledge these findings, and by introducing robust policies to 
alleviate such occurrences show that these actions are not condoned. 
Table 55 - examples where the law was broken. 
EXAMPLE INFORMER HANDLER rrOTAL 
ARRANGING/ORGANISING CRIME 2 8 10 
PARTICIPATING INFORMER 1 21 22 
HANDLING STOLEN PROPERTY 2 4 6 
STEAL CARS 2 2 4 
~CTIVE CRIMINAL 0 5 5 
BUYING/SELLING GOODS egDRUGS 2 9 11 
REFUSED TO ANSWER 3 1 4 
OTHER 5 0 5 
TOTAL 17 50 67 
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Table 55 expands on Table 54 and looks at the examples given by those 17 
Informers and 50 Handlers who agreed that laws had been broken during the use 
ofInformers. One such Informer (1) said, 
• "I sometimes drive whilst disqualified but the police don't bother if I'm 
involved in a job'~ Another (99) agreed that the police were fully aware of 
this situation and said, 
• "Once my Handler wanted to know if I was doing any jobs. I told him I was 
involved in a good class house burglary. I told him all about it. He said I 
could do it as long as he was told where and when. The others got pulled 
and I was left alone. I made a few bob out the job and got some money 
from the coppers aswell. Cant be bad!" 
One of the Informers (8) who gave drugs as an example said, 
• "I know an Informer who was playing one police force against another so 
that he could carry out his drugs business'~ 
One of the Informers (114) who gave an example of handling stolen property 
said, 
• "I have handled property which meant that I was breaking the low. I had to 
handle it to get it to the police and it was the only way to sort out the target. 
It was a sown off shot gun'~ 
All but 1 of the Handlers gave examples, the remaining respondents refused to 
answer. Their responses reflected the fact that they were content to use 
Informers to commit crime in order to achieve their objective to detect other 
crime, for example, they would use Participating Informers (21, 43%), to 
organise or arrange crime (8, 16%), or get them to buy and sell illegal property 
(9,18%). 
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The use of Participating Informers is referred to in Chapter II (Agent 
Provocateur) and Chapter III (police Use ofInformers) and in essence refers to 
those Informers who are authorised by the police to take a 'minor role' in the 
commission of a criminal offence with a view to resolving a more serious crime. 
It is clear that Informers generally are unaware of the rules governing 
Participating Informers, but more importantly, police officers themselves are 
sometimes not sure. A Participating Informer commits a criminal offence, even 
though the police authorise such commission. However, one Handler (202) has 
not understood this, explaining, 
• "There is a fine line between Participating Informants and commission of 
the offence. Some don't know the difference ". 
There is presently a research project being undertaken (led by the author ofthis 
research), looking specifically at Participating Informers. Clearly the question 
which arises from Table 55 is how many Informers are engaged in this type of 
work and are not aware they have been authorised as participants? This study 
shows that only 1 Informer thought this to be the case. The use of Informers in 
this way means they are asked to breach the criminal law, and suggests too that 
the police are content to legitimise their actions. An example was given by one 
Informer (120) who explained, 
• "I went to work for an escort agency as a prostitute. I offered myself for 
information against the owner who was pushing child pornography. It took 
about 5 or 6 weeks, that 's all'~ 
Twenty one (42%) Handlers gave 'Participating Informers' as examples of 
where the law has been broken. As already stated, the use of Participating 
Informers, if authorised is a legitimate process for breaking the law but as one 
(257) explained, 
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• "If you put a Participating Informant report up, you have to indicate exactly 
what his actions are. But if you hold back after he steals the car, for 
example, then you just say that he is being the driver. It's bending the 
rules'~ 
In relation to the Handlers, 8 (16%) admitted that they arranged or organised 
certain crimes through the use of Informers. Such an example was given by one 
(201) who said, 
• "I instructed my Informer to make sure the target was in possession of 
stolen credit cards when I arrested him'~ 
A further 9 (18%) Handlers allowed their Informers to buy stolen goods or 
illegal drugs, one such Handler (221) explaining that it was necessary, 
• " .. so you can get into the operation'~ 
Another (237) agreed and recalled, 
• "Where he (Informer) is handling and I have allowed him to keep the 
property'~ 
A further Handler (284) who referred to drugs said, 
• " .. My snouts are all druggies. They have to be to be any good. If I tried to 
stop them getting their own gear, I would be shooting myselfin the foot'~ 
Five (10%) Handlers accepted that their Informers were active criminals, but as 
one (278) admitted, 
• " .. I have no direct knowledge, and I have done nothing about it'~ 
Another (281) agreed and recalled that one of his Informers was, 
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• "- heavily into nicking cars. You see, a successful informant is usually 
always an active criminal'~ 
This was confirmed by another Handler (297) who explained, 
• "Informers are usually criminals so they always break the law. The fact 
that you use them doesn't make any difference to that. In fact, if they stop 
nicking or whatever, then they're not so useful'~ 
A further Handler (292) recalled that one of his Informers was an illegal 
immigrant and was, 
• "-allowed into the country illegally and allowed to commit crime, an armed 
robbery. He wasn't arrested so that his background wasn 't disc/osed'~ 
Table 56 - Informers and Handlers involved in setting up crime. 
INFORMER HANDLER TOTAL 
YES 41 42 83 
NO 59 70 129 
REFUSED TO ANSWER 20 8 28 
TOTAL 120 120 240 
(x2 = 6.09, df= 2, P = 0.048) 
Table 56 compares the responses by the two groups to the suggestion that they 
have been involved in the 'setting up' of at least one crime. The respondents 
were quite clear that 'setting up' crime meant instigating a crime which would 
not have been committed without their involvement, commonly known as 'agent 
provocateur'. The results are only just significant at the 95% level, however the 
differences are exaggerated by the different proportions of respondents who 
were prepared to answer the question. The Informers were generally more 
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evasive with 20 (17%) refusing to answer, compared with 8 (7%) Handlers. 
Interestingly, the proportions who reported being involved were similar; 34% of 
Infonners and 35% of the Handlers, 83 respondents in total. Out of the 70 
Handlers who said they would not become involved in setting up crime, it is not 
clear how many of those had been nevertheless approached to do so by their 
Infonners. One Handler (222) however referred to this and said, 
• ''I targeted a drugs dealer with the Informant. After a week I hadn't got 
very far. He suggested he supply the target with a kilo of amphet and a 
shooter (firearm). I said no,forget about it'~ 
Table 57 - Examples of crime set up, by groups. 
INFORMER HANDLER rrOTAL 
BURGLARY 6 6 12 
ROBBERY 0 2 2 
DRUGS 18 2 20 
FIREARMS 4 0 4 
HANDLING STOLEN PROPERTY 8 0 8 
PARTICIPATING INFORMER 0 22 22 
OTHER 1 4 5 
REFUSED TO ANSWER 4 6 10 
TOTAL 41 42 83 
Table 57 shows examples given by the respondents where crimes had been 'set 
up'. There were 41 Informers and 42 Handlers as shown in Table 56. The 
Table shows that 22 (26%) Handlers referred to Participating Informers, but 
none of the Informers did. This may add to the point that Informers are often 
unaware of this working practice within the police service: It may also suggest 
that Handlers tried to justify their actions by referring to 'Participating 
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Informers', even though this is not an example of crime but merely a means used 
by the police to 'set up' crime. 
A number of categories of crime are mentioned by the respondents but only the 
burglary offences show a similarity between the groups. One such Informer (85) 
said, 
• "The police were after someone who was a regular burglar. I set up a job 
for him to do and make sure he took the gear to his house. The police were 
waitingfor him, it was easy. He cleared up a load of jobs". Another (238) 
recalled, 
• "The informant was told to arrange a supermarket burglary. He was 
involved It was not disclosed but it ended in a good result'~ 
Handling stolen property is not mentioned by the Handlers, and it is not clear 
whether this is because the offence is not set up at all, or the Handlers do not 
consider it to be worth mentioning. The latter seemed to be the case with one 
Handler (237) who gave burglary as an example but said, 
• ''Which one? There are so many. To give the Informer credibility I gave 
him a warehouse to set up handling jobs. He got so involved he was setting 
up burglaries'~ 
One of the Informers (76) though recalled, 
• "1 have made sure a villain is in a house with some gear on him so that the 
police know all about it. It saves the police time trying to catch them. Like 
drugs, its easy to set them up but they're at it anywtry so I don't think that's 
wrong'~ 
One example which suggests the police are well aware that crimes are being set 
up is given by an Informer (34) who said, 
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• ')1 man from - does a decent living out of crime. I arranged to have a 
stolen bike which had been recovered by the police, to go to this man. They 
then did an operation on him. I kept the money I made from selling the bike 
to him'~ 
A similar story was told by an Infonner (40) who reported that, 
• "1 found out about two villains and I rang my Handler and he told me to get 
some gear and put it in their house. He told me when he was doing the bust 
so I could be away". 
One Infonner involved in drugs (112) said, 
• "They use me all the time, 'cos I'm into heroin. All they have to do is plant 
me somewhere and its like flies round a honeypot. Easy, that is'~ 
Another drugs Infonner (88) explained, 
• ''Every job I set up comes up. For instance, a drugs job. Some dealers on 
crack cocaine are earning 3 to 4 thousand a night. I became part of the 
team and I needed to set the main man up. He was from Trinidad. There 
was dealing every day but the main man -we had to make sure he was 
involved'~ 
The area of drugs was mentioned regularly by the Infonners but only 2 of the 
Handlers referred to it specifically. One ofthose (278) said, 
• '1 remember an informant rang in and told me some drugs were in a biscuit 
tin at the villains home. We arrested him but I knew that the informant had 
sold the drugs in the first place to him'~ 
Another Infonner (108) referred to illegal firearms and said, 
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• "1 remember once they were after a certain bloke for supplying guns to 
villains but they couldn't catch him. I managed to put a moody shooter 
(illegal firearm) in his house which they found. He was locked up for it. I 
thought at the time it was a bit iffy, but as they told me - he was bang at it 
so he had to be stopped That'sfair enough isn't it?" 
One Handler (276) was more general when he said that, 
• "I've dealt with informants who have set up targets. I do discourage them 
because I don't want to lose the case at court, but I know it will go on 
anyway'~ 
This seemed to be the attitude shared by a number of Handlers, one of whom 
(285) said, 
• "Where the target is active, I have often asked the snout to, well you know, 
spur him on a bit. He's going to commit crime anyway so we might as well 
control it'~ 
One Informer (8) who referred to firearms was a middle aged man living in the 
North East of Britain, and on the face of it was a legitimate businessman. He 
was also heavily into the importation of illegal drugs, which of course his 
Handler was well aware of. He gave the impression that he was a good friend of 
the police and wanted to help them as much as he could. It is not clear whether 
he was trying to help, or there was some other reason when he said, 
• "1 knew a man who could get hold of a shotgun. I made sure that he 
obtained it and hid it in his settee so that when I told the police, they knew 
exactly where to find it'~ 
To summarise, the data has shown that a large number of the respondents were 
prepared to 'set up' crimes and a number of examples were given involving 
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various types of crime. Such action can never be justified, even though some 
Handlers tried to do so by suggesting that authorisation was given to use 
'Participating Informers'. If the practice of 'setting up' crimes is commonplace, 
and it seems to be the case, then it could be argued that the use of Informers 
increases criminality. 
Table 58 - Category of crimes set up. by previous conyictions. 
RlMESSET UP PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS 
DlSHONES ~SSAUlT DRUGS SEXUAL BURGLARY ROBBERY OTAl 
BURGLARY 4 0 0 0 2 0 6 
DRUGS 8 0 6 0 2 0 16 
2 
FIREARMS 2 0 2 0 0 0 4 
STOLEN VEHICLE 0 0 1 0 1 0 
sTOLEN PROPERTY 2 1 0 0 0 2 5 
SEXUAL 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
OTAl 16 1 9 1 5 2 34 
Table 58 looks more closely at the types of crimes which had been 'set up' by 
the Informers and compares them with the Informers' previous convictions. The 
aim here is to see if there is a connection between the two. Results show that 34 
Informers who admitted setting up crimes had a criminal history. A closer look 
at the data shows no obvious cormection between the types of crimes 'set up' 
and the Informers' previous convictions, that is other than those relating to 
drugs. Nine (26%) Informers had been convicted of drug offences, and 6 (67%) 
of those had set up drugs related offences. None of the other categories had any 
obvious cormection, although 1 Informer who had been convicted of a sexual 
offence, also set up a similar type of offence. This was a female who managed a 
brothel, and the offences she set up had in fact been cormected with her 
employment. Presumably this was because of her unique position to assist the 
police. 
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In total, 83 (35%) Informers and Handlers agreed that they had been involved in 
the setting up of various criminal offences. This practice can only be described as 
criminal in itself and the interesting aspect of this is that those respondents 
involved seemed generally comfortable talking about this matter, and appeared 
to not see the need to justify their involvement. This was so for both groups. 
Table 59 - Respondents who have been party to the commissioQ of crime 
INFORMER HANDLER TOTAL 
YES 89 51 140 
NO 9 34 43 
PROVIDING IT WAS AUTHORISED 8 24 32 
DEPENDS ON CIRCUMSTANCES 14 11 25 
!TOTAL 120 120 240 
(x2 = 33.2, df= 3, P < 0.001) 
Table 59 looks at those respondents who allowed themselves to become 
involved in the commission of a crime. This involvement is slightly less dramatic 
than being involved in the 'setting up' of a crime, or agent provocateur. The 
data shows that 140 (58%) respondents said they would be prepared to be party 
to the commission of crime, with only 18% saying they would not. This is to be 
compared with 83 respondents who said they had been involved in setting up a 
crime (Table 56). There were statistically significant differences between the 
two groups in that a high proportion of Informers said they would be so 
involved (Standardised residual = 2.3) with a high proportion of Handlers who 
said they would not (Standardised residual = 2.7). Out of the 89 Informers who 
seemed to have no doubts, one such Informer (99) said, 
• "/ don't mind what / do as long as / get paid If the coppers stry its OK then 
I'm on to a winner". 
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Another Informer (98) agreed that he would do anything, stating that, 
• "If my Handler is happy I'll do what he says. He sorts everything out, I 
trust him. He wouldn't let me down'~ 
This response by the Informers suggesting that they will unconditionally do what 
is asked of them is confirmed by an Informer (84) who said, 
• "I owe my Handler. He has helped me no end. If it wasn't jor him I would 
be in prison now. Like, you know, he can square jobs up. Well the least I 
can do is help catch the villains he wants, and I get paid jor it. Cant be 
bad'~ 
Twenty four Handlers (20%) agreed that they would be involved in crime as 
long as the involvement was properly authorised. This condition refers to the 
process of authorising Participating Informers and seems to support the findings 
of Table 57 where 22 Handlers said that they had allowed crimes to be set up 
through authorised use. One Handler (20 I) though was less specific and said, 
• ''It's our job to put them away (the criminal). Ifwe can catch them, I'll do 
anything'~ 
Another (237) agreed and said, 
• ''-It's in a good cause. A necessary evil". 
In addition, 25 respondents stated they would become involved in crime in 
certain circumstances, and these include 7 Handlers where the crime was of a 
minor nature; 6 Informers if it kept them out of trouble, and a further 6 
Informers where they had bought stolen property. An example given by one 
Handler (276) was, 
278 
• "Yes we had a lad who was nicking cars for a team of armed robbers. We 
allowed him to steal a car to be used on a job. We had an opportunity to 
nab some armed robbers". 
Again, drugs offences featured highly here and one Informer (104) agreed 
saymg, 
• "Yes, I would offer to drive the local heroin dealer to pick up his score in 
order to discover who his supplier was as this would catch the bigger fish': 
To summarise, it appears that, with the exception of drugs offences, there is no 
connection between the types of crime 'set up' by the Informers and their 
previous convictions. A large number of Informers and Handlers seemed 
comfortable with being involved in the commission of crime, and although some 
of the Handlers again used 'Participating Informers' as some justification, there 
were a large number who did not. A number of examples were given, but the 
general feeling from both groups suggests that the means justifies the ends. 
Such action is commonly known within the police service as 'noble cause 
corruption' and can never be condoned or authorised. Such a high number of 
respondents being prepared to be involved in the commission of crime must be 
of concern to police policy makers. 
Table 60 - InConnen wbo bave participated in crime whilst inConning 
INFORMERS FREQUENCY 
rtES 60 
NO 48 
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Table 60 looks at Informers who had participated in crime whilst giving 
information to the police. This is the same as taking part in the commission of 
crime. Forty eight Informers said they would not participate in crime and only 9 
Informers said they had not been party to the commission of crime in Table 59. 
Sixty Informers admitted that they had participated in crime, but 89 said they 
had been involved in the commission of crime in Table 59. This disparity may of 
course be due to the respondents' differing perceptions of being involved in 
crime. Nevertheless, the data yet again confirms the Informers' apparent 
willingness to participate in crime. One Informer (27) had no doubts and said, 
• "1 have often been used on jobs. It's easier for the police to control the 
situation. Usually as a driver'~ 
Table 61 - Examples of crimes in which Informers had participated 
CRIME FREQUENCY 
DRIVER 9 
DRUGS 28 
BURGLARY 8 
CAR THEFT 2 
OTHER 3 
REFUSED TO ANSWER 10 
rrOTAL 60 
Table 61 further examines the 60 Informers identified in Table 60 as having 
participated in crimes. The table lists the type of crimes each of those 60 
respondents had participated in. whilst informing. The data shows that most 
Informers (28, 47%) had arranged drugs deals. One Informer (34) suggested, 
• '~ drugs job, when there was no money forthcoming, I was allowed to get 
involved instead of payment'~ 
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Another example was given (35) when, 
• "I was once used to deliver drugs from one target to another. They were 
arrested and I escaped'~ 
Nine Informers (15%) had been drivers during the commission of crime, and 8 
(13%) had been involved in burglaries. One such Informer (57) recalled, 
• "I was doing a shop burglary with some others. I rang my Hand/er ten 
minutes before the job and he didn't have time to do anything about it, so I 
did the job and afterwards the others got arrested and charged They 
arrested me so it looked right but I wasn't charged". 
Not all the Informers who get involved in this type of activity told the police. 
One Informer (90) said, 
• "It was a burglary and I was the look-out. The security guard turned up out 
of the blue, so I had to warn the villains and they ran off, like. They never 
got cought". 
Five others (8%) had been involved in other crime. One such Informer (53) 
said, 
• 'My home was used to stash the gear until it was safe to move it. The police 
knew and they let me keep a few bits'~ 
Handling stolen property was mentioned again by one Informer (108) who said, 
• "Handling nicked gear - by using me as a fence, they (the police) could 
control where everything was going. I even got to keep some of iI'~ 
Another Informer (56) recalled, 
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• "Someone asked me to look after a shotgun. I kept it at my house for a 
while, then I told the police where it was. They didn't arrest the bloke 
because he would have known it came from me'~ 
One Infonner (58) gave Robbery as an example and said, 
• "Some villains want me to do a post office job. There's about five grand in 
it. I'm supposed to go in the place but I'm too old for that sort of thing. I'm 
hoping my Handler will blow the job out but if it goes ahead I'll have to 
take part'~ 
There were also 10 Infonners (15%) who refused to give examples of the type 
of crimes they had participated in. 
Drugs offences features highly in the examples given, but the qualitative data 
specifies a number of so called serious crimes such as burglary, handling stolen 
property, fireanns offences and robbery. The data again seems to confinn the 
Infonners' willingness to commit crime, and the Handlers' apparent acceptance 
that crimes are being committed by their Infonners. 
Table 62 - Whether participation in crime had been declared by Informer 
INFORMER FREQUENCY 
YES 14 
NO 8 
DONTKNOW 38 
TOTAL 60 
Table 62 further examines the possible confusion between 'Participating 
Infonners', and those 'taking part in the commission of crime'. To address this 
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issue, the 60 Informers referred to in Tables 60 and 61 were asked whether their 
participation had been declared. Thirty eight (62%) did not know. To 
speculate, that suggests their Handlers were possibly aware that this was 
happening, but the Informers did not know if authorisation had been given by 
their supervisors. Indeed, it may be in the Handlers' interests to convince their 
Informers that authorisation had been given. At the time of this study. there was 
no procedure in place in England for the Informer to be aware of any necessary 
documentation to be completed, however the National Informer Working Group 
are reviewing current police practices, and it is expected that major changes are 
inevitable. 
Table 62 suggests that at although 8 Informers believed their participation was 
not disclosed - the majority were unable to answer, suggesting that the 
InformerlHandler partnership may lack a measure of communication. The reason 
could of course be more sinister; that is to say some Handlers may have decided 
not to seek the necessary authority, but instead took the decision themselves to 
allow an Informer to participate. 
Table 63 - Handler will allow Informer to commit crime. by groups. 
IINFORMER HANDLER rrOTAL 
!ALWAYS/USUALLY 24 23 47 
SOMETIMES 37 35 72 
RARELY/NEVER 59 62 121 
rrOTAL 120 120 240 
Table 63 shows the responses by both Informers and Handlers when asked if 
they believed the police would allow Informers to commit crime whilst 
informing. There was a high degree of agreement between the two groups, with 
no evidence ofa difference of opinion. Forty seven (20%) said the police would 
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always or usually allow this, and a further 72 (30%) said they would sometimes. 
Half the respondents agreed that Informers are allowed to commit crime, and 
with such a positive agreement between the two groups, there can be little doubt 
that the results are valid. 
In summary, the findings support the hypothesis that the use of Informers is 
instrumental in the commission of crime. A substantial proportion of the 
respondents gave examples where this was the case, and both Informers and 
Handlers accepted that crimes had been set up as a result of the 
InformerlHandler relationship. Examples of various types of crime were given 
including drugs, firearms offences, robbery, theft and others. The participation in 
crime has been discussed and although there currently exists a procedure for 
police officers to allow Informers to participate subject to proper authorisation, 
it is clear that these procedures are not understood or in some cases not adhered 
to. The practice of allowing Informers to participate is being reviewed in this 
country and this review must take account of this study. 
Sub Aim C - I.eve! ofdiscretioD used with the Jaw. 
It was identified in Chapter Five, whilst examining the theoretical issues, that 
there was concern about the growing use of discretion involved in the use of 
Informers. This specific issue is covered in this section. 
To examine possible breaches of the law in more detail, both groups were asked 
to what extent they use their discretion during their informing activities. The 
results are set out in Table 64, with Table 65 developing the point in terms of the 
immunity offered by the police. Discretion is linked closely with those findings in 
relation to 'selectivity' referred to in Tables 46 to 53. Discretion here means the 
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freedom used by the respondents to make judgments and act as they see fit in 
relation to the criminal law. 
Table 64 - Use o(discretion about the law 
INFORMER HANDLER ~OTAL 
IVES 86 54 140 
NO 12 50 62 
DEPENDS ON CIRCUMSTANCES 22 16 38 
!TOTAL 120 120 240 
(x2 = 31.6, df= 2, P < 0.001) 
Table 64 looks at whether discretion is used by Informers and Handlers in 
relation to the law, whilst engaged in informing. On the face of it, the most 
significant feature is the proportion of Handlers who said they would not use 
discretion (standardised residual = 3.4). However there were only 50 (42%) and 
part of the significance is that they are being compared with Informers, the 
majority of which as we know from Table 15, have criminal histories; so perhaps 
it is not that surprising. Even those who said they would not use discretion were 
not all emphatic about their decision. For example, one Handler (290) said, 
• "-1 make it clear that there are certain things I don't want to know about'~ 
The most alarming feature is regarding those 54 (45%) Handlers who said they 
would use their discretion. One (215) had no doubts, saying, 
• "Yes, I do that as well. I think you've got to give them a 'by"~ 
A further 16 (13%) Handlers said they would use discretion under the right 
circumstances, which could include minor offences (11, 9%). This seems to be 
supported by the findings in Table 37, where a number of Handlers agreed they 
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would be selective in petty crime. The study does not determine however, what 
crimes these Handlers consider to be petty, but one Handler (307) suggested, 
• "Where I suspect my informants may be guilty of minor offences e.g. 
possession of drugs or minor traffic offences I may avoid further 
investigation as this may interfere with the informantlhandler relationship'~ 
Twenty two Informers also thought that circumstances would dictate their 
answer, this includes 8 (7%) who thought their use of discretion would help the 
police, and a further 4 (3%) who approved as long as they did not get involved 
themselves. Only 12 Informers said they would not use any discretion. One who 
had no doubt (116) explained that, 
• "1 have driven cars without insurance and tax if it helps the police to get 
their target, yeah'~ 
Another (114) responded by saying, 
• "1 don't want to be an informant. I'm not committing crime and I don't 
want paying. It just suited me at the time because I'm a taxi driver and I 
don't have any licence. The police can help me there'~ 
Only 62 of the total respondents said they used no discretion, with the majority 
accepting that some use is made of this factor. 
In summary, this part of the study shows that widespread use of discretion is 
made by Informers and Handlers. These findings tend to confirm the concern 
expressed by some partners of the police (Chapter five) who fear that another 
Stephen Lawrence enquiry may just be round the corner due to an abuse of 
authority. It may also be supposed that those supporters of the police use of 
discretion are unaware of it's widespread use by Informers and Handlers 
resulting in a flagrant abuse of the law. 
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This use of discretion may suggest a lack of control and supervision on both 
groups, and again provides some doubt about the management of their 
relationship. 
Table 65 - Immunity granted, by groups. 
INFORMER HANDLER TOTAL 
ALWAYS/USUALLY 4 4 8 
SOMETIMES 12 25 37 
RARELY/NEVER 104 91 195 
TOTAL 120 120 240 
To further develop the matter of discretion, Table 65 compares the responses 
from the two groups as to whether Handlers will grant immunity to their 
Informers in exchange for information. 
The results do not seem to support Table 63, where 50% of the respondents 
disagreed that the Informer is allowed to commit crime. Table 65 shows that 
only 8 (3%) respondents said that immunity was always or usually given. 
Another 37 (15%) thought this occurred sometimes, but there were twice as 
many Handlers as Informers, and the majority of respondents (195, 81%) 
disagreed that such practice occurred. 
These findings do not compare either with the use of discretion (Table 64) 
where 178 respondents thought that such use was possible. To speculate, 
perhaps the difference with immunity is that it requires positive action on the 
part of the Handler, whereas when he allows the Informer to commit crime, or 
he uses his discretion, then a more passive role can be taken. That is to say, the 
Handler in effect omits to do something rather than takes positive steps. 
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However, it does seem that more of the Handlers are likely to consider granting 
immunity than the Informers believe. 
Sub Aim D - Do Police Officers breach the Discipline Code? 
The study looked at the level of breaches by the Handlers in relation to the 
Police Discipline Code (Appendix H) and the results are set out in Tables 66 to 
68 inclusive. Table 66 shows the proportion who have done so, and Table 67 
lists examples. Table 68 further develops this area and establishes what sort of 
problems the Handlers were prepared to sort out on behalf of their Informers. 
Table 66 - Breaches of the Police Discipline RegUlations. 
INFORMER HANDLER TOTAL 
YES 0 58 58 
NO 15 46 61 
OONT KNOW/REFUSED TO ANSWER 105 16 121 
TOTAL 120 120 240 
(x2 = 139.2, df= 2, P < 0.001) 
Table 66 shows a significant difference between the two groups in relation to 
breaches of the Police Discipline Regulations 11 in that 102 (85%) Informers 
said they did not know if such breaches occur; a further 3 Informers refused to 
answer. None of the Informers could say positively that they had breached the 
police discipline code. It could be argued that they do not need to know, but 
here again an example emerges of how the partnership between the two groups 
is far from close. Clearly, the Informers know little about police procedures, in 
11 In the interests of clarity, it should be pointed out the Police Discipline 
Regulations have since been replaced by the Police (Conduct) Regulation 1999. 
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much the same way as they lack knowledge about Participating Informers (Table 
62). 
Fifty eight Handlers (50%) agreed they had previously committed disciplinary 
offences, a particularly high figure, bearing in mind this data was obtained after 
the A.C.P.O. Guidelines had been circulated in 1995 which was intended to 
alleviate such practice. 
Table 67 - Examples of breaches of tbe Djscipljne Regulatjons 
FREQUENCY 
UNAUTHORISED MEETINGS 20 
LOCAL RULES AND ORDERS 14 
FAIL TO ARREST WANTED INFORMER 7 
PAYMENT PROCEDURES 4 
SHOWING INFORMER DETAILS OF TARGET 3 
HAVING AN AFFAIR WITH INFORMER 2 
REFUSED TO ANSWER/OTHER 8 
TOTAL 58 
From the 58 Handlers who admitted breaches, Table 67 breaks down the types 
of breaches. The majority relate to meeting their Informers without the 
necessary authority from their supervisors. The A.C.P.O. Guidelines on this 
issue are clear and advise all Police Forces that for the safety of the officers and 
Informers, all meetings must be authorised. This practice does not appear to be 
adhered to, and as one Handler (276) put it, 
• "/ would suggest that any sensible detective would go ahead and see them 
anyway'~ 
Another Handler (290) seemed to be blaming his supervisor when he said, 
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• "/f you have a DCI who doesn't want to know about infonnants, he will try 
to persuade you to steer clear. Then you have to be a bit devious and 
sometimes the rules are broken'~ 
Other local rules breached include where a Police Force dictate that Informers 
should not be met on licensed premises or whilst on bail. Again, this rule is 
broken on a number of occasions. One Handler (235) explained, 
• "Sometimes authorised meetings may have to take place on the 'hurry up' 
when codes cannot be complied with i.e. infonnant on bail refuses or unable 
to make a meeting at the police station and the infonnation is so serious as 
to outweigh the risks of breaching the rules'~ 
Another (315) said, 
• "Drinking on licensed premises, drinking and driving, those sort of things. 
That's just meeting them on their home ground. Also, I tend to take a 'blind 
eye' policy. You have to'~ 
There are 4 occasions where payment procedures are not complied with. It can 
be assumed that they refer to the local police standing orders, which are put into 
place mainly for the safety of the officer; as wen as to prevent corruption and 
abuse of public funds. One such Handler (237) suggested that, 
• "In relation to the payment, some don't want anyone else present. Also, 
when I have paid money out of my pocket, the claim is really for me and the 
boss signs the fonn so I can get the money back'~ 
Such practice was supported by another Handler (239) who said, 
• "I pay out my own pocket. When the money eventually comes through, the 
gaffer signs the fonn but knows the money is yours. He just signs the fonn'~ 
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Seven Handlers suggested that they had neglected their duty by failing to arrest 
their Informer wanted for a criminal offence. One such respondent (297) said, 
• 'jis a police officer I should be arresting my snout all the time. Its neglect 
of duty, but if I do that he wont be much use. That's life'~ 
Although the Informers were not asked about breaches of the Police Discipline 
Code because it was felt they would not have the necessary knowledge, they 
were nevertheless asked how they would react, having broken the rules, if a 
criminal was not processed as a result. There were those who felt that such a 
situation did not help the relationship, and one Informer (62) complained that, 
• "The jobs I've got running at the moment are being stretched because there 
is a bent copper at the big house (police station). My Handler cant do 
nothing 'cause he don't know who he can trust. There's a Chief Inspector 
still being paid by one family and he's already retired It leaves me in a 
mess. I cant trust no-one'~ 
Others felt it was not their responsibility. For example, one Informer (34) said, 
• 'My job is to give information even if it means bending the rules but its the 
police job to make sure he gets done'~ 
Another (116) agreed stating that, 
• ''It would be the police's fault, not mine, so I don't care but obviously I 
would sooner get a result for them'~ 
One Informer (39) said he relied on the police and reported, 
• ''I rely on my Handler to teach me the piifalls. I'll do what he says. I was in 
the box (witness box) for five hours recently and said the right things. 
You've got to'~ 
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Table 68 - Occasions wbere Handlers had sorted out problems. 
Table 68 examines the practice of breaching the rules in more detail. The 
Informers were asked to give examples when Handlers had sorted out individual 
problems for their Informers during their relationship. Table 68 shows that 45 
(38%) Informers had been helped, presumably some on more than one occasion. 
A proportion of the incidents amounted to breaches of police discipline, for 
example one Informer (57) reported, 
• "1 got drunk and damaged a cab door. My Handler came down and sorted 
it out. I didn't get charged so it saved me another conviction. I paid my 
Handler for the damage caused". 
However, some Handlers were contravening the criminal law. For example, 4 
Informers said that whilst involved in supplying drugs, they had been warned by 
their Handlers of impending drugs raids. This was stated by one Informer (120) 
who said, 
• "One girl who works for me is on drugs. He (my Handler) has told me if the 
drug squad intend to take out a warrant on her, he will tell me and I can 
make sure the place is clean'~ 
Another Informer (112) said, 
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• "I'm a registered addict, but sometimes I need a bit more. They (the police) 
sort that for me but only after a job has gone down'~ 
A drug related incident was also reported by one Informer (104) who said, 
• "I was cought in a catch 22 situation where the dealer I was informing on 
pressured me to take drugs into a prison visit and although I informed my 
Handler prior to doing so it led to me being arrested He sorted it and no 
action was taken". 
Another Informer(114) was stopped by the police whilst driving his car without 
insurance and his Handler sorted it out. He explained that, 
• "-It's my livelihood and I'll do anything to keep my business. That's why I'm 
involved in this sort of thing. I don't like it but I have to do it'~ 
Ten Informers stated they had warrants or fines sorted for them, but there is no 
indication specifica1ly how that was done. It may be that the Handlers paid off 
the fines, as suggested by one Informer (75) who said, 
• "He paidafinefor me once. I didn't ask him to. I suppose he was trying to 
do me a favour. I was grateful anyway'~ 
More seriously, the police Handler may have in some way arranged for the fines 
to be cancelled. This was suggested by one Informer (88) who said, 
• "All the time, parking tickets and that rubbish. It's all squared up for me. 
Compared to the information I give him it's nothing. It helps when I'm 
waiting for a pay out. It's only right that I get something from the system. 
You have to take a little to give a little, know what I mean'~ 
Similarly, 2 Informers believed that they received cautions for shoplifting 
charges, but there is no indication that they were treated differently because they 
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were informing. To speculate here, it may be the case that the Handler suggested 
he was helping the Informer as a means to secure an advantage for the future, 
when in fact he did nothing to help at all. One Informer(26) was in doubt about 
the help he received when he said, 
• "/ was on bail for a job. / don't know what they had on me but my Handler 
squared the job up and/never heard no more'~ 
Another Informer (25) refers to bail and recalled that, 
• "Whilst / have been on bail, my Handler has got me off in exchange for 
information". 
There were 3 Informers who referred to the police helping other members of 
their family, and one example was given by a respondent (2) who explained that 
his Handler helped his brother, 
• "-who's always in trouble. The police will get him out of the shit if / give 
them goodjobs'~ 
Whatever the circumstances, it is a fact that 45 Informers believed they were 
being helped because of their relationship with their Handler. 
Regarding the Handlers, a comparison can be drawn between the 58 (48%) who 
acknowledged breaches of the Police Discipline Regulations (Table 64), the 54 
(45%) Handlers who also accepted using their discretion with the law (Table 
62), and the 45 Informers who said their Handlers had sorted out some of their 
problems (Table 68). These three aspects, although themselves quite separate, 
together show a high degree of independence on the part of the Handlers which 
may suggest a lack of control or supervision; but also displays a lack of respect 
for the law and procedures. It may also show, but it is not proven in the study, 
how important the relationship is to the Handlers, in that a good proportion of 
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them are prepared to risk their jobs and livelihood in favour of this unique 
partnership they have with the Informer. It is apparent that the relationship they 
have is very important to them, and not the individual Informer. This is 
confirmed by the fact that only 31 of the Handlers considered friendship to be 
important (Table 30) and 112 of them thought that the Informers motivation was 
for personal gain (Table 39), a fact not supported by the Informers themselves. 
Summary of Aim 5 
The study has examined the extent to which the police use of Informers breaches 
the law and the police discipline regulations. It has been shown that both the 
Informer and Handler are selective about the information they deal with, for a 
number of reasons. The study also shows that both groups are prepared to 
break the law giving examples of various crimes where this has occurred. Both 
the Informers and Handlers have also been involved in 'setting up' crimes, and 
being party to the commission of crime. The results confirm that both groups 
use their discretion with the law, and examples are given where immunity was 
granted to Informers by the Handlers. 
The results show that police officers are prepared to breach the police discipline 
regulations, sometimes quite serious breaches. Handlers have also sorted out 
various problems for their Informers, which has required them to break the rules. 
Aim 6 - To make recommendations, if relevant. relative to the relationship 
between the Informer and Handler. 
Sub Aim A - Does the InformerLHandJer relationship in aoy way affect 
working practices? 
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Drawing from the results of the analysis in Aim 5 of this study, which was to 
determine whether the police use of Informers breached the law or Police 
Discipline Code, it is reasonable to suggest that the relationship between the 
Informer and Handler has played a major part. To put this another way, had the 
relationship not existed, then accepted working practices would not have been 
abused. 
The working practices referred to are those agreed nationally by all police forces 
and which are consolidated into the Association of Chief Police Officers 
Guidelines on the Use and Management of Informers. These are confidential and 
circulated only to senior police officers. Permission was not given for the 
contents of this document to be produced as part of this study, although parts 
have been specifically referred to. The main thrust of the Guidelines was to 
ensure that police officers acted within the law and Police Discipline Regulation, 
as discussed in Aim 4 of this work, and it is this area where the 
InformerlHandler relationship has been examined. 
The study has shown that selective informing exists by both groups in terms of 
the information itself as well as certain categories of crime. Tables 46 to 53 look 
at this issue specifically. The level of selectivity has been identified as well as the 
circumstances surrounding such practice. 
In relation to the criminal law, evidence has emerged suggesting that both 
Informers and Handlers are prepared to commit criminal acts themselves in 
furtherance of the relationship they have with each other. Tables 54 to 63 
examine the data in relation to this aspect, and in particular, there seems to be a 
clear indication that both groups have been prepared to instigate or set up crimes 
themselves, in order to progress the partnership to its optimum. 
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The use of discretion has also been considered and Table 64 has analysed the 
findings which support the hypotheses that the majority of both groups 
Informers and Handlers, will use their own discretion, especially if the 
circumstances suit their situation. This is closely linked to the question of 
immunity offered or accepted by the groups (Table 65). The A.C.P.O. 
Guidelines have failed to address either of these issues and clearly there is a need 
to debate this further, in order for recognised rules to be laid down. 
Finally, the existence of breaches to the Discipline Code have been studied, and 
Tables 66 to 68 have analysed the data appropriate to this issue. There is support 
for the theory that breaches are common place; although the Informers 
themselves were unable to provide much data, the police officers responses have 
been sufficient to give concern to the police service. 
Sub Aim B - Is tbere a need to make recommendations. 
A list of recommendations have been made based on the findings of this 
research, and are shown in Chapter 7. Clearly, the recommendations will be of 
interest and concern to the police service. However, there are more and more 
agencies becoming involved in the management and use of Informers, and it is 
likely that the recommendations will be relevant to them also. Such agencies 
may include Her Majesty's Customs & Excise, Royal Society for the Prevention 
of Cruelty to Animals, Home Office Animal Rights National Index, the Security 
Services, and other such bodies. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Summary Qfthe thesis 
The thesis examines the relationship between an Informer and his/her Handler. 
This relationship is made up of a professional, the police Handler, and a lay 
person, the Informer. A police officer will often need to exert power and control 
in order to carry out his business. The thesis examines whether such use of 
power and control exists in the context of Informer handling, and whether that 
power and control is authorised. The results of this examination were achieved 
firstly by considering the theoretical implications raised in Chapter Five, and 
secondly through the results of the data analysis in Chapter Seven. 
The theory drew heavily from Weber's distribution of power 1, and Freidson's 
work on professionalism 2 so that the features making up a classic professional 
relationship could be identified. Reference has been made to Weber's definition 
of social behaviour, where he lists the various categories of conduct found in 
most behavioural situations. This list can be compared with an Informer's 
motives, suggesting that the Handler!Informer relationship is perhaps not 
dissimilar to other classic professional relationships. 
1 Gerth H H & Wright Mills C (Ed.), from Mal( Weber - Essays in sociology 
London: Routledge, (1970) 
2Freidson E, Professional dominance' the social structure of medical care 
Atherton Press, New York (1970) 
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The police officer as a professional emerged as a key issue, with the Informers 
being best described as clients or customers. Chapter five begun with an 
assumed model of the relationship between the Informer and Handler. This 
assumed model showed the perceived differences between the Handler and 
Informer and, based on common perceptions, served as a bench mark to 
compare with the findings from this research. 
The theoretical examination has produced a number of factors which exist in 
other classic partnerships between professionals, including those where the 
police are not involved. Some of those partnerships have been examined. Those 
factors have been compared with the findings from this research (chapter seven) 
relating specifically to the relationship between an Informer and Handler, to 
determine whether the comparison is in fact legitimate; put simply, to determine 
whether the HandlerlInformer relationship is in any way different to other 
professional relationships. The assumption was that the HandlerlInformer 
relationship is in fact unique; there being few other relationships where the 
professional rewards the client for his services, as opposed to say the 
doctor/patient, or lawyer/client relationship, for example, which operate the 
other way. 
It has also been assumed that relationships between Informers and Handlers 
cannot run smoothly, when their objectives and priorities are so different. 
Nevertheless, it is also assumed that a police officer is a professional and he will 
behave accordingly; that is to say, he will act in accordance with the rules and 
regulations laid down. The study identifies two central features common to a 
professional police officer; power and control. It is acknowledged that police 
officers require a level of power and control in order to carry out their duties to 
uphold the law. The thesis has shown that both these features also exist within 
the relationship between an Informer and Handler. 
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Sadly, the results show that in this relationship there is in fact an abuse of power 
and control as afforded to the Handler. For example, the police Handler has the 
power to deal with crime and criminals brought to his attention through the 
Informer, but rather than take action, he will use his discretion far too often. 
Similarly, he will be selective with the information he obtains, depending on the 
circumstances. For example, he may disregard information which relates to petty 
crime, or not relevant to his particular enquiries. Also, friends and relatives, as 
well as other Informers, are likely to escape action by the Informer or Handler. 
More importantly, though, the thesis has shown a substantial abuse of authority 
when the police officer allows his Informer to commit crime, or even sets up 
crime in order to arrest a target criminal: often, such crimes are far from petty 
and may include burglary, drugs, robbery and firearms offences. In effect, such 
abuse of authority has meant an increase in crimina1ity; totally contrary to the 
objectives of law enforcement officers. 
As a professional police officer, bound by rules and regulations, it will be of 
concern to police managers that a substantial number of respondents admitted 
breaching the police discipline codes, and often were prepared to help their 
Informers in such a way that was ethically and morally wrong. For example, 
there were a number of cases where the police officer warned their Informers of 
drugs raids, cancelled parking tickets and even arranged police cautions after 
arrest. These are clear indications that the relationship between an Informer and 
Handler has a direct effect on the abuse of power and control. 
It would be reasonable to ask why a police officer should act in this way, 
allowing his relationship with the Informer to bring about such abuse. Could it 
be simply explained by the fact that the officer is corrupt? Perhaps there is a 
lack of supervision and management: or merely that insufficient training has been 
afforded to the Handlers? Whatever the reason, this thesis has identified a real 
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link between the standard professional relationship and the InformerlHandler 
relationship - one of power and control. The difference seems to be that the 
latter group are content to abuse these features to such an extent that if not 
addressed, the use of Informers within the police service will become corrupt. 
The thesis has identified that for some at least, the InformerlHandler relationship 
takes priority over everything else - including law enforcement. 
The thesis does not conclude, and therefore can not suggest that the partnership 
between an Informer and a Handler is corrupt; that is to say, that both partners 
have conspired together to attack the integrity of the police service. Sadly 
though, the data cannot suggest the contrary - that corruption does not in fact 
exist. The thesis has shown though, that the relationship between an Informer 
and Handler may provide the potential for corruption by its very existence. A 
police officer acting alone may not have the inclination or oppottunity to abuse 
his authority, but when he associates with an Informer, it is possible that he 
could be persuaded, through the partnership, to do so. It seems, then that it is 
the relationship itself, unlike any other, which may be the cause of the problem. 
Although of course, the potential threat of the relationship will depend largely on 
the strength and integrity of its partners. 
Although there is no law of entrapment in England, there has been a number of 
interesting cases in America and some of them have been discussed in Chapter 
Two. These are closely related to the circumstances of agent provocateur and 
are an important matter for this study. Such circumstances will impact on the 
relationship between the two groups, and the study examines the level at which 
this is practised. Although the study does not cover all the issues discussed, this 
chapter has provided a basic foundation of the legal issues. There has recently 
been a number of well publicised cases criticising the use of Informers and 
highlighting the dangers in terms of miscarriages of justice, and of allegations of 
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perverting the course of justice. There is no doubt that public opinion will now 
have an effect on police working practices, and clearly the legal aspects must 
impact on the policelInformer relationship. 
Chapter Seven contains the analysis for the main body ofthe research, related to 
the Aims as outlined in Chapter four. It has been said on a number of occasions 
that the relationship between the Informer and Handler is central to this study. 
The apparent conclusion is that it is not always a close relationship, as shown 
when, for example the two groups were asked to define an Informer: they 
responded with very different views on the other. The study has been aimed at 
arriving at an acceptable profile covering the Informer and the Handler. A 
number of key factors have been used including the previous criminal 
background of the Informers, if it exists, and their antecedant background 
including employment. In particular, a comparison has been made of the 
Informer's category of work in relation to the Registrar General's Classification 
of Occupations, 1970 (Appendix 1) to determine whether this has any impact on 
their relationship with the Handler. 
The research has identified a number of factors which make up the relationship 
between an Informer and Handler but one of the most interesting aspects is that 
the relationship changes in one crucial way. The Informer usually begins his 
career because he has committed crime or associated with criminals. He is 
therefore a 'customer' or 'client' of the police; someone who is involved in the 
criminal justice system. However, at some stage, he provides information usually 
on a regular basis, for which he is rewarded. He has in fact become a service 
provider. To put this into perspective - compare this relationship with, for 
example the solicitor and his client. A man who needs advice on legal issues will 
seek help from a solicitor and is therefore a client. That client may however also 
clean the solicitor's windows of his office, for which he is paid a wage. That 
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man also provides a service to the solicitor. Using this analogy, it could be 
argued that the InformerlHandler relationship is no more unique than many 
others. After all, the Informer is providing a service in the form of information, 
in exchange for some reward. Perhaps if the mystery disappears, and the 
Informer is looked upon merely as a service provider, then management issues 
may become less complex. 
The relationship between the Informer and the Handler formed an integral part 
of this research and was a common thread throughout. That is not to say that 
the relationship can be described as close, on the contrary, it seemed to be a 
necessary partnership, with little in common between the two groups. They fail 
to agree about a number of key areas, in particular the importance offiiendship 
between each other. Confidentiality, on the other hand was regarded as 
important by both groups; one of the few areas of agreement There were, 
however, so many areas of conflict it is difficult to imagine how the partnership 
survives. There is clearly a differing opinion in terms of their objectives, and 
perhaps this is not so surprising when the two groups are so far apart. The 
police officer, on one hand, a law enforcement officer whose role includes the 
investigation and detection of crime, and the Informer, on the other, generally 
originates from a criminal background, but not always, and becomes involved 
usually to gain some personal benefit. Despite all this, the partnership seems to 
work well, at least in the short term, probably because each uses the other for 
their own purposes, in fact they rely to a large extent on the other partner. 
The motivations were examined in depth, including looking at how the Informers 
motives changed over time. The study has also compared the Informer with a 
Contact and a Public Spirited Citizen, although the study has merely sought the 
views and perceptions of the respondents, in trying to determine the differences 
between each of the types. Again this study failed to provide conclusive results, 
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but the results do show a number of factors which can differentiate between an 
Informer and other sources of information. 
A crucial result was to show how Informers and police officers had, to varying 
degrees, breached the law as a result of the partnership, and contravened the 
police discipline regulations. The study looked at the level of such breaches. 
The breaching of the criminal law and the police discipline code have provided 
the most interesting results arising from the relationship. It can be concluded that 
a significant proportion of the respondents have themselves been involved in 
crime, or set up crimes, or at least crimes have gone on with their knowledge 
and without interference from them. The implications of these findings will 
certainly be of concern to the police service, and particularly the Association of 
Chief Police Officers who believed that the circulation of new guidelines in 1995 
would have removed this behaviour. This research has shown that such incidents 
exist, and it may be that the relationship between the Informer and Handler has 
itself been the cause of this. 
It should be stressed that this study has not examined the ethical situation 
involved, but merely the fact that such breaches occur. Such ethical questions 
could be considered in a future research study, to look at the ethics ofInformer 
handling separately. Selectivity of information and the police use of discretion 
have been examined, both of which are closely allied to the existence of 
criminality resulting from the partnership. The study has shown that both groups 
have used their discretion about the law, more so by the Informers, particularly 
so with petty or minor crime. There is also evidence that some Informers are 
granted a measure of immunity by the Handler, in fact it would appear that the 
Handler's are more likely to grant immunity than the Informer thinks. 
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Other important findings from this study include:-
• Evidence of setting up crimes 
Both Informers and Handlers are prepared to engineer criminal acts in order to 
arrest an identified target. Those police officers who engage in these tactics are 
themselves committing criminal offences, and can only be described as corrupt. 
• Being involved in the commission of crimes 
The study shows that as well a setting up crimes, a number of Informers also 
agreed to involve themselves in the actual commission of those crimes, and their 
Handlers were aware of the Informer's involvement. 
• Evidence of Handlers aUowing Informers to commit crime 
It is hardly surprising that Informers with criminal convictions have a propensity 
towards crime, but the study shows that the Handlers allowed their Informers to 
commit crime and did nothing. Such incidents are clearly in breach of the ACPO 
Guidelines on the use and management of Informers. 
• The granting of immunity by some Handlers 
Police Officers have no authority whatsoever to grant a criminal immunity from 
the Criminal Justice system, and Informer Handler's are no exception. The study 
shows, however, that such decisions are made by Handlers without any reference 
to their supervisory officers or the Crown Prosecution Service. 
• Breaches of the Police Discipline Regulations 
The study found many instances where Handlers had disregarded the rules 
surrounding police discipline which, had they been investigated, may well have 
resulted in the officer being severely punished, or in some cases subjected to 
criminal proceedings. 
• Evidence of Handlers prepared to sort out Informer's problems without 
authority 
The study shows that on a number of occasions, where the Informer has 
requested help with various problems such as outstanding fines, the Handler has 
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been prepared to assist in an unofficial capacity rather than report the facts to an 
appropriate agency. Again, the police officer is making unauthorised decisions 
in the furtherance of his relationship with the Informer. 
It is the area of criminality which has given the most concern during the study. 
The high proportion of respondents who were prepared to become involved in 
criminal acts in the furtherance of their relationship must be acknowledged as a 
matter of urgency requiring action to ensure that it does not continue. One of 
the Aims of the study was to make recommendations in relation to its findings, 
and this will be done later in this Chapter. 
The situation relating to Participating Informers has been touched on in the 
research, and referred to a number of times by the respondents. This aspect has 
caused some confusion, mainly because of the lack of knowledge by the 
Informers, and to a certain extent by the Handlers as well. The results therefore 
must be treated with some caution - incidentally, this area is the subject of 
research presently being undertaken by the police service. Nevertheless, there 
was a significant number who had participated, but a substantial amount of 
doubt was expressed by the Informers in relation to such activity being 
authorised. It is clear, though, that a number of incidents did involve the 
commission of crime, and not all were declared. This was another area where 
both groups were in agreement. 
The ACPO Guidelines on the use of Informers used by the police service are 
clear that no Informer should be used as agent provocateur, or to set up a crime. 
Indeed, this issue together with misprision and entrapment, referred to in 
Chapter Two, shows how the criminal justice system is concerned about the 
existence of such activity. Clearly this is a fundamental issue in the debate on 
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Informers, yet the study has revealed that a large proportion of both groups have 
been involved in setting up crimes. 
The type of crime which had been set up was found to be far from petty or 
minor; and included burglary, drugs, firearms related offences and even robbery. 
This was a sensitive area, and it was not surprising that a substantial number of 
both groups refused to answer, and so it may be assumed that the numbers who 
have been involved could well be greater than shown here. Most of those 
respondents who had been involved were quite content to give examples which 
may suggest that either they do not consider what they have done is wrong or, 
because of their special relationship with each other, believe they are allowed to 
take such action. 
In relation to breaches of the police discipline regulations, the Informers were 
unable to give specific responses and it has been assumed that because they are 
not subject to the regulations, their knowledge of these would be limited. To 
some extent, this is not surprising, but it does again confirm that the relationship 
between Informer and police officer is not a close one, and more importantly, 
may suggest that if Informers are not directly affected, they will not involve 
themselves. A large proportion of the Handlers agreed that they had breached 
the rules, giving numerous examples, all of which breach the ACPO Guidelines; 
some having far more serious implications. A number of Handlers went on to 
list occasions when they had to sort out various problems for their Informers, 
and again gave examples which were quite varied - including those where the 
criminal law again had been breached. 
The analysis suggests that when these incidents occurred it was to maintain the 
relationship which was most important to them. It shows again how remarkable 
this partnership is which takes priority over everything else. It is the relationship 
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itself, this unique and intangible union between the two groups, which somehow 
takes precedence over all other matters, even the criminal law. This is why it is a 
dangerous relationship and one which has always needed careful control, but in 
the light of this study, may require a total overhaul of working practices if 
allowed to continue. There can be no doubts that, armed with the analysis as 
described here, the situation must be given serious consideration. 
Theoretical im plications 
Having considered the issues raised in Chapter Five in relation to the theoretical 
decisions, it is important to see if those decisions are present in the empirical 
study which appears in Chapter Seven (Results) and Chapter Six (Case Study in 
Lincolnshire). 
It was assumed before the theoretical examination had been carried out that the 
relationship between an Infonner and Handler was unique and different from any 
other. However, a comparison of other professional relationships, police and 
otherwise has shown some commonality, and it could now be assumed that the 
Handler/lnfonner relationship is similar, at least in some respects to other 
professional partnerships. In fact, the Informer and Handler, as Skolnick3 
suggests, probably exists merely for one partner to gain something from the 
other; and that may be the main objective in most professional relationships. 
Indeed, if there was no 'benefit' to each of the partners, it is unlikely that the 
relationship would continue. 
3Skolnick J H Justice wjthmlt trial - Law enforcement in democratic societ}!, 
John Wiley & Sons Inc, USA (1966) 
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The study has produced some support for Skolnick's theory, in so··far as the 
majority of Informers said they gained some personal benefit from informing. 
That was not the case with the Handlers, though. Their motives seemed to be 
organisational, seeking intelligence in order to arrest offenders. There was no 
evidence of personal gain. That said, the conclusions drawn from the Case 
Study in Lincolnshire (Chapter Six) may be relevant. Again, the findings did not 
show that the Handlers gained any personal benefit, or even career advancement. 
On the contrary, those police officers in the study who decided not to become 
involved in the use of Informers, were clear that there was little advantage for 
them to do so. Nevertheless, this study suggests that a Handler's involvement in 
the use of Informers may be merely subjective; that is to say, he/she might just 
have a propensity towards this type of work, and it is this that is persuading him 
to continue. If this is the case, presumably the Handlers enjoy what they are 
doing, or they would find another investigative skill, and perhaps this enjoyment 
could be regarded as a 'benefit' in itself 
The main study has shown how the relationship has created an abuse of 
authority, to the extent that police officers as well as Informers are prepared to 
bend the rules, breach laid down procedures, and even break the law in order to 
maintain the InformerlHandler relationship. Perhaps Reiner 4 was anticipating 
this situation when he suggested that "power is legitimised into authority". He 
was referring to the police as an authority and as such were considered 
legitimate, but he suggested that did not mean their rules should always be 
agreed with. It would seem that a good proportion of police Handlers in the 
study also appeared to disagree with the rules to such an extent that they were 
prepared to disregard them. 
4Reiner R The politics ofthe police, Wbeatsheaf, London (1985) 
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This InfonnerlHandler partnership is capable of such abuse of authority perhaps 
because the police officer is a professional. Professionalism is examined by 
Freidson who suggested that a professional is creative and self regulating, and 
even considers himself to be better than the rest of society. This arrogance 
could well contribute to the reason why a Handler may be prepared to abuse his 
authority so easily. For example, the study shows that police Handlers are 
prepared to break the law, in fact commit criminal acts, in order to sustain the 
InfonnerlHandler relationship. That officer could face criminal proceedings 
himself if caught, and yet he continues despite the implications. This surely is 
evidence of the officer's arrogance and total disregard for the criminal justice 
system. 
This abuse of authority, according to some theorists, may be connected to the 
presence of bureaucracy. Freidson 5 identifies the problem when a professional 
is handicapped by a client who is not subject to the same bureaucratic authority, 
and this is certainly the case between a Handler and his Infonner. The findings 
of this study have shown a number of cases where the bureaucratic rules of the 
police service have been breached by the InfonnerlHandler relationship. In 
particular, the study shows that a large proportion of police Handlers breached 
the Police Discipline Regulations, especiaIly in relation to the laid-down rules for 
handling Informers. In contrast, though, Weber 6 feels that the professional, 
acting as a bureaucrat, will ultimately work within the rules to the disadvantage 
of people's feelings. IronicaIly, this has also been supported in the study, as a 
substantial number of Handlers were prepared to work within the rules with little 
regard for their Informers. 
5Freidson E Professional dominance' the social structure ofmedical care, 
Atherton Press, New York (1970) 
6Runciman W G (Ed) Weber - selections in translation, University Press, 
Cambridge (1978) 
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The study has highlighted an important factor which seems unique to the 
InformerlHandler relationship and yet has been identified by those theorists who 
have examined the concept of professionalism and bureaucracy; that is the 
notion of 'friendship'. The study has shown that Informers consider their 
friendship with the Handler to be a very important part of their relationship. The 
Handlers, on the other hand, gave little importance to this feature. In fact there 
was real disparity here, in that this was the only characteristic of the relationship 
which the two groups disagreed on significantly. 
That is not to say that a degree of friendship does not exist between the partners 
of other relationships, but it certainly does not appear to feature as an important 
issue for them (See Assumed Model - Chapter Five). Again, this finding tends to 
support Weber's 7 theory in relation to bureaucracy when he suggests that the 
professional will disregard human feelings, and will therefore not allow himself 
to become involved as a 'friend'. Russell et aI 8 have similar thoughts on this 
issue although they discuss professionalism specifically. Russell concedes that 
police officers have the same human feelings and emotions as those he is dealing 
with, but as a professional, he is able to anticipate those feelings and deal with 
them objectively allowing him to focus on the problems at hand. Again, the 
study may support this theory, perhaps evidenced by those Handlers who would 
meet their Informers in a social environment, for example a public house, giving 
the impression they are friends, but in reality only concerned with obtaining 
information. 
The common thread running throughout Chapter Five is the reference to 'power 
and control' Here again, Weber has studied the distribution of power and 
70p Cit: Gerth H H & Wright Mills(1970) 
8Russe1\ H. E., & Beigel A., Understanding Human Behavior for Effective 
Police Work, Basic Books Inc, USA, (1982) p26 
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concludes that such distribution is reflected through status groups and classes. 
The study has provided no evidence to suggest that the InformerlHandler 
partnership is considered a status group. However, Elliott' s theory of elitism 
may be more relevant. He suggests that where the professional holds a strong 
position over his client, he may well ignore that client's representations. This is 
perhaps another example of the professional disregarding the client's feelings, a 
factor which has emerged during the study of the relationship between the 
Informer and Handler. For example, the study has shown that an Informer's 
motives are likely to change over time, and yet this fact does not seem to be 
important to the Handler who is content to assume the initial reason for 
informing continues throughout the Informer's career. 
Accountability is considered by Skolnick as an important feature of a 
professional relationship. He suggests that professionalism often conflicts with 
accountability, in that the professional is striving for improved management but 
restrained by rules and regulations. Holdaway 9 suggests that more and more 
groups are questioning the accountability of professionals. Despite this, there is 
clearly a lack of accountability in relation to the use ofInformers. The study has 
shown that the rules are often broken and the Handlers seem to disregard their 
obligation to uphold the law when it comes to using Informers; in effect, 
disregarding the need for strict levels of accountability. This study has identified 
the need to adopt far more methods of accountability within the police service, 
and this is reflected in the recommendations within this Chapter. 
KinIaw 10 has examined the existence of empowerment within a professional 
relationship, and suggests that managers are against empowering those under 
~oldaway S Inside the British police - a force at work, Basil Blackwell 
Publisher Ltd., Oxford (1983) 
IOJGnlaw D C The practice ofEmpowerroent" Making the most of human 
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their supervision because it could reduce their own effectiveness. He also makes 
the point that managers are often not technically experienced and are therefore 
not sufficiently qualified to empower their subordinates. The study has provided 
some evidence of empowerment, in that Handlers have made decisions which 
would normally have been made by the Controllers; that is to say, their 
supervisors. For example, Handlers have sorted out problems for their Informers 
without the Controllers authority, such as cancelling parking tickets, arranging 
bail after arrest and even paying overdue rent. The difference here, though, is 
that the Controllers were probably not aware that such decisions were being 
made, and therefore not able to empower the Handler. In fact, the Controller 
would probably not sanction such action if he did know. Nevertheless, the 
Handler has decided to empower himself without seeking the necessary 
authority. Also, Kin1aw's submission that 'grass-roots' workers know more than 
their supervisors could be apparent between the Handler and his Controller, as 
the study has highlighted that Controllers have often not had the necessary 
training and have probably not experienced handling Informers themselves. This 
situation was highlighted by one Handler who said, "A lot of the Controllers 
have never had a snoul so they don 'I want to know. The job discourages you 
because they don't understand". 
The police use of discretion became apparent during the study, a factor 
discussed by Skolnick in particular. Skolnick suggests that one way to show the 
level of power and control by the police is to note their discretionary powers, 
especially if that discretion is unauthorised. Other theorists support the police 
use of discretion, describing it as a pragmatic approach to modem day policing. 
Nevertheless, they would not agree with unauthorised use of discretion; that is 
to say the use of discretion by a police officer which is not properly delegated. 
competence, Aldershot: Gower Publishing, (1995) 
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It is a fact that police officers are often called upon to use their discretion, for 
example in a public order situation where it would be more prudent not to arrest 
the offender at the time in order to quell the crowd. Indeed, it is recognised that 
the police use of discretion is an acceptable form of dealing with a situation. 
This study has shown, though, that the majority of police officers involved in the 
handling of Informers are willing to use their discretion when not authorised to 
do so. Additionally, very few of the Informers were not prepared to use their 
discretion during the relationship. Such discretion by the Handler or Informer 
was usually in relation to taking no action against minor crimes, or even 
committing crime or breaching the rules in order to achieve their obj ective, 
whatever that may be. Such use of discretion can never be regarded as 
authorised. 
The findings in relation to the police use of discretion support the theorists view 
that power and control is a common ingredient in a professional relationship. 
More importantly, though, this study has shown that the InformerlHandler 
partnership is prepared to use their own power by taking unauthorised action, in 
effect taking control over the organisation to which they are serving. This 
situation must be regarded as different to any other professional relationship. 
The comparison between the theoretical issues identified in Chapter Five and the 
empirical findings from Chapter Seven have indeed found some clear integration 
and commonaIity. This conclusion can be best shown by referring again to 
Weber's 11 definition of social behaviour, where it was seen in Chapter Five that 
he distinguishes between three main practical applications; they are, a rational 
goal-oriented conduct, a rational value-oriented conduct, and an affectual 
llFreund J The Sociology ofMax Weber AlIen Lane The Penguin Press London 
(1968) 
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conduct. This theory can be compared with the motives of the Informer and 
Handler, as identified in the study. 
Firstly, the 'goal-oriented' conduct is where the objective is to obtain some 
benefit. We have already discussed that both the Informer and the Handler 
achieve some benefit from the relationship, and certainly in the case of the 
Informer, his motives are often financially led. Perhaps the benefit to the Handler 
is less obvious, but it may merely be the enjoyment they experience in such a 
relationship. 
Weber refers to 'value-oriented' behaviour in terms of doing the right thing, 
having high moral standards or strength of conviction. The study has 
undoubtedly identified such characteristics with the 'public spirited citizen' who 
gives information because, for example, of his dislike for a particular type of 
crime. It is far more difficult, though to find this type of behaviour in an 
InformerlHandler relationship. However, the study shows that at least some of 
the Informers started informing for altruistic reasons, such as a dislike of drug 
trafficking. In relation to the Handlers, most saw the Informer as someone to 
pass information about crimes and criminals, which could in itself be seen as 
being involved in a relationship which is 'doing the right thing'. 
Weber's third type of behaviour, the 'affectual conduct', is where there is some 
emotional motivation, or where a person's passion is evident. Translated in 
terms of the InformerlHandler relationship, such conduct is clearly apparent 
where the Informer gives information for 'revenge', or to secure a 'reduced 
sentance', or to take out the competition. The study has also identified such 
conduct by the handler. For example, he has been so fiustrated by rules and 
regulations; in effect bureaucracy, that he is prepared to breach those rules in 
order to achieve the objective, whatever that may be. 
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It can indeed be argued, then, that the InformerlHandler relationship is not 
dissimilar from other professional relationships. There is of course a mystique 
which exists around the police use ofInformers, and the lack of research and the 
unwillingness by many senior officers to examine the relationship in the past, has 
undoubtedly fuelled that mystique. And so, perhaps the assumed model, as 
suggested in Chapter Five, presupposes that the InformerlHandler partnership is 
unique, when in fact it is not. When all said and done, Informers and Police 
Officers are human beings, and as such will interact together in a similar way. 
It is a unique partnership in terms of it being a collaboration between those who 
commit crimes and those who investigate crimes, but their behaviour towards 
each other and the organisation they represent is clearly not that unique. Despite 
all this, the study has shown that there exists an abuse of authority, a disregard 
for the criminal justice system, and a flagrant misuse of laid-down rules and 
regulations. There can be few other professional relationships which generate 
such abuse, and it is this aspect which has to be addressed. With this in mind, a 
number of recommendations can be made from this study. 
Theoretical overview 
It is apparent from an examination of the theoretical implications that the work 
of a wide range of theorists has been considered in this study. This was 
necessary because the theorists have individually concentrated on a large and 
diverse number of factors, all of which appear to be relevant to the relationship 
between an Informer and Handler. Each of the theories referred to in this study 
are equally important, and therefore could not be compressed into one 
over-arching theory which could totally reflect the HandlerlInformer 
relationship. 
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Having said that it has not been possible to chose one specific theory above all 
others, it is nevertheless important to mention again the relevance of Weber's 
theory in relation to social behaviour. Weber distinguishes between behaviour in 
general and social behaviour, the latter term being reserved, "- for activities 
whose intent is related by the individuals involved to the conduct of others and 
is oriented accordingly. ,,12 In effect, social behaviour is where the actions of 
one has a meaningful bearing on the conduct of others, but Weber points out 
that it is not necessary for the person who is perpetrating the action to be aware 
of it. 
Weber defines social behaviour in order to interpret the concept as accurately 
and rationally as possible. He does this by distinguishing the types of conduct 
which make up social behaviour; descnbed as the 'ideal type' and these have 
been discussed in Chapter Five. What is so interesting about this is that the 
conduct which takes place between the Informer and Handler can be easily fitted 
into one of Weber's 'ideal type'. 
Although many of the other theories, for example bureaucracy, discretion, 
professionalism and accountability, are all important factors which exist within 
the InformerlHandler relationship, it is Weber's theory that is arguably the most 
cogent. Chapter Five sets out the aims of the theoretical examination which 
were to identify some of the theories relating to professional relationships, and 
to determine whether they also existed in the InformerlHandler relationship. It 
was from these theories, and in particular that of Weber, which enabled this 
study to conclude that the InformerlHandler relationship was in fact not as 
unique as initially assumed. On the contrary, the social behaviour which was 
apparent between an Informer and his Handler appeared not dissimilar to many 
12lbid (p 102) 
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other types of professional relationship. The study also concluded that perhaps 
it was only the mystique and secrecy which surrounded the use of Informers 
which made it different from other examples of social behaviour. 
Recommendations 
Aim six (Chapter Four) seeks to make recommendations for the future, relevant 
to the relationship between the Informer and the Handler. Any such 
recommendations will be based on the summary and conclusions drawn mainly 
from the analysis in chapter seven. First though, it must be decided to whom the 
recommendations should be made. Clearly the police service will need to be 
made aware of the findings. Does this mean every police force in England, or 
only those forces which participated in the study? There have been numerous 
references in this thesis to the Association of Chief Police Officers, and their 
Guidelines on the use and management ofInformers, circulated in 1995. The 
findings have identified breaches of these Guidelines, and with this in mind, it has 
been considered right and proper to address the recommendations to this body, 
ACPO and specifically the Crime Committee, one of a number of separate 
groups working under the auspices of ACPO. It may be the case that ACPO 
will consider the Guidelines to be insufficient, and examine the possibility of 
replacing them with something else - perhaps legislation. For example, the Crime 
and Disorder Act, 1998 provides a legal responsibility for the police and local 
authorities to work in partnership and provide a strategy to reduce crime. 
Perhaps there is an argument for similar legislation here also. The 
recommendations will be based in order of the aims as set out in Chapter Four. 
Information identifYing a typical profile of an Informer would be an advantage 
for police supervisors, particularly those involved in recruitment of Informers, 
and police trainers. With this in mind, an acceptance should be made of the 
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sociological profile which exists categorising Informers as Beginners, Providers, 
Estranged and Professional. 
Consideration should be given to registering not only those sources of 
information commonly known as Informers, but also other sources such as 
Contacts and Public Spirited Citizens. This would bring an element of uniformity 
to the process, and provide a wider spectrum of intelligence to the police 
service. 
The police service should recognise that not all police officers are suited to or 
interested in the use of Informers, and in order to identifY those who may have 
potential, some consideration should be given to profiling police Handlers. It 
would also be useful to identifY their role. 
The results of a study in Lincolnshire (Chapter Six) suggests that not every 
police officer, whether a detective or not, wants to become involved in handling 
Informers. It has to be recognised by the police service that this situation exists, 
and encourage those who do wish to become involved. This study has also 
identified that some police officers become involved with Informers because of 
the 'excitement' rather than having a more professional motives, such as the 
detection of crime. This shows again that the motives of Handlers need to be 
known to ensure that they can be managed. 
Accepting that the relationship between the Informer and the Handler may be the 
underlying cause of some of the problems which exist, then some consideration 
should be given to the police service learning more about its implications. It is 
suggested that some infrastructures of this relationship form part of a training 
package to police officers. 
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The police service should place more importance on the motivational factors of 
Informers, and in particular, the possibility of motivational change should be 
recognised and used to its optimum, when supervising and controlling Handlers. 
There was an acceptance by a number of respondents that they did meet socially 
with their partner. More research is required in this area, and in particular there 
is no data which confirms whether or not the Handlers document their meetings 
in this respect. Nevertheless, the implications of such meetings are apparent, and 
more control and supervision is required to dissuade this practice. 
There is evidence that Handlers and Informers are selective in their approach to 
the information they have, the categories of crime, and even the individuals 
subject of the information. This is also the case with the amount of discretion 
used. More stringent rules should be implemented to combat this, with clear 
direction given to police officers in terms of minimum standards. 
A proportion of Informers and Handlers commit criminal offences, are party to 
the commission of such offences, or having knowledge of these offences, take no 
action against them. There can be no justification for this, and the police service 
must recognise its existence as a matter of urgency and take remedial action. 
There is evidence that Informers do act as Agent Provocateur, inciting a criminal 
to commit crime, and practice what is called in America, entrapment. In order to 
ensure that such practices are alleviated, it may be worth considering looking at 
the American courts as described in Chapter two in terms of the subjective test, 
that is focusing on the defendants state of mind. This test known as the Origin 
of Intent allows a defence of entrapment if the offence was found to have been 
created by the police. 
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The research has also concluded that breaches of the police discipline code are 
prevalent, and clearly there exists a real disregard for the ACPO Guidelines on 
the Use and Management of Informers. This situation must be accepted as a 
reality, and remedial action taken as a matter of urgency. 
Future research 
This study has identified a number of issues which require more in-depth 
examination in terms of working practices and policy for law enforcement 
agencies. 
Juvenile Informers, for example is an area which so far has seen little research in 
this country and even less abroad. The police service, though will be obliged to 
consider this issue, particularly with regards to agreeing the correct level of risk 
assessment. The implications of the Health and Safety Act, 1998 may well 
impact on the use of juvenile Informers especially in relation to proper 
assessment; in this day and age of litigation, the police service will have to 
acknowledge their responsibilities in terms of providing a 'duty of care' to 
juvenile Informers. Additionally, more responsibility is being directed towards 
the police service under the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998 especially relating to 
youth offending, and this could well urge the police service to increase their use 
of juvenile Informers in order to reduce youth crime. 
Perhaps the most important piece of legislation to impact on the use of 
Informers in recent times is the Human Rights Act 1998 which became effective 
in October 2000. This Act aims to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms 
of everyone. The most relevant sections are Article 6, which gives the right to a 
fair trial and Article 8, which grants the right to privacy. Both these areas are 
relevant to the use of Informers, and it is feared by some practitioners that the 
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use of Informers will directly conflict with the Human Rights Act. It will be 
important for research to be undertaken in the future to determine how this Act 
has impacted on the use of Informers. 
In addition, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 was implemented 
as a result of concerns arising from the Human Rights Act to improve the 
controls and culture of covert policing. In particular, this act concentrates on 
Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CmS) a term now used to describe 
Informers. Interestingly, though, this Act does not cover the use of Participating 
Informers mainly because the Government did not wish to be seen as condoning 
criminality by including their use in legislation.13 At the time of writing this 
thesis, Law Enforcement Agencies in this country were unsure how they were 
going to manage this important omission. It is imperative that this issue is 
revisited, to determine whether Participating Informers continue to be used, and 
if so, whether they exist as a legitimate investigative tool within the criminal 
justice system. 
The concept of witness protection is quickly becoming an issue for the police 
and is closely connected to the management ofInformers. Cost, ethics and legal 
implications are beginning to impact on police management regarding the 
protection of witnesses, and will require serious consideration. Some police 
forces have recognised the need to look at this area and have set up their own 
witness protection departments, but to date, no research has been carried out. 
The fact that the police are prepared to re-house, relocate and sometimes even 
change the identity of a witness who is often a registered Informer, paid out of 
public funds, demands an evaluation of present working practices. This will 
13Neyroud P et aI Regulating informers' the Regulation of Investigatory Powers 
Act, covert policing and human rights in Informers: Policing, Policy, Practice, 
Billingsley R, Nemitz T, Bean P (Eds) Willan Publishing Devon (2000) 
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identify 'best practice', as welJ as ensuring the integrity of the individuals 
involved is maintained. 
Other such issues arising from the use of Infonners which have been identified 
from this study, and coincidentally are also recognised by ACPO and the 
National Infonner Conference, include the use of Infonnation Technology, 
Training, the fonnation of Dedicated Handler Units, and the registration of 
Infonners. The use of Crimestoppers as an alternative method of source handling 
is also worth examining; especially in relation to the payment of rewards, 
registration and disclosure, as well as the duplication of records. All these 
aspects are policy questions which will effect the practical use ofInfonners. 
This study has produced a profile of an Infonner which may be used by law 
enforcement agencies to understand what type of person they are dealing with. 
It has however been recognised that this work is somewhat shallow and requires 
more research. For example, there has been little differentiation between the 
female and male Infonner. It would have been interesting to look more closely 
at why there are so few female drug offenders who turn to informing. The 
motives of female Infonners may also be different to those of their male 
counterparts, and this could also be of interest to the police service if they are to 
manage all Infonners properly. Nemitz 14 has identified a lack of research 
regarding gender issues but has nevertheless, using the data from this study and 
additional interviews, further examined the female Infonner and Handler, as well 
as witness protection matters relating to women. There are a number of 
questions which remain unanswered; these can only be resolved through 
additional research. 
14Nemitz T Gender Issues in Informer Handling in Infonners: Policing, Policy, 
Practice, Billingsley R, Nemitz T, Bean P (Eds) Willan Publishing Devon (2000) 
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This study has touched on the possibility of more than one member of the same 
family informing, and a number of interesting responses from the Informers have 
been recorded. This feature impacts heavily on the question of confidentiality, as 
well as the ethical issues and further work is required. If there is evidence of 
multi Informer families, then this must be recognised by the law enforcement 
agencies and managed appropriately. 
This study has found that Informers and Handlers meet 'socially', that is to say 
outside of their normal business. The Informers suggest that there is a strong 
element of 'friendship' between themselves and their Handlers although this has 
been disputed by the Handlers. Nevertheless the extent to these so called social 
meetings should be examined further. The police service do not support such 
practice, their fear being that the partnership would be far too close and could 
lead to corrupt practices. Perhaps this is already happening, and although this 
study has no evidence to support such accusations, neither can it refute them. 
Any meetings by the Informers and Handlers in a social context must impact 
heavily on their relationship, and as such is far too important to disregard. 
The research has concentrated on the relationship between a police officer and 
Informer, and all of the Handlers in this work were serving officers. It must be 
acknowledged, though that Informers are used by a number of other agencies 
including Her Majesty's Customs & Excise, the Security Services (MI5 and MI6) 
Post Office Investigations and others perhaps less common such as the Royal 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA). It would be useful, 
then to carry out some research comparing the use of Informers between the 
various agencies. When this has been done, it may then be feasible to consider 
distributing present Guidelines to all the relevant agencies, not just the police, 
creating standardisation throughout the country. 
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The ACPO working group on Informers is presently researching the definition of 
an Informer in order that all references to them can be standardised. Indeed, this 
study has shown disparity in the interpretation of an Informer and an Informant. 
Other names such as 'source' and 'agent' are also widely used. Other areas of 
research by the group include Participating Informers, and already a substantial 
amount of work has been done nationally. Unfortunately, the police service 
continue to view research into Informers as too sensitive, and will not allow 
researchers to collect data who are not employed by the police. Such fears are 
hardly surprising, but this attitude is to say the least blinkered, and there is 
strong opposition to this, arguing that research requires academic resilience. It 
is important that this debate is continued robustly, otherwise the subject of 
Informers will not have the opportunity to be examined independently. 
Relating to the methodology used for this study, for the first time ever, data was 
collected from a substantial number Informers by way of personal interviews. 
This has proven to be invaluable and despite its many problems, must be 
recommended for the future. 
There is a need to consider which direction law enforcement agencies should 
take in the future. This study has concentrated on the sociological issues 
surrounding the relationship between the Informer and the handler. There is 
clearly a need now to research the ethical dilemmas which confront them. The 
findings will inevitably impact on the practical use of Informers, but it is timely 
that the philosophy of Informers is examined to determine whether it is ethically 
and morally right to continue to use Informers as a legitimate part of the British 
Criminal Justice System. The use of the data and findings from this present study 
will allow subsequent research to impose a theoretical input. 
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It is also important to say where future theoretical development should be in 
terms of Informers. It is of course apparent that there are so many gaps in 
existing research, and there are therefore many areas which could be usefully 
examined. That said, it is the area of social behaviour which may benefit the 
most from future research. It has already been noted in this Chapter that 
Weber's definition of social behaviour is surprisingly relevant to the use of 
Informers. This needs to be developed as it is important to understand how the 
interaction between an Informer and Handler can affect the conduct arising from 
social behaviour. Weber identified that the parties of social behaviour would not 
necessarily be aware they had been subjected to the conduct of another. Few 
could argue that further research in this area would benefit the use and 
management of Informers. It is imperative that the Informer, the Handler, as 
well as the Controller and their managers are fully aware of the effects of 
conduct which exists as a result of the social behaviour between an Informer and 
his Handler. 
The Research Design (Chapter Four) has identified that this thesis will have a 
low theoretical input and high level of data collection, and that clearly has been 
the case. Nevertheless, the theoretical implications (Chapter Five) have become 
a major contributor to this thesis. This is because the features which are common 
in most professional relationships seem to exist also in other relationships 
including that between the Informer and the Handler. In particular, power and 
control have been highlighted as common features, but with the relationship 
between an Informer and a Handler, these features are abused. It is hardly 
surprising then that this research has concentrated on the relationship between an 
Informer and his Handler, and the consequences of that relationship. 
In reality, it is the secrecy and mystique shadowing the use of Informers which 
appears to encourage an abuse of authority. In order for such abuse not to be 
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allowed to continue, law enforcement agencies will need to consider far tighter 
controls, better management and supervision, and far more transparent working 
practices capable of independent audit and inspection. This will not be possible 
without more research being undertaken regarding the police use of Informers. 
As this study was carned out following the circulation of the ACPO Guidelines 
on the Use and Management of Informers, it is important to ensure that, once 
new Guidelines have been published, the issues raised in this study are revisited. 
In essence, research into the use of Informers must be allowed to continue. 
Despite the fact this study concludes that the InformerlHandler relationship is 
not so dissimilar from other professional relationships, the consequences of the 
relationship most certainly are. There can be no other partnership which a law 
enforcement officer enters into that creates an abuse of power and authority, 
often leading to crirnina1ity. This is far too serious an issue to neglect in any 
future research. 
A number of important issues have been examined in this study, surrounding the 
use of Informers by the police in England. At a time when the Association of 
Chief Police Officers are beginning to recognise that existing Guidelines are 
flawed, and that there is a need to review present working practices, this study is 
to say the least timely, but more importantly will be seen as a definitive work on 
a subject where research is largely absent. Law enforcement agencies including 
the police are already improving their systems and tightening up their control 
and supervision of Informers and Handlers. However, national agreement is 
necessary and until this is reached then the concerns and shortcomings identified 
in this study will not be fully resolved. 
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INFO~ERS-ENGLAND 
No. Force 
11 Avon &_ 
L2. 
~o 
)evon & 
O. >orset 
11. 
12. Essex 
13. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
17. 
_18. Kent 
25. 
;18. 
31. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
Notes: 
NorfolK 
lorth' 
:01 th 
Sul olK 
Surrey 
Sussex 
Tham- Valley 
West lercia 
West I 
West 
Total 
Establishment 
1087 
1178 
1241 
Wr 
1502 
1187 
Informants 
659 
600 
13' 
,.nn'-"'r. 
\,. (£) 
27,600 
1.30e 
~~ __ r-_~1~:~~~0 __ -r_.45~70'lg~g-; 
1389 681 10, 00 
2950 1405 15, 100 
1184 478 20,000 
7077 3000 99. 10 
3289 3500 46, lO 
1684 423 13, lO 
1034 1068 32 )00 
1136 620 40 nnn 
1229 6 
2 '6 
1446 
1190 
102J 
!053 
i977 
5295 
1181 
11A 4QA 
40 Q 
1900 
752 
1500 
591 
2 
1539 
186 
540 
'}'o77 
250 
1331 
2938 
1604 
550 
43,352 
o 
)8, Q 
25,000 
000 
10 
1_ 
OC 
501 
51,001 
17i ,,800 
46,000 
15,400 
2,147,400 
(1) Some Forces have now weeded their registrations. 
(2) Forces have varying levels of recording systems. 
(3) Figures as at 1.1.95. 
(4) Budget figures do not necessarily reflect total payments. 
(5) Only refers to payment from public funds. 
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INFQRMERS QUESTIONNAIRE 
PART ONE 
1. WHAT IS SUBJECTS CODE ....•.....•...•...••. 1 - 3 
2. WHAT IS YOUR PSEUDONYM ..•.•..•.••..••...•. 
3. WHAT IS YOUR DATE OF BIRTH •..•••...••.•••• 
4. WHAT IS PRESENT AGE 18-21 1 4 
22-28 2 
29-35 3 
36-42 4 
OVER 42 5 
5. WHAT IS YOUR SEX MALE 1 5 
FEMALE 2 
6. WHAT IS MARITAL STATUS MARRIED 1 6 
MARRIED/APART 2 
SEPARATED 3 
DIVORCED 4 
SINGLE 5 
WIDOW 6 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 7 
7. HOW MANY CHILDREN DO YOU SUPPORT NONE 0 7 
ONE 1 
TWO 2 
THREE 3 
FOUR + 4 
8 • WHAT TYPE OF ACCOMMODATION OWNER/OCCUPY 1 8 
DO YOU LIVE IN COUNCIL 2 
PRIVATE RENT 3 
BED-SIT 4 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 5 
9. WHAT IS YOUR PRESENT STATE FULL TIME 1 9 
OF EMPLOYMENT PART TIME 2 
CASUAL 3 
UNEMPLOYED 4 
STUDENT 5 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 6 
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10.STATE JOB 
11.DO YOU HAVE 
CONVICTIONS 
NOT APPLICABLE 0 
LABOURER 1 
MASSEUSE 2 
SHOP ASSISTANT 3 
BUILDER 4 
MECHANIC/DRIVER/TAXIDRIVER 5 
ANTIQUE DEALER 6 
PAINTER/DECORATOR 7 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 8 
PREVIOUS YES 1 
FOR CRIME NO 2 
REFUSED TO ANSWER 3 
12.TYPE OF OFFENCE, MAINLY NOT APPLICABLE 0 
FRAUD/DISHONESTY 1 
ASSAULT 2 
DRUGS 3 
SEXUAL 4 
TRAFFIC 5 
REFUSE TO ANSWER 6 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 7 
13.HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN 
AN INFORMER 
14.HAS ANY OTHER MEMBER OF 
YOUR FAMILY INFORMED TO 
THE POLICE 
LESS THAN 1 YR 1 
1-2 YRS 2 
3-5 YRS 3 
MORE THAN 6 YRS 4 
YES 1 
NO 2 
DONT KNOW 3 
REFUSE TO ANSWER 4 
1S.IN YOUR OWN WORDS, HOW WOULD YOU DEFINE AN 
INFORMER ................................................................... .. 
. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. . . .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. . . . .. .. .. . . .. . . .. .. .. .. .. .. . . .. .. . . . .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
16.IS YOUR INVOLVEMENT IN INFORMING 
RESTRICTED TO CERTAIN CATEGORIES 
OF CRIME 
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YES 1 
NO 2 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17.PLEASE SHOW MAIN CATEGORY NOT APPLICABLE 0 
DRUGS 1 
BURGLARY 2 
THEFT 3 
ROBBERY 4 
HANDLING 5 
REFUSED TO ANSWER 6 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 7 
18.EXPLAIN WHY YOU RESTRICT YOUR INFORMATION TO THIS 
CATEGORY OF CRIME ......................................................... .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
PART TWO 
19.IN YOUR OPINION, WHERE DOES A ON ARREST 1 
RELATIONSHIP WITH A HANDLER AFTER INTERVIEW 2 
FIRST START, NORMALLY ON RELEASE 3 
CRIME ENQUIRIES 4 
OTHER ENQUIRIES 5 
LICENSED PREMISES 6 
PRISON VISIT 7 
SOCIALLY 8 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 9 
20.WHAT WORD BEST DESCRIBES YOUR PROFESSIONAL 1 
RELATIONSHIP FRIENDLY 2 
SOCIAL 3 
TRUSTING 4 
REWARDING 5 
NECESSARY 6 
DONT KNOW 7 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 8 
21.CAN A RELATIONSHIP CHANGE YES 1 
BETWEEN HANDLER/INFORMER NO 2 
DONT KNOW 3 
22.GIVE AN EXAMPLE OF HOW THIS 
HAS OCCURRED 
NOT APPLICABLE 0 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
............................................................................................................ 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
............................................................................................................ 
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23.WHAT IS THE MAIN ADVANTAGE TO YOU NONE 0 23 
OF YOUR RELATIONSHIP PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE 1 
DETECTION OF CRIME 2 
REVENGE/COMPETITION 3 
DONT KNOW 4 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 5 
24.WHAT IS THE MAIN DISADVANTAGE NONE 0 24 
BEING FOUND OUT 1 
DONT KNOW 2 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 3 
25.WHO USUALLY ARRANGES THE MEETING 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 
INFORMER 1 
HANDLER 2 
EITHER 3 
BOTH 4 
CONTROLLER 5 
6 
25 
26.WHERE DO YOU NORMALLY MEET REST/CAFE/PUB 1 26 
COUNTRY/PARK/COMMON 2 
BETTING SHOP 3 
INFORMERS HOME 4 
ANYWHERE 5 
IN VEHICLE 6 
CAR PARK 7 
BUS STATION 8 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 9 
27.HOW IS CONTACT MAINTAINED MAINLY TELEPHONE 1 27 
PAGER 2 
LETTER 3 
PERSONAL VISIT 4 
THROUGH THIRD PARTY 5 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 6 
28.DO YOU USE JOINT HANDLERS 
29.WHAT IS YOUR OPINION 
OF JOINT HANDLERS 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 
YES 1 
NO 2 
NOT APPLICABLE 0 
CAN BE USEFUL 1 
NOT USEFUL 2 
3 
28 
29 
3D.DO YOU MEET WITH YOUR HANDLER YES 1 30 
SOCIALLY NO 2 
REFUSED TO ANSWER 3 
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31.WHAT LEVEL OF IMPORTANCE DO YOU PLACE ON THE 
FOLLOWING 
VERY IMP. IMP. NOT VERY. UNIMP 
THE RELATIONSHIP 
TRUST 
FRIENDSHIP 
HONESTY 
TRUTH 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
RELIABILITY 
PART THREE 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
32.WHAT WAS THE MAIN REASON FINANCIAL 1 38-9 
YOU STARTED INFORMING ENJOYMENT 2 
GRATITUDE 3 
FRIENDS WITH OFFICER 4 
LOOKING FOR A FAVOUR 5 
PRESSURE BY OFFICER 6 
PART OF A DEAL 7 
REDUCE SENTENCE 8 
DISLIKE OF THAT TYPE OF CRIME 9 
REVENGE 10 
CHALLENGE 11 
BE ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE LAW 12 
TAKE OUT THE COMPETITION 13 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 14 
33.LIST OTHER REASONS NOT APPLICABLE 0 40 
(INCLUDING THOSE IN 32 ABOVE) ENJOYMENT 1 
PUBLIC SPIRITED 2 
LIKES CID WORK 3 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 4 
34.SINCE YOU STARTED INFORMING, HAS THE 
MAIN REASON CHANGED 
35.WHAT IS IT NOW NOT 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 
YES 1 
NO 2 
APPLICABLE 0 
1 
36.HAVE THE REASONS FOR YOUR INVOLVEMENT YES 1 
BEEN SATISFIED 
37.DOES YOUR HANDLER KNOW WHY YOU ARE 
INFORMING 
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NO 2 
DONT KNOW 3 
YES 1 
NO 2 
DONT KNOW 3 
41 
42 
43 
44 
, 
38.HAS HE/SHE EVER ASKED YOU FOR YOUR 
REASONS 
YES 1 
NO 2 
39.WERE YOU HONEST ABOUT YOUR 
REASONS 
40.IF NOT, PLEASE EXPLAIN 
NOT APPLICABLE 0 
YES 1 
NO 2 
NOT APPLICABLE 0 
45 
46 
47 
............................................................................................................ 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ,. ............................................ .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
41.DO THE REASONS FOR INFORMING MAKE ANY 
DIFFERENCE TO THE USEFULNESS OF 
INFORMER HANDLING DONT 
YES 1 
NO 2 
KNOW 3 
48 
42.PLEASE EXPLAIN YOUR REASONS...................... 49 
.................................................................................................. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
43.ARE THERE ANY CIRCUMSTANCES 
IN WHICH YOU WOULD REFUSE TO 
BECOME INVOLVED IN INFORMER USE 
44.ARE THOSE REASONS 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 
45.GIVE EXAMPLES 
YES 1 
NO 2 
NOT APPLICABLE 0 
LEGAL 1 
MORAL 2 
SOCIAL 3 
PHYSICAL 4 
5 
NOT APPLICABLE 0 
50 
51 
52 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . . . 
...................................................... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
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46.WHAT DO YOU THINK YOUR ARRESTING CRIMINALS 1 53 
HANDLER GETS OUT OF THE DETECTING CRIME 2 
RELATIONSHIP CAREER PROSPECTS 3 
DONT KNOW 4 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 5 
PART FOUR 
47.TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, HAS A CASE YES 1 54 
BEEN DROPPED TO PROTECT YOUR IDENTITY NO 2 
DONT KNOW 3 
REFUSED TO ANSWER 4 
48.TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, HAS THE POLICE 
HID THE FACT THAT YOU GAVE 
INFORMATION RATHER THAN DISCLOSE 
YOUR IDENTITY REFUSED 
YES 1 
NO 2 
DONT KNOW 3 
TO ANSWER 4 
55 
N/A 0 56 
49.HOW WOULD YOU REACT TO YOUR STOP INFORMING 1 
IDENTITY BEING DISCLOSED BE ADVISED BY HANDLER 2 
TO COURT WOULD NOT MAKE A DIFFERENCE 3 
DENY ALL KNOWLEDGE 4 
NOT SURE 5 
REFUSED TO ANSWER 6 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 7 
PLEASE COMMENT ON THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS (50-52) :-
A U SRN 
L S 0 A E 
WUMRV 
A A E E E 
Y L T L R 
S L I Y 
50.POLICE WILL PROTECT ME 
51.POLICE WILL ALLOW ME TO 
COMMIT CRIME WHILE I AM 
INFORMING 
52.1 HAVE BEEN GRANTED IMMUNITY 
ON THE SPOT BY MY HANDLER IN 
EXCHANGE FOR INFORMATION 
53.HAVE YOU EVER BEEN PERSONALLY 
SELECTIVE ABOUT THE INFORMATION 
YOU HAVE GIVEN. REFUSED 
351 
Y M 
E 
S 
1 2 345 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
YES 1 
NO 2 
TO ANSWER 3 
57 
58 
59 
60 
54.GIVE AN EXAMPLE WHEN 
THIS HAS OCCURRED 
NOT APPLICABLE 0 61 
· ,. ............. '" ..................................... . 
· .............................. '" ............ '" .... '" . '" .. 
'" ............. '" . '" ........ '" .. '" ........ '" ........... '" '" . '" '" . 
55.ARE THERE ANY PERSONS WHO YOU YES 1 62 
WOULD NOT INFORM ON, WHO ARE NO 2 
COMMITTING CRIME DONT KNOW 3 
56. WHO NOT APPLICABLE 0 63 
RELATIVES 1 
FRIENDS 2 
POLICE OFFICER 3 
REFUSED TO ANSWER 4 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 5 
57.HAVE THERE BEEN OCCASIONS WHEN REGULARLY 1 64 
A CRIME HAS COME TO YOUR NOTICE OFTEN 2 
BUT YOU HAVE NOT GIVEN SOMETIMES 3 
INFORMATION ABOUT IT RARELY 4 
NEVER 5 
REFUSE TO ANSWER 6 
58.GIVE AN EXAMPLE NOT APPLICABLE 0 65 
· ....... '" .... '" ...................... '" '" '" ... '" .. '" . '" ...... '" 
· . '" ... '" ....... '" . '" ...... '" .......... '" ... '" ...... '" ... '" ... . 
'" .......... '" '" ... '" '" . '" .......... '" .. '" ... '" ....... '" .... '" '" .. 
· '" ................ '" ...... '" ............ '" ...... '" ..... '" .. 
59.HAVE YOU ANY KNOWLEDGE OF INCIDENTS YES 1 66 
WHERE THE USE OF INFORMANTS HAS BROKEN NO 2 
THE LAW DONT KNOW 3 
REFUSE TO ANSWER 4 
60.GIVE AN EXAMPLE NOT APPLICABLE 0 67 
· .. '" .... '" ... '" ...... '" ..... '" ....... '" .. '" ..... '" '" ......... '" 
· '" '" '" .. '" ........... '" ..... '" ... '" ..... '" ...... '" ..... '" . '" ...... '" 
'" '" '" '" '" . '" '" . '" .. '" '" '" '" '" . '" '" '" .. '" '" . '" '" '" '" '" '" '" . '" '" '" '" '" '" '" ............ . 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
352 
61.HAVE THERE BEEN OCCASIONS WHEN THE 
POLICE DISCIPLINE CODE HAS BEEN 
BREACHED TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE 
REFUSE 
REGULARLY 1 
OFTEN 2 
SOMETIMES 3 
RARELY 4 
NEVER 5 
DONT KNOW 6 
TO ANSWER 7 
62.GIVE AN EXAMPLE NOT APPLICABLE 0 
68 
69 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· .................................................... . 
· .................................................... . 
· .................................................... . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
63.HOW IS PAYMENT MADE CASH 1 70 
CHEQUE 2 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 3 
64.WHAT DO YOU SPEND THE MONEY ON DRUGS 1 71 
DRINK/FOOD 2 
FAMILY 3 
CANT REMEMBER 4 
REFUSED TO ANSWER 5 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 6 
65.WHO ELSE IS PRESENT OTHER POLICE OFFICER 1 72 
WHEN PAYMENT IS MADE NO-ONE 2 
CANT REMEMBER 3 
REFUSED TO ANSWER 4 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 5 
66.HAVE YOU BEEN USED TO SET YES 1 73 
UP A CRIME NO 2 
REFUSED TO ANSWER 3 
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67.GIVE AN EXAMPLE NOT APPLICABLE 0 74 
· ................................................................................................... .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
6B.PLEASE COMMENT ON THE FOLLOWING:- "THERE ARE OCCASIONS 
THE COMMISSION 
WILL HELP TO 
WHEN I WILL ALLOW MYSELF TO BE PARTY 
OF A CRIMINAL OFFENCE IF I FEEL THAT 
DETECT A MORE SERIOUS OFFENCE" 
TO 
IT 
........................................................................................................ 75 
............................................................................................................ 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . . .. . .. . .. .. . .. 
· ................................................................................ . 
· ....................................................................................... .. 
69.PLEASE COMMENT ON THE FOLLOWING:- "I BELIEVE THE USE 
OF INFORMANTS IS CRUCIAL TO THE DETECTION OF CRIME AND 
THEREFORE, SOMETIMES I USE MY OWN DISCRETION ABOUT THE 
LAW" 
....... ..................................................................................... 7 6 
.. .. .. .. . .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. . .. . .. . .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. . . . .. .. . . . .. .. . .. .. .. .. 
.. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . . . .. .. . .. .. .. . . .. . .. .. . .. . .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. . .. .. .. . .. .. .. . .. .. 
.. .. . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . . .. . .. . .. . . .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. . .. .. . . .. .. .. .. .. . .. . . . 
.. .. .. .. .. . .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. . .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. . . .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. .. .. . 
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COMMENTS BY INTERVIEWER 
· ........................................................................................................ .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
............................................................................................................ 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . . . . . . . 
· .................................................... . 
· .................................................... . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
• ••••.••..•••.••••••.•••.•••••••• • DATE •••••••••••••••• 
SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS 
70.Have you ever participated in a 
crime whilst informing 
Refused to 
Yes 
No 
answer 
71.If so, has the fact been 
declared 
72.Give the circumstances 
Not 
Not 
Applicable 
Yes 
No 
Dont know 
applicable 
1 
2 
3 
0 
1 
2 
3 
0 
· ................................................. . 
· ...................................................... .. 
· ............................................................ . 
· ....................................................................... .. 
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77. 
78. 
79. 
73.Whilst informing, have you ever Yes 1 
asked your handler to sort out No 2 
other matters for you. e.g. square Cant remember 3 
up a speeding ticket etc. Refused to answer 4 
74.Give an example Not applicable 0 
........... ,. ....................... ,. .... ,. .... ,. ...... . 
. . ,. ....... ,. .......................................................................... .. 
.. .. . . .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . . .. ,. ............................................... .. 
.. .. . .. . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. . .. . .. .. . . .. .. .. . .. ,. ................................. .. 
75.How would you 
as a result, a 
feel if you had 
criminal walks 
broken the rules, and 
free. 
Not applicable 0 
................... ,. ..................................................................... .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ,. ...................... ,. ............. ,. ........................... .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. . .. . .. .. .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . . .. . ,. ............ ,. ............... . 
.. .. .. . .. .. . .. . . . . ,. ....... ,. .................. ,. ................... ,. ,. ....... . 
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80. 
81. 
82. 
HANDLERS QUESTIONNAIRE 
PART ONE 
1. WHAT IS SUBJECTS CODE........................... 1-3 
2. YOUR PRESENT FORCE .......................................................... .. 
3. YOUR CURRENT RANK CONSTABLE 1 
SERGEANT 2 
INSPECTOR 3 
CHIEF INSPECTOR 4 
OTHER 5 
4. YOUR PRESENT POST UNIFORM 1 
C. LD 2 
SPECIALIST (SPECIFY) 3 
5. HOW LONG HAVE YOU LESS THAN 1 YR 1 
BEEN A HANDLER 1-2 YRS 2 
3-5 YRS 3 
MORE THAN 6 YRS 4 
6. EXPLAIN YOUR ROLE AS A HANDLER ........•..••.•... 
................................................................................................ 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
7. AT WHAT POINT DOES AN 
INFORMER BECOME REGISTERED 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 
FIRST INFORMATION 1 
SECOND INFORMATION 2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
8. EXPLAIN THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AN INFORMER AND 9 
CONTACT ................................................................................ .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
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9. EXPLAIN THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AN INFORMER AND 10 
PUBLIC SPIRITED CITIZEN .....•••...•••••...••••.. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
10.IN YOUR OWN WORDS, HOW WOULD YOU DEFINE AN 
INFORMER ................................................................................ .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
11.IS YOUR INVOLVEMENT IN INFORMING 
RESTRICTED TO CERTAIN CATEGORIES 
OF CRIME 
YES 1 
NO 2 
11 
12 
12.PLEASE SHOW THE MAIN CATEGORY. NOT APPLICABLE 0 13 
1 
13.EXPLAIN WHY YOU RESTRICT YOUR INFORMATION TO THIS 14 
CATEGORY OF CRIME. NOT APPLICABLE 0 
DRUG SQUAD OFFICER 1 
.............................................................................................. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
14.IF YOU DO RESTRICT YOUR INFORMATION 
WHAT DO YOU DO ABOUT OTHER CATEGORIES N/A 0 15 
IGNORE 1 
INFORM OTHER OFFICER 2 
INFORM OTHER DEPARTMENT 3 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 4 
358 
PART TWO 
15.IN YOUR OPINION, WHERE DOES A ON ARREST 1 16 
RELATIONSHIP WITH AN INFORMER AFTER INTERVIEW 2 
FIRST START, NORMALLY ON RELEASE 3 
CRIME ENQUIRIES 4 
OTHER ENQUIRIES 5 
LICENSED PREMISES 6 
PRISON VISIT 7 
SOCIALLY 8 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 9 
16.WHAT WORD BEST DESCRIBES YOUR RELATIONSHIP 17 
IN GENERAL PROFESSIONAL 1 
FRIENDLY 2 
SOCIAL 3 
REWARDING 4 
NECESSARY 5 
UNDERSTANDING/TRUSTING 6 
DONT KNOW 7 
. OTHER (SPECIFY) 8 
17.CAN A RELATIONSHIP CHANGE 
BETWEEN HANDLER/INFORMER 
18.GIVE AN EXAMPLE OF HOW 
THIS HAS OCCURRED 
YES 1 
NO 2 
DONT KNOW 3 
NOT APPLICABLE 0 
18 
19 
................................................................................. ,. ...................... .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. ,. .. ,. ,. ........... ,. ......................... ,. . ,. .................. . 
19.WHAT IS THE MAIN ADVANTAGE OF YOUR RELATIONSHIP 20 
FOR YOU. 
20.WHAT IS 
NONE 0 
DETECTION OF CRIME 1 
ARREST OF CRIMINALS 2 
DONT KNOW 3 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 4 
THE MAIN DISADVANTAGE NONE 0 
BEING CONTACTED OFF DUTY 1 
CONTACTED AT HOME 2 
INSUFFICIENT RECOGNITION 3 
ADDS TO WORK LOAD 4 
SUSCEPTIBLE TO ALLEGATIONS 5 
DONT KNOW 6 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 7 
21.WHO USUALLY ARRANGES THE MEETING 
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INFORMER 1 
21 
22 
HANDLER 2 
EITHER 3 
BOTH 4 
CONTROLLER 5 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 6 
22.WHERE DO YOU NORMALLY MEET PUBLIC HOUSE 1 23 
RESTAURANT 2 
BETTING SHOP 3 
INFORMERS HOME 4 
PARK/COMMON/STREET 5 
IN VEHICLE 6 
CAR PARK 7 
BUS STATION 8 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 9 
23.HOW IS CONTACT MAINTAINED USUALLY TELEPHONE 1 24 
24.DO YOU USE JOINT 
PAGER 2 
LETTER 3 
PERSONAL VISIT 4 
THROUGH THIRD PARTY 5 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 6 
HANDLERS YES 1 
NO 2 
SOMETIMES 3 
25.WHAT IS YOUR OPINION NOT APPLICABLE 0 
OF JOINT HANDLERS USEFUL 1 
NOT USEFUL 2 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 3 
26.DO YOU MEET WITH YOUR INFORMER YES 1 
SOCIALLY NO 2 
OCCASIONALLY 3 
27.WHAT LEVEL OF IMPORTANCE DO YOU PERSONALLY PLACE 
ON THE FOLLOWING. 
VERY IMP. IMP. NOT VERY. UNIMP 
THE RELATIONSHIP 1 2 3 4 
TRUST 1 2 3 4 
FRIENDSHIP 1 2 3 4 
HONESTY 1 2 3 4 
TRUTH 1 2 3 4 
CONFIDENTIALITY 1 2 3 4 
RELIABILITY 1 2 3 4 
PART THREE 
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25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
28.IN RELATION TO YOUR LAST REGISTERED 
INFORMER, DO YOU KNOW WHY HE STARTED 
GIVING YOU INFORMATION DONT 
YES 1 
NO 2 
KNOW 3 
35 
29.HOW DID YOU BECOME AWARE NOT APPLICABLE 0 36 
YOU ASKED HIM/HER 1 
HE VOLUNTEERED 2 
FROM A THIRD PARTY 3 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 4 
30.DID YOU VERIFY THE REASONS YES 1 
NO 2 
DONT KNOW 3 
37 
31.HOW DID YOU VERIFY NOT APPLICABLE 0 38 
ACCEPT HIS WORD 1 
CHECKED WITH OTHER 2 
DOCUMENTATION 3 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 4 
32.IN YOUR EXPERIENCE, WHAT IS 
THE MAIN REASON FOR 
REVENGE 
REDUCE SENTENCE 
FRIENDLY WITH OFFICER 
OF THAT TYPE OF CRIME 
1 39-40 
2 
INFORMING 
DISLIKE 
FINANCIAL 
ENJOYMENT 
GRATITUDE 
LOOKING FOR A FAVOUR 
PRESSURE FROM OFFICER 
PART OF A DEAL 
CHALLENGE 
SIDE OF THE LAW 
THE COMPETITION 
GET ON THE RIGHT 
TAKE OUT 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
33.LIST OTHER REASONS YOU HAVE EXPERIENCED 
(INCLUDING THOSE IN 32 ABOVE) 
NOT APPLICABLE 0 
ENJOYMENT 1 
TAKE OUT COMPETITION 2 
LIKES CID WORK 3 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 4 
34.CAN YOU RECALL A SITUATION WHERE 
THE MAIN REASON CHANGED 
35.WHAT DID THE REASON CHANGE TO 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 
YES 1 
NO 2 
DONT KNOW 3 
NOT APPLICABLE 0 
1 
36.DO THE REASONS FOR INFORMING MAKE ANY 
DIFFERENCE TO THE USEFULNESS OF 
YES 1 
NO 2 
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41 
42 
43 
44 
INFORMER HANDLING DONT KNOW 3 
37.PLEASE EXPLAIN YOUR REASONS ....•..•.••.•......•...•. 45 
............................................................................................................ 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
38.ARE THERE ANY CIRCUMSTANCES YES 1 
IN WHICH YOU WOULD REFUSE TO NO 2 
BECOME INVOLVED IN INFORMER USE 
39.ARE THOSE REASONS NOT APPLICABLE 0 
LEGAL 1 
MORAL 2 
SOCIAL 3 
PHYSICAL 4 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 5 
40.GIVE AN EXAMPLE NOT APPLICABLE 0 
41.AS A POLICE OFFICER, DOES THE 
USE OF INFORMERS PERSONALLY 
ADVANCE YOU IN THE SERVICE 
IN YOUR VIEW. 
PART FOUR 
42.HAS A CASE OF YOURS BEEN DROPPED 
TO PROTECT YOUR INFORMERS IDENTITY 
YES 1 
NO 2 
POSSIBLY 3 
PROBABLY 4 
DONT KNOW 5 
REFUSED 
YES 1 
NO 2 
DONT KNOW 3 
TO ANSWER 4 
43.HAVE YOU EVER HID THE FACT THAT AN 
INFORMER WAS USED, RATHER THAN 
DISCLOSE HIS/HER IDENTITY 
REFUSED 
YES 1 
NO 2 
DONT KNOW 3 
TO ANSWER 4 
PLEASE COMMENT ON THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS(44-47):-
A U SRN 
L S 0 A E 
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46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
44.1 HAVE BEEN PUT UNDER PRESSURE 
TO PRODUCE RESULTS AS A HANDLER 
45.1 WILL PROTECT MY INFORMER 
46.1 WILL ALLOW MY INFORMER TO COMMIT 
CRIME WHILST HE/SHE IS INFORMING 
WUMRV 
AAEEE 
Y L T L R 
S L I Y 
Y M 
E 
S 
1 2 345 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
47.1 HAVE GRANTED IMMUNITY TO AN INFORMER 1 2 3 4 5 
IN EXCHANGE FOR INFORMATION 
48.FAILURE TO SUCCEED ON JOBS USING YES 1 
INFORMERS CAN EFFECT MY CREDIBILITY NO 2 
REFUSED TO ANSWER 3 
49.HAVE YOU EVER BEEN PERSONALLY YES 1 
SELECTIVE ABOUT THE INFORMATION NO 2 
YOU HAVE RECEIVED. REFUSED TO ANSWER 3 
50.GIVE AN EXAMPLE NOT APPLICABLE 0 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
....................................................... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. 
51.ARE THERE ANY PERSONS KNOWN TO BE 
COMMITTING CRIME WHO YOU WOULD NOT 
ACT AGAINST 
YES 1 
NO 2 
DONT KNOW 3 
52.WHO ARE THEY NOT APPLICABLE 0 
RELATIVES 1 
FRIENDS 2 
INFORMERS 3 
POLICE OFFICERS 4 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 5 
53.HAVE THERE BEEN OCCASIONS WHEN 
A CRIME HAS COME TO YOUR NOTICE 
BUT YOU HAVE NOT 
ACTED ON IT 
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REGULARLY 1 
OFTEN 2 
SOMETIMES 3 
RARELY 4 
59 
60 
61 
54.GIVE AN EXAMPLE 
NEVER 5 
REFUSED TO ANSWER 6 
NOT APPLICABLE 0 62 
· .................................................... . 
· ................................. ,. .................. . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· .................................................... . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
55.HAVE YOU ANY KNOWLEDGE OF INCIDENTS 
WHERE THE USE OF INFORMERS HAS 
BROKEN THE LAW 
REFUSED 
YES 
NO 
DONT KNOW 
TO ANSWER 
1 
2 
3 
4 
56.GIVE AN EXAMPLE NOT APPLICABLE 0 
63 
64 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· .................................................... . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· ...................................................... . 
· .................................................... . 
· ................................................................ . 
· ...................................................................... .. 
.. .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . .. . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . 
57.HAVE THERE BEEN OCCASIONS WHEN THE 
POLICE DISCIPLINE CODE HAS BEEN 
BREACHED, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE 
REFUSED 
REGULARLY 
OFTEN 
SOMETIMES 
RARELY 
NEVER 
DONT KNOW 
TO ANSWER 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
58.GIVE AN EXAMPLE NOT APPLICABLE 0 
· ................................................................ .. 
65 
66 
· ............................................................................. . 
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· .................................................... . 
· .................................................... . 
· .................................................... . 
· .................................................... . 
· .................................................... . 
· .................................................... . 
59.HOW IS PAYMENT MADE CASH 1 67 
(WHERE RELEVANT) CHEQUE 2 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 3 
60.DO YOU ASK WHAT THE MONEY YES 1 68 
IS SPENT ON(WHERE RELEVANT) NO 2 
SOMETIMES 3 
REFUSED TO ANSWER 4 
61.GENERALLY WHAT IS THE REPLY NOT APPLICABLE 0 69 
DRUGS 1 
FOOD 2 
FAMILY 3 
DONT KNOW 4 
REFUSED TO ANSWER 5 
62.WHO ELSE IS PRESENT OTHER POLICE OFFICER 1 70 
WHEN PAYMENT IS MADE NO-ONE 2 
CANT REMEMBER 3 
REFUSED TO ANSWER 4 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 5 
63.HAVE YOU EVER USED AN INFORMER YES 1 71 
TO SET UP A CRIME NO 2 
REFUSED TO ANSWER 3 
64.GIVE AN EXAMPLE NOT APPLICABLE 0 72 
· .............................................. . 
· .............................................. . 
· .............................................. . 
· .............................................. . 
65.PLEASE COMMENT ON THE FOLLOWING:- "THERE ARE OCCASIONS 
WHEN I WILL ALLOW MYSELF TO BE PARTY TO THE COMMISSION 
OF A CRIMINAL OFFENCE IF I FEEL THAT IT WILL HELP TO 
DETECT A MORE SERIOUS OFFENCE" .......••..•.•..•.•... 73 
· ................................................... . 
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· ................................................................................... .. 
· ....................................................................................... .. 
· ................................................................................... . 
· .......................................................................................... .. 
66.PLEASE COMMENT ON THE FOLLOWING:- "I BELIEVE THE USE 
OF INFORMANTS IS CRUCIAL TO THE DETECTION OF CRIME AND 
THEREFORE, SOMETIMES I USE MY OWN DISCRETION ABOUT THE 
LAW" 
................................................................... 74 
............................................................................................... 
.. . . . .. .. . . . .. .. .. . .. . .. .. .. .. . . .. .. .. .. . .. . .. .. .. . . .. .. .. . . .. . . . .. .. .. . . .. . . .. .. .. . 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. . .. .. . . .. .. . . . . .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. . .. 
.. . . .. .. .. .. . .. .. . . . .. .. .. .. .. . . .. .. .. .. .. . . .. .. .. .. . . .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. . .. . .. .. 
.. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. . .. .. .. . . . .. .. . .. . .. .. .. .. .. . .. . .. . .. .. .. . . .. .. . . .. .. . 
.. .. .. .. .. .. . . .. .. .. . . . .. .. .. .. . . .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . . . . .. .. .. .. . . .. 
COMMENTS BY INTERVIEWER 
............................................................................................ 
.. .. .. .. .. . . . .. .. .. .. . . .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . . .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. . .. . . . . . .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. . . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . . .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. . 
.. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. . .. .. .. .. . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . . .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. . . .. .. .. . 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. • .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . • .. .. DATE ......................... .. 
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CONTRACT 
TIDS DOCUMENT CONFIRMS IN WRITING THAT DETECTIVE 
SUPERINTENDENT ROGER BILLINGSLEY OF THE LINCOLNSHIRE 
POLICE GIVES THE FOLLOWING UNDERTAKING: 
THAT WHILST INVOLVING THE 
(pOLICE FORCE/AGENCy) IN RESEARCH PRESENTLY BEING 
CARRIED OUT INTO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INFORMERS 
AND THEIR HANDLERS, 
1. ALL INTERVIEWEES WILL MAINTAIN THEIR ANONYMITY 
2. THE COMPLETED QUESTIONNAIRES WILL BE CONFIDENTIAL 
3. ANY SUBSEQUENT ANALYSIS WILL NOT SPECIFY 
INDIVIDUALS FROM ANY SPECIFIC POLICE FORCE 
4. EACH INTERVIEWEE WILL BE ADVISED THAT THEIR 
RESPONSES ARE VOLUNTARY 
5. THEIR ANSWERS WILL NOT BE USED IN ANY FUTURE 
CRIMINAL OR POLICE DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS 
6. THE CHIEF CONSTABLE OF LINCOLNSHIRE IS AWARE OF THIS 
RESEARCH AND SUPPORTS ITS COMPLETION 
7. NO SUBSEQUENT PAPERS IN RELATION TO THE RESEARCH 
ANALYSIS WILL BE PUBLISHED WITHOUT PRIOR 
CONSULTATION WITH THE FORCE/AGENCY INVOLVED 
SIGNED ................................................................................ . 
DETECTIVE SUPERINTENDENT 
DATE ................................................................................... . 
367 
THE ROLE OF THE DETECTIVE 
INTERIM REPORT 
TERMS OF REFERENCE 
To undertake an Activity Analysis of all C.I.D. Officers across 
the Force, from C.I.D. Aides up to and including Detective 
Chief Inspectors, within the existing Area Activity Analysis 
schedule and to provide a report in tabular format 
summarising the measured activities. 
INTRODUCTION 
The report details the data gathered, in relation to C.I.D., from 
the Activity Analysis samples carried out so far this year. The 
Areas included in this report are West Lindsey, Lincoln and 
Kesteven. The recording period covered is from 20th 
February 1995 to 16th July 1995. 
The results contained in this report are concemed with 
Detectives only. Those sections within C.I.D. that include 
Uniformed Officers will be dealt with in the final report. 
RESULTS 
The tabulated results of the activity recording programmes are 
shown together with graphical summaries in the following 
order: 
Section 1 Detective Constables 
Section 2 Detective Sergeants 
Section 3 Detective Chief Inspectors and Detective Inspectors 
Further information conceming the number of recorded crimes 
over the period is tabulated in Appendix A. 
Each Section contains a similar set of tabulations, graphs and 
comments on the significant data obtained. The tables 
contained in each section are as follows: 
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Table 1 A summarised list of activities sub-divided into 
INCIDENT linked activities (1), NON-INCIDENT 
linked activities (P), SUPERVISORY (S) and 
UNCOMMITTED (U). The table shows the 
number of hours recorded against type of activity, 
percentage of total hours, percentage of incident 
related hours, percentage of non-incident related 
hours and an average time, in minutes per day 
expended by each officer for each type of activity. 
Table 2 A summarised list of INCIDENT related activities 
shown against the type of incident. This is divided 
into CRIME (C) and NON-CRIME (N) categories 
and shows the total hours of activity recorded 
against each type of incident, percentage of total 
incident hours and percentage of total hours 
recorded by the particular category of officer. 
Table 3 A complete list of total hours recorded for each 
type of activity during a specific hour of the day 
over the recording period. This is sub-divided 
into INCIDENT related hours, NON-INCIDENT 
related hours, SUPERVISORY and 
UNCOMMITTED hours. 
Table 4 An extract from Table 2, outlining percentages of 
time spent on activities for each Crime category. 
(included in Section 1 only) 
Graph 1 This is a combination pie and stack chart which 
identifies the proportion of INCIDENT related work 
and further analyses into more specific areas 
of activity. 
Graph 2 This is similar to Graph 1 except that it concerns 
the NON-INCIDENTrelated work and identifies the 
proportions of that category in terms of Briefings 
and Special Operations etc. 
Graph 3 This is a bar chart which identifies the amount of 
time spent on Crime. It details the various 
activities i.e. observation and clerical etc., for each 
369 
category of Crime. (included in Section 1 only). 
Graph 4 This is a pie chart 1 which identifies the 
percentage of time spent on Crime as a 
proportion of recorded crime. 
SECTION 1 
DETECTIVE CONSTABLES 
The main areas of activity for Detective Constables are 
detailed in the table below: 
ACTIVITY 
Travel to/from and Deal with Incident 
EnquirieslObservation/Searches 
Interview/deal with Detainees 
Clerical R.O.T.I. 
Clerical/Paperwork 
Briefings/Meetings/Conferences 
Special Operations/Events 
Uncommitted (refreshments) 
Other Work 
Time in Station 
% 
11.47% 
14.22% 
6.58% 
11.97% 
21.33% 
5.10% 
5.53% 
4.88% 
18.88% 
52.98% 
During the sample period a total of 5438.25 hours were 
recorded. Out of the total hours 3007.75, (55.31%), was spent 
on incident linked work with 2948.25 hours, (54.2%) spent on 
crime activities. 
Table 2 shows that Detective Constables spend the biggest 
proportion of the total time, 825 hours, (15.2%), on activities 
associated with Domestic Burglary. This equates to 27.4% of 
the time booked against crime. The highest proportion of time 
recorded on an activity relating to Domestic Burglary was 
Clerical R.O.T.I. which over the period accounted for 171.75 
hours. 
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The category which also takes up a significant amount of time 
is all other crime. This accounts for 664.50 hours of the total 
time recorded, which is 22.1 % of the total crime activities. 
The highest proportion of time spent on an activity was on 
enquiries. 
Enquiries take up a total of 556.75 hours, (19%) of the time 
recorded against crime activities. Of the total hours booked on 
enquiries, (556.75 hours), 167.25 hours, (30%), is spent on 
Burglary and 161.75 hours, (29%), on other crimes. 
To put these figures in perspective, recorded crime over the 
period shows that 'other offences' accounted for 4556 
offences, (19.7%), out of a total recorded crime figure of 
23185. Other offences, as per the Home Office classification, 
include blackmail, treason and perverting the course of 
justice. 
It is possible that officers involved in the recording have 
included other crimes such as shoplifting or handling stolen 
property in the other category so in this case it is not a true 
reflection of 'other crime'. 
Recorded crime figures have been provided for the period 
1/2/95 to 31/7/95 and broken down into categories to show 
what percentage of the total, burglary etc. is. These 
percentages have been compared with the amount of time 
Detectives have actually spent on the particular categories. 
For example violent crime, including physical attacks, sexual 
offences and robbery, make up 6.40% of the total recorded 
crime. Detective Constables spent 20.10% of incident time on 
activities involved with violence offences. Criminal damage, 
including arson and threats, accounts for 14.50% of the total 
recorded crime and officers recorded only 1.50% of the 
incident time on activities linked with this crime. 
A breakdown of recorded crime can be found in Appendix A, 
with Graph 4 showing how it relates to incident linked activity 
for Detective Constables. 
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Overall, Detective Constables spent 3007.75 hours, (55.31%), 
on incident linked activities, 2154.75 hours, (39.62%) on 
non-incident linked activities, 10.50 hours, (0. 19%) on 
supervisory work and 265.25 hours, (4.88%), on 
refreshments. 
SECTION 2 
DETECTIVE SERGEANTS 
The main areas of activity for Detective Sergeants are listed in 
the table below. 
ACTIVITY 
Travel to/from and Deal with Incidents 
Enqui ries/Observation/Searches 
Paperwork/Clerical (inc. Supervisory) 
Briefings/Meetings/Conferences 
Other Managerial/Supervisory 
Other Work 
Uncommitted (refreshments) 
Time in Station 
% 
5.82% 
11.27% 
28.34% 
11.89% 
12.15% 
25.62% 
4.96% 
64.67% 
During the sample period a total of 927.75 hours were 
recorded. Out of the total, 317.25 hours, (34.20%) was spent 
on incident linked activities with 306.75 hours, (33.1 %) being 
spent on crime activities. 
The data in Table 2 shows that the highest proportion of time 
was spent on domestic burglary, 77.75 hours, which is 24.5% 
of the time booked against crime. Detective Sergeants spent 
most of their time, 77.50 hours on enquiries with the highest 
proportion on burglary. 
Overall, the highest proportion of their total time was on 
non-incident linked work. 
SECTION 3 
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DETECTIVE CHIEF INSPECTORS & DETECTIVE 
INSPECTORS 
The main activities are detailed in the table below. 
ACTIVITY 
Enquiries/Observation/Searches 
Paperwork/Clerical (including Supervisory) 
Briefings/Meetings/Conferences 
Other Managerial/Supervisory 
Other Work 
Uncommitted (refreshments) 
Time in Station 
Activity Analysis is normally only carried out up to and 
including Inspector rank, therefore the D/C11 has been 
accounted for with the Inspectors. 
% 
7.18% 
28.76% 
21.90% 
22.43% 
13.35% 
5.00% 
69.17% 
During the sample period a total of 470.25 hours were 
recorded. Out of the total, 93.50 hours, (19.88%) was on 
incident linked work with 98.7 hours being on crime activities. 
Of the hours recorded against crime activity, clerical other 
accounted for the highest proportion of time. 
Activity Analysis Results C.I.D (D/C) 
ACT CODE DESCRIP 
P02REP 
20/02195 to 16/07195 
All days selected 
Force: LINCOLNSHIRE 
Command unit: All 
Officers: DC 
Average 
Percentage Time per Day 
Unit types: All Percentage Percentage of Non-Incid. (mins) 
No of shifts: 669 TOTALof Total Hrs of Incid. Hrs Hrs 
lA Deal with incident 343.00 6.31% 11.40% 30.76 
1AO Travel tolfrom incident 280.75 5.16% 9.33% 25.18 
18 Enquiries 575.75 10.59% 19.14% 51.64 
[C Observation 143.00 2.63% 4.75% 12.83 
[0 Searches 54.50 1.00% 1.81% 4.89 
E Issue advicelwaminglVDRS 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 
IF Interview detainees 172.75 3.18% 5.74% 15.49 
IG Dealing with detainees 185.00 3.40% 6.15% 16.59 
1H Paperwork 118.25 2.17% 3.93% 10.61 
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1HO Clerical- R.O.T.I. 651.00 11.97% 1 
1H1 Clerical - Computer 31.50 0.58% 
1H2 Clerical - Other 290.50 5.34% 
11 At court 70.50 1.30% 
Ii Other incident linked 91.25 1.68% 
Jz TOTAL MAN-HOURS (1): 3007.75 55.31% 
PA Preventative patrol 97.50 1.79% 
PAO Prev. patrol- CarNan 127.751 2.35% 
PS Briefings/meetings 275.00 5.06% 
PC Relief station duties 0.50 0.01% 
PO Court duties/escort 57.25 1.05% 
PE Special operations/events 300,75 5.53% 
PF Investigate complaints 4.25 0.08% 
PG Dealing with infonnants 68.25 1.25% 
PH Community involvement 2.75 0.05% 
PI Property enquiries 29.00 0.53% 
PJ Enquiries (fireanns,etc) 1.50 0.03% 
PJO Enq. - SummonslWarrants 16.00 0.29% 
PJ1 Eng. - Foreign Force 37.75 0.69% 
PJ2 Eng. -Other 172.25 3.17% 
PK Crime prevention activity 146.00 2.68% 
PL Prison interviews 27.75 0.51% 
PM Paperwork - other 580.00 10.67% 
PMO Clerical Computer 140.00 2.57% 
PN Other non incident linked 70.50 1.30% 
PNO Kennel Duties 0.00 0.00% 
PN1 Dog Training 0.00 0.00% 
PZ TOTAL MAN-HOURS (P): 2154.75 39.62% 
SA Handover Procedures 0.75 0.01% 
SS staff appraisals/develop 0.00 0.00% 
SC Relief custody duties 0.00 0.00% 
SO Relief station/cntri sgt 0.00 0.00% 
SE Monitoring cell block 0.00 0.00% 
SF Conferences 2.00 0.04% 
SG Planning for known events 6.25 0.11% 
SH Identification parades 0.00 0.00% 
SI Checking paperwork 0.251 0.00% 
SJ Other manageriaVsupervis 1.25 0.02% 
SZ TOTAL MAN-HOURS (S): 10.50 0.19% 
UA Refreshments 265.25 4.88% 
UAO Clerical: Paperwork-Patrol 0.00 0.00% 
UA1 Misc:TransnnclDeliveries 0.00 0.00% 
UA2 Escort Abnonnal Loads 0.00 0.00% 
UZ TOTAL MAN-HOURS (U): 265.251 4.88% 
ZZ TOTAL MAN-HOURS: 5438.251 100.00% 
ZZZ Man-hours in station: 2881.25 52.98% 
ZZZ Paid overtime: 339.25 6.24% 
ZZZ Unpaid overtime: 13.25 0.24% 
ZZZ % IN STATION: 
ZZZ % AID OVERTIME: 
1 ZZZ 1% UNPAID OVERTIME: 1 
Activity Analysis Results C.I.D (OIS) 
ACT CODE DESCRIP 
P02REP 
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21.64% 58.39 
1.05% 2.83 
9.66% 26.05 
2.34% 6.32 
3.03% 8.18 
100.00% 269.75 
4.52% 8.74 
5.93% 11.46 
12.76% 24.66 
0.02% 0.04 
2.66% 5.13 
13.96% 26.97 
0.20% 0.38 
3.17% 6.12 
0.13% 0.25 
1.35% 2.60 
0.07% 0.13 
0.74% 1.43 
1.75% 3.39 
7.99% 15.45 
6.78% 13.09 
1.29% 2.49 
26.92% 52.02 
6.50% 12.56 
3.27% 6.32 
0.00% 0.00 
0.00% 0.00 
100.00% 193.25 
0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.18 
0.56 
0.00 
0.02 
0.11 
0.94 
23.79 
0.00 
0.00 
1 0.00 
23.79 
487.74 
lA 
1AO 
[B 
IC 
0 
E 
IF 
IG 
H 
1110 
1H1 
1H2 
11 
IJ 
IZ 
PA 
PAO 
PB 
PC 
PlO 
PE 
PF 
PG 
PH 
PI 
PJ 
PA 
PJ1 
PJ2 
PK 
PL 
PM 
PMO 
PN 
PNO 
PN1 
PZ 
SA 
SB 
SC 
SO 
SE 
SF 
SG 
SH 
SI 
SJ 
SZ 
UA 
UM 
20/02195 to 16/07/95 
All days selected 
Force: LINCOLNSHIRE 
Command unit: All 
Officers: OS 
Unit types: All 
No of shifts: 112 TOTAL 
Deal with incident 26.75 
Travel tolfrom incident 27.25 
Enquiries 79.00 
Observation 18.75 
Searches 6.75 
Issue advicelwamingNDRSO.OO 
Interview detainees 7.50 
Dealing with detainees 5.25 
Paperwork 6.75 
Clerical· R.O.T.I. 31.50 
Clerical· Computer 5.25 
Clerical· Other 35.75 
At court 34.75 
Other incident linked 32.00 
TOTAL MAN·HOURS (1): 317.25 
Preventative patrol 21.25 
Prev. patrol· CarNan 23.00 
Briefings/meetings 71.50 
Relief station duties 0.00 
Court duties/escort 8.50 
Special operations/events 30.00 
Investigate complaints 0.00 
Dealing with infonnants 5.25 
Community invoivement 6.25 
Property enquiries 2.00 
Enquiries (fireanns,etc) 0.00 
Eng .• Summons/Warrants 0.00 
Eng .• Foreign Force 5.50 
Enq.· Other 7.25 
Crime prevention activity 33,50 
Prison interviews 4.50 
Paperwork· other 84.75 
Clerical Computer 31.50 
Other non incident linked 11.00 
Kennel Duties 0.00 
Oog Training 0.00 
TOTAL MAN·HOURS (P):345.75 
Handover Procedures 0.00 
staff appraisals/develop 2.75 
Relief custody duties 0.00 
Relief station/cntri sgt 0.00 
Monitoring cell block 0.00 
Conferences 38.75 
Planning for known events 23.50 
Identification parades 0.00 
Checking paperwork 67.25-
Other manageriaVsupervis 86.50 
TOTAL MAN·HOURS (5):218.75 
Refreshments 46.00 
Clerical: Paperwork·Patrol 0.00 
Average 
Percentage Time per Day 
Percentage Percentage of Non·incid. (mins) 
ofTotal Hrs of Incid. Hrs Hrs per Officer 
2.88% 8.43% 14.33 
2.94% 8.59% 14.60 
8.52% 24.90% 42.32 
2.02% 5.91% 10.04 
0.73% 2.13% 3,62 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00 
0.81% 2.36% 4.02 
0.57% 1.65% 2.81 
0.73% 2.13% 3.62 
3.40% 9.93% 16.88 
0.57% 1.65% 2.81 
3.85% 11.27% 19.15 
3.75% 10.95% 18.62 
3.45% 10.09% 17.14 
34.20% 100.00% 169.96 
2.29% 6.15% 11.38 
2.48% 6.65% 12.32 
7.71% 20.68% 38,30 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00 
0.92% 2.46% 4.55 
3.23% 8.68% 16.07 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00 
0.57% 1.52% 2.81 
0.67% 1.81% 3.35 
0.22% 0.58% 1.07 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00 
0.00% 0.00 
0.59% 1.59% 2.95 
0.78% 2.10% 3.88 
3.61% 9.69% 17.95 
0.49% 1.30% 2,41 
9.14% 24.51% 45.40 
3.40% 9.11% 16.88 
1.19% 
3.18% 5.89 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00 
37.27% 100.00% 185.22 
0.00% 0.00 
0.30% 1.47 
0.00% 1 0.00 
0.00% 0.00 
0.00% 0.00 
4.18% 20.76 
2.53% 12.59 
0.00% 0.00 
7.25% 36.03 
9.32% 46.34 
23.58% 1 117.19 
4.96% 24.64 
0.00% 0.00 
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UAI 
UA2 
UZ 
ZZ 
ZZZ 
ZZZ 
ZZZ 
ZZZ 
ZZZ 
ZZZ 
Misc:Translinc/Deliveries 0.00 
Escort Abnormal Loads 0.00 
TOTAL MAN·HOURS (U): 46.00 
TOTAL MAN·HOURS: 927.75 
Man·hours in station: 600.00 
Paid overtime: 48.50 
Unpaid overtime: 12.50 
% IN STATION: 64.67 
% PAID OVERTIME: 5.23 
% UNPAID OVERTIME: 1.35 
0.00% 
0.00% 
4.96% 
100.00% 
64.67% 
5.23% 
1.35% 
0.00 
0.00 
24.64 
497.01 
Activity Analysis Results C.I.O (0/C/1 & 011) 
ACT CODE DESCRIP 
P02REP 
20102195 to 16107195 
All days selected 
Force: LINCOLNSHIRE 
Command unit: All 
Officers: DICII & DA 
Unit types: All 
Average 
Percentage Time per Day 
Percentage Percentage of Non·lncid. (mins) 
No of shifts: 52 TOTAL of Total Hrs of Incid. Hrs Hrs 
lA 
lAD 
IB 
IC 
ID 
lE 
IF 
IG 
M 
IHO 
IH1 
IH2 
11 
IJ 
IZ 
PA 
PAO 
PB 
PC 
PO 
PE 
PF 
PG 
PH 
PI 
PJ 
PJO 
PA 
PJ2 
PK 
PL 
PM 
PMO 
Deal with incident 2.25 
Travel to/from incident 1.50 
Enquiries 21.75 
Observation 11.25 
Searches 0.751 
Issue advicelwamingNDRSO.OO 
Interview detainees 0.00 
Dealing with detainees 2.25 
Paperwork 0.00 
Clerical- R.O.T.I. 0.00 
Clerical- Computer 3.50 
Clerical- other 35.25 
At court 0.00 
other incident linked 15.00 1 
TOTAL MAN·HOURS (1): 93.50 
Preventative patrol 1.00 
Prey. patrol- CarNan 0.75 
Briefings/meetings 65.00 
Relief station duties 0.00 
Court duties/escort 0.00 
Special operations/events 0.50 
Investigate complaints 3.75 
Dealing with informants 22.50 
Community involvement 0.00 
Property enquiries 0.00 
Enquiries (firearms,etc) 0.00 
Eng. - SummonsWarrants 0.00 
Eng. - Foreign Force 0.00 
Enq. - Other 6.75 
Crime prevention activity 3.00 
Prison interviews 0.25 1 
Paperwork - other 70.25 
Clerical Computer 6.75 
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0.48% 
0.32% 
4.63% 
2.39% 
0.16% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.48% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.74% 
7.50% 
0.00% 
3.19% 
19.88% 
0.21% 
0.16% 
13.82% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.11% 
0.80% 
4.78% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
1.44% 
0.64% 
0.05% 
14.94% 
1.44% 
2.41% 
1.60% 
23.26% 
12.03% 
0.80% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
2.41% 
0.00% 
0,00% 
3.74% 
37.70% 
0.00% 
16.04% 
100.00% 
0.54% 
0.41% 
35.37% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.27% 
2.04% 
12.24% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
3.67% 
1,63% 
0.14% 
38.23% 
3.67% 
2.60 
1.73 
25.10 
12.98 
0.87 
0.00 
0.00 
2.60 
0.00 
0.00 
4.04 
40.67 
0.00 
17.31 
107.88 
1.15 
0.87 
75.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.58 
4.33 
25.96 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
7.79 
3.46 
0.29 
81.06 
7.79 
PN other non incident linked 3.25 0.69% 1.77% 3.75 
PNO Kennel Duties 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 
PN1 Dog Training 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 
PZ TOTAL MAN-HOURS (P) 183.75 39.07% 100.00% 212.02 
SA Handover Procedures 0.00 0.00% 
S8 staff appraisalsldevelopt 9.75 2.07% 
SC Relief custody duties 0.00 0.00% 
SO Relief station/cntri sgt 0.00 0.00% 
SE Monnoring cell block 0.00 0.00% 
SF Conferences 38.00 8.08% 
SG Planning for known events 7.50 1.59% 
SH Identification parades 0.00 0.00% 
SI Checking paperwork 26.00 5.53% 
SJ other manageriaVsupervis 88.25 18.77% 
SZ TOTAL MAN-HOURS (S): 169.50 36.04% 
UA Refreshments 23.50 5.00% 
UM Clerical: Paperwork-Palrol 0.00 0.00% 
UAI Misc:TranslinclDeliveries 0.00 0.00% 
UA2 Escort Abnormal Loads 0.00 0.00% 
UZ TOTAL MAN-HOURS (U): 23.50 5.00% 
ZZ TOTAL MAN-HOURS: 470.25 100.00% 
ZZZ Man-hours in station: 325.25 
ZZZ Paid overtime: 0.00 
ZZZ Unpaid overtime: 9.75 
ZZZ % IN STATION: 69.17 
ZZZ % PAID OVERTIME: 0.00 
ZZZ %UNPAID OVERTIME: -2.07 
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ADDITIONAL QUESTIONNAIRE FQR IJNCOLNSBmE POUCE 
I. WHAT IS SUBJECTS CODE.................................................................... 1-3 
2. CURRENT RANK constable I 4 
sergeant 2 
inspector 3 
chief inspector 4 
superintendent 5 
3. GENDER male I 5 
female 2 
4. PRESENT POST uniform I 6 
c.i.d 2 
complaints and discipline 3 
drug squad 4 
regional crime squad 5 
drug enforcement team 6 
other ( specify) 7 
5. AGE 19-25 I 
26-35 2 
36-40 3 
41-50 4 
over 50 5 
6. HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN A HANDLER nJa 0 
less than I year I 
1-2yrs2 
3-5yrs3 
more than 6 yrs 4 
7. WHAT IS THE MAIN REASON YOU INVOLVE nJaO 
YOURSELF WITH INFORMERS excitement I 
detection of crime 2 
arrest of criminals 3 
enjoy dealing with criminals 4 
cost effective investigative tool 5 
other ( specify) 6 
7 
8 
9 
8. IF YOU DO NOT INVOLVE YOURSELF 
WITH HANDLERS, EXPLAIN WHY NOT 
nJa 0 10 
hassle I 
other (specify) 
not cut out for it 2 
not interested 3 
disagree morally 4 
not had the opportunity 5 
6 
9. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE ABOVE ANSWER (7 OR 8) IN DETAIL II 
......................................................................................................................... 
378 
EXTRACT FROM 1991 NATIONAL CENSUS 
Table 38 Single years of age Great Britain, England & Wales, England, regions of England, 
metropoli1an counties, Inner London, Outer London, 
regional remainders, Wales, Scotland 
38. Residents In households 
Age TOTAL TOTAL 
PERSONS Males Females Age PERSONS Males Females 
GREAT BRITAIN GREAT BRITAIN- continued 
ALL AGES 54,055,69326,231,998 27,823,697 
0 738,458 377,643 360,815 45 686,194 341,883344,311 
1 731,877 374,469 357.408 46 713,939 356,116357,823 
2 718,883 367,341 351,542 47 689,894 344,715345,179 
3 727,413 372,593 354,820 48 663,264 331,170332,094 
4 708,157 361,948 346,209 49 594,732 298,240298,492 
5 709,090 363,398 345,692 50 572.928 285,544287,384 
6 694,380 355,035 339,345 51 609,061 303,448305,613 
7 674,903 345,784 329,119 52 606,094 301,575304,519 
8 672,149 344,461 327,688 53 601,698 300,176301,520 
9 682,180 349,232 332.948 54 590,701 294,326298,375 
10 699,742 357.757 341,985 55 578,677 287,474291,203 
11 695,555 356,234 339,321 56 567,600 281,916285,684 
12 657,340 337,959 319,381 57 549,661 271,904 277,757 
13 617,066 316,272 300,794 58 556,931 274,678282,253 
14 618,988 317,772 301,216 59 567,802 278,702289,100 
15 646,573 331.768 314,805 60 578,405 280,690297,715 
16 677,595 347,989 329,626 61 566,261 272,695293,566 
17 690,839 352,288 338,551 62 557,553 268,014289,539 
18 722,673 366,638 356,035 63 544,122 260,931 283.191 
19 754,579 378,759 375,820 64 554,107 264,185289,922 
20 784,397 390,862 393,535 65 552,635 262,230 290,405 
21 774,751 383,842 390,909 66 537,729 250,944286,785 
22 802:852 393,605 409,247 67 536,062 247,277 288,785 
23 812,773 397,215 415,558 68 529,486 240,878 288,608 
24 840,057 411,130 428,927 69 552,059 248,521 303.538 
25 855,248 418,405 436,843 70 562,331 249,035313,298 
26 873,928 427,971 445,957 71 523,495 228,633294,862 
27 870,420 428,570 443,850 72 366,484 156,277 210,207 
28 861,094 2422 61 438,477 73 338,377 142,945195,432 
29 847,174 417,324 429,850 74 377,013 157,337219,676 
30 833,477 412,008 421,469 75 372,084 152,232219,852 
31 800,449 398,075 404,374 76 385,982 154,530231,452 
32 792,244 391,754 400,490 77 358,690 140,912217,778 
33 782,735 387,644 395,091 78 330,513 127,093203,420 
34 755,975 374,458 381,517 79 302,174 113,704188,470 
35 734,291 364,600 369,691 80 275,083 100,147174,936 
36 721.154 357,466 363,688 81 249,338 88,364 160,974 
37 730,516 361.846 368,670 82 224,460 76,712 147,748 
38 719,898 357,012 362,884 83 193,109 64,156128,953 
39 714,858 355,037 359,821 84 165,076 52,526 112,550 
40 726.523 360,762 365,761 85 139,678 43,020 98,658 
41 753,261 373,614 379,647 86 117,381 34,656 82,725 
42 780,527 388,158 392,369 87 94,728 26.899 67,829 
43 849,406 422,231 427,175 88 74,835 20,403 54,432 
44 883,428 440,545 442,883 89 58,546 15196 43,350 
90 and over 148,849 32916 115,913 
Distribution for over 18 years of age 
Male Female Total 
18-21 1,520,101 1,516,299 3,036,400 (7.3) 
22-28 2,897,513 3,018,859 5,916,372 (14.2) 
29-35 2,743,863 2,802,482 5,546,345 (13.3) 
36-42 2,553,895 2,592,840 5,146,735 (12.3) 
over 42 10,186,701 11,861,952 22,048,653 (52.9) 
Total 19,902,073 21,792,432 41,694,505 (100.00) 
(47.8%) (52.2%) 
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Extract from Statutory Instruments - 1985 No. 518 - Police 
The Police (Discipline) Regulations 1985 
Regulation 4(1) SCHEDULE 1 
DISCIPLINE CODE 
1. Discreditable conduct, which offence is committed where a member of 
a police force acts in a disorderfy manner or any manner prejudicial to 
discipline or reasonably likely to bring discredit on the reputation of the 
force or of the police service. 
2. Misconduct towards a member of a police force, which offence is 
committed where -
. (a) the conduct of a member of a police force towards another such 
member is oppressive or abusive, or 
(b) a member of a police force assaults another such member. 
3.Disobedience to orders, which offence is committed where a member 
of a police force, without good and sufficient cause -
(a) disobeys or neglects to carry out any lawful order, written or 
otherwise; 
(b) fails to comply with any requirement of a code of practice for the 
time being in force under section 60 or 66 of the Act of 1984; or 
(c) contravenes any provision of the Police Regulations containing 
restrictions on the private lives of members of police forces, or 
requiring him to notify the chief officer of police that he, or a relation 
included in his family, has a business interest within the meaning of 
those Regulations. 
4. Neglect of duty, which offence is committed where a member of a 
police force, without good and sufficient cause -
(a) neglects or omits to attend to or carry out with due promptitude and 
diligence anything which it is his duty as a member of a pOlice force 
to attend to or carry out, or 
(b) fails to work his beat in accordance with orders, or leaves the place 
of duty to which he has been ordered, or having left his place of duty 
for an authorised purpose fails to retum thereto without undue delay, 
or 
(c) is absent without leave from, or is late for, any duty, or 
(d) fails properly to account for, or to make a prompt and true 
380 . 
return of, any money or property received by him in the course 
of his duty. 
5. Falsehood or prevarication, which offence is committed where a 
member of a police force -
(a) knowingly or through neglect makes any false, misleading or 
inaccurate oral or written statement or entry in any record or 
document made, kept or required for police purposes, or 
(b) either wilfully and without proper authority or through lack of due 
care destroys or mutilates any record or document made, kept or 
required for police purposes, or 
(c) without good and sufficient cause alters or erases or adds to any 
entry in such a record or document, or 
(d) has knowingly or through neglect made any false, misleading or 
inaccurate statement in connection with his appointment to the 
police force. 
6. Improper disclosure of information, which offence is committed where 
a member of a police force -
(a) without proper authority communicates to any person, any 
information which he has in his possession as a member of a police 
force, or 
(b) makes any anonymous communication to any police authority, or 
any member of a police force, or 
(c) without proper authority, makes representations to the police 
authority or the council of any county or district comprised in the 
police area with regard to any matter concerning the force, or 
(d) canvasses any member of that authority or of such a council with 
regard to any such matter. 
For the purposes of this paragraph the Isles of Scilly shall be treated as 
if they were a county. 
7. Corrupt or improper practice, which offence is committed where a 
member of a pOlice force -
(a) in his capacity as a member of the force and without the consent of 
the chief officer of police or the police authority, directly or indirectly 
solicits or accepts any gratuity, present or subSCription, or 
(b) places himself under a pecuniary obligation to any person in such a 
manner as might affect his properly carrying, out his duties as a 
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member of the force, or 
(c) improperly uses, or attempts so to use, his position as a member of 
the force for his private advantage, or 
(d) in his capacity as a member of the force and without the consent of 
the chief officer of police, writes, signs or gives a testimonial of 
character or other recommendation with the object of obtaining 
employment for any person or of supporting an application for the 
grant of a licence of any kind. 
8. Abuse of authOrity, which offence is committed where a member of a 
police force treats any person with whom he may be brought into contact 
in the execution of his duty in an oppressive manner and, without 
prejudice to the foregoing, in particular where he -
(a) without good and sufficient cause conducts a search, or requires a 
person to submit to any test or procedure, or makes an arrest, or 
(b) uses any unnecessary violence towards any prisoner or any other 
person with whom he may be brought into contact in the execution 
of his duty, or improperly threatens any such person with violence, 
or 
(c) is abusive or uncivil to any member of the public. 
9. Racially discriminatory behaviour, which offence is committed (without 
prejudice to the commission of any other offence) where a member of a 
police force -
(a) while on duty, on the grounds of another person's colour, 
race, nationality or ethnic or national origins, acts towards that 
other person in any such way as is mentioned in paragraph 8 
(abuse of authority), or 
(b) in any other way, on any of those grounds, treats improperly a 
person with whom he may be brought into contact while on 
duty. 
10. Neglect of health, which offence is committed where a member of a 
police force, without good and sufficient cause, neglects to carry out any 
instructions of a medical officer appointed by the police authority, or 
while absent from duty on account of sickness, commits any act or 
adopts any conduct calculated to retard his retum to duty. 
11. Improper dress or untidiness, which offence is committed where 
without good and sufficient cause a member of a police force while on 
duty, or while off duty but wearing uniform in a public place, is 
improperly dressed or is untidy in his appearance. 
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12. Damage to police property, which offence is committed where a 
member of a police force -
(a) wilfully or through lack of due care causes any waste, loss or 
damage to any police property, or 
(b) fails to report as soon as is reasonably practicable any loss of or 
damage to any such property issued to, or used by him, or entrusted 
to his care. 
13. Drunkenness, which offence is committed where a member of a 
police force renders himself unfit through drink for duties which he is or 
will be required to perform or which he may reasonably foresee having 
to perform. 
14. Drinking on duty or soliciting drink, which offence is committed 
where a member of a pOlice force, while on duty -
(a) without proper authority, drinks, or receives from any other person, 
any intoxicating liquor, or 
(b) demands, or endeavours to persuade any other person to give him, 
or to purchase or obtain for him, any intoxicating liquor. 
15. Entering, licensed premises, which offence is committed where a 
member of a police force -
(a) while on duty, or 
(b) while off duty but wearing uniform, 
without good and sufficient cause, enters any premises in respect of 
which a licence or permit has been granted in pursuance of the law 
relating to liquor licensing or betting and gaming or regulating places of 
entertainment. 
16. Criminal conduct, which offence is committed where a member of a 
police force has been found guilty by a court of law of a criminal offence. 
17. Being an accessory to a disciplinary offence, which offence is 
committed where a member of a police force incites, connives at or is 
knowingly an accessory to any offence against discipline. 
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Registrar General's Classification of Occupation, 1970 
1. Higher ProfessionallManagerial 
2. Lower ProfessionallManagerial 
3. Trained manual 
4. Semi-skilled Manual 
5. Non-skilled 
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